UNCLASSIFIED AUD-MERO-20-35 Office Of Audits June 2020

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UNCLASSIFIEDAUD-MERO-20-35Office of AuditsJune 2020Review of the Afghan Special ImmigrantVisa ProgramMIDDLE EAST REGION OPERATIONSUNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDJune 2020OFFICE OF AUDITSMIDDLE EAST REGION OPERATIONSReview of the Afghan Special Immigrant VisaProgramAUD-MERO-20-35What OIG ReviewedIn 2009, Congress passed the Afghan AlliesProtection Act, which established a specialimmigrant visa (SIV) program to resettleAfghans who were or are employed inAfghanistan by the U.S. Government or by theInternational Security Assistance Force andexperienced an ongoing and serious threat as aresult of their employment. Congress amendedthe Act in 2013 to improve the efficiency of thevisa issuance process. From FY 2009 to FY 2019,18,471 special immigrant visas were issued, andas of September 2019, 18,864 applicantsremained in the process. The FY 2020 NationalDefense Authorization Act directed theDepartment of State (Department), Office ofInspector General (OIG), to evaluate and offerimprovements to eight identified obstacles thatcould affect the effective protection of Afghanallies through the SIV program and providesuggestions for improvements in futureprograms.What OIG RecommendsOIG made six recommendations in this reportintended to improve the SIV program. On thebasis of the Under Secretary for Management’sresponse to a draft of this report, OIG considersone recommendation closed and fiverecommendations resolved, pending furtheraction. A synopsis of management’s commentsand OIG’s reply follow each recommendation inthe Results section of this report. The UnderSecretary for Management’s response to a draftof this report is reprinted in its entirety inAppendix B. OIG previously issued aManagement Assistance Report related to thistopic that offered three recommendations toimprove the process by which the Departmentreports the Afghan SIV applicant wait times.What OIG FoundOIG evaluated the eight obstacles identified by Congress.Two obstacles did not significantly affect the Department’simplementation of the Afghan SIV program. One obstacle,the uncertainty of visa availability, affects implementationbut depends on congressional SIV allocation. However, fiveobstacles, if unaddressed, will remain impediments toimplementing the Afghan SIV program and achieving thegoals defined by statute, which is to issue an SIV within a9-month timeframe. Specifically, OIG found that theDepartment’s staffing levels across its various offices thatprocess Afghan SIVs have generally remained constantsince 2016 and are insufficient to reduce the SIV applicantbacklog. Similarly, staffing levels during the interagencyand security check process contribute to delays inprocessing the Afghan SIVs. Additionally, the Departmentlacks a centralized database to effectively document theidentity of locally employed staff and contractors. Instead,the Department relies on multiple information technologysystems that are not interoperable. Finally, OIG found thatthe U.S. Government offers protection and safety to SIVapplicants within the confines of the workplace; however,protection outside of work hours is impracticable.These obstacles exist, in part, because the SeniorCoordinating Official position, which is intended to overseeand direct the Afghan SIV program, has been vacant sinceJanuary 2017. As a result, the Department’s managementof resources and strategic planning for the Afghan SIVprogram is decentralized and lacks the focus needed tocontinuously evaluate the program and seekimprovements. In addition, the Senior Coordinating Officialposition is needed to plan for changes in applicant volumethroughout the SIV process and to promote continuity ofoperations. Until a designated leader has the authority todirect the management of the Afghan SIV program, theseobstacles will continue to hinder the U.S. Government’sability to timely process Afghan SIV applicants who areexperiencing threats as a result of their employment withthe U.S. Government.UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDCONTENTSOBJECTIVE . 1BACKGROUND . 2The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program . 2RESULTS. 6The Extent to Which the Afghan SIV Program Has Affected the United States’ Ability to HireLocally Employed Staff and Contractors in Afghanistan . 7The Extent to Which the Cost and Availability of Medical Examinations Impacted Afghan SIVProcessing. 8The Extent to Which the Uncertainty of Visa Availability Has Affected Visa Processing . 10The Extent to Which the Department Considered Appropriate Staffing Levels for ExpeditedProcessing Domestically and Abroad . 14The Extent to Which Delays Could Be Reduced in Interagency Processing and Security Checks. 18The Extent to Which Obstacles Existed in Documenting the Identity and Employment ofLocally Employed Staff and Contractors, Including the Possibility of Establishing a CentralDatabase of Employees and Contractors . 20The Extent to Which the Department Assessed Expediting Processing at All Stages of theProcess for Applicants, Including Consideration of Reducing the Number of Required Forms 24The Extent to Which the Department Employed Measures for the Protection and Safety ofLocally Employed Staff and Contractors . 27RECOMMENDATIONS . 31APPENDIX A: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY . 32APPENDIX B: UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT’S RESPONSE. 34ABBREVIATIONS . 39OIG TEAM MEMBERS . 40UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDOn December 20, 2019, Congress passed the FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act(NDAA) directing the Department of State (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), toissue a report that evaluates and offers improvements to eight obstacles, which were identifiedby Congress, to effective protection of Afghan and Iraqi allies 1 through the special immigrantvisa (SIV) program and provides suggestions for improvements in future programs.OBJECTIVEThe objective of this review was to determine the extent to which the eight identifiedobstacles2 affected the implementation of the Afghan SIV program and to offer suggestedimprovements in future programs. OIG evaluated the Afghan SIV program by addressing eightresearchable questions, which align with the eight identified obstacles:1. The extent to which the Afghan SIV program has affected the United States’ ability tohire locally employed staff and contractors in Afghanistan.2. The extent to which the cost and availability of medical examinations impacted AfghanSIV processing.3. The extent to which uncertainty of visa availability has affected visa processing.4. The extent to which the Department considered appropriate staffing levels, bothdomestically and abroad, for expedited processing.5. The extent to which delays could be reduced in interagency processing and securitychecks.6. The extent to which obstacles existed in documenting the identity and employment oflocally employed staff and contractors, including the possibility of establishing a centraldatabase of employees and contractors.7. The extent to which the Department assessed expediting processing at all stages of theprocess for applicants, including consideration of reducing the number of requiredforms.8. The extent to which the Department employed measures for the protection and safetyof locally employed staff and contractors.At the start of this review, OIG learned that the Iraqi SIV program concluded in September 2014 and only had84 applicants in the pipeline to be processed as of December 15, 2019, whereas the Afghan SIV program had18,768. As a result, OIG did not evaluate the Iraqi SIV program and informed Congress of this decision on January24, 2020.12FY 2020 NDAA, Section 1215, Special Immigrant Visa Program Reporting Requirements, (b) Contents, 435.AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED1

