Conflict And Diplomacy In The Middle East
ED IT ED B YYA N N IS A . ST IVA C HTISConflict andDiplomacy inthe Middle EastExternal Actors and Regional Rivalries
Conflict andDiplomacy inthe Middle EastExternal Actors and RegionalRivalriesED IT ED BYYA N N IS A. ST IVAC H TISi
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ivAbstractThe Middle East’s geographical and strategic uniqueness has made everygreat power in history to seek to advance its interests in the region. Yet, theregion constitutes the greatest single reserve of oil in the world, which hasmade it a regular source of foreign interference in the post-World War II era.In addition to its geographical and strategic uniqueness, the Middle East isthe birthplace and spiritual center of the three most important monotheisticreligions, namely Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Due to its geopoliticalimportance, any inter- and intra-state conflict in the Middle East has thepotential not only for destabilizing the region as a whole or upsetting theregional balance of power but also affecting global stability. For thesereasons, the Middle East has been a major center of world affairs; aneconomically, politically, and culturally sensitive area.This volume provides an account of international relations in thecontemporary Middle East. After employing the Regional Security ComplexTheory (RSCT) in order to define and delimit the region of the Middle East,individual chapters are dedicated to addressing the question of regional order,examining how regionalism and globalism feature in Middle Easternintegration processes, exploring regional bids for hegemony, and investigatingthe approaches and policies of major international actors, such as the UnitedStates, Russia, China, the European Union and the United Nations.
vEditorYannis A. Stivachtis is an Associate Professor of Political Science at VirginiaPolytechnic Institute & State University, USA.ContributorsJonathan Cristol is a Research Fellow at the Levermore Global ScholarsProgram, Adelphi University (NY) and Senior Fellow at the Center for CivicEngagement, Bard College (NY), USA.Xi Chen is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University ofTexas Rio Grande Valley, USA.Ali G. Dizboni is an Associate Professor at the Department of PoliticalScience, Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC).Onur Erpul is a Fulbright Scholar and PhD candidate in InternationalRelations at Florida International University, USA.Stefanie Georgakis Abbott is Assistant Director of Presidential Studies atthe Miller Center, University of Virginia, USA.Spyridon N. Litsas is an Associate Professor of International Relations atthe University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece.Allison Miller is a PhD Candidate in Globalization and Governance at theSchool for Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Virginia PolytechnicInstitute & State University, USA.Sofwat Omar is a Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science,Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC).Ayşegül Sever is a Professor of International Relations at MarmaraUniversity, Istanbul, Turkey.
viConflict and Diplomacy in the Middle EastContentsINTRODUCTIONYannis A. Stivachtis1.GLOBALISM, REGIONALISM AND THE MIDDLE EASTAyşegül Sever1162.THE CHALLENGES TO MIDDLE EASTERN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY:A STUDY IN DISORDEROnur Erpul323.UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THECOLD WARJonathan Cristol484.RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER PUTIN:CAN BEARS WALK IN THE DESERT?Spyridon N. Litsas645.CHINA IN THE POST-HEGEMONIC MIDDLE EAST: A WARY DRAGON?Xi Chen786.THE EU AND THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM THE EURO-MEDITERRANEANPARTNERSHIP TO THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEANStefanie Georgakis Abbott937.THE EU AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOODPOLICY (ENP)Yannis A. Stivachtis1108.THE UNITED NATIONS AND MIDDLE EASTERN SECURITYAllison Miller9.128HEGEMONIC ASPIRATIONS AND MIDDLE EAST DISCORD: THE CASEOF IRANAli G. Dizboni & Sofwat Omar144NOTE ON INDEXING 166
1Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle EastIntroductionYA N N IS A. ST IVAC H TISThe Middle East occupies a unique geographical and strategic position.Hence, it is not a coincidence that every great power in history has sought toadvance its interests in the region. In addition to its geographical andstrategic uniqueness, the Middle East is the birthplace and spiritual center ofthe three most important monotheistic religions, namely Christianity, Judaismand Islam, as well as the greatest single reserve of oil. Last, but not least, dueto its geopolitical importance, any inter- and intra-state conflict in the MiddleEast has the potential not only of destabilizing the region as a whole orupsetting the regional balance of power but also affecting global stability. Forthese reasons, the Middle East has been a major center of world affairs; aneconomically, politically, and culturally sensitive area. The purpose of thisvolume is to provide an account of international relations in the contemporaryMiddle East. To address the question of regional order, attention will focus onthe policies of external actors – such as the United States (US), Russia,China, the European Union, and the United Nations – as well as on regionalhegemonic aspirations and resulting rivalries.Defining and Delimiting the Middle East as a RegionNo unanimity exists on a definition of the Middle East – even the name of theregion has not been universally accepted. For the purpose of this volume, thedefinition of the Middle East region will be based on Barry Buzan’s RegionalSecurity Complex Theory (RSCT) that was introduced in the first edition ofPeople, States and Fear (1983, 105–15). RSCT provides a theoreticaljustification for constructing world regions based on the degree of enmity andamity existing among states. Updates to the theory were presented in Buzan(1991, chapter 5 and 2016, chapter 5), while a revised version of RSCT waspresented by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde in 1998 and byBuzan and Wæver in 2003.Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)A more traditional way to define a region is with reference to the balance of
