Terrorism And Social Media: Global Evidence

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Munich Personal RePEc ArchiveTerrorism and social media: globalevidenceAsongu, Simplice and Orim, Stella-Maris and Nting, RexonJanuary 2019Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101094/MPRA Paper No. 101094, posted 13 Jun 2020 12:19 UTC

A G D I Working PaperWP/19/026Terrorism and social media: global evidenceForthcoming: Journal of Global Information Technology ManagementSimplice A. AsonguAfrican Governance and Development Institute,P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon.E-mails: asongusimplice@yahoo.com, asongus@afridev.orgStella-Maris I. OrimSchool of Engineering, Environment and Computing,Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry CV1 5DH, UKE-mail: S.Orim@coventry.ac.ukRexon T. NtingUniversity of Wales, Trinity Saint David Winchester House,11 Cranmmer Road, London, UK, SW9 6EJ.Emails: rexon.nting@uwtsd.ac.uk /rexonting@hotmail.com1

2019 African Governance and Development InstituteWP/19/026Research DepartmentTerrorism and social media: global evidenceSimplice A. Asongu, Stella-Maris I. Orim & Rexon T. NtingJanuary 2019AbstractThe study assesses the relationship between terrorism and social media from a cross section of148 countries with data for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary LeastSquares, Negative Binomial and Quantile regressions. The main finding is that there is apositive relationship between social media in terms of Facebook penetration and terrorism.The positive relationship is driven by below-median quantiles of terrorism. In other words,countries in which existing levels of terrorism are low are more significantly associated with apositive Facebook-terrorism nexus. The established positive relationship is confirmed fromother externalities of terrorism: terrorism fatalities, terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries andterrorism-related property damages. The terrorism externalities are constituents of thecomposite dependent variable.JEL Classification: D83; O30; D74Keywords: Social Media; Terrorism2

1. IntroductionThe positioning of this study builds on three main tendencies in scholarly and policy-makingcircles, notably: (i) the growing challenge of terrorism across the world, (ii) the policyconcern of social media in fuelling violence and terrorism and (iii) gaps in the literature1.These points are substantiated in chronological order.First of all, terrorism is a growing challenge to the prosperity of nations. It is importantto note that, terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Accordingly, recent geopolitical events such as the 2011 ArabSpring have increased externalities of weak and failed states such civil war and terrorismacross the Middle East, Africa and Asia (GTI, 2014; Asongu et al., 2018a). As we shallsubstantiate below, even developed countries have been experiencing the negativeexternalities of this terrorism phenomenon. To put this point into more perspective, Libya inthe post-Gaddafi era has become a failed state owing to inter alia: various rebel factionsfighting to have control over the country and determine the laws in the country in order tochart a post-conflict course of economic development. The narrative maintains that Yemen isalso a failed State reflecting the same characteristics because the fragile politico-economicand social situation of the country is being fuelled by wars that are fought by moretechnically-advanced countries with geopolitical objectives (Asongu et al., 2018a). Forinstance, Saudi Arabia and Iran are backing antagonistic elements behind the fragile politicalsituation in Yemen. The political stalemate in Syria has resulted in considerable negativeconsequences for neighbouring countries (e.g. Lebanon and Iraq), especially with the rise andfall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). According to the narrative, in Africa,the Boko Haram in Nigeria has been causing social turmoil in the country as well as inneighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad (Solomon, 2017; Asongu &Biekpe, 2018).More developed countries have not been immune to the recent waves of terroristattacks because of a number of notable incidences, which include: the aborted 2015 attacks inVerviers, Belgium; the Australian-Sydney crisis in December 2014; the February 2015 attacksin Australia; the “Charlie Hebdo” 2015 incidence in Paris, the November 2015 attacks inFrance and the July 2015 attacks at the “Promenade des Anglais” in Nice and the stream ofattacks in Great Britain (22nd of March 2017 Westminster attack, 22nd of May 20171Social media and Facebook are used interchangeably throughout the study because of data availabilityconstraints in the other social media indicators.3

