FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Validation Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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Cryptosec 2048Realia Technologies S.L. (Realsec)http://www.realsec.com/FIPS 140-2 Level 3 ValidationNon-Proprietary Security Policy Copyright 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.

INDEX123INTRODUCTION . 41.1Purpose . 41.2References . 41.3Document Organization. 4CRYPTOSEC 2048 . 52.1Overview. 52.2Module Interfaces . 62.3Roles and Services . 72.3.1Crypto-Officer Role . 72.3.2User Role. 82.3.3Unauthenticated Services. 102.4Finite State Machine Model . 102.5Physical Security. 102.6Operational Environment. 112.7Key Management . 112.7.1Key Storage & Protection . 112.7.2Key Generation . 122.7.3Key Import and Export. 122.7.4Key Zeroization . 132.7.5Random Number Generator . 132.8EMI/EMC . 132.9SELF TESTING . 132.10DESIGN ASSURANCE . 142.11MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS . 14SECURE OPERATION OF THE CRYPTOSEC 2048. 153.1Secure administration . 153.1.1Initialization . 153.1.2Management . 153.1.3Termination. 163.2Secure operation. 16 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 2 of 19

4FIPS 140-2 MODE OF OPERATION . 174.15Security Functions . 174.1.1Approved Security Functions. 174.1.2Non-Approved Security Functions . 17GLOSSARY OF TERMS. 19 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 3 of 19

1INTRODUCTION1.1 PurposeThis is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cryptosec 2048cryptographic accelerator from Realia Technologies S.L. This security policy describes howthe Cryptosec 2048 meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to run the modulein a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2validation of the module.FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — SecurityRequirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements forcryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validationprogram is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/.1.2 ReferencesThis document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical termsof a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on themodule from the following sources: The Realia Technologies S.L. website, http://www.realsec.com/, contains informationon the full line of products from Realia Technologies S.L. The NIST Validated Modules website, http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/cryptval/, containscontact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. Technical or sales-related questions can also be sent to info@realsec.com.1.3 Document OrganizationThe Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. Inaddition to this document, the Submission Package contains: Realia Technologies S.L. Vendor Evidence document. Finite State Machine. Module Source Code Listing. Hardware Schematics. Crypto Officer/User Guides. Other supporting documentation as additional references.With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 ValidationDocumentation is proprietary to Realia Technologies S.L. and is releasable only underappropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contactRealia Technologies S.L. 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 4 of 19

2CRYPTOSEC 20482.1 OverviewThe Cryptosec 2048 is a high-end PCI cryptographic accelerator card that providescryptographic services and secure storage of cryptographic keys. The module is built toperform cryptographic processing and features a tamper-protective case to physically protectsensitive information contained within the card.The Cryptosec 2048 supports the following algorithms approved for use in a FIPS mode ofoperation: RSA key generation, signature generation/verification, and key wrapping. DES (only to be used in legacy systems) and TDES (2-key and 3-key) generation,encryption and decryption. In many cases below, the Security Policy refers to “DES”as the cryptographic services provided in FIPS PUB 46-3, that includes the DEA andTDEA, commonly referred to as DES and TDES. Unless explicitly stated, DES shouldimply both algorithms defined FIPS PUB 46-3. SHA-1 hashing.The Cryptosec 2048 also supports the following algorithms for use in a non-FIPS mode ofoperation: RSA encryption/decryption. MD5 hashing. RIPEMD hashing.The Cryptosec 2048 product design, development, test and production has satisfied therequirements to ensure a secure product. Security has been the focus of the developmentteam, and the Cryptosec 2048 product has been designed from the ground up to incorporatesecurity in all design and development steps. 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 5 of 19

