INSURGENCY IN A SMALL COUNTRY, ETHNIC REVOLT IN SRI LANKA
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECTINSURGENCY IN A SMALL COUNTRY, ETHNIC REVOLT INSRI LANKAbyMajor General P S B KulatungeSri Lanka Army.Professor Anthony JoesThe views expressed in this academic research paper are those of theauthor and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of theU.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.U.S. Army War CollegeCARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved OMB No.0704-0188Public reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completingand reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, WashingtonHeadquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision oflaw, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)2. REPORT TYPE07-04-20034. TITLE AND SUBTITLEInsurgency in a Small Country, Ethnic Revolt in Sri LankaUnclassified6. AUTHOR(S)Kulatunge, PSB ; Author7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESSU.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle BarracksCarlisle, PA17013-50509. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS,12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENTAPUBLIC RELEASE,13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES14. ABSTRACTSee attached file.15. SUBJECT TERMS16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:17. LIMITATIONOF ABSTRACTSame as Report(SAR)a. REPORTb. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGEUnclassifiedUnclassifiedUnclassified3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO)xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-20035a. CONTRACT NUMBER5b. GRANT NUMBER5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER5d. PROJECT NUMBER5e. TASK NUMBER5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORTNUMBER10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORTNUMBER(S)18.19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSONNUMBER Rife, DaveOF PAGES RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil3519b. TELEPHONE NUMBERInternational Area CodeArea Code Telephone NumberDSNStandard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18
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ABSTRACTAUTHOR:MG PSB KulatungeTITLE:INSURGENCY IN A SMALL COUNTRY, ETHNIC REVOLT IN SRI LANKAFORMAT:Strategy Research ProjectDATE:07 April 2003PAGES:35CLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedThis project will examine the principles of insurgency in a small country and the reasons for it tosurvive for such a long period.iii
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TABLE OF ILIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.IXINSURGENCY IN A SMALL COUNTRY, ETHNIC REVOLT IN SRI LANKA.1HISTORICAL OVERVIEW . 1EVOLUTION OF THE LTTE. 8CHAIN OF COMMAND. 9ROLE AND DEPLOYMENT. 10INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE. 11OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE. 12TRAINING. 13BASES AND TRAINING AREAS . 14INVENTORIES. 15KNOWN ARMS AND SUPPLIERS/ROUTES . 16ASSESSMENT . 17ENDNOTES.21BIBLIOGRAPHY .25v
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PREFACEThe foundation of this research was initially from my experience serving in the north andeast of Sri Lanka for over 22 years of my service career. I had the fortune of meeting most ofthe IPKF officers and Sri Lanka government officials serving in the northern and easternprovince who provided me with a wealth of information. In addition, I gathered much of theinformation from my numerous posting in the areas of conflict.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI am grateful for the help and assistance of numerous colleagues and contacts who haveprovided leads, ideas, suggestions, and sources of material for this publication.In Colombo, Sri Lanka, I wish to acknowledge the help and support rendered by Mr.Iqbal Athas who provided valuable information. At USAWC I wish to thank Professor AnthonyJoes who supervised my research paper with care and diligence. I also wish to thank ColonelChristopher Owens who encouraged me and helped me to organize the research work and toMr. Shawn Mosholder for helping me with the reconstruction and arranging of my researchpaper according to the SRP template and finally in Washington, D.C. to Mr. Sena Fernando whopainstakingly helped with the typing of this research paper.I am indebted to all those mentioned above, for without their assistance my researchpaper would have not been a reality.vii
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONSFIGURE 1. JAFFNA PENINSULA . 1FIGURE 2: LTTE’S MAIN PROCUREMENT BASES . 4FIGURE 3: LTTE’S SUICIDE KIT. 6FIGURE 4 - NORTH AND EAST PROVINCES. 7FIGURE 5 - MAP OF SRI LANKA . 10ix
