Nuclear Weapons Under International Law: An Overview

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NuclearWeapons UnderInternational Law:An OverviewOctober 2014

Nuclear Weapons Under International Law: An OverviewThis summary describes the regulation and status of nuclearweapons under international law, assessing applicable law as itstands (lex lata) and not as one might wish it to be (lex desiderata).It is based on Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, edited byGro Nystuen, Annie Golden Bersagel and Stuart Casey-Maslen,and published by Cambridge University Press in August 2014. Sixteeninternational lawyers contributed to the book: Stuart Casey-Maslen,Louise Doswald-Beck, Annie Golden Bersagel, Torbjørn Graff Hugo,Nobuo Hayashi, Cecilie Hellestveit, Daniel H. Joyner, Erik V. Koppe,Martina Kunz, Don MacKay, Daniel Mekonnen, Jasmine Moussa,Gro Nystuen, Simon O’Connor, Marco Roscini, and Jorge E. Viñuales.The preface is written by Charles Garraway CBE, who served forthirty years as a legal officer in the United Kingdom (UK) ArmyLegal Services.DisclaimerThe designation of states or territories does not imply any judgement by the Geneva Academy or theInternational Law and Policy Institute, Oslo (ILPI) regarding the legal status of such states or territories,or their authorities and institutions, or the delimitation of their boundaries, or the status of any statesor territories that border them.

ContentsSummary2Introduction4Types of nuclear weapons4History of use and testing4A. Use of nuclear weapons under international law51. In the conduct of hostilities52. Accountability for use of nuclear weapons under international law73. Outside a situation of armed conflict74. Use under jus ad bellum8B. Disarmament, non-proliferation, and the nuclear-weapons-free zones1. Disarmament law obligations102. Nuclear-weapons-free zones11C. The relevance of environmental law for nuclear weapons131. International humanitarian law and the environment132. Nuclear weapons and environmental treaties133. Testing of nuclear weapons14AnnexesNotes10151. The conclusions of the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion152. A comparative review of treaties governing nuclear weapons16181

