GAO-19-118, Accessible Version, DEFENSE LOGISTICS: Actions .
United States Government Accountability OfficeReport to Congressional CommitteesNovember 2018DEFENSELOGISTICSActions Needed toEnhance the Securityof High-RiskAmmunition atStorage LocationsAccessible VersionGAO-19-118
November 2018DEFENSE LOGISTICSActions Needed to Enhance the Security of High-RiskAmmunition at Storage LocationsHighlights of GAO-19-118, a report tocongressional committeesWhy GAO Did This StudyWhat GAO FoundDOD maintains stockpiles ofammunition for use during operations,including SRC I ammunition. SRC Iammunition requires a high level ofprotection and security due to its abilityto cause extreme damage or lethality.Military service guidance for safeguarding Security Risk Category (SRC) Iammunition—which consists of nonnuclear, portable missiles and rockets in aready-to-fire configuration—is not consistent with all of the Department ofDefense’s (DOD) minimum requirements. For example, DOD’s guidancerequires at least 8 hours of backup power for intrusion detection systems, but theArmy, Navy, and Air Force guidance requires only 4 hours. The Army and Navyhave drafted updates to their guidance to be consistent with DOD requirementsand planned to issue revised guidance by or before the end fiscal year 2018.Marine Corps and Air Force officials told GAO they also plan to revise theirguidance to be consistent with DOD requirements.Senate Report 114-255 (2016),included a provision that GAO evaluatehow DOD and the military serviceshave established and maintainedphysical security measures at DODlocations with SRC I ammunition.GAO’s report evaluates the extent towhich (1) military service guidance isconsistent with DOD’s requirements forsafeguarding SRC I ammunition and(2) the military services have identifiedand resolved physical securitydeficiencies at selected locations thatstore SRC I ammunition. GAOreviewed DOD guidance, visitedselected military locations that werechosen based on size and variety ofSRC I inventory, and interviewedofficials. GAO also analyzed securityinspection reports from 2014 to 2017.This is a public version of a sensitivereport that GAO issued in September2018. Information that DOD deemedsensitive has been omitted.What GAO RecommendsGAO is making five recommendations,including that the Army, Navy, andMarine Corps take actions to ensuretheir physical security inspections oflocations that store SRC I ammunitionare completed in accordance withpolicy, and that DOD revise itsguidance to require that the servicesestablish a process to consistentlydocument the resolution of all identifiedphysical security deficiencies. DODconcurred with all fiverecommendations.View GAO-19-118. For more information,contact Diana Maurer at (202) 512-9627 ormaurerd@gao.gov.Examples of Physical Security Requirements for Ammunition StorageThe military services have conducted inspections of the physical security atlocations with SRC I ammunition that GAO reviewed, and have identified securitydeficiencies. However, GAO is not identifying examples of deficiencies in thisreport because DOD deemed such information sensitive. GAO determined thatsome inspections were not conducted on time in accordance with military serviceguidance. For example, GAO reviewed 125 Army, Navy, and Marine Corpsinspection reports from select locations and found that 54 inspections (or 43percent) were late by 1 day to 14 months. These services have not taken actionsto help ensure that physical security inspections are being conducted on time.Without taking actions to help achieve the services’ requirements for timelyinspections—such as assigning roles and responsibilities for monitoring—theservices are at greater risk of compromising the security of SRC I ammunition.In addition, it is unknown whether the military services have resolved all securitydeficiencies because the services do not consistently document resolutions. Forexample, only 3 of 14 Army locations provided documentation about howidentified physical security deficiencies were resolved. DOD guidance does notrequire such documentation, and therefore GAO could not determine whether 29of the 35 selected locations reviewed across the services had consistentlyresolved all identified deficiencies and, if so, what steps were taken to do so.Revising DOD guidance to ensure that the military services establish a processfor documenting the resolution of all identified security deficiencies would helpthe services further reduce the risk of loss or theft of SRC I ammunition.United States Government Accountability Office
