DynamicversusCognitive Unconscious
Dynamic versus CognitiveUnconsciousessays of 1915 on “Repression” and “Theunconscious”.John F. KihlstromUniversity of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.Freud’s Conception of theUnconsciousAll psychodynamic theories of personalityand psychopathology are based on the notionof conflict involving unconscious forces. Inclassical Freudian psychoanalytic theory,the conflict is between primitive sexual andaggressive impulses arising from the id, and thedemands of external reality, and of conscience,processed respectively by the ego and thesuperego. The sexual and aggressive impulses,and other mental contents associated withthem, are rendered unconscious by means ofrepression. But these repressed mental contentsleak through the repressive barrier to expressthemselves in experience and action—albeitin symbolically disguised form. Hence Breuerand Freud’s classic formulation, in their Studies on hysteria (1893–1895) that “hystericssuffer from reminiscences”—meaning thattheir symptoms were symbolic expressions ofrepressed traumatic memories.The purpose of psychoanalysis was tolead the patient to insight concerning theseunconscious determinants of experience,thought, and action—to bring these unconscious impulses into consciousness, so thatthey could be acknowledged and dealt withrationally. Various “neofreudian” theorists,including the object-relations theorists,placed more emphasis on the origins ofintrapsychic conflict in the real social world,whereas the psychoanalytic ego psychologists allowed the ego cognitive functions,such as perception and memory, which didnot necessarily involve conflict. This entry isconcerned primarily with the unconsciousas conceived by classical psychoanalysis andrepresented by Freud’s “metapsychological”In fact, there are two such conceptions. Thetopographical theory, implicit in the Studies onhysteria and detailed in The interpretation ofdreams (1900), divided the mind into threesystems known as Ucs. (unconscious), Pcs.(preconscious), and Cs. (conscious). In Freud’sreflex-based model, Ucs. conducted a perceptual analysis of an environmental stimulus andstored a trace of the stimulus in one or moreassociative memories. Pcs. determined whetherany of this unconsciously processed materialwould become accessible to consciousness;material censored by Pcs. remained in Ucs.Material permitted into Pcs. was accessible tothe Cs., depending on its level of intensity, andwhether it received sufficient attention. Only ifan idea entered into Cs. could it make contactwith the motor apparatus, resulting in somesort of conscious response.After his “discovery” of infantile sexualityand the death instinct, Freud introduced anew structural theory in The Ego and the Id(1923), based on the functions of various partsof the mind, rather than where they werelocated in the chain leading from stimulus toresponse. In this theory, the id is the seat of theinstincts; the ego performs cognitive functionsand employs repression and other defenses tocontrol instinctual discharge according to theconstraints of reality; and the superego plays asimilar role, taking into account the demandsof individual conscience and social norms.These functions do not map precisely ontothe three systems of the topographic theory.Repression is an ego function, but it must beperformed unconsciously, so that the personis not aware of what is being repressed, or thatit is being repressed. While part of the ego isThe Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Robin L. Cautin and Scott O. Lilienfeld. 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.DOI: 10.1002/9781118625392.wbecp0275
2 DYNAMIC VERSUS COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUSdirectly accessible to consciousness throughPcs., part of the ego is also unconscious,because it contains nonrepressed unconsciouscontents. The contents of the id are mostlyunconscious, but some of its contents, such asemotions, have direct pathways to consciousexpression that do not flow through the ego.In sum, Freud used the term “unconscious”in three quite different ways. Descriptively, itrefers to any thought, feeling, or desire thatis not in awareness at any particular time.Systematically, such thoughts can be “preconscious” if they are available to consciousness inprinciple, even if they are not accessible at thepresent moment. If they are not even availableto consciousness, they may be considered tobe unconscious in the strict sense of the term.However, Freud held that only repressed mental contents were unconscious in the dynamicsense of the term: they are prevented frombeing represented in consciousness because ofa contravening force arrayed against them.The Cognitive UnconsciousJust when the psychodynamic conceptionof unconscious mental life was growing inpopularity among clinicians and the publicas a whole, the behaviorist revolution in academic psychology ruled any discussion of theunconscious, or indeed of consciousness, outof