Nuclear Weapons Under International Law: An OverviewSummaryThe legality of nuclear weapons under internationallaw remains hotly contested. In fact, the 1996 AdvisoryOpinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) onthe legality of the threat or use of nuclear weaponsraised as many questions as it answered, while insome respects the state of relevant internationallaw has evolved since 1996.A central question is naturally whether nuclearweapons may ever be used in a way that respectsthe rules of jus in bello, especially the law applicableto the conduct of hostilities in a situation of armedconflict. Primary among the rules of internationalhumanitarian law (IHL) is distinction in attacks,which requires parties to any conflict–internationalor non-international–to direct attacks only againstlawful military objectives, whether persons or objects.However, even if an attack is so directed, the ruleof proportionality dictates that civilian harm (deaths,injuries, damage to civilian objects, or a combinationthereof) may not be expected to be excessivewhen compared with the direct and concretemilitary advantage anticipated. Arguably, expectedenvironmental damage must also be assessed aspart of the proportionality rule.Broadly speaking, three scenarios have frequentlybeen advanced for a lawful use of nuclear weapons,and two would not, a priori, involve a difficultproportionality assessment as the targets would beclear military objectives with little ambient civiliandamage expected. The first of these scenarios is useagainst a nuclear-armed submarine on the high seasabout to fire its missiles. While the high seas mightsuffer from environmental damage (and of courseany civilian vessels in the vicinity might be destroyedwith a concomitant loss of life), a case can be madethat the attack does not violate primary IHL rules.Second, a mass gathering of armed forces in thedesert far away from populated areas has beenadvanced as a possible lawful target for a nuclearstrike. Again, the proportionality element might beminimal, although here an additional IHL prohibitiondesigned to protect combatants–on means andmethods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluousinjury or unnecessary suffering–would need to beassessed. Even if the rule does not operate as anabsolute standard, it is extremely hard to conceiveof circumstances when it could be deemed trulynecessary to engender among those engaged incombat the horrific blast and burn injuries that nuclearweapons cause as well as the long-term physiologicalharm they inevitably inflict, including a significantlyincreased risk of cancer mortality.Third, the potential use of nuclear weapons could beclaimed to not violate IHL where it fulfilled the criteriafor a belligerent reprisal (i.e. as a necessary response2to an earlier serious violation of IHL). However, it is ahuge challenge to envisage circumstances whereuse of nuclear weapons against civilians could hopeto meet the stringent requirements of a lawful reprisalin practice.But even if it is possible, in theory, to envisage alimited use of nuclear weapons that does not violateIHL, human rights law would also apply, subject tojurisdictional rules. In the context of the right to life,international human rights courts primarily analysewhether sufficient effort was made to avoid or limitloss of life in cases where potentially lethal forcecannot be avoided. The possible IHL justification thatsuch loss is not excessive compared with the militaryadvantage expected is not in practice a factor takeninto account by such courts. This is important giventhe elastic nature that the ‘proportionality in attack’rule seems to enjoy, and the fact that insufficientprecautions in attack are not listed as ‘indiscriminateattacks’ as such under IHL. The positive obligationsrequired under human rights law to ensure the properrespect of such law means that human rights courtsinsist that the law be effective, and not theoretical.Any use of nuclear weapons will, therefore, result inconcrete human rights violations that are justiciable.Furthermore, where use of nuclear weapons occurredby one state on the territory or against the armedforces of another (not the only possible scenarioinvolving use, but arguably the most probable), thenthe requirements of jus ad bellum would also needto be satisfied. This body of law, which regulatesthe interstate use of force, would allow weapons,potentially including nuclear weapons, to be used inself-defence against an armed attack. To do so, thelaw would judge the necessity for the use of force andwhether the force that was used was proportionate tothe aim of repelling the attack. Perhaps a surprise tosome, the law would not impose particular restrictionson nuclear weapons as a weapon type, but merelyconsider their use as one element in the use of forceequations. Arguably, the same formula also appliesto threats (ad bellum): threatening use of forceby nuclear weapons is governed by the same legalframework as threats of the use of force in general.Given that use of nuclear weapons could constituteviolations of IHL rules, such acts would potentiallyalso be subject to rules and proceedings underinternational criminal law (ICL). Use of nuclearweapons could, under certain circumstances, amountto genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or warcrimes. This would seem to apply irrespective ofthe discrepancy between the 1998 Rome Statuteof the International Criminal Court (ICC) and otherinternational legal regimes, including customary law,when it comes to specific references to prohibitedweapons.

SummaryBeyond use, the legality of development, testing,production, stockpiling, and transfer must also beassessed under international law. Arguably, a banon atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons has nowcrystallized into customary international law; the samecannot, though, be said so easily with respect tounderground testing. Already under the 1959 AntarcticTreaty any activity involving nuclear weapons, suchas their testing, stockpiling, deployment, or launchingin or from Antarctica is prohibited; similar provisionsapply by treaty to nuclear weapons in outer space oron the sea bed.In addition, the rapid development of environmentallaw, a branch of international law touched on bythe ICJ in its 1996 Advisory Opinion, brings with itimplications for the testing and release of pollutantsat various stages of the weapons production cycle.Only nine states possess nuclear weapons, but thesestates represent almost half the world’s populationand more than one quarter of the earth’s land area.These nine states are currently not covered bythe 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)’scomprehensive prohibition on non-nuclear weaponsstates producing or otherwise acquiring nuclearweapons. These states include the five permanentmembers of the United Nations Security Council,which are recognized nuclear weapon states underthe NPT, as well as the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan, which are notparty to the NPT.regimes pertaining to the two other weapons of massdestruction, especially the treaties on biological andchemical weapons. Contrary to what is the case forthese two other weapons, the NPT does not containa rule prohibiting use of nuclear weapons.On the topic of armed non-state actors and nuclearmaterials, an extensive and far-reaching normativeframework exists. The question is to what extent itis able to prevent nuclear terrorism.Nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) providecomplementary machinery to other measures ofdisarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,and the development of peaceful uses of nuclearenergy. Since the end of the Cold War, the rationalefor the bipolar nuclear arms race has diminished, andhence the rationale for keeping the nuclear weaponsdebate strictly within the hands of the NWS shouldby implication have diminished. The zone countriesmay thus have a greater potential for influencing thedebates on nuclear weapons, in various settings,than currently appears to be the case. The potentialof NWFZs in defusing the risk of regional nuclear armsraces and decreasing the risk of nuclear weaponsfalling into the hands of non-state actors are alsoincreasingly important security considerations forthe major nuclear powers.But though these states are not bound by multilateraltreaty obligations that prohibit the acquisition andproduction of nuclear weapons, this does not meanthat environmental law is irrelevant to these states’activities involving nuclear weapons. All stagesof the ‘life-cycle’ of nuclear weapons may causepollution of the environment, not only throughradioactive substances but also through hazardouschemicals used in producing and maintaining theseweapons. Indeed, it is argued that nuclear weaponsstates might be subject to environmental litigationor non-compliance procedures for breaching theirinternational environmental obligations, even absentnuclear detonation.And for those nuclear weapons states that are partyto the NPT, Article VI on disarmament is especiallypertinent. While disagreement persists regarding theprecise nature and scope of the obligation in thisprovision, Article VI is a binding legal obligation, notmerely a goal. Thus, when looking at the number ofnuclear warheads today, more than 40 years afterthe treaty’s entry into force, the NPT has provedless efficient with regard to nuclear disarmamentobligations undertaken by the nuclear weapons states(NWS). Finally, the NPT is also seen in light of the legal3