Introduction2power theory. However, to define a region, the principal element that Buzanhas added to power relations among states is the pattern of amity and enmityexisting among them (Buzan 1991, 189). ‘Amity’ refers to inter-staterelationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectation of protection orsupport. ‘Enmity’, on the other hand, refers to inter-state relationships conditioned by suspicion and fear.The balance of power theory would consider the patterns of amity and enmityas a product of the balance of power, with states shifting their alignments inaccordance with the dictates of movements in the distribution of power.However, Buzan has correctly pointed out that the historical dynamic of amityand enmity is only partly related to the balance of power, and that where it isrelated, it is much more durable than the relatively fluid movement of thedistribution of power (Buzan 1991, 190). Moreover, patterns of amity andenmity arise from a variety of issues ranging from border disputes andideological alignments to longstanding historical links – whether positive ornegative – and which could not be predicted from a simple consideration ofthe distribution of power (Buzan 1991, 190). Enmity can be particularlydurable when it acquires a historical character between peoples, as it hasbetween the Arabs and the Israelis or the Iranians and the Iraqis. Consequently, the two patterns, namely power relations and enmity/amity, shouldbe considered as distinct factors.Patterns of amity and enmity among states can, therefore, be used to define aregion by focusing on their security relations. The term ‘security complex’ isused by Buzan to label the resulting formations. A security complex is definedas “a group of states whose primary security concerns link togethersufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically beconsidered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991, 190). Thus, the term‘security complex’ indicates both the character of the attribute that defines theset (security), and the notion of intense interdependence that distinguishesany particular set from its neighbors. Security complexes emphasize theinterdependence of rivalry, as well as that of shared interests.Working from the perspective of securitization, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver andJaap de Wilde have sought to revise Buzan’s original definition of securitycomplexes. In doing so, they have still maintained that security interdependence is markedly more intense among the units inside such complexes thanwith units outside them and that security complexes are about the relativeintensities of security relations that lead to distinctive regional patternsshaped both by distribution of power and relations of amity and enmity. Thedifference is that they have now defined a security complex,
3Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle Eastas a set of units whose major processes of securitization,desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their securityproblems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apartfrom one another (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 201).Merging and applying the above two definitions, the Middle East securitycomplex can be defined as a group of states whose primary securityconcerns, resulting from their processes of securitization, desecuritization, orboth are so interlinked that their security problems cannot realistically beconsidered, analyzed or resolved apart from one another.The idea of security complexes is an empirical phenomenon with historicaland geopolitical roots. Security complexes are also generated by theinteraction of anarchy and geography. The political structure of anarchyconfronts all states with the power-security dilemma, but security interdependence is powerfully mediated by the effects of geography. Because threatsoperate more potently over short distances, security interactions with states inclose proximity tend to have first priority. However, geographical proximity oreven sharing of borders do not necessarily imply the presence of strongsecurity interdependence among states. For example, security interdependence between Iran and Israel is much stronger than Iran’s securityinterdependence with Pakistan, which indicates that Iran and Pakistan belongto different security complexes.The task of identifying a security complex requires making judgements aboutthe relative strength of patterns of amity and enmity and consequently ofsecurity interdependence among different countries. In some places, patternsof amity and enmity are very strong while in others they are relatively weak. Insome places the interdependence can be positive, as between Jordan andEgypt – while in others negative, as between Israel and Iran. Usually, securitycomplexes will arise from local relationships, but when outside actors areinvolved a set of states can be bound together in response to this intrusion.For example, US support for Israel has often brought Arab states together inopposition.A security complex exists where a set of security relationships stands out byvirtue of its relative strong, inward-looking character, and the relativeweakness of its outward security interactions with its neighbors (Buzan 1991,193). In other words, security interdependence will be more strongly focusedamong the members of the set than they are between the members andoutside states. For example, the strong security links between Israel andSyria put these two countries clearly within the same security complex, whilethe relatively weak links between Iran and Pakistan suggest that these two