bounds. Science was based on the objectivemeasurement of observables; mental life wasinherently subjective and unobservable; therefore, in order to be a science, psychology hadto focus its attention on observable behaviorand the observable circumstances in whichit took place. Unconscious mental life wasdoubly unobservable, because it was not evensubjective—it was not even represented inthe individual’s private thoughts, feelings, anddesires. It had to go too, as psychology focusedon the analysis of relations between observablestimulus and observable response.The idea of unconscious mental activitybegan to slip back into scientific psychologyonly with the cognitive revolution that beganin the 1950s and 1960s. Cognition begins withperception, and many perception theoristsadopted Helmholtz’s notion that consciousperceptions resulted from unconscious inferences concerning the stimulus environment.Noam Chomsky argued that language wasmediated by grammatical knowledge, whichwas inaccessible to conscious introspection andcould be known only by inference. And thevarious “multistore” models of memory identified consciousness with short-term memoryand made room for preconscious perceptsand memories that were not, at the moment,subject to attention. In fact, the multistoremodel of memory looks very much like themodel proposed by Freud in The interpretationof dreams—although, it must be emphasized, itis rooted in the computer model of the mind,rather any reading of Freud.Beginning in the 1970s, and culminating inthe 1980s, a number of trends came togetherto legitimize the idea of unconscious cognition (Kihlstrom, 1987): acceptance of thedistinction between automatic and controlledcognitive processes, as exemplified by theStroop effect; the discovery of dissociationsbetween explicit and implicit memory inamnesic patients; clear evidence of analogouspriming effects in “subliminal” perception; anddocumentation of divisions of consciousnessin hypnosis and related states, exemplified byhypnotic analgesia and posthypnotic amnesia.The most salient of these trends concernedautomaticity. Automatic processes are unconscious in the strict sense of the word: they areinevitably evoked by the presentation of anappropriate stimulus, and they are incorrigiblyexecuted; they are effortless, consume little orno attentional capacity, and they are efficient,creating little or no interference with otherongoing cognitive activities. Like Helmholtz’sunconscious inferences and Chomsky’s Universal Grammar, they are inaccessible tophenomenal awareness in principle, and canbe known only by inference. The distinctionbetween automatic and controlled has been socompletely accepted within cognitive, social,and clinical psychology that automatic processes have been called “the new unconscious”
DYNAMIC VERSUS COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS(Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005). Some socialpsychologists have embraced automaticity sostrongly as to claim that conscious thoughtplays only a trivial role in behavior, and thatfree will is an illusion (Kihlstrom, 2008).Automatic mental processes are generallythought to operate on stimulus input to generate conscious mental contents—percepts,memories, feelings, desires, and the like—raising the question of whether mentalcontents—percepts, memories, and the like canalso be unconscious, yet still influence ongoingexperience, thought, and action. Studies ofpriming in amnesic patients and normal subjects answered this question in the affirmative:items from a study list facilitated performanceon a number of tasks, even though the list itemsthemselves could not be consciously remembered. Explicit memory refers to consciousrecollection, as exemplified by performanceon standard tests of recall and recognition.Implicit memory refers to any effect of a pastevent, on the subject’s experience, thought, andaction in the absence of (or, at least, independent of) conscious recollection of that event.Priming and other implicit memory effectsmay occur automatically, but the importantpoint is that they are mediated by a representation of an event, stored in memory—in otherwords, by an unconscious memory.The discovery of priming effects in theabsence of conscious recollection of the primeinspired the extension of the distinctionbetween explicit and implicit beyond thedomain of memory to other cognitive functions. By analogy with implicit memory, forexample, implicit perception may be defined asthe influence of an event in the current stimulus environment, in the absence of consciousperception of that event. Implicit perceptioncovers cases of “subliminal” perception, butalso priming effects from stimuli that arein no sense subliminal, such as “blindsight”in neurological patients with damage to thestriate cortex. In implicit memory, an eventthat had been consciously perceived is subsequently lost to conscious recollection; in3implicit perception, the event was not consciously perceived in the first place. In