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INSURGENCY IN A SMALL COUNTRY, ETHNIC REVOLT IN SRI LANKAFIGURE 1. JAFFNA PENINSULAHISTORICAL OVERVIEWThe protracted insurgency in Sri Lanka is a vicious by-product of prolonged ethnic conflictbetween Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhala Community and the minority Tamil Community. Thecurrent wave of violence can be traced back to the early 1970s, when a group of Sri LankanTamil politicians who had lost power in an election began to campaign earnestly for anindependent Tamil State. Their rhetoric against the Sinhala community and the government inColombo galvanized a few employed and under-employed Tamils to take up arms against thestate. The formative phase of violence inspired by Tamil nationalism was directed againstfellow Tamils who did not support the idea of a separate state; these victims included Tamilpoliticians, police officers, government officials and suspected informants.Sri Lanka’s armed forces were incapable of meeting the militant threat during this period,not unsurprisingly, given that they were primarily trained to perform ceremonial functions. Bythe time the military was able to transform itself into a professional fighting force, the militants1had developed a mastery of guerrilla warfare. The bloody ethnic riots of July 1983 , a2watershed in the history of Sri Lanka polarized the two communities and were a reaction of a
segment of the majority community to the deaths of 13 soldiers in an ambush by the most3formidable Tamil militant group – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).Following this, over one million Tamils left Sinhala areas for the predominantly Tamilnorthern and eastern provinces of the Island and almost all the Sinhalese left the north. From1983 to 1987, Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups recruited, trained and armed over 20,000 Tamil4youths. With the cooperation of a sympathetic Tamil Nadu state government and the NewDelhi central government, militants began to build up their arsenal and expertise. About500,000 Tamils who left for neighboring India and the West sought asylum as political refugees;they became the economic backbone of the militant campaign.The powerful presence of an international link was a major morale boost for the Tamilinsurgents in Sri Lanka. It was a form of recognition of their struggle both domestically andinternationally. The international component enhances domestic survival and contributes to theresilience of an organization. Although there was limited financial assistance until the ethnicriots of July 1983,there were many Tamils who were sympathetic towards the Tamil cause andwaiting for an opportunity to make a contribution for the advancement of Tamil nationalisticaspirations and goals. The ethnic riots deeply wounded the sentiments and galvanized theTamils as a community. Pasttragedies were brought to light and kept alive by the politicalleaders on both sides.From 1977 onwards the LTTE international network made inroads to countries where5there was a Tamil presence . From the mid—1970s onwards, the Tamil militant structuressteadily grew in the west, with its nucleus in London. The linkages were mostly confined to theMiddle East, for military development, and to Europe and elsewhere like Nigeria, Yemen, andZambia for financial assistance. By the 1980s,Tamil militant representatives had traveled farand wide. The Arab and the Islamic world were important but so were countries where Tamilslived, worked and earned in substantial number. They were Libya, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria,Morocco, Turkey and Yemen. They also had substantial contacts with Cyprus and Greece. Thegovernment in Colombo failed to keep track of Tamil political activities overseas.Prior to July 1983, all efforts by Tamil insurgent groups and their representatives to raisemoney overseas to sustain a war had been unsuccessful. It was only after July 1983,with theexodus of over 100,000 Tamil refugees and another equal number of displaced persons that6gave birth to a distinct Tamil Diaspora. By the end of 1983,there were over 100,000 Sri LankanTamils in Tamil Nadu alone and this number would swell up to nearly 200,000 with theescalation of the conflict. The exodus to the west was equally intense. Many countries in thewest, sympathetic to the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils would revise their immigration and2
emigration policies vis-à-vis Sri Lanka. As a consequence, the number of refugees, mostlyeconomic but in the guise of political asylum seekers, would bring the totality of the Sri LankanTamil Diaspora to over 450,000.From 1983 onwards the LTTE established offices and cells throughout the world, buildingan international network unsurpassed by Armenian, Kurd, Sikh, Lebanese or Palestinian7militants. Today, the LTTE international infrastructure includes six ocean-going ships , officesand cells and a state-of-the art network designed to disseminate anti-Sri Lankan statepropaganda and raise funds for advancing the goal of a separate Tamil state. Their worldwidenetwork facilitated the purchase of weapons from private arms dealers and government usingfalse end-use certificates. While the LTTE international secretariat is located in London, theguerillas