Option Selection Report For The Chiltern Train Protection .
Report for Network RailOption selection report for theChiltern Train ProtectionStrategyDoc:J2044/Doc003Rev:Rev 02Date:27th February 2020Sotera Risk Solutions Limited22 Glanville RoadBromleyKent BR2 9LWUnited KingdomTel: 44 (0)20 82890384Email: peter.dray@sotera.co.ukInternet: www.sotera.co.uk
REVISIONSRevision NoRev 00Rev 01Rev 02Prepared byPeter DrayPeter DrayPeter DraySotera Risk SolutionsChecked byIssue dateDavid HarrisDavid Harris17/02/202027/02/2020Page 1CommentsInternal versionIssued to Network RailIssued to Network Railaccommodatingcomments receivedNetwork Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
TABLE OF CONTENTS2.1Participants52.2Workshop Process52.3Agreed options for assessment62.4Agreed evaluation criteria63.1Assessment of each option83.2Conclusion from the assessment of strategic optionsSotera Risk SolutionsPage 227Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
1INTRODUCTIONFollowing the DoT investigation into the Clapham Junction Rail Accident(1988), recommendations were made regarding the fitment of AutomaticTrain Protection on the mainline GB railway. Two pilot schemes for ATPwere identified covering Chiltern and Great Western; these schemes wereimplemented in the early 1990s.The two installed systems are compliant with the current legislativerequirements for train protection systems as described in the RailwaysSafety Regulations 1999 (Termed RSR 99).Included in RSR 99, is the mandated requirement on the mainlinenetwork to provide a track side and train borne train protection system.A ‘train protection system’ is defined in Regulation 2(1) of RSR 99 as:“equipment which(a) causes the brakes of the train to apply automatically if thetrain–(i) passes without authority a stop signal such passing ofwhich could cause the train to collide with another train, or(ii) travels at excessive speed on a relevant approach;(b) is installed so as to operate at every stop signal referred to insub-paragraph (a), except a stop signal on the approach to anemergency crossover, and at an appropriate place on everyrelevant approach;except that where it is reasonably practicable to install it, it meansequipment which automatically controls the speed of the train toensure, so far as possible, that a stop signal is not passed withoutauthority and that the permitted speed is not exceeded at any timethroughout its journey”.Following the regulations, there was an acceptance that ATP would berequired across the network and, in the interim, TPWS would beprovided. Since the 1999 regulations, there have been significantdevelopments in the industry: Completion of the installation of TPWS at junction signals (circa.2003), which, in conjunction with other risk reduction measures,has reduced SPAD risk across the network by 90%. The incremental improvement to the deployment of both tracksideand trainborne TPWS to improve reliability, availability andeffectiveness in stopping trains before they reach a conflict point. The development of ETCS, which is planned for installation acrossthe entire main line railway, which will provide an enhanced levelof protection compared to TPWS.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 3Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
Having been installed as part of a trial for nearly thirty years, the ATPsystem fitted to Chiltern between Marylebone and Aynho Junction is nowobsolete; spares are no longer available, and the equipment is notmanufactured. Hence, maintaining the existing system is becominginfeasible and alternative train protection strategies need to beconsidered for the future. System reliability and availability are alsodeclining.As a consequence of the obsolescence and reliability issues, Network Railand Chiltern Railways have identified a range of alternative risk controlstrategies to manage the risk over the area of the rail network over whichChiltern Railways operate.In order to assess the safety impact of each of the options Sotera RiskSolutions Limited (Sotera) were commissioned to undertake a detailed,independent, risk assessment of the potential future train protectionstrategies 1. The results of the assessment were then used as an input toCost Benefit Analysis and formal option selection, which considered awider range of decision making criteria. This report presents the outputof the option selection to recommend a single option to take forward.1Report for Network Rail - Risk Assessment of the Chiltern Train Protection Strategy, Sotera RiskSolutions Limited, 2020.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 4Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