Nuclear Weapons Under International Law: An OverviewIntroductionIntroductionIn this introductory section the types of nuclearweapons that exist or which could be developed aredescribed along with details of their testing and use.Section A then reviews their use under internationallaw, both in the conduct of hostilities and as an actwithout the requisite nexus to a situation of armedconflict. Section B considers disarmament law andnon-proliferation rules and measures as well asnuclear-weapons-free zones (which cover most of thesouthern hemisphere). Section C assesses the testing,production, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons underinternational environmental law.Annex 1 contains the conclusions of the ICJ in its 1996Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Annex 2 includesa comparative review of treaties governing nuclearweapons.Types of nuclear weaponsA nuclear weapon is an explosive device whosedestructive force results from either nuclear fissionchain reactions or combined nuclear fission andfusion reactions. Nuclear weapons whose explosiveforce results exclusively from fission reactions arecommonly referred to as atomic bombs, while thosethat derive much or most of their energy in nuclearfusion reactions are termed thermonuclear weapons(or hydrogen bombs).In fission weapons, a mass of fissile material (enricheduranium or plutonium) is turned into a supercriticalmass, producing explosive yields ranging from theequivalent of around one to five hundred kilotonsof TNT. The detonation of any nuclear weapon isaccompanied by a blast of radiation. Fission alsoproduces radioactive debris, more commonlyknown as fallout.A thermonuclear weapon uses the heat generatedby a fission bomb to compress and ignite a nuclearfusion stage. Thermonuclear weapons typically havea far higher explosive yield than do fission weapons,in the range of megatons rather than kilotons. Fusionreactions do not create fission products, but becauseall thermonuclear weapons contain at least one fission4stage, thermonuclear weapons can generate at leastas much nuclear fallout as fission-only weapons.1A ‘neutron’ bomb is a thermonuclear weapon thatyields a relatively small explosion but a large amountof neutron radiation. A neutron bomb could be usedto inflict massive casualties while leaving infrastructuremostly intact and creating a minimal amount offallout.2 In contrast, a salted bomb (surrounding anuclear weapon with, for example, cobalt-60 or gold98) would produce exceptionally large quantities ofradioactive contamination.3History of use and testingThe fear that the Nazis could develop nuclearweapons prompted United States (US) PresidentTheodore Roosevelt to establish the ManhattanProject in 1941. The world’s first detonation of anuclear weapon, the result of the Project’s work,occurred just before 5.30am on 16 July 1945 at asite in New Mexico. The first nuclear weapon attackoccurred on 6 August 1945 over the city of Hiroshimain Japan. ‘Little Boy’, as the bomb was named,exploded 580 metres above the ground, renderingan explosive yield of some 16 kilotons of TNT. No oneknows exactly how many tens of thousands of peoplewere killed in the attack. Three days later the USdetonated ‘Fat Man’, a plutonium bomb with a larger20-kiloton yield, 610 metres above a suburbof Nagasaki, killing some 74,000 people.The second state after the US to test a nuclearbomb successfully was Russia, which in 1949detonated an atomic bomb, made with plutoniumas its nuclear material. ‘Greenhouse George’, a UStest fire in Nevada in May 1951, was the first fusionnuclear weapon to be detonated.4 The largest nuclearexplosion ever is believed to be Russian in origin: itsexplosive yield amounted to 50 megatons. The largestUS nuclear detonation, equivalent to 15 megatons,occurred on Bikini Atoll in May 1954. Other nuclearweapon states are India, Israel, and Pakistan as wellas the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRKorea) which conducted an underground testof a low-yield nuclear device in October 2006.1Pure fusion weapons–fusion reactions without the need for a fission bomb to initiate them–would create significantly less nuclearfallout than other thermonuclear weapons, because they would not disperse fission products. However, no known, credible design fora pure fusion weapon currently exists.2A ‘positron’ bomb could use antimatter as a trigger for nuclear weapons or even as a weapon in itself, should production of antimatterin sufficient quantities ever become possible. If electrons or protons collide with their antimatter counterparts, they annihilate eachother, unleashing more energy than any other known energy source (10 billion times that of high explosives), along with a burst ofgamma radiation that could kill massive numbers of people without ejecting radioactive fallout.3A salted bomb should not be confused with a ‘dirty bomb’, an ordinary chemical explosive device containing radioactive material thatis spread over the area when the device explodes.4Russia detonated a hydrogen bomb in 1952, the UK in 1955, China in 1967, and France in 1968.