UNCLASSIFIEDBACKGROUNDThe Afghan Special Immigrant Visa ProgramIn 2009, Congress established a visa program to resettleAfghans who worked on behalf of the United States in“Our fundamental aim here is totake care of those who took careAfghanistan and experienced an ongoing and seriousof us. In my experience, the onlythreat as a result of their employment with the U.S.way [to] provide meaningfulGovernment. The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009security is to get them and theirauthorized visas, 3 also known as SIVs, to Afghans whoimmediate families to the [Unitedwere or are “employed by or on behalf of, the [U.S.]States] as expeditiously asGovernment in Afghanistan . . . ; provided faithful andpossible.”valuable service to the [U.S.] Government . . . ; andAmbassador Ryan Crocker,[have] experienced or [are] experiencing an ongoingIraq (2007–2009), Afghanistanserious threat as a consequence of [their] employment(2011–2012)by the [U.S.] Government.” In 2013, Congress amendedthe Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 to include aseries of provisions to “improve the efficiency by whichapplications for special immigrant visas . . . are processed.” 4 This amendment also stated that“all steps under the control of the respective departments incidental to the issuance of [SIVs,]including required screenings and background checks, should be completed not later than9-months after the date on which an eligible [Afghan] submits all required materials tocomplete an application for such a visa.” 5 The amendment also allowed for additionalprocessing for “visas in high-risk cases for which satisfaction of national security concernsrequires additional time.” 6In addition, the amendment stated that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of HomelandSecurity, and the Secretary of Defense “shall each designate a senior coordinating official, withsufficient expertise, authority, and resources, to carry out the duties . . . with regard to theissuance of [SIVs].” 7 The senior coordinating official shall, among other things, developproposals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the process, coordinate and monitorthe implementation of such proposals, and implement appropriate actions as authorized by thelaw. In 2014, Congress expanded the Afghan SIV program eligibility to certain Afghans whowere employed by the International Security Assistance Force. 83The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, Section 602(b), Pub. L. 111 8, March 11, 2009.4FY 2014 NDAA, Section 1219, “Improvement of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program,” 243.5FY 2014 NDAA, Section 1219, “Improvement of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program,” (A) In General, 244.6Ibid.7FY 2014 NDAA, Section 1218, (h) Senior Coordinating Officials, 242.FY 2015 NDAA, Section 1227, “extension of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program,” 262. The FY 2016 NDAA,Section 1216, further expanded the Afghan SIV program eligibility to certain Afghans who were employed by asuccessor mission to the International Security Assistance Force, 322.8AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED2

