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The Philosophical Works of Descartes iThe Philosophical Worksof Descartes

The Philosophical Works of Descartes iiThe Philosophical Worksof DescartesRené DescartesRendered into English by Elizabeth S.Haldane, LL. D. and G. R. T. Ross, M. A., D.Phil.YOGeBooks: Hollister, Mo 65672

The Philosophical Works of Descartes iiiYOGeBooks by Roger L. Cole, Hollister, Mo 65672 2017 YOGeBooks by Roger L. ColeAll rights reserved. Electronic edition published 2017isbn: mThe text of this ebook is in the public domain, but this ebook is not. Pleasedo not distribute it without authorization.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes ivPreface.The aim of this edition is to present to Englishreaders all the philosophical works ofDescartes which were originally intended forpublication. More than one valuable translationof the treatises which give a general view ofDescartes’ system has already appeared. Butcertain others which are quite indispensablefor a thorough comprehension of his viewshave not yet been made accessible to Englishreaders. The chief of these are probably the“Rules for the Direction of the Understanding”and the “Passions of the Soul.” As a matter offact the “Passions of the Soul” was actuallytranslated into English by an anonymous writerin the year 1650, but this translation is nowv

The Philosophical Works of Descartes vexceedingly rare, and no other has appeareduntil the present time. In the “Passions” we findthe full exposition of Descartes’ theory thatmental and physiological phenomena may beexplained by simple mechanical processes. Itwas a completely new departure to state thatsuch matters were capable of being interpretedthus, and one that has had a fundamentalinfluence on the psychology and physiology ofthe present time.It is also most important to mark the resultof Descartes’ speculations on contemporarythought; and the complete translation nowpresented of the “Objections” directedagainst the “Meditations,” published togetherwith Descartes’ replies thereto, in the secondvolume, will enable the English reader to realizethe novelty of the Cartesian doctrine, and theenormous effect it had upon European thoughtat the time. He will further be able to judgebetter of the success of Descartes’ attempts tovi

The Philosophical Works of Descartes viextricate himself from the difficulties which hisphilosophy undoubtedly contains.The works translated here are the “Rules,”the “Method,” the “Meditations,” with the“Objections and Replies,” part of the “Principles,”the “Search after Truth,” the “Passions,” andthe “Notes.” Unfortunately it has been foundimpossible to include Descartes’ philosophicalcorrespondence and his more speciallyphysiological treatises, but perhaps in the nottoo distant future the work of the presenttranslators will be supplemented in thisdirection.The translators have used the new andcomplete edition of Descartes’ Works whichhas been prepared by M. Adam and thelate M. Tannery (Paris, Léopold Cerf). Thetranslator of the “Rules for the Direction ofthe Understanding” has also had recourse toan edition published by Dr Artur Buchenau(Leipzig, Dürr’schen Buchhandlung 1907).Moreover his especial thanks are due to Mr W.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes viiR. Boyce Gibson, who already had a translationof the work in manuscript, for kindly permittinghim to use, as he did with great profit, thisprevious version.E. S. HaldaneG. R. T. RossMarch 1911

The Philosophical Works of Descartes viiiContentsPreface. ivRules for the Direction of the Mind “Rules for the Direction of Our Intelligence.” 12Rule I. 5Rule II. 10Rule III. 18Rule IV. 27Rule V. 42Rule VI. 45Rule VII. 56Rule VIII. 66Rule IX. 81Rule X. 87Rule XI. 95Rule XII. 102

The Philosophical Works of Descartes ixRule XIII. 138Rule XIV. 153Rule XV. 181Rule XVI. 185Rule XVII. 195Rule XVIII. 200Rule XIX. 213Rule XX. 214Rule XXI. 215Discourse on Method Prefatory Note to the Method. 216217Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting theReason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences. 220Part I. 222Part II. 238Part III. 258Part IV. 274Part V. 290Part VI. 323Meditations on First Philosophy Prefatory Note to the Meditations. 356357

