2020 China Military Power Report - U.S. Department Of Defense
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of Chinai
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaMilitary and Security DevelopmentsInvolving the People’s Republic of China2020Annual Report to CongressA Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 2000, as AmendedSection 1260, “Modifications to Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, PublicLaw 116-92, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in bothclassified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republicof China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technologicaldevelopment of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinesesecurity strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational conceptssupporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United StatesChina engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report,including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy forsuch engagement and cooperation in the future.”
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaPREFACE:A 20 YEAR RETROSPECTIVE ON CHINA’SSTRATEGY AND ARMED FORCES
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaFor 20 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has provided Congress with an annual report onmilitary and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These reportshave assessed the contours of China’s national strategy, its approach to security and military affairs,and potential changes in the PRC’s armed forces over the next 20 years, among other matters. 2020marks an important year for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as it works to achieve importantmodernization milestones ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) broader goal to transformChina into a “moderately prosperous society” by the CCP’s centenary in 2021. As the United Statescontinues to respond to the growing strategic challenges posed by the PRC, 2020 offers a uniqueopportunity to assess both the continuity and changes that have taken place in the PRC’s strategy andarmed forces over the past two decades.DoD’s first annual report to Congress in 2000 assessed the PRC’s armed forces at that time to be asizable but mostly archaic military that was poorly suited to the CCP’s long-term ambitions. The reportrecognized the CCP’s objective was for the PRC to become a “strong, modernized, unified, andwealthy nation.” Despite these great power aspirations, the PLA lacked the capabilities, organization,and readiness for modern warfare. Yet the CCP understood these deficiencies and set long-term goalsto strengthen and transform its armed forces in a manner commensurate with its aspirations tostrengthen and transform China.DoD’s 2000 report assessed that the PLA was slowly and unevenly adapting to the trends in modernwarfare. The PLA’s force structure and capabilities focused largely on waging large-scale land warfarealong China’s borders. The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Itsconventional missiles were generally of short range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cybercapabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and itsnominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day. Further, China’s defenseindustry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modernweapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. Thereport assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressedthey would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.”Two decades later, the PLA’s objective is to become a “world-class” military by the end of 2049—agoal first announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017. Although the CCP has not defined whata “world-class” military means, within the context of the PRC’s national strategy it is likely that Beijingwill seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or in some cases superior to—the U.S.military, or that of any other great power that the PRC views as a threat. As this year’s report details,the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades tostrengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect. Indeed, as this report shows, China isalready ahead of the United States in certain areas such as:i
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force ofapproximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants. Incomparison, the U.S. Navy’s battle force is approximately 293 ships as of early 2020. Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has more than 1,250 groundlaunched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with rangesbetween 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventionalGLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs. Integrated air defense systems: The PRC has one of the world’s largest forces of advanced longrange surface-to-air systems—including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domestically producedsystems—that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated air defense systemarchitecture.More striking than the PLA’s staggering amounts of new military hardware are the recent sweepingefforts taken by CCP leaders that include completely restructuring the PLA into a force better suitedfor joint operations, improving the PLA’s overall combat readiness, encouraging the PLA to embracenew operational concepts, and expanding the PRC’s overseas military footprint.Despite the PLA’s progress over the past 20 years, major gaps and shortcomings remain. The PRC’sleaders are aware of these problems, and their strategy envisions the PLA undergoing almost 30 moreyears of modernization and reform. Of course, the CCP does not intend for the PLA to be merely ashowpiece of China’s modernity or to keep it focused solely on regional threats. As this report shows,the CCP desires the PLA to become a practical instrument of its statecraft with an active role inadvancing the PRC’s foreign policy, particularly with respect to the PRC’s increasingly global interestsand its aims to revise aspects of the international order.Given the continuity in the PRC’s strategic objectives, the past 20 years offer a harbinger for the futurecourse of the PRC’s national strategy and military aspirations. Certainly, many factors will determinehow this course unfolds. What is certain is that the CCP has a strategic end state that it is workingtowards, which if achieved and its accompanying military modernization left unaddressed, will haveserious implications for U.S. national interests and the security of the international rules-based order.Report scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the end of 2019.Developments in 2020, including the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, will be covered in DoD’s 2021 report.ii