ContentsLetter1BackgroundMilitary Service Guidance on Safeguarding Ammunition Is NotConsistent with DOD Requirements, but the Services HavePlans to Update Their GuidanceMilitary Services Have Identified Physical Security Deficiencies atSelect SRC I Ammunition Storage Locations, but It Is UnknownWhether All Deficiencies Have Been ResolvedConclusionsRecommendations for Executive ActionAgency Comments4813222324Appendix I: Selected Examples of Security Risk Category I Ammunition26Appendix II: Scope and Methodology28Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense33Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments37GAO ContactStaff Acknowledgments3737Appendix V: Accessible Data38Agency Comment Letter38TablesTable 1: Department of Defense (DOD) Policies and Regulationsand Military Service Regulations and Guidance onPhysical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives,Including Security Risk Category I AmmunitionTable 2: Examples of Department of Defense (DOD) PhysicalSecurity Requirements for Arms, Ammunition andExplosives (AA&E), Including Security Risk Category(SRC) I AmmunitionPage i57GAO-19-118 Defense Logistics
FiguresFigure 1: Examples of Department of Defense (DOD) PhysicalSecurity Requirements for Security Risk Category IAmmunitionFigure 2: Selected Examples of Security Risk Category IAmmunitionFigure 2: Selected Examples of Security Risk Category IAmmunition Continued82627AbbreviationsAA&EArms, Ammunition, and ExplosivesDODDepartment of DefenseSRCSecurity Risk CategoryThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in theUnited States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entiretywithout further permission from GAO. However, because this work may containcopyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may benecessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.Page iiGAO-19-118 Defense Logistics
441 G St. N.W.Washington, DC 20548LetterNovember 5, 2018The Honorable James M. InhofeChairmanThe Honorable Jack ReedRanking MemberCommittee on Armed ServicesUnited States SenateThe Honorable Mac ThornberryChairmanThe Honorable Adam SmithRanking MemberCommittee on Armed ServicesHouse of RepresentativesThe Department of Defense (DOD) manages a stockpile of sensitiveconventional ammunition including ammunition identified as Security RiskCategory (SRC) I, which is nonnuclear, portable missiles and rockets in aready-to-fire configuration.1 SRC I ammunition can destroy aircraft in flightand pierce armor; therefore, the department requires a higher level ofprotection and security for SRC I ammunition than that provided for theother categories of conventional ammunition.2 Examples of SRC Iammunition include: Stinger and Javelin missiles, the 66-mm Light AntiTank Weapon, and the M136 Anti-Armor Weapon.3Senate Report 114-255 (2016), accompanying S.2943, a bill for theNational Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, includes aprovision that we evaluate the extent to which DOD and the militaryservices, in accordance with policies and procedures, have established1Conventional ammunition is an end item, a complete round, or a materiel componentcharged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition for use inconnection with defense or offense as well as ammunition used for training, ceremonial, ornon-operational purposes. It is not nuclear, biological, or chemical.2SRC designation is based on the ammunition’s utility, casualty or damage effect,adaptability, and portability. SRC I ammunition is highly explosive, extremely damaging orlethal, easy to employ without use of other systems, and easily carried by one person;thus, it is accorded a category I designation.3See appendix I, figure 2, for photographs and descriptions of selected SRC I ammunition.Page 1GAO-19-118 Defense Logistics
Letterand maintained physical security measures at DOD and contractorlocations with SRC I ammunition. It also includes a provision that weevaluate the extent to which identified security measures differ betweenselected DOD depot and retail locations, as well as selected contractorlocations.4 In our report, we evaluated the extent to which the (1) militaryservices’ guidance is consistent with DOD’s requirements forsafeguarding SRC I ammunition and (2) the military services haveidentified and resolved physical security deficiencies at selected locationswithin the continental United States.This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued inSeptember 2018. DOD deemed some of the information in ourSeptember report to be sensitive, which must be protected from publicdisclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information about thespecific quantity of SRC I ammunition items at DOD installations locatedin the continental United States and about specific examples of identifiedphysical security deficiencies. This report addresses the same objectivesas the sensitive report and uses the same methodology.To determine the extent to which the military services’ guidance isconsistent with DOD’s requirements for safeguarding SRC I ammunition,we reviewed and compared Department of Defense Manual 5100.76,Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, andExplosives (AA&E), (April 17, 2012) and military service guidance thatoutlines specific physical security requirements for SRC I ammunition inthe continental United States. We reviewed and compared all DOD andmilitary service published and draft guidance. Also, we interviewedcognizant officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense forIntelligence and each of the military