2OPTION SELECTION WORKSHOP2.1ParticipantsThe option selection workshop was held on 31st January 2020, at NetworkRail’s office at Baskerville House, Birmingham, B1 2ND. The participantsof the workshop are listed in Table 1.Table 1Workshop participantsNameCompanyRoleDarren YoungNetwork RailSenior Project ManagerBarry LawsonNetwork RailProject ManagerAndy FreeNetwork RailRoute Asset Manager (Signalling)Pete EvansNetwork RailSenior Principles Engineer (Signals)Dominic MottramNetwork RailArea Manager - Chiltern Railways at Network RailMark BennettNetwork RailSenior SponsorSimon JarrettChiltern RailwaysEngineering Assurance ManagerSimon WalkerChiltern RailwaysHead of Fleet Engineering at Chiltern RailwaysPeter DraySoteraFacilitatorDavid HarrisSoteraFacilitator/SecretaryThe assembled team of participants were assessed to have thecompetency required to make a decision on the optimum future trainprotection strategy for the Chiltern route.2.2Workshop ProcessThe key stages to the workshop were: To agree the set of options available for the future train protectionarrangements for Chiltern. To agree the evaluation criteria to be applied to each option. To apply the evaluation criteria to each option, comparing thestrengths and weakness of each option. To select an option (or options) to recommend.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 5Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
2.3For the selected option(s) determine any optimisation thatmaximises the delivery of the safety benefits and offsets anypotential increase in risk in the interim period while it isimplemented.Agreed options for assessmentTo ensure all possible potential future strategies were considered, a wideset of were identified in advance and reviewed in the workshop. Theupgrades involved lineside and trainborne upgrades. The full range ofoptions included:1. Maintaining the existing ATP for Chiltern.2. Switching ATP off and relying on existing TPWS provision.3. Enhanced trackside TPWS from Marylebone to Aynho Junction (tolatest standards and fitment to plain line signals).4. Enhanced trackside TPWS from Marylebone to Birmingham MoorStreet (to latest standards and fitment to plain line signals).5. Enhanced trackside TPWS from Marylebone to Aynho Junction (tolatest standards and fitment to plain line signals) together withupgrades to Chiltern train TPWS to Mk4 units.6. Enhanced trackside TPWS from Marylebone to Birmingham MoorStreet (to latest standards and fitment to plain line signals)together with upgrades to Chiltern train TPWS to Mk4 units.7. ETCS L2 Limited supervision for Chiltern Marylebone to AynhoJunction.8. Enhanced trackside TPWS Marylebone to Aynho Junction togetherwith ETCS L2 Limited supervision for Chiltern (Marylebone toAynho Junction).9. ETCS full supervision for Chiltern (Marylebone to Aynho Junction).Note: for all the above options, the risk assessment is based upon theassumption that ATP is switched off by 2021 (other than for Option 1).This assumption enables the assessment to compare the relative safetyof maintaining ATP with the alternative strategies. In practice, ATPwould be maintained for as long as practical whilst an alternative strategyis implemented, which is the subject of Section 4.The workshop participants agreed that this was a comprehensive set ofoptions although there may be some minor modification or optimisationshould they be recommended for implementation.2.4Agreed evaluation criteriaThe evaluation criteria included:1) Safety Performance - train accidentsa) Final (2026 )Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 6Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
b) Interimc) Further mitigations2) Safety Performance – other3) Operational impacta) Normalb) Degraded/emergency4) Costa) Capitalb) Ongoing5) Deliverability/uncertaintya) Technical feasibilityb) Delivery within timescalesc) Maintainability6) Impact on other parties (eg, TOCs)7) Alignment with business objectives8) Regulatory position.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 7Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