UNCLASSIFIEDSince the introduction of the program, Congress has continued to extend or amend the AfghanAllies Protection Act of 2009 to authorize additional visas. From FY 2009 to FY 2019,18,471 special immigrant visas were issued, and as of September 2019, 18,864 applicantsremained in the process.Stages and Entities Involved in the Afghan SIV ProgramIn the amended legislation, Congress identified four stages to the Afghan SIV program:(1) receiving approval from the Chief of Mission, 9 (2) completing the adjudication of formI-360,10 (3) conducting a visa interview, and (4) issuing the visa to an eligible applicant.11 Toprocess an SIV applicant, several entities play significant roles in these four stages, which aredepicted in Figure 1 and described in the paragraphs that follow.Figure 1: Stages and Entities Involved in the Afghan SIV ProcessSource: OIG generated from information obtained from congressional legislation and the Department.The Chief of Mission is the principal officer in charge of a diplomatic mission and is designated by the Secretary ofState.9The I-360 petition, provided by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, is for foreign nationals wishing tobegin the Green Card (lawful permanent residence) application process within one of the SIV categories.10FY 2014 NDAA, Section 1219, Improvement on the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program, (12) Report onImprovements, (B) Contents, (13) Public Quarterly Reports, 245.11AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED3

UNCLASSIFIEDChief of Mission ApprovalThe first step in the Chief of Mission approval process is for an Afghan to submit an applicationpackage to the Department’s National Visa Center. 12 Once the National Visa Center reviews theSIV application package and determines it to be documentarily complete, the National VisaCenter notifies the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Unit (ASIV Unit). 13 This unit is responsible fordetermining an applicant’s eligibility for the program by verifying, among other items, historyand length of employment and a letter of recommendation from the applicant’s immediatesupervisor. On the basis of this determination, the ASIV Unit may recommend that the Chief ofMission Committee at Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, approve the applicant for an SIV.14U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services I-360 PetitionAfter the applicant receives Chief of Mission approval, the ASIV Unit informs the National VisaCenter, which then notifies the applicant to file Form I-360, “Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er),or Special Immigrant,” with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 15 This petition is requiredfor the applicant to receive a Green Card to become a Lawful Permanent Resident. At thisstage, the applicant also submits documentation for a “derivative” spouse or child (if any) whoare also applying under the applicant’s SIV.16 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servicesadjudicates the petition and notifies the National Visa Center of the applicant’s approval.Immigrant Visa InterviewOnce the National Visa Center receives approval from U.S. Citizenship and ImmigrationServices, it notifies the applicant to begin collecting the necessary documents to support theimmigrant visa application. The National Visa Center then reviews the immigrant visaapplication package for documentation completeness before scheduling a visa interview at theembassy or consulate where the applicant is residing. After a visa interview is scheduled, theembassy or consulate conducts the interview with the applicant, as well as any derivative familymembers applying under the SIV applicant.The National Visa Center, located in Portsmouth, NH, is within the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Office,Domestic Operations. The National Visa Center acts at the primary public-facing organization within theDepartment during the SIV process.12The ASIV Unit is an office within the combined Executive Office for the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and Southand Central Asian Affairs and was created in 2016 to offshore the Chief of Mission verification process toWashington, DC.13The Chief of Mission Committee makes a recommendation to approve or deny the applicant. Therecommendation is provided to the Assistant Chief of Mission, who is delegated by the Chief of Mission to makethe final decision.1415U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security.9 Foreign Affairs Manual 502.1-1(C)(2), “Derivative Applicant/Beneficiaries,” states that a derivative is, amongothers, a spouse or child acquired prior to the principal alien’s admission to the United States or the alien’sadjustment of status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident.16AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED4