Manchester Arena bombing, 3rd of June 2017 London attack, 19th of June Finsbury ParkAttack and 15th of September London tube train attack). Among possible determinants ofterrorism, social media has been documented as a mechanism by which recruitments ofterrorists and propaganda of terrorism is channelled (Gates & Podder, 2015).Second, there is no consensus in the literature on the policy concerns surrounding therole of social media in fuelling terrorism. This is essentially because one strand of theliterature is of the position that social media accelerates political instability and violence(Dreyfuss, 2017a; Browning, 2018; Patton et al., 2014; Storrod & Densley, 2017; Bejan,2018; Dean, Bell & Newman, 2012; Taylor, Fritsch & Liederbach, 2014). Conversely, acontending strand maintains that social media can be employed to reduce violence andpolitical polarization (Barberá, 2015; Parkyn, 2017). Concerning the former framework, thepositive incidence of social media on the 2011 Arab Spring has been documented byWolfsfeld et al. (2013) while Bastos et al. (2015) have established the connection betweenprotests and social media. With regard to the contending strand, Barberá (2015) hasestablished that social media can increase political harmonization which is susceptible ofdecreasing political anger that can fuel terrorism. Furthermore, the strand of the literature isalso supported with the position that unrests can be reduced through collaborative andnetworking mechanisms (Parkyn, 2017). The narrative maintains that social media canprovide a good platform on which discussions between rebel factions can take place in orderto assuage externalities such as political instability and terrorism. Surprisingly, as apparentfrom Section 2 and further perusal of the existing studies, empirical literature on the relevanceof social media on terrorism is sparse.Third, the highlighted gap in the literature is apparent because social media is arelatively new phenomenon. According to attendant narratives, the importance of social mediahas not been given the necessary scholarly attention. The sparse empirical literature istraceable to constraints in data availability. This is essentially because, there are only fivemacroeconomic empirical studies using Facebook penetration as a measure of social media.Jha and Sarangi (2017) have investigated how Facebook penetration influences corruption.The effect of Facebook penetration on natural resource governance has been examined byKodila-Tedika (2018) whereas Jha and Kodila-Tedika (2018) have assessed if democracy isdriven by Facebook penetration. Asongu and Odhiambo (2019a, 2019b) have assessed therelationships between social media, governance and tourism.Noticeably from the above, this study adds to the recent strand of studies ondevelopment consequences of social media by exploiting the new dataset in order to assess4

the nexus between Facebook penetration and terrorism. The positioning also responds torecent policy concerns on the sparse documentation of the consequences of social media(World Bank, 2016). Moreover, exploratory discourses on the relevance of social media interrorism have not been backed with empirical validity (Patrikarakos, 2017). Hence, this studycontributes to the terrorism literature by putting some empirical validity to discourses in orderto establish whether the purported positive nexus between terrorism and social mediawithstands empirical scrutiny. The attendant research question is the following: what is therelationship between social media and terrorism?In order to provide an answer to the underlying research question, the study uses across section of 148 countries with data for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based onOrdinary Least Squares, Negative Binomial and Quantile regressions. The main finding is thatthere is a positive relationship between Facebook penetration and terrorism. The positiverelationship is driven by below-median quantiles of terrorism. In other words, countries inwhich existing levels of terrorism are low are more significantly associated with a positiveFacebook-terrorism nexus. The established positive relationship is confirmed from otherexternalities of terrorism: terrorism fatalities, terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries andterrorism-related property damages.The inquiry is positioned as an applied research study because the intuition forassessing the nexus between social media and terrorism is sound, given that informationtechnology can be used to organise and coordinate terrorism activities. In essence, appliedresearch is not exclusively based on the acceptance or rejection of existing theories, but couldprovide the basis for theory-building. Hence, this study is consistent with the extant literaturein arguing that applied research that is based on sound intuition is a useful scientific activity(Costantini & Lupi, 2005 ; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016).The positioning of the study on the nexus between social media and terrorism alsodeparts from contemporary global information technology management literature which hasfocused on inter alia: the importance of globalisation in patterns of information technology(Lee & Joshi, 2016); differences in the diffusion of social media across cultures (Khan &Dongping, 2017); patterns of combined usage of information technology and innovation inEurope (Billon et al., 2017); cultural practices and virtual social network diffusion (Krishnanet al., 2016); progress in the international hyperlink network (Barnett et al., 2016); youth civicengagement behaviour on social media (Warren et al., 2016; Montgomery & Xenos, 2008;Valenzuela et al., 2012); linkages between information technology, information sharing andinclusive development (Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017; Asongu & Boateng, 2018; Bongomin et al.,5