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaEXECUTIVE SUMMARYiv
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaUNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGYChina’s National Strategy The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) strategy aims to achieve “the great rejuvenation of theChinese nation” by 2049. China’s strategy can be characterized as a determined pursuit of politicaland social modernity that includes far-ranging efforts to expand China’s national power, perfectits governance systems, and revise the international order. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frames this strategy as an effort to realize long-heldnationalist aspirations to “return” China to a position of strength, prosperity, and leadership onthe world stage. The CCP’s leadership has long viewed China as embroiled in a major international strategiccompetition with other states, including, and in particular, the United States. In 2019, China intensified its efforts to advance its overall development including steadying itseconomic growth, strengthening its armed forces, and taking a more active role in global affairs.Foreign Policy The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to revise aspects of the international order on the Party’s termsand in accordance with ideas and principles it views as essential to forging an external environmentconducive to China’s national rejuvenation. In 2019, the PRC recognized that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing itsforeign policy, highlighting the increasingly global character that Beijing ascribes to its militarypower.Economic Policy The CCP prioritizes economic development as the “central task” and the force that drives China’smodernization across all areas, including its armed forces. China’s economic development supports its military modernization not only by providing themeans for larger defense budgets, but through deliberate Party-led initiatives such as OBOR andMade in China 2025, as well as the systemic benefits of China’s growing national industrial andtechnological base.Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy The PRC pursues its MCF Development Strategy to “fuse” its economic and social developmentstrategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilitiesin support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.v
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China MCF encompasses six interrelated efforts: (1) fusing the China’s defense industrial base and itscivilian technology and industrial base; (2) integrating and leveraging science and technologyinnovations across military and civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending military andcivilian expertise and knowledge; (4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure andleveraging civilian construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service and logisticscapabilities for military purposes; and, (6) expanding and deepening China’s national defensemobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its society and economy for use incompetition and war. While MCF has broader purposes than acquiring foreign technology, in practice, MCF meansthere is not a clear line between the PRC’s civilian and military economies, raising due diligencecosts for U.S. and global entities that do not desire to contribute to the PRC’s militarymodernization.Defense Policy & Military Strategy The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and developmentinterests. China’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense.” In 2019, the PLA remained primarily oriented towards longstanding regional threats whileemphasizing a greater global role for itself in accordance with China’s defense policy and militarystrategy. China’s leaders stress the imperative of meeting key military transformation markers set in 2020and 2035. These milestones seek to align the PLA’s transformation with China’s overall nationalmodernization so that by the end of 2049, China will field a “world-class” military. The CCP has not defined what it means by its ambition to have a “world-class” military. Withinthe context of China’s national strategy, however, it is likely that China will aim to develop amilitary by mid-century that is equal to—or in some cases superior to—the U.S. military, or thatof any other great power that China views as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and developmentinterests.MISSIONS, TASKS, & MODERNIZATION OF CHINA’S ARMED FORCES INTHE “NEW ERA” The PRC’s strategy includes advancing a comprehensive military modernization program that aimsto “basically” complete military modernization by 2035 and transform the PLA into a “worldclass” military by the end of 2049. The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to counteran intervention by an adversary in the Indo-Pacific region and project power globally.vi
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China In 2019, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fieldingmodern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct jointoperations. China has already achieved parity with—or even exceeded—the United States in several militarymodernization areas, including:–Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force ofapproximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants. Incomparison, the U.S. Navy’s battle force is approximately 293 ships as of early 2020. Chinais the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage and is increasing its shipbuildingcapacity and capability for all naval classes.–Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has developed itsconventional missile forces unrestrained by any international agreements. The PRC has morethan 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles(GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fieldsone type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.–Integrated air defense systems: The PRC has one of the world’s largest forces of advancedlong-range surface-to-air systems—including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domesticallyproduced systems—that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated air defensesystem (IADS) architecture.Developments in the PLA’s Modernization and Reform The People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) is the largest standing ground force in the world.In 2019, the PLAA continued to transition into a modern, mobile, and lethal ground force byfielding upgraded combat systems and communications equipment and enhancing its ability toconduct and manage complex combined-arms and joint operations. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—the largest navy in the world—is anincreasingly modern and flexible force that has focused on replacing previous generations ofplatforms with limited capabilities in favor of larger, modern multi-role combatants. As of 2019,the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, antiair, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.–Naval Shipbuilding and Modernization: The PLAN remains engaged in a robustshipbuilding and modernization program that includes submarines, surface combatants,amphibious warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and auxiliary ships as well as developing andfielding advanced weapons, sensors, and command and control capabilities.vii