The Cryptosec 2048, Hardware Model 1.0, firmware version 01.04.0010 is tested to meet theFIPS 140-2 security requirements for the levels shown in the following table. The overallmodule is tested FIPS 140-2 Security Level 3.FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements1. Cryptographic Module Specification2. Module Ports and Interfaces3. Roles, Services, and Authentication4. Finite State Model5. Physical Security6. Operational Environment7. Cryptographic Key Management8. EMI / EMC9. Self Tests10. Design Assurance11. Mitigation of Other AttacksSection Level33333N/A3333N/ACryptosec 2048 is comprised of the module itself and the supplied software drivers outsidemodule boundary to access the functionality of the product. A special serial cable is alsoincluded.2.2 Module InterfacesThe Cryptosec 2048 is classified as a multi-chip embedded module for FIPS 140-2 purposes.The FIPS 140-2 cryptographic boundary is defined by the perimeter of the protection covers.The battery system (battery clips, auxiliary battery connector), DB-15 power supply pin, powersupply relay, the DB-15 connector and the buzzer are excluded from the security requirementsof FIPS 140-2. The module is accessible only through well-defined interfaces.The physical interfaces of the Cryptosec 2048 are: PCI port, buzzer (unused, disabled byfirmware), RS-232 port, I2C port (unused, disabled by firmware), DB-15 power supply pin andbattery system.All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, asdescribed in the following table:Module Physical InterfacePCI, RS-232PCI, RS-232PCIPCIPCI, battery system and DB-15 power supply pinFIPS 140-2 Logical InterfaceData Input InterfaceData Output InterfaceControl Input InterfaceStatus Output InterfacePower InterfaceAll sensitive information that is entered to the module in plaintext form (like authentication data,cryptographic key components and cryptographic key component check values) is enteredthrough the RS-232 port. All sensitive information that leaves the module in plaintext form (likecryptographic key components and cryptographic key component check values) is outputthrough the RS-232 port. A trusted VT-100 or VT-100-like system must be connected to thatport. 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 6 of 19

2.3 Roles and ServicesThe Cryptosec 2048 performs identity-based authentication. Operators are identified by ausername and authenticated by a password. The role of an operator is assigned when theoperator is created.The strength of the authentication mechanism with 255 possible characters with repetition and8a minimum of a 8-character password is 1 in 17,878,103,347,812,890,625 (255 ). The moduledelays a replay for five seconds when an incorrect password is entered. After three incorrectentries the session is closed and must be reestablished.The status of the module can be viewed from two registers on the PCI bus. When using thesupplied software drivers to access the module, the status is returned as the function callreturn value.The roles supported by the module are two: Superuser (or Crypto-Officer) and User. TheSuperuser is a normal User with administrative privileges. There are unauthenticated servicesthat do not provide any security functionality, those services are available to all roles.2.3.1Crypto-Officer RoleThe following table summarizes the services available only to superusers:ServiceCreate UserDelete UserSet time anddateLoad workkeyRetrievework key’sCVWork keyexistsLoad backup keyDescriptionInitializes a newUserErases an existingUserAdjusts themodule’s RTCLoads the workkey. (Not used inFIPS mode)Computes thework key’s CV(Not used in FIPSmode)Checks work keyexistence (Notused in FIPSmode)Loads themodule’s back-upkeyInputOutputCSPType ofAccessto CSPUser’s ID, User’s passwordStatusUser’s passwordWriteSession ID and User’s IDStatusWork keyWriteUsers’ passwordReadSession ID and time anddate infoSession ID, number ofcustodians, work keycomponents, users’ ID andpasswordStatusStatusSession IDStatus and CVSession IDStatus and keyexistenceSession ID, number ofcustodians, users’ ID andpasswordSession ID, number ofcustodians, users’ ID andpasswordReadWork keyReadBack-up keyWriteUsers’ passwordReadStatus and back-upkey componentsBack-up keyReadUsers’ passwordReadBack-up keyReadStatusGet back-upkeyRetrieves theback-up keyRetrieveback-upkey’s CVComputes theback-up key’s CVSession IDStatus and CVCreate backupCreat es amodule’s back-upSession IDStatus and Back-updataRestoreback-upRestores amodule’s back-upSession ID and Back-updataStatusResetfirmwareClears theprogram memoryLoads a licensefile (Not used inSession IDStatusSession ID and LicensedataStatusLoad licenseWork keyEvery CSP apartform back-up keyand work keyEvery CSP apartform back-up keyand work keyEvery CSP 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.ReadWriteLostPage 7 of 19