implicitlearning, subjects acquire new declarativeor procedural knowledge, in the absence ofconscious awareness of what they have learned.This is not merely a case of forgetting a learningepisode, as in source amnesia; rather, subjectsact on knowledge that they do not consciouslyknow they possess. An implicit thought may bedefined as an idea or image, itself a percept ora memory, which affects the subject’s behaviorin the absence of conscious awareness of thatthought. In this case, it is the thought itself,not just the automatic process that generates it,which is unconscious.All of these effects have been well documented in the experimental literature. Somewhat more tentatively, the explicit-implicitdistinction has been extended to emotion andmotivation as well. Of course, feelings anddesires can be generated automatically, just likepercepts, memories, and thoughts. But thereis the further question of whether feelingsand emotions can affect our behavior, in theabsence of conscious awareness. In principle,the answer must be yes. Implicit emotion refersto the effects of positive or negative feelings onexperience, thought, and action, in the absenceof conscious awareness of that state. The resultis a dyssynchrony between the subjective component of an emotional response, which ismissing, and the behavioral and/or physiological components, which are preserved. Inmuch the same way, the discrepancy between“projective” and “objective” measurements ofsocial motives suggest a dissociation betweenexplicit and implicit motivation.Unconscious feelings and desires belong tothe domain of the cognitive unconscious, if“cognition” is defined broadly to refer to anymental activity (Kihlstrom, 2012). A moreinclusive term would be the “psychological”unconscious, including emotional and motivational states as well as cognitive ones. Inprinciple, mounting evidence for the cognitiveunconscious justifies speculation about theemotional and motivational unconscious aswell. However, it must be acknowledged that
4 DYNAMIC VERSUS COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUSthe evidence for unconscious emotions andmotives is nowhere near as strong as that forunconscious cognitions.Evidence for the PsychodynamicUnconsciousAutomaticity, and documentation of explicitimplicit dissociations in various psychological domains, have sometimes been taken asevidence that Freud was right all along aboutthe unconscious, and that psychoanalytictheory is scientifically viable. However, thisargument confuses the three meanings thatFreud adduced to the term “unconscious.”Laboratory evidence for the cognitive unconscious is consistent with Freud’s descriptiveand systematic senses of “unconscious,” buttells us nothing about the “dynamic” sense thatis critical for psychoanalytic theory. Cognitiveprocesses that are executed automatically, orthe implicit memories that are inaccessible toconscious recollection, bear no relation to therepressed contents that populate the Freudianunconscious—childhood trauma, primitivesexual and aggressive urges, and the like. Nordoes the process by which implicit percepts,memories, and other mental contents becomeinaccessible to phenomenal awareness bearany resemblance to the process of repressionas described by Freud. To steal a phrase fromPresident George H. W. Bush, the cognitiveunconscious is “kinder and gentler” than that.This is not to say that Freudian andpost-Freudian descriptions of the dynamicunconscious are invalid; only that they cannotrely on the kind of evidence that supports the“cognitive” unconscious. But it does mean thatevidence for the psychodynamic unconscioushas to bear on the specific propositions ofpsychoanalytic theory. To that end, Rapaport(1960) organized classical psychoanalytic theory around a number of “metapychological”principles, including the “topographic pointof view” that “the crucial determinants ofbehaviors [including thoughts, feelings, anddesires] are unconscious” (p. 46). This statement implies two more specific hypotheses:first, that unconscious mental states existand, then, that they are the crucial determinants of behavior. The first hypothesis isimportant. For Freud, the unconscious wasnot confined to mental processes, whetherHelmholtz’s unconscious inferences or the“new unconscious” of automaticity, whichgenerate conscious mental contents such aspercepts, memories, and thoughts. Rather,Freud held that thoughts, feelings, and desires,could themselves be unconscious, yet stillinfluence conscious experience, thought, andaction. Research on implicit memory, perception, and the like indicate that this is indeed thecase. In fact, it is precisely by virtue of primingand related effects that we know that theyexist. The cognitive unconscious is not merelya mental wastebasket into which unattendedpercepts and forgotten memories have beendumped.But this is hardly proof of Freud’s metapsychology, because the existence and influence ofunconscious mental states and processes is nota unique prediction of