UNCLASSIFIEDIssuing the Special Immigrant VisaOnce the visa interview is conducted, the applicant and derivative spouse or child, if any,undergo administrative processing, which may include requesting additional documentation,conducting additional interviews, and interagency security checks. Once this is completed, theConsular Officer instructs the applicant to schedule and receive a medical examination. Oncethe applicant receives a medical clearance, the Consular Officer issues the SIV, and the AfghanSIV recipient will immigrate to the United States.These four stages should be completed within the 9-month timeframe established by Congressunless the Department identifies high-risk applicants who require additional scrutiny to satisfynational security requirements. According to 9 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 502.5-12(B), andconsistent with the FY 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, applicants seeking SIVs areprioritized in the following order:1. Interpreters and Translators: Afghans working with the U.S. military and U.S.Government personnel as interpreters and translators.2. U.S. Government Direct Hire Employees: Afghan locally employed staff under personalservices agreement or personal services contract for the Department, the Departmentof Defense, or other U.S. Government agencies.3. Contractors with U.S. Government Installation Badges: Afghan third-party contractors orsubcontractors employed on behalf of the U.S. Government working at a U.S.Government installation in Afghanistan.4. Implementing Partners: Afghan third-party contractors or subcontractors employed onbehalf of U.S. Government entities, such as the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment and the Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement, implementing instructions in the field in Afghanistan.5. All Other Applicants: Afghan U.S. Government contractors, logistics or transportationservice providers, and companies contracted by the U.S. Government to provideservices to Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police installations.AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED5

UNCLASSIFIEDRESULTSOIG evaluated the eight obstacles identified by Congress and found that two did notsignificantly affect the implementation of the Afghan SIV program. Specifically, OIG found thatthe Afghan SIV program did not have a significant impact on the United States’ ability to hirelocally employed staff or contractors in Afghanistan primarily because the United States doesnot advertise the Afghan SIV program as an employment benefit or treat it as a recruitmenttool for prospective applicants and because the U.S. Government typically offers higher salariesthan most other employers. OIG also found that, although medical examinations are costly,they are readily available to SIV applicants and the Department has taken steps to reduce thecost burden on SIV applicants. A third obstacle, the uncertainty of visa availability, affects SIVprogram implementation but is dependent on congressional SIV allocation and outside theDepartment’s control.However, OIG confirmed that five obstacles identified by Congress, if unaddressed, will remainimpediments to implementing the Afghan SIV program and achieving the goals established byCongress, which include issuing an SIV within a 9-month timeframe. OIG found that theDepartment’s staffing levels across its various offices that process Afghan SIVs have generallyremained constant since 2016, notwithstanding increased backlog, and are insufficient toreduce the SIV applicant backlog. This includes staffing levels during the interagency processingand security check, which contribute to delays in processing Afghan SIVs. Additionally, theDepartment lacks a centralized database to effectively document the identity of locallyemployed staff and contractors. Instead, the Department relies on multiple informationtechnology systems that are not interoperable, which impedes the ability to expediteprocessing at all stages of the Afghan SIV process. Finally, OIG found that the U.S. Governmentoffers protection and safety to SIV applicants within the confines of the workplace andprotected their sensitive Personally identifiable information; however, protection outside ofwork hours is impracticable.These obstacles exist, in part, because the Department’s Senior Coordinating Official position,which is intended to oversee and direct the Afghan SIV program, has been vacant since January2017. As a result, the Department’s management of resources and strategic planning for theAfghan SIV program is decentralized and lacks the focus needed to continuously evaluate theprogram and seek improvements. For example, notwithstanding the changes in volume ofapplicants over time, the Department has not conducted an assessment to determine theappropriate staffing levels for the Afghan SIV program. The Senior Coordinating Official positionis needed to plan for such volume changes throughout the SIV process and to promotecontinuity of operations. Until there is a designated leader who has the authority to direct themanagement of the Afghan SIV program, these obstacles will continue to hinder the U.S.Government’s ability to timely process Afghan SIV applicants.AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED6