A. Use of nuclear weapons under international lawA. Use of nuclear weapons underinternational lawAny future use of a nuclear weapon, shouldone occur, is likely to be in the conductof hostilities within an international armedconflict.5 Accordingly, any such use of anuclear weapon would be judged under theapplicable international laws, jus ad bellum(international law governing the interstateuse of force) and jus in bello (internationallaw applicable in armed conflict).61. In the conduct of hostilitiesThe primary rules under jus in bello are found inthe law of armed conflict, which today is widelytermed international humanitarian law (IHL). UnderIHL, while states ‘do not have unlimited freedom ofchoice of means in the weapons they use’,7 thereis no requirement that each weapon be specifically‘authorized’ for its use to be lawful; use of any givenweapon will only be unlawful when, and to the extentthat, it is prohibited by an applicable conventional orcustomary rule.A fundamental rule of IHL stipulates that parties to aconflict must direct attacks only against lawful militaryobjectives (whether military personnel or objectsof concrete military value). The rule of distinction inattacks8 is a norm of customary international law,applicable in non-international armed conflicts as itis in international armed conflicts. Accordingly, anyweapon that is incapable of distinguishing betweencivilians/civilian objects and military targets isconsidered inherently indiscriminate and its use isalways unlawful.9A supporting rule, that of proportionality in attacks,holds that even if an attack is effectively directedagainst military objectives, civilian harm (deaths,injuries, damage to civilian objects, or a combinationthereof) it must not be launched if it may be expectedto be excessive when compared with the direct andconcrete military advantage anticipated. Arguably,environmental damage must also be assessed aspart of the proportionality rule.In his separate opinion in relation to the InternationalCourt of Justice (ICJ)’s 1996 Advisory Opinion onthe Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons(the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), JudgeSchwebel speculated on different types of uses ofnuclear weapons and which of these might be lawfulor not. He referred to the regularly projected scenarioof use of tactical nuclear weapons against submarinesthat are themselves equipped with nuclear weaponsas ‘discrete military or naval targets so situated thatsubstantial civilian casualties would not ensue’.10 Citingthe example of use of a nuclear ‘depth-charge’ todestroy a submarine about to fire nuclear missiles (orwhich has already fired one or more nuclear missiles)he concludes this ‘might well be lawful’. Indeed, anargument can be made that in such a situation useof a nuclear weapon might not violate IHL.11A second oft-cited scenario concerns use of anuclear weapon to destroy an enemy army situatedin a desert. Judge Schwebel concluded, justly, thatin ‘certain circumstances, such a use of nuclearweapons might meet the tests of discriminationand proportionality; in others not.’ But this scenarioalso evokes another general rule of IHL, namelythe prohibition of the use of means and methods ofwarfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury orunnecessary suffering (the unnecessary sufferingrule). This prohibition is one of the very scarce IHLrules designed to protect combatants while theyare participating directly in hostilities.The explosion of a nuclear weapon createsphenomenal quantities of heat upon detonation:between 60 and 100 million degrees centigrade.5Conceivably a nuclear weapon detonation could be also the act that triggers the international armed conflict.6Since an express prohibition of use of nuclear weapons is included in the Treaties of Bangkok, Semipalatinsk and Tlatelolco, any useby a state party to zany of these treaties would clearly violate international law.7International Court of Justice (ICJ), Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996, §78.8The rule is sometimes referred to as a principle, either of distinction or of discrimination.9See, e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Study of Customary IHL, Rule 71, www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1 rul rule71.10 Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, p. 98.11It assumes, though, that the location of the submarine is known precisely (no small assumption in the case of nuclear weaponequipped submarines); that nuclear weapons can be fired in a timely fashion (having secured the necessary authority high up thechain of command); and that the requisite proportionality calculations have been made, including the determination that alternative,less harmful weapons would not be sufficient to achieve the military task.5