The Philosophical Works of Descartes xTo the Most Wise and Illustrious the Dean andDoctors of the Sacred Faculty of Theology in Paris. 359Preface to the Reader. 370Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations. 377Meditations on the First Philosophy in which theExistence of God and the Distinction BetweenMind and Body are Demonstrated. 386Meditation I. 387Meditation II. 400Meditation III. 422Meditation IV. 460Meditation V. 481Meditation VI. 498The Principles of Philosophy Prefatory Note to the Principles. 537538Selections from the Principles of Philosophy of RenéDescartes. 540To the most Serene Princess ELIZABETH, EldestDaughter of Frederick, King of Bohemia, CountPalatine and Elector of the Holy Roman Empire. The Principles of Philosophy. First Part. Of the Principles of Human Knowledge. 573580581

The Philosophical Works of Descartes xiSecond Part. Of the Principles of Material Things. 665Third Part. Of the Visible World. 704Part IV. Of the Earth. 737The Search After Truth 805Prefatory Note to ‘The Search After Truth.’ 806The Search After Truth by the Light Of Nature. 808The Passions of the Soul 867Prefatory Note to ‘The Passions of the Soul.’ 868The Passions of the Soul. 870Part First. Of the Passions in General, and Incidentallyof the Whole Nature of Man. 871Bibliography 935

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 1Rules for the Direction of theMind11. Ingenii.ix

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 2“Rules for the Direction of Our Intelligence.”PREFATORY NOTE.his seems to be the earliest of Descartes’philosophical works. The editors of thelatest French edition of his works assign it tothe year 1628 (Œuvres, edit. Adam et Tannery,Vol. x. pp. 486 sqq.), just before his removal toHolland and nine years after the idea of a newMethod in philosophy first occurred to him.The work was to have been complete inthirty-six rules falling into three parts containingtwelve rules each. The first part gives the generalnature of Descartes’ new Method; while in thesecond a transition is made to its applicationin the field of Mathematics. Unfortunately thetreatise, which was never completed, breaksTx

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 3off after, Rule XXI, and indeed the explanationof the last three rules is also omitted. The thirdpart was to have shown the application of theMethod to the general problems of Philosophy.The treatise was not published duringthe author’s lifetime and appeared first inprint in the Opuscula Posthuma publishedat Amsterdam in 1701. The original MS. hadpassed to Clerselier and was employed byArnauld and Nicole, the authors of the PortRoyal Logic, in their second edition of thatwork, which appeared in 1664. It appears nowto be irrevocably lost. The Amsterdam editionseems to have been made from a copy left inHolland, and M. Adam has been able to collatethe text with another copy (not in Descartes’handwriting) which Leibniz secured in Hollandin 1670 and which still remains in the RoyalPublic Library of Hanover.Much of the doctrine contained in this workwill be afterwards met with in the “Method,”“Meditations,” etc., but there are important

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 4points in which there is a discrepancy betweenthe earlier and later writings. More noteworthystill is the fact that there are several speculativesuggestions (e.g. certain of those about‘simple natures’) which never received furtherdevelopment in Descartes’ philosophy.For further information about our author’smathematical doctrine the reader is referredto his Géometrie, etc.G. R. T. R.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 5Rule I.The end of study should be to direct the mind towards theenunciation of sound and correct judgments on all mattersthat come before it.Whenever men notice some similaritybetween two things, they are wont toascribe to each, even in those respects in whichthe two differ, what they have found to be trueof the other. Thus they erroneously comparethe sciences, which entirely consist in thecognitive exercise of the mind, with the arts,which depend upon an exercise and dispositionof the body. They see that not all the arts canbe acquired by the same man, but that he whorestricts himself to one, most readily becomes1

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 6the best executant, since it is not so easy for thesame hand to adapt itself both to agriculturaloperations and to harp-playing, or to theperformance of several such tasks as to onealone. Hence they have held the same to be trueof the sciences also, and distinguishing themfrom one another according to their subjectmatter, they have imagined that they ought tobe studied separately, each in isolation from allthe rest. But this is certainly wrong. For sincethe sciences taken all together are identicalwith human wisdom, which always remains oneand the same, however applied to differentsubjects, and suffers no more differentiationproceeding from them than the light of thesun experiences from the variety of the thingswhich it illumines, there is no need for minds tobe confined at all within limits; for neither doesthe knowing of one truth have an effect likethat of the acquisition of one art and preventus from finding out another, it rather aids usto do so. Certainly it appears to me strange2