3RESULTS OF THE OPTION SELECTION3.1Assessment of each optionThe conclusions from the evaluation of each option are presented in thissection. For each option, a chart is provided which indicates the trainaccident risk:1) The level of risk at four points in time, including:a) The end of 2019 (the base case for assessment accounting forexisting ATP and service levels).b) The end of 2021, accounting for additional HS2 construction trafficand increased passenger demand.c) The end of 2024, accounting for East-West rail traffic and furtherpassenger demand.d) The end of 2026, which is the end point for the assessment.2) Each bar is separated into two components, the lower darker barindicated the risk in the Marylebone to Aynho junction section ofrailway (i.e. the section of the route within which ATP currentlyoperates), the lighter bar is for the rest of the railway over whichChiltern Railways operates. The bars cover all operators that runtrains over the same route sections as Chiltern Railways, includingfreight operators.3) There are three reference lines, the higher (red) one indicating therisk that would result if Chiltern ATP was permanently switched off in2021 and no additional mitigations were introduced. A solid greenline indicating the level of risk that would result if ATP could bemaintained without any reduction in availability or reliability in thelonger term. A dotted green line indicating the risk on the ATPprotected area between Marylebone and Aynho junction (i.e. the areawhere ATP is currently fitted) if ATP could be maintained without anyreduction in availability or reliability in the longer term.For all options (other than Option 1) there is a risk increase in 2021 dueto the assumption that ATP is switched off by 2021 which is beforeadditional safety controls could be implemented. The management ofrisk in the transitional period (without ATP switched-off) is the subject ofSection 4.The risk assessment results presented are derived from a detailed trainaccident risk model developed for the railway over which ChilternRailways operates. The risk model assesses the train-train collision,buffer collision and derailment risk (from overspeeding). The modelaccounts, in detail, for the trackside and trainborne train protectionarrangements, the train services operated and the layout of the railway.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 8Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
Details of the approach to the risk assessment and the results can befound in a previous report(1).Option 1: Maintain the existing ATP for ChilternSafety Performance: This option, in principle, would maintain theexisting level of train accident risk. In the future cases there will bemodest increases in the baseline level of risk through higher networkutilisation (passenger journeys) and the introduction of additionalservices, such as East-West Rail (see Figure 1).Train accident risk for Option 1Maintain exsiting ATP for Chiltern0.025FWI per year0.0200.0150.0100.0050.000Other areasSL19SL21SL23SL26MYB - AynhoCost: UnknownMaintain exsiting ATP for Chiltern30 year safety benefit: 0.174Switch ATP off and rely on existing TPWSMaintain exsiting ATP for Chiltern (MYB - Aynho risk only)Safety benefit to cost ratio:In practical terms, the ATP system is now obsolete: the technology is notsupported, spares are no longer available and stored spares are now at acritical level. Consequently, without an alternative strategy, as thetrainborne units continue to fail, risk would increase through eitherwithdrawing trains from service and causing knock-on risk through delaysand cancellations, or alternatively, the trains would be operated with thefitted Mk1 TPWS units only. The Mk1 TPWS units provide a significantlylower level of train protection than ATP. At the current time trains withfailed ATP equipment are normally operated without the ATP functionaluntil the end of the day. A consequence of the increasing ATP systemfailure rate and operation with ATP in a failed state may mean that the1Sotera Risk Solutions Ltd, A report for Network Rail - Risk Assessment of the Chiltern TrainProtection Strategy, January 2020.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 9Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
potential increase in risk is accelerated and well above that shown in thechart above where it is assumed that the ATP system on all fitted stockcan be maintained in a functional state.Costs: There are no capital costs associated with operating the existingsystem, however, the system is not sustainable. A previous report hasinvestigated the possibility of re-engineering the existing ATP system,which was found to be impractical (1).Deliverability and uncertainty: The existing system is not deliverableor maintainable due to the obsolescence reasons presented above.Furthermore, pursuit of the option would result is progressivedeterioration of safety levels in order to maintain service levels. Hencethis is not a viable option for the future.Impact on other parties: There is negligible impact on other parties ofoperating ATP. Where Chiltern