ServiceGeneratelicense infofileDescriptionFIPS mode)Generates alicense informationfile (Not used inFIPS mode)2.3.2InputOutputSession IDStatus and licensedataCSPType ofAccessto CSPCSPType ofAccessto CSPUser’s passwordReadPrivate keyWritePrivate keyReadUser RoleThe following table summarizes the services available to any User:ServiceDescriptionClose sessionForces the executionof the power-up testsLogs an operator andcreates a session IDCloses a sessionRSA keygenerationGenerates a RSA keypairPower-up TestCreate sessionRSA keygeneration andno storeRSA keygeneration, nostore andcipherRSA privateRSA publicGet public keyGenerates a RSA keypair and exports itGenerates a RSA keypair and exports it inVIS formatPerforms a RSAprivate encryptionPerforms a RSApublic encryptionRetrieves a publickeyInputOutputSession IDStatusSession ID NULLSession IDSession ID, publicexponent andmodulus lengthSession ID, publicexponent andmodulus lengthSession ID, publicexponent, moduluslength and theexporting key IDSession ID, key ID,dataSession ID, key ID,dataStatus and SessionIDStatusStatus and key IDStatus and key dataStatus and cipheredkey dataStatus andencrypted dataStatus andencrypted dataSession ID and key ID Status and key dataRetrieves a privatekeySession ID and key ID Status and key dataWrite privatekeyLoads a private keySession ID and keydataErase RSA keyDeletes a User’s RSAkeySession ID and key ID StatusList RSA keysReturns the User’sRSA key IDsSession IDStatus and key IDlistGet usersReturns the users’ IDSession IDStatus and User infoSet passwordSets a new User’spasswordSession ID and newpasswordStatusRandom24Returns a 24-bitrandom numberSession IDStatus and dataGet date andtimeReads the module’sRTCSession IDStatus and RTCdataHash finishTerminates a hashsession and returnsthe hash valueSession IDStatus and hashvalueGet private keyPrivate keyReadTransport keyReadPrivate keyStatus and key IdWriteTransport keyUser’s DES keyReadReadPrivate keyLostPrivate keyReadUser’s passwordWrite 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 8 of 19