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 7that so many people should investigate humancustoms with such care, the virtues of plants,the motions of the stars, the transmutationsof metals, and the objects of similar sciences,while at the same time practically none bethinkthemselves about good understanding, oruniversal Wisdom, though nevertheless allother studies are to be esteemed not so muchfor their own value as because they contributesomething to this. Consequently we are justifiedin bringing forward this as the first rule of all,since there is nothing more prone to turn usaside from the correct way of seeking out truththan this directing of our inquiries, not towardstheir general end, but towards certain specialinvestigations. I do not here refer to perverseand censurable pursuits like empty glory orbase gain; obviously counterfeit reasoningsand quibbles suited to vulgar understandingopen up a much more direct route to such agoal than does a sound apprehension of thetruth. But I have in view even honourable and

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 8laudable pursuits, because these mislead us ina more subtle fashion. For example take ourinvestigations of those sciences conducive tothe conveniences of life or which yield thatpleasure which is found in the contemplationof truth, practically the only joy in life that iscomplete and untroubled with any pain. Therewe may indeed expect to receive the legitimatefruits of scientific inquiry; but if, in the courseof our study, we think of them, they frequentlycause us to omit many facts which are necessaryto the understanding of other matters, becausethey seem to be either of slight value or of littleinterest. Hence we must believe that all thesciences are so inter-connected, that it is mucheasier to study them all together than to isolateone from all the others. If, therefore, anyonewishes to search out the truth of things in seriousearnest, he ought not to select one specialscience; for all the sciences are conjoined witheach other and interdependent: he oughtrather to think how to increase the natural light

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 9of reason, not for the purpose of resolvingthis or that difficulty of scholastic type2, but inorder that his understanding may light his willto its proper choice in all the contingencies oflife. In a short time he will see with amazementthat he has made much more progress thanthose who are eager about particular ends,and that he has not only obtained all that theydesire, but even higher results than fall withinhis expectation.2. scholae.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 10Rule II.Only those objects should engage our attention,to the sure and indubitable knowledge of whichour mental powers3 seem to be adequate.Science in its entirety is true and evidentcognition. He is no more learned who hasdoubts on many matters than the man who hasnever thought of them; nay he appears to beless learned if he has formed wrong opinionson any particulars. Hence it were better not tostudy at all than to occupy one’s self with objectsof such difficulty, that, owing to our inabilityto distinguish true from false, we are forcedto regard the doubtful as certain; for in those3. ingenia.3

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 11matters any hope of augmenting our knowledgeis exceeded by the risk of diminishing it. Thusin accordance with the above maxim we rejectall such merely probable knowledge and makeit a rule to trust only what is completely knownand incapable of being doubted. No doubtmen of education may persuade themselvesthat there is but little of such certain knowledge,because, forsooth, a common failing of humannature has made them deem it too easy andopen to everyone, and so led them to neglectto think upon such truths; but I neverthelessannounce that there are more of these than theythink—truths which suffice to give a rigorousdemonstration of innumerable propositions,the discussion of which they have hitherto beenunable to free from the element of probability.Further, because they have believed that itwas unbecoming for a man of education toconfess ignorance on any point, they haveso accustomed themselves to trick out theirfabricated explanations, that they have ended

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 12by gradually imposing on themselves and thushave issued them to the public as genuine.But if we adhere closely to this rule we shallfind left but few objects of legitimate study.For there is scarce any question occurring inthe sciences about which talented men havenot disagreed. But whenever two men cometo opposite decisions about the same matterone of them at least must certainly be in thewrong, and apparently there is not even oneof them in the right; for if the reasoning ofthe second was sound and clear he would beable so to lay it before the other as finally tosucceed in convincing his understanding also.Hence apparently we cannot attain to a perfectknowledge in any such case of probable opinion,for it would be rashness to hope for morethan others have attained to. Consequently ifwe reckon correctly, of the sciences alreadydiscovered, Arithmetic and Geometry aloneare left, to which the observance of this rulereduces us.4