UNCLASSIFIEDThe Extent to Which the Afghan SIV Program Has Affected the United States’Ability to Hire Locally Employed Staff and Contractors in AfghanistanOIG found that the Afghan SIV program did not have a significant impact on the United States’ability to hire locally employed staff or contractors in Afghanistan. This is primarily because theUnited States does not advertise the Afghan SIV program as an employment benefit or treat itas a recruitment tool for prospective applicants and because the U.S. Government typicallyoffers higher salaries than most other employers. However, OIG did find that Embassy Kabulexperiences considerably higher rates of locally employed staff attrition compared to other U.S.embassies because Afghan SIV applicants are only required to have 2 years of eligible servicebefore they can apply for an SIV. 17 As a result, Embassy Kabul struggles to maintain operationalcontinuity, in part, because of the eligibility criteria.The Afghan SIV Program Is Not Used To Recruit Locally Employed StaffDepartment officials stated that the Afghan SIV program is not used as a recruitment tool forthe Department’s locally employed staff.18 However, both the Department and contractors areable to attract local Afghans to fill positions. Embassy Kabul personnel stated that embassypositions are regarded as high paying and stable and generate interest among Afghans,regardless of the Afghan SIV program. In 2014, the Department increased the locally employedstaff employment salary by 45 percent to make it comparable to salaries paid by internationalorganizations and other foreign embassies in country with which Embassy Kabul competes fortop candidates. 19 As a result of the high salary and additional benefits, such as medical plansand a 25-percent pay incentive for the difficult working conditions in Kabul, 20 Embassy Kabulpersonnel stated that it is a highly sought-after employer.SIV Program Contributes to Embassy Kabul Locally Employed Staff AttritionAlthough Embassy Kabul does not experience recruitment challenges with locally employedstaff, OIG found that it experiences high levels of employee turnover primarily because of theAfghan SIV program. 21 In 2015, the Government Accountability Office reported that locallyemployed staff who resigned as a result of receiving their SIVs reached its highest level inAccording to Embassy Kabul personnel, the hiring process for locally employed staff is lengthy—6 months to1 year—because of the rigorous pre-employment checks and security vetting.17Department of Defense personnel were unsure of the extent its contractors use the Afghan SIV program as arecruitment tool. A Department of Defense official reported that, in the past, when the Department of Defenseemployed large numbers of translators and interpreters, the Afghan SIV program served as a significant recruitingtool. However, the official stated that he could not speak to current recruiting practices used by contractors.18In 2014, the Department implemented a wage adjustment for locally employed staff at 70 U.S. missions tocompete with the local labor market. Foreign National pay is based on a 13-grade pay scale dependent on thelocally employed staff’s education and work experience, ranging from Foreign Service National 1 ( 12,464) toForeign Service National 13 ( 130,470).1920This 25 percent is in addition to the locally employed staff’s base pay.21OIG was not able to evaluate whether contractors experienced high turnover related to the Afghan SIV program.AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED7