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitutethe largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,500 totalaircraft and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Westernair forces across a broad range of capabilities and competencies. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is responsible for the PRC’s strategicland-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. The PLARF develops and fields a wide varietyof conventional mobile ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The PRC isdeveloping new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve itsnuclear-capable missile forces. The number of warheads on the PRC’s land-based ICBMs capableof threatening the United States is expected to grow to roughly 200 in the next five years.– The PRC is expanding its inventory of the multi-role DF-26, a mobile, ground-launchedintermediate-range ballistic missile system capable of rapidly swapping conventional andnuclear warheads.– The PRC’s robust ground-based conventional missile forces compliment the growingsize and capabilities of its air- and sea-based precision strike capabilities. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization establishedto centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions andcapabilities. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for cyberwarfare, technicalreconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. Its current major target is theUnited States.–The PRC’s Space Enterprise. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly.Beijing has devoted significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, frommilitary space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches,scientific endeavors, and space exploration.–The PLA has historically managed the PRC’s space program. The SSF Space SystemsDepartment is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations.–In 2019, the PRC described space as a “critical domain in international strategiccompetition” and stated the security of space provided strategic assurance to the country’snational and social development.Military Readiness: In recent years, CCP leaders have directed the PLA to improve its combatreadiness. This guidance is increasingly evident in the intensity of the PLA’s training and thecomplexity and scale of its exercises.viii
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaCapabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, ifordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwancontingency. The PLA’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are currently the most robust within theFirst Island Chain, although the PRC aims to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into thePacific Ocean. The PRC also continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global securityobjectives beyond a Taiwan contingency. The PLA is developing the capabilities and operational concepts to conduct offensive operationswithin the Second Island Chain, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in some cases, globally. Inaddition to strike, air and missile defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilitiesimprovements, China is focusing on information, cyber, and space and counterspace operations.Nuclear Deterren
a “world-class” military means, within the context of the PRC’s national strategy it is likely that Beijing will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or in some cases superior to—the U.S. military, or that of any other great power that the PRC views as a threat. As this year’s report details,
WEI Yi-min, China XU Ming-gang, China YANG Jian-chang, China ZHAO Chun-jiang, China ZHAO Ming, China Members Associate Executive Editor-in-Chief LU Wen-ru, China Michael T. Clegg, USA BAI You-lu, China BI Yang, China BIAN Xin-min, China CAI Hui-yi, China CAI Xue-peng, China CAI Zu-cong,
Navy This branch of our nation’s armed services conducts military operations at sea, world-wide. According to the Department of Defense, its focus is “maintaining the freedom of the seas, deterring aggression, and achieving victory at war.” Like the Air Force, the Navy has many aircraft to assist with protecting the seas.File Size: 959KBPage Count: 12Explore furtherUnderstanding the 5 Branches of US Military - US Militaryusmilitary.comBasic Branches of the United States Armylibarts.hamptonu.eduU.S. National Military Chain-of-Commanddde.carlisle.army.milArmy Branches Military Science - SOU Homeinside.sou.eduWhat Are the Branches of the US Military? Military.comwww.military.comRecommended to you b
Supersedes: AFI36-2608, 26 October 2015 Certified by: SAF/MR (Mr. John A. Fedrigo) Pages: 140 This instruction implements Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1336.08, Military Human Resource Records Life Cycle Management, and is consistent with DAFPD 36-25, Military Promotion and Demotion. It applies to all military and civilian members of .File Size: 1MBPage Count: 176Explore furtherAFI 36-2608 Military Personnel Records System Air Force .www.airforcecounseling.comAFI 36-2608 Military Personnel Records System Air Force .www.airforcecounseling.comAFI 36-2608 - MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS SYSTEMS .standards.globalspec.comAIR FORCE - AFI 36-2608 - MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS .standards.globalspec.comAIR FORCE - AFI 36-2608 - MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS .standards.globalspec.comRecommended to you based on what's popular Feedback
Since the end of the Cold War, China has also abandoned its decades-old total war doctrine by embracing a limited war doc-trine, which is more suitable for its new political aims. Second, though China is a major power in North and Southeast Asia, the time is not yet ripe for it to be a global military power that can project its military capability beyond its nearby seas. China’s most recent .
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of military moves. The short duration of military assignments, coupled with lengthy relicensing processes, can discourage military spouses from seeking relicensure, causing them to quit an occupation or causing military families to leave the military. From 2011 to 2016, the Department worked with all 50 States through common methods used by