ServiceDescriptionInputOutputDelete DES keyDeletes a User’s DESkeySession ID and key ID StatusCSPType ofAccessto CSPDES keyLostReturns User’s DESGet DES key ID key Ids and theirlengthSession IDStatus and key IDlist and lengthsDES keyReadGet DES keypartsReturns a User ‘sDES key in n partsSession ID, key IDand number ofcustodiansStatus and keycomponentsDES keyReadGet DES keycipherReturns a User’sDES key cipheredSession ID, DES keyIDStatus and key dataGet CV DESkeyComputes a User’sDES key’s CVSession ID, DES keyIDStatus and CVLoad DES keypartsLoads a DES key in npartsSession ID, number ofcustodians and users’ID and passwordStatus and key IDGet CVtransport keyComputes thetransport key’s CVSession IDGet transportkeyReturns a User ‘stransport key in npartsSession ID andnumber of custodiansLoad transportkeyLoads the User’stransport keyDerivate DESkeyBCHU configDatabGenerate DESkeyGet DES keycipheredIV valuesPerforms the VISAkey diversificationalgorithmConfigures thesymmetric cipheringand hashing unitControls traffic to andfrom the symmetricunitGenerates a DES keyReturns a User’sDES key cipheredwith another User’sDES keyReturns the chainvalues of the activeDES operationSession ID, number ofcustodians and keycomponentsSession ID, Derivationkey, Export key andderivation dataDES keyReadTransport keyReadDES keyReadDES keyWriteUsers’ passwordReadStatus and key’s CVTransport keyReadStatus and keycomponentsTransport keyReadStatusTransport keyWriteDerivation keyReadExport keyReadDES keyWriteStatusSession ID and configdataStatusSession IDStatusSession ID and keylengthStatusSession ID, cipheringkey ID and exportedkey IDStatus and cipheredkeySession IDStatus and chainvaluesExported keyLoad DES keylist partsSimilar to Load DESkey parts, but with nkeysSession ID, number ofcustodians, keys’lengths and users’ IDand passwordStatus and key IDsWrite privatekey CB2000 Imports a private keyin CB2000 formatSession ID and keyinfoStatus and key IDSession IDStatusSession IDStatus and numberof licensesSession IDStatus and numberof licensesSession IDStatus and key IDSession ID, cipheringkey ID and key dataStatus and key IDUse licenseRead partialcounterMakes use of a cardemission item (Notused in FIPS mode)Reads the number oflicenses ready to beusedRead totalcounterReads the number oflicenses usedLoad DES keycipherLoad DES keycipheredLoads a ciphereduser’s DES keyLoads a User’s DESkey ciphered withReadCiphering keyReadDES keysWriteUsers’ passwordsReadTransport keyReadPrivate keyWriteDES keyTransport keyCiphering DESkeyWriteRead 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.ReadPage 9 of 19

ServiceGet OMRGet DES keypublicLoad DES keyprivateChange modeDescriptionanother User’s DESkeyRecovers thesymmetric cipheringand hashing unitconfigurationRecovers a User’sDES key cipheredwith a public keyLoads a DES keyciphered with a publickeySwitches betweenFIPS and non-FIPSmodeInputOutputSession IDStatus and configdataSession ID, key IDand public keyStatus and exportdataSession ID and publickeyStatus and key IDSession IDStatusRSA signPerforms a RSAsignature (partially)Session ID, key ID,hash data, hashalgorithm andsignature formatStatus, signatureblock length andsignature blockRSA verifyPerforms a RSAsignature verification(partially)Session ID, public keylength, public key dataand signature blockStatus, signatureblock length,signature block inclear, hashalgorithm andsignature format2.3.3CSPType ofAccessto CSPDES keyWriteDES keyReadDES keyWritePrivate keyReadPrivate keyReadUnauthenticated ServicesThe following table shows the unauthenticated services:ServiceDescriptionInputFirmware VersionReturns the firmwareversionSession ID if any, else,Session ID NULLGet HSMIdentificationReturns a unique 64-bitidentification codeSession ID if any, else,Session ID NULLOutputCSPType ofAccessto CSPStatus and thefirmware version, in theform MM.mm.bbbb,where MM is the majorversion number, mm isthe minor versionnumber and bbbb isthe build numberStatus and theidentification code2.4 Finite State Machine ModelThe Cryptosec 2048 is designed around a FSM which is detailed in a proprietary document.Parties interested in reviewing this document should contact Realia Technologies S.L. via thesources listed in the Introduction section of this document.2.5 Physical SecurityThe module provides tamper evidence and tamper response mechanisms. The metallic casingand the epoxy resin conform the tamper evidence mechanism. The tamper response is basedon a zeroization circuitry.The metallic non-removable covers are made of 0.9mm steel and they cover both sides of thePCB. The space between them is completely filled with epoxy resin, making the module moreprotected. 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 10 of 19