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 13Yet we do not therefore condemn thatmethod of philosophizing which others havealready discovered and those weapons of theschoolmen, probable syllogisms, which areso well suited for polemics. They indeed givepractice to the wits of youths and, producingemulation among them, act as a stimulus; and itis much better for their minds to be mouldedby opinions of this sort, uncertain though theyappear, as being objects of controversy amongthe learned, than to be left entirely to their owndevices. For thus through lack of guidance theymight stray into some abyss; but as long as theyfollow in their masters’ footsteps, though theymay diverge at times from the truth, they willyet certainly find a path which is at least in thisrespect safer, that it has been approved of bymore prudent people. We ourselves rejoice thatwe in earlier years experienced this scholastictraining; but now, being released from thatoath of allegiance which bound us to our oldmasters, and since, as becomes our riper years,

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 14we are no longer subject to the ferule, if wewish in earnest to establish for ourselves thoserules which shall aid us in scaling the heights ofhuman knowledge, we must admit assuredlyamong the primary members of our cataloguethat maxim which forbids us to abuse our leisureas many do, who neglect all easy quests andtake up their time only with difficult matters; forthey, though certainly making all sorts of subtleconjectures and elaborating most plausiblearguments with great ingenuity, frequently findtoo late that after all their labours they haveonly increased the multitude of their doubts,without acquiring any knowledge whatsoever.But now let us proceed to explain morecarefully our reasons for saying, as we did alittle while ago, that of all the sciences knownas yet, Arithmetic and Geometry alone arefree from any taint of falsity or uncertainty.We must note then that there are two waysby which we arrive at the knowledge of facts,viz. by experience and by deduction. We

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 15must further observe that while our inferencesfrom experience4 are frequently fallacious,deduction, or the pure illation of one thingfrom another, though it may be passed over,if it is not seen through5, cannot be erroneouswhen performed by an understanding that isin the least degree rational. And it seems tome that the operation is profited but little bythose constraining bonds by means of whichthe Dialecticians claim to control human reason,though I do not deny that that discipline maybe serviceable for other purposes. My reasonfor saying so is that none of the mistakes whichmen can make (men, I say, not beasts) are dueto faulty inference; they are caused merelyby the fact that we found upon a basis ofpoorly comprehended experiences, or thatpropositions are posited which are hasty andgroundless.4. experientias. This is a technical term used (like experimentum) for inductivearguments.5. si non videatur. Leibniz’s ms. adds in brackets ‘ea opus esse.’ Tr. ‘if it is not seen tobe necessary.’5

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 16This furnishes us with an evident explanationof the great superiority in certitude ofArithmetic and Geometry to other sciences.The former alone deal with an object so pureand uncomplicated, that they need make noassumptions at all which experience rendersuncertain, but wholly consist in the rationaldeduction of consequences. They are onthat account much the easiest and clearest ofall, and possess an object such as we require,for in them it is scarce humanly possible foranyone to err except by inadvertence. Andyet we should not be surprised to find thatplenty of people of their own accord preferto apply their intelligence to other studies, orto Philosophy. The reason for this is that everyperson permits himself the liberty of makingguesses in the matter of an obscure subjectwith more confidence than in one which is clear,and that it is much easier to have some vaguenotion about any subject, no matter what,

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 17than to arrive at the real truth about a singlequestion however simple6 that may be.But one conclusion now emerges out ofthese considerations, viz. not, indeed, thatArithmetic and Geometry are the sole sciencesto be studied, but only that in our search forthe direct road towards truth we should busyourselves with no object about which wecannot attain a certitude equal to that of thedemonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry.6. facili.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 18Rule III.In the subjects we propose to investigate, ourinquiries should be directed, not to what othershave thought 7, nor to what we ourselvesconjecture, but to what we can clearly andperspicuously behold and with certainty deduce;for knowledge is not won in any other way.To study the writings of the ancients is right,because it is a great boon for us to be ableto make use of the labours of so many men;and we should do so, both in order to discoverwhat they have correctly made out in previousages, and also that we may inform ourselvesas to what in the various sciences is still left for7. senserint.6