Railways operate over LUL infrastructure,the ATP system provides roll-back protection. If the system is replaced,the functionality would need to be provided through alternativetechnology as roll-back protection is a requirement to operate over LULinfrastructure.Alignment with business objectives: The existing ATP system is notaligned with the Network Rail commitment for system-wide deploymentof ETCS. Should additional stock fail, Chiltern Railways would not be ableto provide a service compatible with the timetable, unless they werepermitted to operate trains relying on the existing TPWS system.Regulatory position: The existing ATP is entirely compliant with theRailway Safety Regulation 1999, for train protection. Hence it is the legalbaseline.Conclusion: The critical issue of system obsolescence means it is notfeasible to maintain the existing ATP system, therefore this is not apractical option to progress as a future strategy.Option 2: Switch ATP off and rely on existing TPWS provisionSafety: Switching-off ATP would result in a significant train accident riskincrease (of approximately 40%) between Marylebone and AynhoJunction. Whilst this would mean that the level of protection iscomparable to that on most of the rail network, the option is notconsidered sustainable. The level of train accident risk from this option isshown in Figure 2.1Mott MacDonald, Options for Interim Solution on Chiltern ATP Routes, March 2015, NR 3893399/01.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 10Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
Train accident risk for Option 2Switch ATP off and rely on existing TPWS0.025FWI per year0.0200.0150.0100.0050.000Other areasSL19SL21SL23SL26MYB - AynhoCost: 0Maintain exsiting ATP for Chiltern30 year safety benefit: 0 FWISwitch ATP off and rely on existing TPWSMaintain exsiting ATP for Chiltern (MYB - Aynho risk only)Safety benefit to cost ratio: -Switching off ATP would also result in a small risk increase on LondonUnderground infrastructure as ATP also provides rollback protection whichis requirement for operation on their infrastructure.Operational performance: Operating with ATP switched-off wouldresult in a modest operational performance improvement asapproximately 10% of fleet failures are connected with ATP systemfailures. It is estimated that there could be a 1-2% operationalperformance improvement from switching-off ATP.Cost: Switching ATP off would result in a moderate saving in terms oftrackside and trainborne maintenance and from response to failures.Deliverability and uncertainty: Of all the options considered this is themost deliverable and least uncertain option. In practical terms, thesystem is not likely to be switched off, but would be kept running until itcould no longer be maintained. It has been estimated that the system islikely to deteriorate at a rate of approximately 20% per year (as arealistic worst case). The impact of this on safety performance isdiscussed in more detail in Section 4.Impact on other parties: There would be an issue delivering roll backprotection, which is a requirement for operating on London Undergroundinfrastructure.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 11Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
Alignment with business objectives: Consultation with the NetworkRail Regional Executive has indicated that the risk increase is intolerable;there are other achievable options that do not result in a risk increase.The option is also thought likely to be unacceptable to the ChilternRailways’ board.Regulatory position: As this option would involve switching-off ATP andit would be reasonably practical to maintain some ATP, the early removalwould require an exemption against RSR 1999.Conclusion: Whilst this option would reduce costs and delays, it is notconsidered viable or sustainable due to the increase in train accident risk.Option 3: Enhanced trackside TPWS from Marylebone to Aynho Junction(to latest standards and fitment to plain line signals)Note: The trackside TPWS fitment on much of the UK railway is not to thelatest standards; this option includes updating the fitment of junctionsignals to the latest standards together with provision of TPWS at plainline signals. Hence, the option would provide a degree of enhancedprotection at junction and plain line signals although this would be limitedat junction signals as many already meet current standards. For thisoption the upgrade would include trackside fitment between Maryleboneand Aynho junction only and switching-off ATP.Safety: This option provides a level of safety risk that is moderatelyhigher than the current level with ATP fully operational (see Figure 3).Whilst this would mean that the level of protection is similar, and slightlyenhanced, compared to most of the rail network, the option is notconsidered viable due to the risk increase that would result betweenMarylebone and Aynho Junction.Alternative technology would also be required to provide rollbackprotection to enable operation on London Underground infrastructure.Sotera Risk SolutionsPage 12Network Rail\J2044\Doc 003\Rev 02