Nuclear Weapons Under International Law: An OverviewAnyone within a radius of 2.5km from groundzero12 and who is unprotected will receive third-degree(full thickness) burns, which will almost certainly befatal. What is unique about nuclear weapons is theradiation, which occurs at different times. ‘Prompt’radiation comes first, soon after the explosion,consisting of neutrons, gamma rays, and electrons.Neutron radiation is an especially hazardous formof radiation to humans. In the explosion of a nuclearweapon, the fireball rises, sucking the cooler air belowas well as radioactive debris up from the ground.Water drops are extracted from the cooler air to formclouds. Fallout begins one to two hours afterwardsand lasts for a day or so.The horrific blast and burn injuries nuclear weaponswould likely inflict on hundreds of thousands ofpeople across a huge area in the instant followingdetonation are dramatically enhanced by the lethaldoses of radiation that would kill in the ensuing daysand weeks. But the long-term impact of nuclearweapons also means a significantly increased risk ofcancer mortality throughout the life of the survivors.How the temporal aspect of the unnecessarysuffering rule, namely the fact that injury or sufferingdoes not manifest itself immediately, is to beunderstood, requires further analysis. That said, giventhe characteristics that would ordinarily manifestthemselves from exposure to radiation, it is fair tocontend that this issue must be taken into account inapplying the rule. It is extremely hard to envisage asituation where military considerations would dictatethe necessity of recourse to nuclear weapons and thatcould justify their use against combatants, given thehumanitarian effects.A third scenario in which use of nuclear weapons hasbeen claimed to be lawful is as a belligerent reprisal.The term reprisal describes an act that would normallybe unlawful under IHL, but which is not prohibitedinsofar as it seeks to cause an opposing party to theconflict to cease the commission of acts that violateIHL. To be lawful a reprisal must be a necessaryresponse to a serious and prior unlawful act (or acts)by the target state (and not one of its allies); must beconducted with a view to bringing the target state backinto compliance with IHL;13 and should be announcedas such. Unlawful acts carried out as mere retaliationor punishment therefore remain unequivocallyunlawful. In addition, to be lawful the ostensible act oracts of reprisal must be proportionate to the originalbreach.Many objects and persons enjoy special protectionagainst reprisals.14 The 1977 Additional Protocol I, whichapplies to international armed conflicts, stipulates thatattacks against the civilian population or civilians byway of reprisals are prohibited. A number of stateshave protested against this rule. The UK, for instance,when ratifying the Protocol in 1998 attached anunderstanding whereby if an ‘adverse party makesserious and deliberate attacks against the civilianpopulation or civilians or against civilian objects’ theUK would consider itself ‘entitled’ to take otherwiseprohibited measures ‘necessary for the sole purposeof compelling the adverse party to cease committingviolations but only after formal warning to theadverse party requiring cessation of the violations hasbeen disregarded and then only after a decision takenat the highest level of government.’15However, were either the Russian Federation or the USever to launch a major strike against the other, owingto the inevitability of the response such a first strikeattack would presumably be all-out, with a view to totaldestruction, or as near to it as could be achieved. Theintent of the huge nuclear response that would likelyensue could hardly be claimed to be pursuant to anyintent to restore compliance with the law; it would besimple, uncloaked retaliation: collective punishmentfor as massive a violation of IHL as it is possible tocontemplate. Such a nuclear response could thusnot be considered a reprisal and, as unfair as it mightseem, equally wrong in the eyes of the law.In its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJconcluded that any use of nuclear weapons would‘generally be contrary to the rules of international lawapplicable in armed conflict, and in particular theprinciples and rules of humanitarian law’.16 For anygiven use of nuclear weapons to satisfy the legalrequirements, the circumstances of use would have12 The Strategic Bombing Survey of the 1945 atomic bomb attacks, released in June 1946, used the term ground zero to ‘designatethe point on the ground directly beneath the point of detonation’. US Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombingsof Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 19 June 1946, p. 5.13 Thus, a reprisal is not a synonym for tu quoque, the (non-)defence to a criminal charge, whereby if one party in a conflict hascommitted certain crimes, it has no authority to prosecute or punish individuals from an opposing party for similar crimes.14 These include persons in the power of a party to an international armed conflict, including the wounded, sick and shipwrecked;medical and religious personnel; captured combatants; civilians in occupied territory; and other categories of civilians in the power ofan adverse party to the conflict, notably civilian internees. It is also unlawful to conduct reprisals against medical buildings, vessels,and equipment protected by 1949 Geneva Conventions I and II or against cultural property protected under the 1954 HagueConvention for the Protection of Cultural Property.15 Reproduced in A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Law of War, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 511–12.16 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, dispositive E.6

