Next Priorities Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga Would For .

5Next Prioritiesfor Japan’sFOIP VisionThe Quad, ASEAN,and InstitutionalLinkages in the IndoPacificDr. Kei KogaOne of Japan’s most importantdiplomatic agendas has become the realization of a“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP),which was launched by former PrimeMinister Shinzo Abe in 2016 to maintain and facilitate the existing rulesbased order in the region. 1 And yet, itwas not clear to what extent newPrime Minister Yoshihide Suga wouldemphasize this strategic vision. Infact, the question of Japan’s commitment to the FOIP has drawn much international attention from practitioners and foreign policy experts becauseof Japan’s potential preoccupationwith a number of domestic issues,ranging from COVID-19, economic recovery, and the 2021 Tokyo Olympics. 2Indeed, Suga’s political priorities appear to focus on domestic affairs, suchas unemployment and revising thesmall and medium-sized enterprisebasic law. The Prime Minister is alsosaid to lack diplomatic experience,which was well illustrated by hisstatement during the campaign forPresident of the Liberal DemocraticParty in September 2020, when Sugastated that he cannot emulate ShinzoAbe’s summit diplomacy and that hewould consult with the Minister andMinistry of Foreign Affairs as well asformer Prime Minister Abe about Japan’s diplomacy. 3As a result of this apparent inertia,diplomatic continuity has ensued.Since Suga was inaugurated onSeptember 16, 2020, he emphasized the importance of Abe’s foreign-policy agendas. The FOIP remains Japan’s core strategic vision, with the US-Japan allianceplaying a pivotal role. 4 Japanhosted the second Japan-AustraliaIndia-US Foreign Ministers’Indo-Pacific Perspective 21

Kogameeting (the so-called “Quad”) onOctober 6 to further coordinatetheir policies to realize the FOIPregion.5 Suga regards SoutheastAsia as the geographical center ofthe Indo-Pacific, and he made hisvery first diplomatic trips to Vietnam (2020 ASEAN chair) and Indonesia (the largest SoutheastAsian country) in October. Basedon these early moves, there appears to be no diplomatic upset:Suga seems likely to followthrough on what Abe has envisioned for the FOIP.However, this diplomatic posture isnot sustainable in the long-term.Eventually, Japan needs to providea clear strategy to realize the FOIPin the context of the rapidly evolving US-China great power rivalry.There are three reasons for this.The Need for FlexibleAdaptationFirst, Japan’s FOIP vision is essentially evolutionary, which requiresconceptual updates over time. Asmany have already pointed out,the concept of Japan’s FOIP hasbeen changing since its inceptionin 2016. Initially, Japan aimed tomaintain and strengthen the rulesbased international order in theIndo-Pacific region, which has beenlargely shaped by the UnitedStates in the post-Cold War era. 6Japan’s interest has been to bluntChina’s increasing political influence in the region, which isthought to be detrimental to existing international rules and norms.Most notably, China’s rejection ofthe 2016 South China Sea Tribunal Award disrespected international laws, while China’s “Beltand Road Initiative” has been responsible for setting new international standards for development. 7However, Japan’s strategy to protect the FOIP principles was unclear to begin with. Japan initiallyemphasized the importance of “fundamental rights” such as the ruleof law, human rights, and democracy. 8 Yet, because there are manynon-democratic states in the region, such an emphasis soon disappeared. Moreover, the FOIP visionwas initially called the “Free andOpen Indo-Pacific Strategy” butJapan eliminated “strategy” fromthe phraseology because someASEAN member states were concerned about its diplomatic implications—that FOIP aimed to counterbalance or contain China, for example. 9 As such, Japan flexiblychanged the FOIP concept in accordance with reactions from otherstates.Currently, Japan’s FOIP visionconsists of “three pillars”: (1) “promotion and establishment of therule of law, freedom of navigation,free trade, etc.”; (2) “Pursuit ofIndo-Pacific Perspective 22

Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Visioneconomic prosperity (improvingconnectivity and strengtheningeconomic partnership includingEPA/FTAs and investment treaties)”; and (3) “Commitment forpeace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement,HA/DR cooperation, etc.).” 10 Theseare all international rules andnorms that Japan has long supported. Nevertheless, these pillarsmight change in the future, depending on the development of theregion’s strategic environment.Particularly, as power diffusesacross the region, a renewed rulesmaking mechanism may becomenecessary. The Suga administration must prepare for this challenge in the future.Navigating Great PowerRivalrySecond, Japan still seeks a balancein its diplomatic relations withboth the United State and China.Currently, Japan’s foremost ally,the United States, has begun totake a much tougher stance onChina in terms of COVID-19, economics, and technological modernization. Many in Washington nowbelieve the past approach of “engagement” to have been a mistake.The experience of the COVID-19pandemic has exacerbated thistrend. 11 To be sure, the Trump administration’s confrontationalapproach toward China faces severe criticism, and there are debates over a means to manage itsrelations with China. Nevertheless, Washington’s tough posturetoward China has garnered broadbipartisan support. America’sFOIP strategy is now part of ananti-China strategy, designed toforce Beijing to follow existing international rules and norms. Thistrend will not easily be reversed.On the other hand, Japan still attempts to engage China. Earlierthis year, Abe invited Xi Jinping toJapan as a state visit in April andattempted to draft the “fifth document,” the fifth symbolic officialdocument after the Sino-Japanesediplomatic normalization in 1972that highlights the future vision ofSino-Japanese relations. 12 Thevisit was postponed because of theCOVID-19 pandemic, however, andrising tensions over the East ChinaSea mean that both leaders seemto have lost political traction for bilateral initiatives.Suga recognizes the importance ofJapan-China relations for national,regional, and global stability. Hehas advocated the need for common agendas. 13 Even as he maintains a firm stance on territorialsovereignty and the rule of law,then, Suga has shown interest inpersuading China to follow international rules and norms byIndo-Pacific Perspective 23