psychodynamic theory.Recall that Freud’s functional division of themind proposed that the unconscious mind hadtwo quite different aspects. The first was whatwe might think of as “ordinary,” conflict-free,unconscious cognition: unconscious processes such as those supporting Helmholtz’sunconscious inferences; and preconsciouspercepts, memories, and thoughts that wereaccessible to conscious awareness, but currently unconscious because attention was notbeing directed to them. The psychodynamicunconscious, on the other hand, has specialproperties, because it is tied closely to infantilesexual and aggressive impulses arising fromthe id, and conflict, and repression initiated bythe ego.Following Rapaport and Gill (1959), wecan further analyze the topographic pointof view into a nested hierarchy of generalpsychoanalytic propositions, specific psychoanalytic propositions, and empiricalpropositions—evidence for which would,actually, support the psychodynamic visionof unconscious mental life. At the general
DYNAMIC VERSUS COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUSlevel, for example, we might expect thatunconscious mental contents would differfrom conscious mental contents in terms ofprimary-process versus secondary-processthought—that is, that they are more imagistic, even hallucinatory, than verbal; moreirrational than logical; and governed more bythe pleasure principle than by the reality principle. At the specific level, we might expect thatunconscious thoughts, feelings, and desiresare related to infantile sexual and aggressiveurges. Or that unconscious ideas are kept outof consciousness by means of repression (itselfan unconscious process) rather than dissociation (Janet’s alternative to Freud), consciousthought-suppression, or mere denial. In termsof empirical propositions, psychodynamictheory would invoke unconscious conflict, andrepression, to explain why adults have poormemory of their early childhoods, especially ofincidents pertaining to sexual abuse and othertraumata.It is this specifically psychodynamic unconscious that Freud claimed to have discovered.Evidence of the “ordinary” cognitive unconscious will not support the existence of thepsychodynamic unconscious. Nor will we findany help in the evidence that Freud himselfadduced in support of his theory, consistingof his interpretations of his patients’ dreams,symptoms, and free associations. The problemswith this evidence are well known, and will notbe repeated here. They cannot be solved by thesimple expedient of shifting from clinical tolaboratory research.Repression and Traumatic MemoryConsider, for example, the concept of repression. A large body of experimental work hasattacked the problem of repression by looking at detection thresholds for “taboo” andbenign words, differential recall of pleasantand unpleasant experiences, or of completedand uncompleted tasks, and the like. Sometimes these studies have turned up evidencethat perception or memory favors materialwith a positive affective tone, and this is often5taken as evidence for repression. On the otherhand, many of these studies suffer from anumber of methodological problems, someof which are quite subtle (More important, asRapaport (1942) pointed out, it is a mistake toinvoke repression to explain the forgetting ofthe merely unpleasant, disagreeable, or sociallyunacceptable. Rather, repression operatesspecifically to deny conscious representationto primal sexual and aggressive instincts andtheir derivatives. In this light, almost theentire experimental literature on “repression”is simply irrelevant to psychoanalytic theory.Similarly, a large number of clinical studieshave purported to find evidence of repression in victims of child sexual abuse andother forms of trauma (Kihlstrom, 2006).Sometimes dissociation is substituted forrepression, although the two mechanisms arequite different. Unfortunately, most of theseare retrospective studies that lack independentcorroboration of the abuse, so it is unclear thatthe ostensibly repressed event ever happened.Prospective studies of verified abuse victimsfind no instances of forgetting that cannot beexplained by ordinary mechanisms such asinfantile and childhood amnesia or the simplepassage of time. It is sometimes suggested thattraumatic stress might impair the encodingof traumatic memories, but this has not beendemonstrated. In any event, this would notbe the same as repression, which rendersavailable memories inaccessible to consciousrecollection.Does that mean that the psychodynamicunconscious is simply not amenable toexperimental study, and we are thrown backon clinical evidence after all? Although manypsychoanalysts doubt the relevance of modernexperimental psychology to both theory andpractice, the divorce between clinical psychoanalysis and experimental psychology isnot quite complete. Consider, for example,two prominent programs of research thatemploy subliminal perception paradigms totest hypotheses derived from psychoanalytictheory and practice.