A. Use of nuclear weapons under international lawto be truly exceptional.17 But such circumstancesdo exist, notably with respect to low-yield nuclearweapons, and it therefore remains unpersuasive toargue that all nuclear weapons are either inherentlyindiscriminate or inherently disproportionate underIHL.A separate question raised by the ICJ in its AdvisoryOpinion was that threats of use of nuclear weaponsalso constitute a violation of IHL rules in general.Arguably, however, IHL in general does not regulatethreats, save in a few explicit cases. This question,which seems rather limited in scope and impact, playsa role in the general confusion generated by the ICJ’sAdvisory Opinion regarding the separation betweenjus in bello and jus ad bellum.2. Accountability for useof nuclear weapons underinternational lawGiven that use of nuclear weapons could constituteviolations of IHL rules, such acts would potentiallyalso be subject to rules and proceedings underinternational criminal law (ICL). Use of nuclearweapons could, under certain circumstances andaccording to varying liability modes, constitutegenocide, crimes against humanity, and/or warcrimes. This would seem to apply irrespective ofthe discrepancy between the 1998 Rome Statuteof the International Criminal Court (ICC) and otherinternational legal regimes, including customary law,when it comes to specific references to prohibitedweapons. The lack of explicit ICC jurisdiction withregard to nuclear weapon use in the ICC Statutehardly precludes the categorization of such useas an international crime under other legal regimes,and subject to national prosecution.3. Outside a situation ofarmed conflictHuman rights lawIn addition to a purely IHL analysis, however,international human rights law is also relevant toa determination of the legality of use of nuclearweapons. In the context of the right to life, internationalhuman rights courts primarily analyse whethersufficient effort was made to avoid or limit loss oflife in cases where potentially lethal force cannotbe avoided. The possible IHL justification that suchloss is not excessive compared with the militaryadvantage expected is not in practice a factor takeninto account by such courts. This is important giventhe elastic nature that the IHL ‘proportionality in attack’rule seems to enjoy, and the fact that insufficientprecautions in attack are not listed as ‘indiscriminateattacks’ as such under IHL. The positive obligationsrequired under human rights law to ensure the properrespect of such law means that human rights courtsinsist that the law be effective, and not theoretical.Any use of nuclear weapons will, therefore, result inconcrete human rights violations that are justiciableprovided that the responsible state h

Nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) provide complementary machinery to other measures of disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since the end of the Cold War, the rationale for the bipolar nuclear arms race has diminished

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