UNCLASSIFIED2014.22 At that time, the Afghan SIV program only required 1 year of eligible service. 23Subsequently, the FY 2016 NDAA increased the required years of service from 1 year to 2 yearsfor the Afghan SIV program. However, Embassy Kabul’s Human Resources Office told OIG thatlocally employed staff turnover is considerably higher than other U.S. embassies because of the2-year service requirement.As a result, Embassy Kabul faces challenges with maintaining operational continuity because oflocally employed staff attrition. Onboarding locally employed staff is a lengthy process becauseof pre-employment checks and security vetting. Embassy Kabul’s Human Resources Office toldOIG that hiring an Afghan local—from the initial offer of employment to the start date—cantake 6 months to 1 year. This makes the relatively short tenure of many personnel eligible forSIVs particularly difficult to manage. Embassy Kabul has taken steps to mitigate the effects ofSIV-related attrition by double-encumbering positions and seeking replacements immediatelyupon receiving notice that a locally employed staff will be issued an SIV. 24 However, EmbassyKabul will continue to face continuity challenges as locally employed staff will likely continue toapply for SIVs after meeting the 2-year service requirement. Because attrition was not a focusof the congressional request, OIG is not offering any recommendations to address this issue.The Extent to Which the Cost and Availability of Medical Examinations ImpactedAfghan SIV ProcessingOIG found that the required medical examinations are costly when compared to the averageAfghan household income, though they did not significantly affect the implementation of theAfghan SIV program. However, OIG found that there is a private medical facility in Afghanistancapable of meeting United States immigration requirements and that the medical facility, whichis located in Kabul, was readily available to schedule examinations. OIG also found that, toreduce the cost burden on Afghan SIV applicants, the Department reversed the immigrant visaprocess by allowing applicants to receive their medical examinations after administrativeprocessing, instead of before. This change removes the possibility that the SIV applicant’smedical examination results will expire before receiving the visa and that the applicant willhave to pay for a second examination.Medical Examinations Are Costly but Available to ApplicantsThe Immigration and Nationality Act and the FAM both state that all applicants applying forimmigrant visas are required to undergo a physical and mental examination as part of theprocess to determine the applicant’s eligibility for a visa. 25 The FAM also includes criteriaThe Government Accountability Office’s report, “State and [U.S. Agency for International Development] ShouldEvaluate Actions Taken to Mitigate the Effects of Attrition among Local Staff,” GAO-16-100, December 2015, statesthat in 2014, 243 out of 615 locally employed staff (nearly 40 percent) resigned.2223FY 2016 NDAA, Section 1216, Title XII, 129 Stat. 1045.24Double encumbering, or dual incumbency, is when two individuals are employed in the same position.25Aliens and Nationality, 8 U.S.C. § 1201, (d) Physical Examination; 9 FAM 504.4-7, “Medical Examinations.”AUD-MERO-20-35UNCLASSIFIED8

UNCLASSIFIEDrecommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 26 for appointing panelphysicians who conduct the medical examinations. 27 In addition, the FAM states that thephysician’s examining facility should be located near the visa-issuing post and that the numberof examining physicians should be kept to a minimum. 28 In June 2019, Embassy Kabul entered aMedical Services Agreement with one medical facility that has a staff of six panel physicianswho conduct all immigrant visa medical examinations for Embassy Kabul.Although the U.S. Government does not charge the SIV applicant any fees, 29 the medical facilitycharges for each adult and child medical examination. The Medical Services Agreement sets thebase examination fee at 415 for adults (16 years or older) and at 338 for children (15 years oryounger) with supplemental charges for vaccinations. According to the Embassy Kabul

AUD-MERO-20-35 What OIG Reviewed In 2009, Congress passed the Afghan Allies Protection Act, which established a special immigrant visa (SIV) program to resettle

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