A wire runs inside both sides of the module. In case the wire is cut or broken in any way, themain processor tamper response mechanism is launched. The internal 128 KB memory isactively erased. This memory contains the main processor firmware and the Master Firmwarekey.2.6 Operational EnvironmentThis section does not apply. The Cryptosec 2048 does not provide a modifiable operationalenvironment.2.7 Key Management2.7.1Key Storage & ProtectionSecret Keys:The module can store up to 15000 general use DES and TDES (2-key and 3-key) keys. Theyare kept ciphered in the SRAM of the module. They are owned by their respective users. AUser can have several keys. Secret keys can be exported and imported in several ways. Theyare also part of the back up.There are also some special secret keys, with specific purposes: Backup key: it is a 3-key TDES. The back up file is encrypted/decrypted with thiskey. The Superuser can load and save this key. This is done by means of splitknowledge key entry. It is stored in the internal processor memory. Transport key: it is a 3-key TDES, used to import and export keys, although otherkeys can be used with this purpose. Each User has a transport key, and is able toadministrate it on its own. They are stored in the SRAM memory, protected by theMaster Firmware key. Work key: it is a DES key, a TDES 2-key or a TDES 3-key. It is not used in FIPSmode. It is stored in the internal processor memory. Master Firmware key: it is a TDES 3-key. It is used to cipher the SRAM protectedcontents. It is generated automatically by the module, and it is never exported orrevealed in any way. It is stored in the internal processor memory.Private keys:The module can store up to 1000 RSA keys. Their modulus may vary in length from 512 to2048 bits. Take into account that in FIPS mode, the minimum accepted modulus length is1024 bits. They are kept, into a PKCS#1 structure, ciphered by the Master Firmware key inthe SRAM of the module. They are owned by users. A User can have several keys. Privatekeys can be exported and imported in several ways. They are also part of the back up.The firmware protects the secret, private and public keys against unauthorized disclosure,unauthorized modification and unauthorized substitution requiring owner’s authentication.No one, not even the owner, can modify a key, but only the owner can delete its keys.The administrators can erase users and other administrators, this implies the deletion of all thekeys owned by that user. 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 11 of 19

2.7.2Key GenerationThe key generation algorithms differ from DES keys to RSA key pairs.In the DES key case, the process starts generating a random number of the specified length.This value is compared with weak keys and semi-weak keys, if they do not match, the numberis accepted as a DES key. Note that the parity bits are not set, although they can be set whenexporting the key. This is to keep compatibility with some PIN block management functions(not included in this firmware version).In the RSA key pair case, the process starts generating the prime numbers p and q, withlength according to the specified modulus length. There are different possibilities regardingprimality tests, they can be selected by the User. In FIPS mode, FIPS 186-2 specifications arefollowed.2.7.3Key Import and ExportThere are three methods to import a symmetric key:1. Split knowledge.Each custodian of each component is authenticated (one by one) before typing its part ofthe key. The key component is entered along with a corresponding CV. The cryptographicmodule calculates a CV and compares it to the CV entered. If the values do not match, anerror occurred during key entry and the key is rejected.The n components are needed to restore the key imported. The key is assigned to theowner of the session.2. Ciphered with a DES key.The owner of the key is authenticated before giving its key, which is ciphered with theTransport Key of the owner or with other key owned by the User.3. Ciphered with a RSA key pair.The User can import the DES key previously ciphered with a public key, if the User ownsthe key pair.There are three methods to export a symmetric key:1. Split knowledge.Each custodian is authenticated (one by one) before getting its part of the key. Thecryptographic module gives the CV of each part to be verified next time it was imported.2. Ciphered with a DES key.The key is ciphered with the Transport Key of the owner.3. Ciphered with a RSA key pair.The User can select a RSA key pair and export the DES key ciphered with the public part.RSA key pairs are exported or imported ciphered with the transport key in a PKCS#1 RSAPrivate structure. The public parts are exportable freely and in clear, in a PKCS#1 RSA Publicstructure. 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 12 of 19