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 19investigation. But yet there is a great dangerlest in a too absorbed study of these workswe should become infected with their errors,guard against them as we may. For it is theway of writers, whenever they have allowedthemselves rashly and credulously to take up aposition in any controverted matter, to try withthe subtlest of arguments to compel us to goalong with them. But when, on the contrary, theyhave happily come upon something certainand evident, in displaying it they never fail tosurround it with ambiguities, fearing, it wouldseem, lest the simplicity of their explanationshould make us respect their discovery less, orbecause they grudge us an open vision of thetruth.Further, supposing now that all were whollyopen and candid, and never thrust upon usdoubtful opinions as true, but expoundedevery matter in good faith, yet since scarceanything has been asserted by any one manthe contrary of which has not been alleged

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 20by another, we should be eternally uncertainwhich of the two to believe. It would be nouse to total up the testimonies in favour ofeach, meaning to follow that opinion whichwas supported by the greater number ofauthors; for if it is a question of difficulty thatis in dispute, it is more likely that the truthwould have been discovered by few than bymany. But even though all these men agreedamong themselves, what they teach us wouldnot suffice for us. For we shall not, e.g. all turnout to be mathematicians though we know byheart all the proofs that others have elaborated,unless we have an intellectual talent that fitsus to resolve difficulties of any kind. Neither,though we have mastered all the argumentsof Plato and Aristotle, if yet we have not thecapacity for passing a solid judgment on thesematters, shall we become Philosophers; weshould have acquired the knowledge not of ascience, but of history.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 21I lay down the rule also, that we must whollyrefrain from ever mixing up conjectures withour pronouncements on the truth of things.This warning is of no little importance. Thereis no stronger reason for our finding nothingin the current8 Philosophy which is so evidentand certain as not to be capable of beingcontroverted, than the fact that the learned,not content with the recognition of what isclear and certain, in the first instance hazardthe assertion of obscure and ill-comprehendedtheories, at which they have arrived merely byprobable conjecture. Then afterwards theygradually attach complete credence to them,and mingling them promiscuously with what istrue and evident, they finish by being unableto deduce any conclusion which does notappear to depend upon some proposition ofthe doubtful sort, and hence is not uncertain.But lest we in turn should slip into the sameerror, we shall here take note of all those8. vulgari.7

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 22mental operations by which we are able,wholly without fear of illusion, to arrive at theknowledge of things. Now I admit only two, viz.intuition and induction.By intuition I understand, not the fluctuatingtestimony of the senses, nor the misleadingjudgment that proceeds from the blunderingconstructions of imagination, but theconception which an unclouded and attentivemind gives us so readily and distinctly that weare wholly freed from doubt about that whichwe understand. Or, what comes to the samething, intuition is the undoubting conception ofan unclouded9 and attentive mind, and springsfrom the light of reason alone; it is more certainthan deduction itself, in that it; is simpler,though deduction, as we have noted above,cannot by us be erroneously conducted. Thuseach individual can mentally have intuition ofthe fact that he exists, and that he thinks; thatthe triangle is bounded by three lines only, the9. purae.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 23sphere by a single superficies, and so on. Factsof such a kind are far more numerous thanmany people think, disdaining as they do todirect their attention upon such simple matters.But in case anyone may be put out by thisnew use of the term intuition10 and of otherterms which in the following pages I amsimilarly compelled to dissever from theircurrent meaning, I here make the generalannouncement that I pay no attention to theway in which particular terms have of late beenemployed in the schools, because it would havebeen difficult to employ the same terminologywhile my theory was wholly different. All that Itake note of is the meaning of the Latin of eachword, when, in cases where an appropriate termis lacking, I wish to transfer to the vocabularythat expresses my own meaning those that Ideem most suitable.This evidence and certitude, however, whichbelongs to intuition, is required not only in10. ‘Intuitus’ is but sparingly used in Descartes’ later writings.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 24the enunciation of propositions, but also indiscursive reasoning of whatever sort. Forexample consider this consequence: 2 and 2amount to the same as 3 and 1. Now we needto see intuitively not only that 2 and 2 make 4,and that likewise 3 and 1 make 4, but furtherthat the third of the above statements is anecessary conclusion from these two.Hence now we are in a position to raisethe question as to why we have, besidesintuition, given this supplementary method ofknowing, viz. knowing by deduction, by whichwe understand all necessary inference fromother facts that are known with certainty. This,however, we could not avoid, because manythings are known with certainty, though not bythemselves evident, but only deduced fromtrue and known principles by the continuousand uninterrupted action of a mind11 that hasa clear vision of each step in the process. It isin a similar way that we know that the last link11. cogitationis.8