2018 ; Gosavi, 2018; Humbani & Wiese, 2018; Isszhaku et al., 2018; Minkoua Nzie et al.,2018; Muthinja & Chipeta, 2018; Abor et al., 2018; Tchamyou, 2019; Tchamyou et al., 2019)and determinants of information technology in developing countries (Asongu et al., 2018b).The rest of the study is structured as follows. A review of existing literature is coveredin Section 2 while the data and methodology are disclosed in Section 3. Section 4 presents theempirical results while Section 5 concludes with implications and future research directions.2. Review of existing literature2.1 Drivers and deterrents of terrorismThe terrorism literature has failed to engage the dimension of social media as a driverof terrorism. As summarized in Table 1, the surveyed literature has failed to engage theelement of social media, probably because of data availability constraints. The surveyedliterature is expanded in four main strands, namely: (i) foreign aid and policy; (ii) democracy,civil liberties and state failure; (iii) welfare and foreign occupation and (iv) militaryexpenditure.First, with regard to the nexus between policy and terrorism, Savun and Phillips(2009) have investigated why countries that are associated with better democratic values aremore likely to be affected by transnational terrorism. The authors have concluded that, therelationship depends on the behaviour of the country. They maintain that, irrespective of thetype of regime (i.e. democratic versus autocratic regimes), if political systems are moreconcerned with international politics, they are equally more likely to be vulnerable totransnational terrorism. This is not the case with countries that pursue isolationist projects.The nexus between refugees, humanitarian aid and terrorism have been assessed by Choi andSalehyan (2014) who have established that “no good deed goes unpunished”. The findingbuilds on the evidence provided which support the perspective that aid allocations enable theelite in militant factions to loot and corrupt: incidences which provide opportunities forforeign interest in a country to be targeted and attacked by terrorists. In another studypublished the same year, Button (2014) used the mechanisms of “interstate rivalry” in theexamination of why the use of development assistance for counterterrorism purposes does notwork in all circumstances. The author maintains that when foreign aid from the United Statesof America (USA) is sent to recipients who are associated with interstate rivalry, theunderlying recipients also in turn employ development assistance as an instrument of waragainst their rivals. Hence, the foreign aid intended to be used in fighting terrorism is not usedaccordingly, but invested to ensure victory in interstate wars.6

Button and Carter (2014) have shown that the connection between foreign aid andtransnational terrorism is contingent on whether terrorism in the country receiving foreign aidthreatens the interest of the USA or not. The authors have concluded that allocation ofdevelopment assistance from the USA is more directly to countries in which the interests ofthe USA are likely to be targeted by terrorists. Eng and Urperlainen (2015) have establishedthat, while for the purpose of credibility, considerable rewards are promised by donors, thesedonors equally promise severe sanctions that are often out of proportion. The authors also findthat the underlying rewards and sanctions cannot be simultaneously engaged unless suchactions are supported by domestic interest groups. Asongu and Ssozi (2017) have establishedthat foreign aid is most effective in the fight against terrorism in nations where existing levelsof terrorism are highest.The second strand focuses on civil liberties, democracy and state failure. Within thisframework, Lee (2013) has examined the nexus between democracy, hostage-taking and civilliberties in order to provide insights into how types of governments are linked to terrorism.The study is based on the premise that terrorism-motivated hostage-taking has a higherpropensity to be associated with governments that are democratic because much emphasis isplaced on personal freedom and human values.The relationship between “military and economic development assistance from theUnited States” and the rise of anti-American terrorism is investigated by Gries et al. (2015)who conclude that terrorism-related anti-American sentiments are fuelled by a combination ofdependence (i.e. economic and military reliance) and local repression. No evidence is foundto support the view that development assistance from the USA helps in making the USAsafer. Coggins (2015) assesses if state failure causes terrorism to establish that, failed andfailing states are substantially not associated with higher levels of terrorism. However, nationsthat are collapsing politically and in a state of war, are linked with higher incidences ofterrorism. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) have shown that terrorism affects governancedynamics (political, economic and institutional components) whereas Asongu et al. (2018a)have concluded that good governance mechanisms (especially political stability) can be usedto effectively fight terrorism.7

Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countriesVariablesGlobal Terrorism (Ln)Terrorism incidents(Ln)Terrorism fatalities(Ln)Terrorism injuries(Ln)Terrorism-related propertydamages(Ln)Facebook PenetrationAccess to WeaponsViolent CrimeConflict IntensityPolitical InstabilityPanel A: Summary statisticsMeanStandard dev. 0001Panel B: Sampled countries (148)“Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain;Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria;Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China;Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Denmark;Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia;Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras;Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya;Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar;Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco;Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman;Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of theCongo; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia;Somalia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Tajikistan; Tanzania;Thailand; The Gambia; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; UnitedArab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemenand Zambia”.Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.Appendix 3: Correlation 0WeaponsCrimeConf. InternPol. Inst.FacebookTerror incidentsTerror FatalitiesTerror InjuriesTerror Prop. DGlobal TerrorismWeapon: Access to weapons. Crime: Violent crime. Pol. Inst: Political Instability. Facebook: Facebook Penetration. Terror Prop. D:Terror-related Property Damages.29