services, which have responsibilitiesfor promulgating guidance, to gain an understanding of DOD’s and theservices’ physical security standards and criteria for SRC I ammunition,and implementation of these standards at ammunition storage locationsthroughout the continental United States. We visited 6 military servicelocations—including military service installations and ammunition supplypoints—and 1 contractor location with a current production contract forSRC I missiles. We selected these locations based on the size of SRC I4Depot locations include military sites that are responsible, among other things, forshipping, storing, and maintaining ammunition. Retail locations include military serviceinstallations, bases, and ammunition supply points. Contractor locations include areas—through contracts with the DOD components—where arms, ammunition, and/or explosivesare manufactured, retrofitted, modified, or developed.Page 2GAO-19-118 Defense Logistics
Letterinventory, the variety of SRC I ammunition being stored, and thegeographic features of the location. At these locations, we observedimplemented security measures and discussed with knowledgeableofficials how they safeguard SRC I ammunition.To determine the extent to which the military services have identified andresolved physical security deficiencies at selected locations within thecontinental United States, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 35service locations that had SRC I ammunition as of May 31, 2017 (for theNavy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) and as of June 20, 2017 (for theArmy), which coincided with the timing of our audit work. We requestedeach location’s physical security inspection reports from calendar years2014 to 2017, corrective action documentation, and other relevantinformation.5 We selected this timeframe to provide multiple years ofreports to review and analyze. We selected these 35 military servicelocations, which included the 6 locations we visited, based on the size ofSRC I inventory, service, the geographic site of the service location, andthe mission of or type of service location. In total, we received 178physical security inspection reports. We analyzed these reports todetermine whether the military services were meeting service guidancerequirements in effect from 2014 to 2017, such as whether the locationsconducted the inspections in accordance with the timeframe set forth intheir guidance, and included required information. In addition, weinterviewed physical security officials at all but one of the 35 locations, todiscuss, if applicable, why the inspections were not conducted on timeand the process for correcting deficiencies identified during theinspections.6 Also, we determined whether the military services’ physicalsecurity efforts were consistent with federal internal control standards thatstate management should (1) evaluate performance and hold individualsaccountable for their responsibilities and (2) establish and operatemonitoring activities, including documenting the results of ongoing5We use the term “inspections” even though the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force usethe term “survey” in their guidance. The Navy stores ammunition onboard ships. Office ofthe Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5530.13C, Department of the Navy PhysicalSecurity Instruction for Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) includesphysical security requirements for ammunition onboard ships. However, DOD Manual5100.76 does not apply to ammunition stored aboard a United States Naval Ship or UnitedStates Ship. Therefore, we did not include physical security inspections conductedonboard naval ships in the scope of our review.6We were unable to interview physical security officials at one location in our nongeneralizable sample due to scheduling conflicts.Page 3GAO-19-118 Defense Logistics
Lettermonitoring.7 While the results of our sample cannot be generalized, theyprovide valuable insights based on a mix of locations in terms of theservices, geographic dispersion, size of inventory, and mission types.Appendix II describes our scope and methodology in greater detail.We conducted this performance audit from September 2016 toSeptember 2018 in accordance with generally accepted governmentauditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform theaudit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonablebasis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Webelieve that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for ourfindings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We subsequentlyworked with DOD in October 2018 to revise the original sensitive reportso it could be issued to the public. This public version was also preparedin accordance with these standards.BackgroundPolicy and Guidance for Physical Security of SRC IAmmunitionDOD has issued department-wide guidance on the physical security ofsensitive conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E),including SRC I ammunition. DOD Manual 5100.76, Physical