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 25in a long chain is connected with the first, eventhough we do not take in by means of one andthe same act of vision all the intermediate linkson which that connection depends, but onlyremember that we have taken them successivelyunder review and that each single one is unitedto its neighbour, from the first even to the last.Hence we distinguish this mental intuition fromdeduction by the fact that into the conceptionof the latter there enters a certain movementor succession, into that of the former theredoes not. Further deduction does not requirean immediately presented evidence suchas intuition possesses; its certitude is ratherconferred upon it in some way by memory.The upshot of the matter is that it is possibleto say that those propositions indeed whichare immediately deduced from first principlesare known now by intuition, now by deduction,i.e. in a way that differs according to our pointof view. But the first principles themselves aregiven by intuition alone, while, on the contrary,

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 26the remote conclusions are furnished only bydeduction.These two methods are the most certainroutes to knowledge, and the mind shouldadmit no others. All the rest should be rejectedas suspect of error and dangerous. But thisdoes not prevent us from believing mattersthat have been divinely revealed as being morecertain than our surest knowledge, since beliefin these things12, as13 all faith in obscure matters,is an action not of our intelligence14, but ofour will. They should be heeded also since, ifthey have any basis in our understanding, theycan and ought to be, more than all things else,discovered by one or other of the ways abovementioned, as we hope perhaps to show atgreater length on some future opportunity.12. ‘that faith of ours,’ Leibniz’s ms.13. ut quaecunque est de obscuris.14. ingenii.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 27Rule IV.There is need of a method for finding out thetruth.So blind is the curiosity by which mortalsare possessed, that they often conducttheir minds along unexplored routes, havingno reason to hope for success, but merelybeing willing to risk the experiment of findingwhether the truth they seek lies there. As wellmight a man burning with an unintelligentdesire to find treasure, continuously roam thestreets, seeking to find something that a passerby might have chanced to drop. This is the wayin which most Chemists, many Geometricians,and Philosophers not a few prosecute their9

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 28studies. I do not deny that sometimes in thesewanderings they are lucky enough to findsomething true. But I do not allow that thisargues greater industry on their part, but onlybetter luck. But however that may be, it werefar better never to think of investigating truthat all, than to do so without a method. For itis very certain that unregulated inquiries andconfused reflections of this kind only confoundthe natural light and blind our mental powers.Those who so become accustomed to walk indarkness weaken their eye-sight so much thatafterwards they cannot bear the light of day.This is confirmed by experience; for how oftendo we not see that those who have never takento letters, give a sounder and clearer decisionabout obvious matters than those who havespent all their time in the schools? Moreoverby a method I mean certain and simple rules,such that, if a man observe them accurately, heshall never assume what is false as true, and willnever spend his mental efforts to no purpose,

The Philosophical Works of Descartes 29but will always gradually increase his knowledgeand so arrive at a true understanding of all thatdoes not surpass his powers.These two points must be carefully noted,viz. never to assume what is false as true, andto arrive at a knowledge which takes in allthings. For, if we are without the knowledgeof any of the things which we are capable ofunderstanding, that is only because we havenever perceived any way to bring us to thisknowledge, or because we have fallen intothe contrary error. But if our method rightlyexplains how our mental vision should

The Philosophical Works of Descartes ix Rule XIII. 138 Rule XIV. 153 Rule XV. 181 Rule XVI. 185 Rule XVII. 195 Rule XVIII. 200 Rule XIX. 213 Rule XX. 214 Rule XXI. 215 Discourse on Method 216 Prefatory Note to the Method. 217 Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeki

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