6 DYNAMIC VERSUS COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUSSubliminal PsychodynamicActivationBeginning in the 1960s, Lloyd Silvermanand his colleagues published a remarkableseries of studies of subliminal psychodynamic activation (Silverman, 1976; Silverman,Lachmann, & Milich, 1982; Weinberger &Silverman, 1990). The general method inthese experiments was to present patientsor normal subjects with verbal or nonverbalstimuli specifically constructed according topsychoanalytic theory intended to activateunconscious wishes, and then to observe theeffects of these stimuli on task performance.The stimuli are then presented subliminally,in an attempt to skirt the subject’s defenses.For example, presentation of oral-aggressivestimuli (CANNIBAL EATS PERSON) aggravated symptoms in both schizophrenic anddepressed patients; presentation of incestualstimuli (FUCK MOMMY) increased homoerotic tendencies in male homosexuals; analstimulation (GO SHIT) increased speechdysfluencies in stuttering. Most famously,symbiotic stimulation (MOMMY AND IARE ONE) diminished symptomatology inschizophrenics, and reduced anxiety anddefensiveness in male homosexuals (Silverman, 1983). Subliminal symbiotic stimulationalso had positive effects on a variety of measures of task performance in normal subjects,as did oedipal-sanctioning stimuli (BEATINGDAD IS OK).These experiments have been subject to avariety of methodological criticisms, the mostserious of which have to do with potential problems in threshold-setting procedures—that is,in ensuring that the ostensibly subliminalstimuli really are subliminal (Balay & Shevrin,1988) (for responses, see Weinberger & Hardaway, 1990). They have also been criticizedfrom within the psychoanalytic community onthe grounds that they are based on misinterpretations of psychoanalytic theory. Viewed fromoutside psychoanalysis, the patient studies areproblematic, because it is far from clear thatthe underlying psychoanalytic formulationsare valid. It is far from clear, for example, thatschizophrenia has its roots in oral aggression,or homosexuality in incestuous desires.Perhaps the most important problemwith subliminal psychodynamic activation,however, concerns the stimuli themselves.Everything we know about subliminal perception indicates that it is temporally limited,with effects lasting only for seconds. Moreimportant, subliminal perception appears to beanalytically limited, such that it is difficult orimpossible to analyze even modestly complexverbal stimuli for meaning. Although studies of subliminal psychodynamic activationhave yielded a number of interesting effects,the discrepancy between the high attentionaldemands of the subliminal message, andthe low attentional resources available tosubliminal perception, must be resolved.Electrophysiology of UnconsciousConflictAnother extensive program of research on thepsychodynamic unconscious has been undertaken by Howard Shevrin and his associates,also employing subliminal stimulation (e.g.,Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel, & Williams,1996; Shevrin & Dickman, 1980; Shevrin et al.,1992). Shevrin’s earliest experiments focusedon demonstrating the encoding of subliminal stimulation. Although inspired by thenotion of a dynamic unconscious, these experiments lacked the explicitly psychodynamicflavor of the Silverman studies. For example,Shevrin demonstrated that a subliminal “rebus”stimulus, consisting of an image representinga word (e.g., a pen and a knee representingthe word penny) could be recovered in dreamimagery and free associations.The most relevant set of experimentsinvolved patients receiving psychoanalyticallyoriented treatment. Individual psychodiagnostic assessments were used to identifywords that represented the patient’s consciousunderstanding of his or her presenting complaint (e.g., social phobia), and other wordsthat represented his or her hypothesized
DYNAMIC VERSUS COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUSunconscious conflict (e.g., exhibitionistic fantasies). These individualized sets of words werethen presented to the subjects subliminallyand supraliminally while their physiological responses were recorded to extractevent-related potentials (ERPs) from the EEG.The investigators then attempted to classify thestimuli based on a complex time-frequencyanalysis of the ERP signals. The unconsciousconflict stimuli were more likely to be classified correctly when they were presentedsubliminally than supraliminally, while thereverse was true for the conscious complaintstimuli. No such differences were found forcontrol stimuli drawn from the positive andnegative poles of the evaluation dimension ofsemantic space. Interestingly, the differentialin classification rates was greater for thosepatients who were clinically rated as favoringrepression as a defense. The implication isthat the repressive process that moderates thedynamic unconscious is particularly sensitiveto conflict-related material.Employing a similar methodology witha group of patients diagnosed with anxietydisorder, Shevrin and his colleagues haverecently observed different patterns of EEGalpha activity (often associated with the