Train accident risk for Option 3Enhanced trackside TPWS MYB to Aynho0.025FWI per year0.0200.0150.0100.0050.000Other areasSL19SL21SL23SL26MYB - AynhoCost: 20,760,000Maintain exsiting ATP for Chiltern30 year safety benefit: 0.098Switch ATP off and rely on existing TPWSMaintain exsiting ATP for Chiltern (MYB - Aynho risk only)Safety benefit to cost ratio:Operational performance: Operating with ATP switched-off wouldresult in a modest operational performance improvement asapproximately 10% of fleet failures are connected with ATP systemfailures. It is estimated that there could be a 1-2% operationalperformance improvement from switching-off ATP. However, there maybe additional delays due to failures and activations resulting from theadditional TPWS fitment.Cost: The capital cost of this option is approximately 20.8m.Deliverability and uncertainty: Of all the options considered, thisoption is highly deliverable and one of the least uncertain options. It isestimated that the option could be delivered by the end of 2023.A benefit of the TPWS options is that trackside maintenance can beundertaken by a larger pool of competent maintainers, ie, ATP is highlyspecific with a relatively small number of maintainers. Furthermore,spares for lineside TPWS are readily available.It should be noted that in practical terms, the ATP system would not beswitched off, but kept running until it could no longer be maintai
Safety Regulations 1999 (Termed RSR 99). Included in RSR 99, is the mandated requirement on the mainline network to provide a track side and train borne train protection system. A ‘train protection system’ is defined in Regulation2(1) of RSR 99 as: “ equipment which (a) causes the brakes of the train to apply automatically if the train –
May 02, 2018 · D. Program Evaluation ͟The organization has provided a description of the framework for how each program will be evaluated. The framework should include all the elements below: ͟The evaluation methods are cost-effective for the organization ͟Quantitative and qualitative data is being collected (at Basics tier, data collection must have begun)
Silat is a combative art of self-defense and survival rooted from Matay archipelago. It was traced at thé early of Langkasuka Kingdom (2nd century CE) till thé reign of Melaka (Malaysia) Sultanate era (13th century). Silat has now evolved to become part of social culture and tradition with thé appearance of a fine physical and spiritual .
On an exceptional basis, Member States may request UNESCO to provide thé candidates with access to thé platform so they can complète thé form by themselves. Thèse requests must be addressed to esd rize unesco. or by 15 A ril 2021 UNESCO will provide thé nomineewith accessto thé platform via their émail address.
̶The leading indicator of employee engagement is based on the quality of the relationship between employee and supervisor Empower your managers! ̶Help them understand the impact on the organization ̶Share important changes, plan options, tasks, and deadlines ̶Provide key messages and talking points ̶Prepare them to answer employee questions
Dr. Sunita Bharatwal** Dr. Pawan Garga*** Abstract Customer satisfaction is derived from thè functionalities and values, a product or Service can provide. The current study aims to segregate thè dimensions of ordine Service quality and gather insights on its impact on web shopping. The trends of purchases have
Bruksanvisning för bilstereo . Bruksanvisning for bilstereo . Instrukcja obsługi samochodowego odtwarzacza stereo . Operating Instructions for Car Stereo . 610-104 . SV . Bruksanvisning i original
Chính Văn.- Còn đức Thế tôn thì tuệ giác cực kỳ trong sạch 8: hiện hành bất nhị 9, đạt đến vô tướng 10, đứng vào chỗ đứng của các đức Thế tôn 11, thể hiện tính bình đẳng của các Ngài, đến chỗ không còn chướng ngại 12, giáo pháp không thể khuynh đảo, tâm thức không bị cản trở, cái được
10 tips och tricks för att lyckas med ert sap-projekt 20 SAPSANYTT 2/2015 De flesta projektledare känner säkert till Cobb’s paradox. Martin Cobb verkade som CIO för sekretariatet för Treasury Board of Canada 1995 då han ställde frågan