have 40 offices – in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy,Scandinavia, Canada, Australia and one recently opened in Japan – to lobby against aid andassistance being provided to Sri Lanka. In the US, the LTTE has offices in Chicago, Boston,New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Washington D.C and several in the states of California andTexas.Reprisal killings and civilian deaths in the crossfire of firefights strengthened the militantmovement and the resultant publicity tarnished Sri Lanka’s reputation as a fledging democracyand a popular tourist destination. With finance from overseas and pledges of sustained support,the level of violence escalated. LTTE recruitment was targeted on the naturally motivatedfamilies that have suffered at the hands of the Sri Lankan armed forces. The militant campaigndeveloped into an insurgency. Ill-conceived counter insurgency measures involving artillery andother means of heavy firepower to minimize military casualties, resulted in high civiliancasualties and generated greater support for Tamil militancy. Explosives, weapons and othersupplies came mostly from India, only 36 miles away and a 45-minute cruise by speedboat.The SLN intercepted only a fraction of the militant arsenal.Although Tamil insurgents had established a few training camps in Tamil Nadu in1982,there was no official assistance from the Central government of India prior to August1983.In the eyes of many Indian hard-liners, Sri Lanka since 1977 had stepped out of the non8aligned orbit and had become an ally of the west. There were Israeli intelligence operatives,British counter insurgency experts, South African mercenaries, and rumors about offeringTrincomalee, one of the finest deep water harbors, to the US navy. Sri Lanka had good relationswith Pakistan and China, two countries that had fought border wars with India and they were inthe process of stepping up military assistance to Colombo. Further, President Jayewardene of9Sri Lanka did not enjoy with Premier Indira Gandhi the same warm relationship he had with her3
father, Premier Jawaharlal Nehru. Premier Indira Gandhi, also the leader of the powerfulCongress(I) Party, took a policy decision to support Sri Lankan northern insurgency from August1983.The need to have leverage over Colombo was adequately demonstrated by the Researchand Analysis Wing (RAW),the agency also responsible for advancing India’s secret foreignpolicy goals. Within her inner circle, the decision was justified. Geopolitics and domesticcompulsions validated the rationale. The third agency of RAW, a supra intelligence outfit, wasentrusted with the task. Within a year ,the number of Sri Lanka Tamil training camps in TamilNadu mushroomed to 32.By mid 1987,over 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents had beenprovided sanctuary, finance, training and weapons either by the central government, stategovernment of Tamil Nadu or by the insurgent groups themselves. While most of the initialtraining was confined to Indian military and para military camps in Uttara Pradesh, specializedtraining was imparted by the Indian instructors attached to RAW to Sri Lankan insurgents in10New Delhi, Bombay and Vishakhapuram.The most secretive training was conducted inChakrata, north of Dehra Dun, India’s premier military academy for training service personnel,11where RAW had also imparted training to Bangladesh, Pakistan and Tibetan dissidents.FIGURE 2: LTTE’S MAIN PROCUREMENT BASES4
Toward mid 1987, India, realizing that the Sri Lankan insurgency was having a spill-overeffect, worked concertedly towards mediating the conflict between the government in Colomboand the Tamil groups. In Tamil Nadu, 3 per cent of 60 million Tamils supported 22 small butsignificant Indian Tamil political and militant groups campaigning for Dravidasan, anindependent Tamil state in India. Furthermore, the Cold War – in which India acted within theSoviet sphere of influence and Sri Lanka was within the Western sphere of influence wascoming to an end. On 29 May 1987 an Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, devolving greater autonomyof the Tamils and preserving India’s geopolitical and strategic interests in the region, was signedbetween Premier Rajiv Gandhi12and President J.R. Jayawardene. The accord entailed thedeployment of 100,000 Indian soldiers to maintain peace between Sri Lankan troops and Tamilmilitants. Until the accord, the LTTE had been a highly secretive Tamil militant group shieldedfrom the public eye. All the Tamil militant groups, except the LTTE that had developed anindependent network of international support, joined the political mainstream. Among thesegroups were the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam,(PLOTE), Eelam PeopleRevolutionary Liberation Front,(EPRLF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization,(TELO), EelamRevolutionary Organizers,(EROS), and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party(EPDP). After13three months of peace the LTTE declared