inhibition of cognitive processing) in response tosubliminal presentation of words representingtheir conscious symptoms and unconsciousconflicts. Like Silverman’s research, Shevrinemploys subliminal stimulation in an attemptto circumvent the patient’s defenses, and makecontact with repressed, conflictual material.In his view, the qualitative differences in EEGcorrelates observed between representationsof conscious symptoms and unconscious conflicts supports the idea that the psychodynamicdynamic unconscious operates on differentprinciples than those that govern conscious orpreconscious thought.Shevrin’s research has an advantage overSilverman’s in the use of simple stimuli (usually only one word) and very short intervalsbetween stimuli and response—both features compatible with the analytic limitationsof subliminal perception. His research has7the additional merit that it employs individualized stimulus materials, rather than aone-size-fits-all symbiotic stimulus. Shevrinhas shunned vulgar Freudianisms (he acknowledges that sometimes a cigar really is just acigar) but it is also true that his ideas of unconscious conflict seem far removed from theprimal sexual and aggressive urges, Oedipus complexes, and castration anxieties ofclassical Freudian theory. Similarly, whileShevrin’s research has revealed some qualitative differences between conscious andunconscious perception, it is not clear howthese neurophysiological findings map ontothe differences between primary-process andsecondary-process thought postulated inFreudian theory.In any event, before we can acknowledgeShevrin’s findings as definitive evidence ofa psychodynamic unconscious, operating inparallel with the more ordinary psychological unconscious, it is critical to confirm thatthe ostensibly unconscious conflict reallyis unconscious—that is, for example, that apatient with social phobia does not know thathis personality includes some exhibitionistictendencies. Moreover, it is critical to showthat the same kinds of clinical inferencescould be made without the benefit of thewhole apparatus of psychoanalytic theory.Perhaps a cognitive-behavioral therapist wouldalso come to the conclusion that a particularpatient, complaining of a social phobia, avoidssocial situations because he fears what he mightdo in them, such as getting drunk, perhaps,and dancing with a lampshade on his head.Does the Dynamic UnconsciousHave a Future?Scientific and clinical interest in psychoanalytic theory has declined since its zenith in the1950s, with the advent of cognitive-behavioralforms of psychotherapy and the rise ofempirical approaches to personality. Ascognitive psychology revived its interest inconsciousness, and then took an interest inthe psychological unconscious, it was perhaps
8 DYNAMIC VERSUS COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUSinevitable that Freud’s view of unconsciousmental life would experience a resurgence ofinterest as well. But the carefully controlledexperiments that have provided evidencefor the cognitive unconscious—automaticprocesses, implicit memories, subliminal perception, and the like—have not yielded muchevidence favoring the view of the dynamicunconscious as conceived in psychoanalytictheory, with its unconscious conflicts overprimitive sexual and aggressive motives. TheFreudian dynamic unconscious may well exist,in parallel with the ordinary unconscious ofmodern cognitive psychology, but that remainsto be seen.SEE ALSO: Anxiety Disorders; Dissociative Disorders; Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939); Psychoanalyticand Psychodynamic Therapies: Long-Term andShort-Term; Psychophysiology (Peripheral); Recovered Memories; Repressed MemoriesReferencesBalay, J., & Shevrin, H. (1988). The subliminalpsychodynamic activation method: A criticalreview. American Psychologist, 43, 161–174.Hassin, R. R., Uleman, J. S., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.).(2005). The new unconscious. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). The cognitive unconscious.Science, 237(4821), 1445–1452.Kihlstrom, J. F. (2006). Trauma and memoryrevisited. In B. Uttl, N. Ohta, & A. L. Siegenthaler(Eds.), Memory and emotions: Interdisciplinaryperspectives (pp. 259–291). New York: Blackwell.Kihlstrom, J. F. (2008). The automaticity juggernaut.In J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman, & R. F. Baumeister(Eds.), Psychology and free will (pp. 155–180).New York: Oxford University Press.Kihlstrom, J. F. (2013). Unconscious processes. InD. Reisberg (Ed.), Oxford handbook of cognitivepsychology (pp. 176–186). Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.Shevrin, H., Bond, J. A., Brakel, L. A. W., Hertel, R.K., & Williams, W. J. (1996). Conscious andunconscious processes: Psychodynamic, cognitive,and neurophysiological convergences. New York:Guilford.Shevrin, H., & Dickman, S. (1980). Thepsychological unconscious: A necessaryassumption for all psychological theory?American Psychologist, 35, 421–434.Silverman, L. H. (1976). Psychoanalytic theory: Thereports of my death are greatly exaggerated.American Psychologist, 31, 621–637.Silverman, L.
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