Kogamaintaining channels of communication at various levels, includingthe summit level. 14 In this sense,there is a divergence in diplomaticposture between Japan and theUnited States. Yet, since the USJapan alliance is the core of theFOIP vision, it will be necessaryfor both states to coordinate how tomaintain consistency between Japan’s softer and US tougher FOIPstance vis-à-vis China.Realigning InstitutionsThird, Japan’s institutional strategy in the Indo-Pacific has yet tobe clearly articulated. In the initialconcept, Japan’s emphasis was onthe Quad as a central frameworkto realize FOIP. 15 However, givendiplomatic concerns raised by several ASEAN member states in2018, Japan and the Quad members began to emphasize the importance of ASEAN unity and centrality. 16 In response, with a strongpush from Indonesia and a diplomatic coordination by Thailand asASEAN chair, ASEAN issued its“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) statement in 2019,which emphasized the “inclusiveness” of regional architecture andregional cooperation over “rivalry.”17 ASEAN’s priority is thusto neutralize great power rivalryand its negative spill-over effect toSoutheast Asia and other sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific. Japanimmediately supported the AOIP.That said, it is still not clear whatJapan and the Quad members expect from ASEAN. If the Quadmembers regard ASEAN’s utilityonly as a dialogue convenor thatprovides multilateral communication channels, and if they attemptto create “effective multilateralism” that gets things done as theUS Secretary State Pompeo indicated, some ASEAN member stateswould likely view this as diplomatic marginalization. 18 To reassure ASEAN and garner its support for their FOIP vision, Japanand the Quad members need toclearly delineate ASEAN’s role inthe Indo-Pacific.The Future of FOIPThese three factors show that morework needs to be done to realizeJapan’s FOIP vision—constructinga new regional rules-based order.This is the work that the Abe administration left out, and that theSuga administration needs to workon.Two tasks should be prioritized.The first is to evolve the Quad intothe Quad-Plus as an Indo-Pacificinstitutional framework. Whileagreeing the basic principles of theFOIP, Quad-Plus member andpartner states will have to understand that there are divergingIndo-Pacific Perspective 24

Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Visionnational interests among them,and that cooperation will not bepossible in all issue areas. Rather,an expanded Quad-plus could emulate the division of labor modeledby the Japan-Australia-US “Trilateral Partnership for infrastructureinvestment in the Indo-Pacific,”and the partnership between theUnited States and Japan on energy, infrastructure, and digitalconnectivity.19 In short, the Quad(Plus) can function best as a forumto flexibly coordinate policies thatadvance the FOIP vision wherepossible. This means that the Quadcan also expand its membership toany states that agree with theFOIP principles. Accordingly, it isin Japan’s interests to ensure thatthe Quad-Plus formula it utilizedto include more regional states,such as Vietnam and Indonesia, aswell as European states, such asthe United Kingdom, France, andGermany, to buttress the provisionof international public goods suchas knowledge-transfer rules, infrastructure development, and management of non-traditional securityissues.The second task is to strike a balance between ASEAN and theQuad. As mentioned above, someASEAN member states are skeptical about the development of theQuad framework, which threatensto diplomatically marginalizeASEAN and intensify great powerrivalry with China. Without closeconsultation, institutionalizing theQuad could exacerbate ASEAN’sconcerns and skepticism. Also,given ASEAN’s consensus-baseddecision-making process, it is important to reassure all memberstates in this regard. Therefore,Japan should propose to enhanceASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacificby forming “webs” of regional institutions. The starting point mightbe to create a Quad-ASEAN TrackII dialogue, as well as to link theQuad and ASEAN-X formula. TheQuad’s strength is its flexibility: itshould actively engage ASEAN andits individual member state, offering reassurance and building partnerships. At the same time, in order to enable regional states to engage in deeper multilateral, strategic discussions and prevent greatpowers from irreversible politicaland economic decoupling, Japanshould encourage ASEAN to further institutionalize the East AsiaSummit, such as strengthening itssecretariat functions and conducting more frequent Senior-Officiallevel exchanges.Japan’s FOIP vision under theSuga administration aims to avoidan intensive confrontation betweenthe United States and China by developing regional rules and normsthat are based on the existingIndo-Pacific Perspective 25