war on the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF),confirming the constraints facing the transition from militancy to politics. During the two years offighting, the battle hardened LTTE matched a much larger, resourceful and formally trained14military.As a consequence of the deployment of foreign troops, a Sinhala nationalist force – theJanatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - declared war on the government. Some 40,000 Sinhalese,mostly youths, were extra judicially killed by state-sponsored death-squads in the south. SriLanka, hitherto a model democracy of the west, proved incapable of fighting a military campaignwhile retaining the characteristics of a fully-fledged democracy. The island recorded the highestnumber of political murders during 1988-89 of any country in the world. In a tactical move torelieve the mounting Indian pressure, the LTTE agreed to hold talks with Colombo. WhenJayawardene’s successor, Ranasinghe Premadasa, called for the withdrawal of the IPKF, NewDelhi refused. Premadasa then sanctioned covert military assistance to the weakened LTTE.Finally, the IPKF departed from the shores of Sri Lanka in March 1990, although it left behind a15heavily armed proxy force. This was decimatedwithin a few weeks by the combat efficientLTTE.Within three months, the LTTE broke the cease-fire and declared war on the government,and executed 400 Sinhala policemen who had surrendered. This seemed to confirm the theory5
that the LTTE always uses periods of peace to gain International recognition, disseminatepropaganda, generate funds, procure supplies, gather intelligence, regroup, retrain and recruit.After a decade of battle the LTTE had grown from a small force of 3,000 in 1986 to 16,000 in1996. Sri Lanka witnessed the emergency and the systematic elimination of 30 Tamil groups bythe LTTE, as well as the death of 100,000 people, mostly civilians (including southern killings).The LTTE also eliminated the alternative Tamil leadership, including AppapillaiAmirthalingam,16the leader of the Tamil United Liberated Front (TULF), the party that haddominated conservative Tamil politics over the years. After labeling members of the rival Tamilgroups as traitors, the LTTE declared itself the sole representative force of the Sri Lankan Tamilspeaking people. The LTTE controlled the northern province until late 1994, while Sri Lankantroops fought LTTE deployments in the eastern province. Throughout the 1990s the LTTEstaged several suicide attacks in Colombo, eliminating important leaders, including RanasinghePremadasa, who had aimed to conquer the LTTE on the battlefield.FIGURE 3: LTTE’S SUICIDE KITPremadasa was killed on 1 May 1993 by a LTTE suicide bomber who had infiltrated hishousehold during the peace talks. LTTE hit squads had also assassinated rival
The protracted insurgency in Sri Lanka is a vicious by-product of prolonged ethnic conflict between Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhala Community and the minority Tamil Community. The current wave of violence can be traced back to the early 1970s, when a group of Sri Lankan
insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This is important work, laying out the case that as terrorism and insurgency differ, recognizing that the current "long war" is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency must lead us
THE SRI LANKAN INSURGENCY: A REBALANCING OF THE ORTHODOX POSITION A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Peter Stafford Roberts Department of Politics and History, Brunel University April 2016 . 2 Abstract The insurgency in Sri Lanka between the early 1980s and 2009 is the topic of this
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009) Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961) Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)
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The consequences for Sri Lankan society have been both marked and severe, and their legacy will almost certainly be felt for many years to come. - 3 - . insurgency in the south and the ongoing conflict in the north and east. Insurgency groups too have been responsible for thousands of abductions, disappearances and murders. .
akuntansi musyarakah (sak no 106) Ayat tentang Musyarakah (Q.S. 39; 29) لًََّز ãَ åِاَ óِ îَخظَْ ó Þَْ ë Þٍجُزَِ ß ا äًَّ àَط لًَّجُرَ íَ åَ îظُِ Ûاَش
Collectively make tawbah to Allāh S so that you may acquire falāḥ [of this world and the Hereafter]. (24:31) The one who repents also becomes the beloved of Allāh S, Âَْ Èِﺑاﻮَّﺘﻟاَّﺐُّ ßُِ çﻪَّٰﻠﻟانَّاِ Verily, Allāh S loves those who are most repenting. (2:22
latino lgbt people in the criminal justice system, but limited DATA PAINT A PICTURE OF BIAS AND OVERREPRESENTATION. Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, "Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States and States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014," June 2015; Gary J. Gates and Frank Newport, “Special Report: 3.4% of U.S. Adults Identify