Security ofSensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E),directs DOD components—including the military services—that possessAA&E to implement the procedures in the manual and to developsupplemental guidance to protect AA&E. DOD policies establish therequirement for continuous program and policy oversight to ensureprotection of AA&E within DOD. DOD components—including the militaryservices—are responsible for developing and implementing security plansand policies that include security measures for all AA&E under theircontrol. Further, DOD policies require SRC I ammunition to have a higherlevel of protection and security than that provided for SRC II through SRC7GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2014).Page 4GAO-19-118 Defense Logistics
LetterIV conventional ammunition.8 Table 1 shows DOD’s and the militaryservices’ policies and guidance for protecting SRC I ammunition.Table 1: Department of Defense (DOD) Policies and Regulations and Military Service Regulations and Guidance on PhysicalSecurity of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, Including Security Risk Category I AmmunitionComponentDOD policies and regulations and military service regulations and guidanceDODDOD Instruction 5100.76, Safeguarding Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)(February 28, 2014).DOD Manual 5100.76, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives(AA&E) (April 17, 2012).ArmyArmy Regulation 190-11, Military Police: Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (September5, 2013).Army Regulation 190-13, Military Police: The Army Physical Security Program (February 25, 2011).Army Regulation 190-51, Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) (September30, 1993).Army Pamphlet 190-51, Risk Analysis for Army Property (September 30, 1993).NavyOffice of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5530.13C, Department of the Navy Physical SecurityInstruction for Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) (September 26, 2003).Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5530.14E, Navy Physical Security and Law EnforcementProgram (November 20, 2017) (change transmittal 3, November 20, 2017).Marine CorpsMarine Corps Order 5530.14A, Marine Corps Physical Security Program Manual (June 5, 2009).Air ForceAir Force Instruction 31-101, Integrated Defense (July 5, 2017).Source: DOD policies, regulations, and guidance. GAO-19-118Overview of Key Stakeholders Responsible for PhysicalSecurity of SRC I AmmunitionThe Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence has responsibility fordeveloping DOD guidance establishing the minimum physical securitystandards for safeguarding AA&E and facilities that maintain AA&Estocks, including specific requirements for SRC I. In addition, theUndersecretary of Defense for Intelligence is responsible for establishing8The SRC identification process supports the minimum security requirements toadequately protect identified ammunition. Also, the SRC designation is based on theammunition’s utility, casualty or damage effect, adaptability, and portability. Examples ofSRC II include: missiles and rockets that are crew-served or require platform-mountedlaunchers; grenades and mines; and light automatic weapons. Examples of SRC IIIinclude: missiles and rockets that require platform-mounted launchers and complexhardware and software equipment to function; blasting caps and bulk explosives; andsilencers and mufflers weapons components. Examples of SRC IV include ammunitionwith non-explosive projectile, riot control agents, and handguns.Page 5GAO-19-118 Defense Logistics
Letterpolicies, standards, and procedures governing the physical security ofAA&E and for their effective and uniform implementation.The heads of DOD components oversee compliance with existing AA&Esecurity policies and develop physical security programs that implementprocesses and procedures to assess and evaluate appropriate securitymeasures. Within each military service, the following individual or officehas been assigned responsibility for establishing physical securityprograms for AA&E:·the Army’s Provost Marshal General;·the Chief of Naval Operations’ Special Assistant for NavalInvestigative Matters9;·the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, andOperations; and·the Air Force’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,Engineering and Force Protection, Directorate of Security Forces.According to military service ammunition data, the Army, Navy, MarineCorps, and Air Force store SRC I missiles and rockets in the continentalUnited States.Conventional AA&E in the custody of contractor-owned facilities, includingSRC I ammunition,
Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, Including Security Risk Category I Ammunition 5 Table 2: Examples of Department of Defense (DOD) Physical Security Requirements for Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E), Including Security Risk Category (SRC) I Ammunition 7 . Letter\t1. Background\t4
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