Although it is not an import/export mechanism, note that every key is saved and restored in theback-up process.2.7.4Key ZeroizationIf the physical security mechanisms are activated, the back-up key, the work key and theMaster Firmware key are actively zeroized, together with the firmware and other processor’sinternal memory contents. The User information, the rest of the secret keys and the privatekeys are not erased but retained in encrypted format, but they are unusable, as the MasterFirmware key is zeroized.The delete firmware command, followed by a reset, forces the activation of the processdescribed in the former paragraph.Key deletion and user deletion processes include the zeroization of key and user information.2.7.5Random Number GeneratorThe Cryptosec 2048 uses the FIPS approved RNG specified in FIPS 186-2 with change noticeDSA-RNG using SHA-1 for generation of cryptographic keys and other purposes in FIPSmode. This RNG is seeded with the internal hardware-based RNG.In non FIPS mode, the module only uses the internal hardware-based RNG.A continuous test is performed on both.2.8 EMI/EMCThe module conforms to FCC Part 15 Class B requirements for home use.2.9 SELF TESTINGThe Self-Tests that the module can perform are: Power-Up Testsooooo Integrity of Firmware Test (CRC-32).TDES KAT (3-key, 2-key, single key (DES)).SHA-1, MD5, RIPEMD-128, RIPEMD-160 KAT.RSA KAT.RNG KAT (FIPS 186-2 RNG).Conditional TestsooooPair-wise consistency Test (RSA).Signature Generation/Verification Test (RSA).Manual Key Entry Test.Continuous RNG Test (applicable to the hardware-based RNG and also to theFIPS 186-2 RNG in FIPS mode).The events that can produce the conditions are as follows: 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 13 of 19

EVENT (E) or FUNCTION (F)Power up (E)Power up (E)Power up (E)Power up (E)RSA key generation (F)RSA key generation no store(F)RSA key generation, no store and cipher (F)Write private key(F)RSA key generation (F)RSA key generation no store (F)RSA key generation, no store and cipher (F)Write private key (F)Load backup key (F)Load transport key (F)Load DES key parts (F)Load DES key list parts (F)Load work key (F)First time the firmware is loaded (E)Create session (F)RSA public (F)Get backup key (F)Get transport key (F)Get DES key parts (F)RSA key generation (F)RSA key generation no store (F)RSA key generation, no store and cipher (F)CONDITIONFirmware integrity testDES testHash testRSA testPair wise consistence testSign verify testManual key entrance testContinuous RNG testIf a power-up self-test error has occurred, the module displays an appropriate indicator via thestatus output interface. The module must be reset to clear the error condition, and then canresume normal operation. If the Error continues (hard-error) to occur, the module must bereturned to the manufacturer for repair or the firmware must be replaced. If a conditional erroroccurs, the module clears the soft-error and resumes normal operation.2.10 DESIGN ASSURANCEEach release of the hardware is stored in a separate repository named by release number.Each hardware build is named, e.g.: v0.0, v0.1, v1.0, v1.1, v2.0, etc. The hardware version isshown on the space between the battery and the module’s cover. It is also shown by means ofthe VT-100 terminal when the module is started.Each release of the firmware is stored in a separate repository named by release number.Each hardware build is named, e.g.: v00.00.0000, v00.01.0001, v01.00.0010, v01.01.0000,v02.00.0004, etc. The firmware version is shown invoking a specific command. As thehardware version, it is also shown by means of the VT-100 terminal when the module isstarted.User documentation is versioned like source. Each release of the documentation is stored in aseparate repository named by release number. The documentation states the firmware versionthat it refers to.2.11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKSThe Cryptosec 2048 does not employ any technology that mitigates against other attacks. 2004 Realia Technologies S.L.This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.Page 14 of 19

3SECURE OPERATION OF THE CRYPTOSEC 20483.1 Secure administration3.1.1InitializationWhen the module is received, the Superuser must check the module’s case for evidence oftampering. Such indications include prying, bending, or cutting of the metal c

Generates a RSA key pair and exports it Session ID, public exponent and modulus length Status and key data RSA key generation, no store and cipher Generates a RSA key pair and exports it in VIS format Session ID, public exponent, modulus length and the exporting key ID Status and ciphered key data RSA private Performs a RSA private encryption .

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