Introduction4states belong to two different security complexes.The principal factor defining a complex is usually a high level of threat andfear, which is felt mutually among two or more states. The Arab–Israeli andthe Iranian–Israeli cases clearly show the extent to which neighboring localdynamics are conditioned by the security rhetoric of the states towards eachother, by their military deployments, and by the record of their conflicts. Onthe other hand, the relationship between Egypt and Jordan indicates that ahigh level of trust and friendship can also serve as a binding force. This isbecause security interdependence can be positive as well as negative.Power relations and patterns of amity and enmity among states constitute thebasis for assessing whether a regional security complex exists. But are thereany additional factors that could serve to define regional security complexes?Additional Factors Determining the Composition of Regional SecurityComplexesCultural, religious, racial and ethnic ties may also constitute a factor inidentifying security complexes since shared cultural characteristics among agroup of states would cause them both to pay more attention to each other ingeneral, and to legitimize mutual interventions in each other’s security affairsin particular. For example, it is not difficult to see how ethnicity (Arab) andreligion (Islam) have facilitated and legitimized security interdependenceamong a large group of states in the Middle East.Ethno-cultural thinking underlies much traditional historical analysis. Thisfactor is particularly clear in the Middle East where the idea of an Arab nation,and the trans-national political force of Islam combine to create a potentregional political realm. Arab nationalism and Islam weaken the identity of thelocal states, legitimize an unusually high degree of security inter-penetrationand stimulate a marked propensity to establish regional organizations (theArab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council,and the Maghreb Group). They also play a major part in defining the mainnodes of conflict in the region centered on two non-Arab states embeddedwithin it (Israel and Iran) one of which is not Islamic and the other is therepresentative of Islam’s principal schism. Although cultural, religious, racialand ethnic ties may be important contributing factors in defining the shapeand structure of regional security complexes, they nevertheless come secondto the patterns of amity and enmity which is the principal defining factor.Another way in which security complexes can be identified is with reference tothe role of economic factors. Usually, in looking for the set of states that
5Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle Eastconstitute security complexes, one is primarily concerned with the military,political and societal dimensions of security. The reason for which thesesectors are the most relevant to the patterns of threat and amity/enmity thatdefine the set is because economic relations are not nearly so muchconditioned by geographical proximity, as are the military, political andsocietal ones. Consequently, the problem of economic security is likely tohave a quite different relational dynamic from that of military, societal andpolitical security. In most world regions, where local political and militaryinterdependence is strong, economic relations follow a much more wideranging pattern that has little to do with the region. Under such conditions, theeconomic security of regional states does not depend primarily on theirrelationship with the other states within the same complex.Economic factors, however, do play a role determining both the power ofstates within their local security complexes and their domestic stability andcohesion as actors. They may also play an important role in motivating thepatterns of external interest in the local complex as in the case of the US andthe oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Yet, they can affect theprospects for regional integration, which can influence and determine how agiven security complex evolves. Therefore, economic factors need to betaken into account in defining or analyzing a security complex. However, as inthe case of the cultural, religious, racial and ethnic ties, economic factorscome second to the patterns of amity and enmity which is the principaldefining factor.The Composition and Boundaries of Regional Security ComplexesBuzan (1991, 195) draws a distinction between a ‘lower’ and a ‘higher-level’security complex. A lower level complex is composed of local states whosepower does not extend much beyond the range of their immediate neighborsor states with which are in a relatively close proximity. A higher-level securitycomplex, by contrast, includes great powers whose capabilities extend farbeyond their immediate environment and whose power is sufficient to impingeon several regions. Consequently, the active involvement of Russia and theUS in the Middle East reflects the existence of a high-level security complex.Security complexes will often include a number of small states. For example,despite their size the small Gulf States are members of the Middle Eastsecurity complex. Due to their relative low power in comparison with theirneighbors, these states may have little impact on the structure of thecomplex. Moreover, the security of small states is intimately bound up in thepattern of relations among larger states, but they can only become a sourceof threat to a larger state by virtue of the impact of their alignments on
Introduction6relations among the larger powers. The position of Lebanon in the MiddleEast security complex is illustrative as the influence of Iran over that countryconstitutes a central feature of the Iranian–Israeli security relationship.Another question that has been raised by Buzan is whether regional securitycomplexes are exclusive or overlapping. Although David Lake and PatrickMorgan (1997) have argued that security complexes can have overlappingmembership, Buzan and Wæver (2003, 48) have taken the position thatregional security complexe
1. globalism, regionalism and the middle east ayşegül sever 16 2. the challenges to middle eastern international society: a study in disorder onur erpul 32 3. united states foreign policy in the middle east after the cold war jonathan cristol 48 4. russian foreign policy in the middle east under putin: can bears walk in the desert?
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