19682008Recipients ofUSA foreign aidduration and countmodelsInternationalterrorismUSA foreign aidEffective whenrecipient state donot haveconflictingprioritiesButton & Carter(2014)19702007USA and USAalliesNon-contemporaryregressionsGlobal andtransnationalterrorismsUSA foreign aidEffective whenUSA interest arethreatenedChoi & Salehyan(2014)19702007154 Countriesnegative binomialregression and tobitDomestic andtransnationalInfusion of aidresourcesCountries withmore refugees8

modelterrorismexperience moreterrorismCollard-Wexler etal. (2014)1980200874 foreign stateoccupationsNaïve and Hardeningmechanisms modelsbased on Pape’s theoryof occupationSuicide attacksin dance of foreignmilitary interventionsto mitigate suicideattacks in countriesexperiencing militaryinterventions.Foreignoccupationsincreases suicideattacksEnders et al.(2014)19702010UndisclosedTerrorism Lorenzcurve and nonlinearDomestic andtransitionalterrorismReal GDP per capitaTerrorism moreconcentrated inmiddle-incomecountriessmooth transitionregressionsBrockhoff et al.(2015)19842007133 countriesTwo-step decreasesterrorismespecially whensocio-economicconditions arebetterCoggins (2015)19992008155 countriesGEE1 sticperpetrator,internationallocation andinternationalperpetratorterrorisms.Stages of failed statesAvoidance offailed states inwar or politicalcollapseGries et al. (2015)19842008126 countriesNegative BinomialRegression andSystem GMMAnti-USAterrorismUSA aid dependenceUSA aiddependence fuelsAnti-USAterrorism1984200878 developingcountriesQuantile regressionsdomestic,transnational,unclear andtotal terrorismdynamicsBilateral, Multilateraland Total aidAid is effective inthe highestquantile oftransnationalterrorism19812005138 Countriesnegative binomialmaximum-likelihoodregression modelSuicide attacksin e of foreignmilitary interventionsto mitigate suicideattacks in countriesexperiencing militaryinterventions.Certain features ofpro-governmentinterventionincrease suicideattacks incountriesexperiencemilitaryinterventionsAsongu & Ssozi(2017)Choi & Piazza(2017)Asongu &Nwachukwu(2018a)1984200878 developingcountriesGMM (Roodman)Domestic &TransnationalCatch-up for policyharmonizationAsongu et al.(2019)1998201253 AfricancountriesGMM (Roodman)Domestic,transitional,unclear andtotal terrorismdynamicsPolitical stability,“voice ory quality,corruption-controland the rule of law13.34-19.92 yearsfor domesticterrorism and24.67-27.88 yearsfor transnationalterrorismAll the engagedgovernanceinstrumentsnegatively affectterrorismGMM: Generalized Method of Moments.The third strand focuses on papers that have investigated the relationship betweenterrorism and welfare. Kieger and Meirrieks (2010) in this strand have assessed therelationship between terrorism and welfare capitalism in the world. The authors have9

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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countriesVariablesGlobal Terrorism (Ln)Terrorism incidents(Ln)Terrorism fatalities(Ln)Terrorism injuries(Ln)Terrorism-related propertydamages(Ln)Facebook PenetrationAccess to WeaponsViolent CrimeConflict IntensityPolitical InstabilityPanel A: Summary statisticsMeanStandard dev. 0001Panel B: Sampled countries (148)“Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain;Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria;Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China;Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Denmark;Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia;Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras;Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya;Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar;Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco;Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman;Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of theCongo; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia;Somalia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Tajikistan; Tanzania;Thailand; The Gambia; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; UnitedArab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemenand Zambia”.Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.Appendix 3: Correlation 0WeaponsCrimeConf. InternPol. Inst.FacebookTerror incidentsTerror FatalitiesTerror InjuriesTerror Prop. DGlobal TerrorismWeapon: Access to weapons. Crime: Violent crime. Pol. Inst: Political Instability. Facebook: Facebook Penetration. Terror Prop. D:Terror-related Property Damages.29

externalities of terrorism: terrorism fatalities, terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries and terrorism-related property damages. The inquiry is positioned as an applied research study because the intuition for assessing the nexus between social media and terrorism is sound, given that information

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