THREATS TO UNDERSEA CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

T H R E AT S T OUNDE R S E A CA B L ECOMMUNICATIONSSEPTEM BER 28, 2017031991 Threats to Undersea Cabling Cover v3.indd 19/25/2017 11:21:38 AM

Threats toUndersea CableCommunicationsSeptember 282017Commercial undersea cable communications carry over97% of all intercontinental electronic communications,facilitating the reach and speed of internet and phoneaccess critical to international trade, official governmentcommunications, and daily end user requirements. Thisvast, critical submarine network infrastructure remainslargely unknown to consumers and corporations notdirectly affiliated with its development and/ormaintenance. However, it is susceptible to damage ordestruction by accidental and malicious threats, whichcan lead to costly, widespread internet andcommunications disruptions.This paper is a joint public-private sector analyticalproduct with two primary goals. The first is to highlightpotential risks, which could degrade or interruptsubmarine cable-supported services. The second goal isto explore collaboration avenues between the UnitedStates Government (USG) and the private sector s and ensure business continuity.iExamining StrategiesPublic and PrivateEntities Can Pursue toContain Such Threats

Global Submarine Cable Network iiCable Laying iii1

Table of ContentsMethodology. 4Department of Homeland Security Analyst Exchange Program . 4Team Members . 4Approach . 4Classification Level . 5Introduction . 6Critical Findings & Recommendations . 6The Resilience of the Undersea Cable Communication Network . 6Conceptual Submarine Cable Segment Threat Matrix . 7Operational Vulnerabilities . 8Study Recommendations . 8Foreign Threats . 10Overview . 10An internationally integrated industry . 11Industry dynamics . 13An increasingly complex system . 13Increasing risks to undersea cables . 13Laws and policies vary by country . 15Knowledge is power . 16Recommendations . 17Physical Threats . 19Overview . 19Threat Vectors. 21Cyber Attack . 22Indicators . 23Mitigation Methods . 23Recommendations . 24Insider Threat . 252

Overview . 25Risk to Undersea Cable Communications . 26Indicators . 28Mitigation Methods . 28Recommendations . 29Conclusion . 31ANNEX I - Lexicon . 32ANNEX II - Submarine Cable Depth Definitions . 34Overland and Last Mile . 34Near-shore . 34Off-shore . 35Continental shelf . 35Deep sea. 36ANNEX III - Submarine Cable Network History . 37Early Beginnings . 37Designing a Submarine Network . 37Cable Evolution . 38Growth and Expansion . 38Satellite Technology vs. Undersea Cables. 39ANNEX IV - Additional Resources . 40Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA) . 40Carnegie Mellon University - CERT . 40The Communications Security Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) . 41The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) . 41IEEE. 41The North American Submarine Cable Association (NASCA) . 42References . 443

MethodologyDepartment of Homeland Security Analyst Exchange ProgramThe Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program (AEP), sponsored by the Department ofHomeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A), on behalf of the Officeof the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), facilitates collaborative partnershipsbetween members of the intelligence community and private sector industry experts toexplore key national security issues in greater depth. Teams work together over a sixmonth period on a range of important topics to gain a better understanding of howdifferent, yet complementary perspectives and interests, can work in tandem to ensuremission success.Team MembersThe AEP “Threats to Undersea Cable Communications” Team was comprised of publicand private sector employees with a range of insights and responsibilities relevant totelecommunications infrastructure. The following team members collaborated andcontributed to the creation of this whitepaper: James Dean –TrueCourse Advisory Services, LLCShannon N. –Federal Bureau of InvestigationDonna H. –United States GovernmentMichael Marshall –British TelecommunicationScott S. –United States GovernmentHubert C. B. –Department of Homeland SecurityAudrey Villinger –Security Industry Specialists, Inc.Teyloure Ring – A.S. SolutionsHeather Nelson –Office of the Director of National IntelligenceMichael T. –Office of the Director of National IntelligenceApproachFrom February through September 2017, the team conducted an independentassessment of the threats to undersea cable communications (UCC) with two primaryobjectives:1) Examining vulnerabilities to the undersea cable communications infrastructure,and4

2) Developing security risk mitigation strategy considerations for senior leadership ofbusinesses, local, state, and USG personnel who work in the undersea cablecommunications industry.Of note, the team used “undersea” and “submarine” interchangeably.The group communicated weekly and researched various open-source articles, academicjournals, and government reports, in addition to holding telephone and in-personinterviews with submarine cable subject matter experts (SME), individuals associated withtelecommunication entities, and state and federal government agencies focused on orinterested in maritime threats. The team also visited cable landing stations andinterviewed subject matter experts at a large data center/network access point (NAP).The work was guided by key intelligence questions (KIQs) developed by the group and aset of carefully considered methodologies. The information provided is not intended to bean exhaustive list of organizational and human factors posing threats to the submarinecable infrastructure. Rather, it is intended to provide the reader a baseline to beginthinking critically about the risks to undersea cable communications and its supportinginfrastructure.Every reasonable effort has been taken to ensure the information and analysis containedin this report were from reliable and reputable sources and that relevant information hasbeen communicated. However, DHS, ODNI, and the AEP team members are notresponsible for inaccurate open-source information, including information found in socialmedia outlets, public venues, and public records. Cited information and photo-captureddescriptions do not reflect the opinion of any of the above-mentioned parties, but areincluded to contextualize the analysis.To protect the confidentiality of information from private- and public-sector contributors,the team conducted interviews on a non-attribution basis and anonymized governmentagencies, corporate entities, and individuals contacted during this study.Classification LevelThis report is an open-source, unclassified document. In the spirit of AEP’s educationaland collaborative mission, redistribution, retransmission, and republication of this reportis encouraged.5

Introduction“When communications networks go down, the financial services sector does not grindto a halt, rather it snaps to a halt.” ivStephen Malphrus, Former Chief of Staff, Federal Reserve BoardROGUCCI conference, Dubai, U.A.E., October 19, 2009This unclassified source study explores the vulnerabilities, risk factors, and disruptionindicators within the submarine cable network and supporting infrastructure with the intentof hardening the industry’s security measures, improving business continuity, andultimately reducing operational cost. Focusing on foreign, physical, and insider threats,this report is intended to inform small to medium-sized users (business community andgovernment) and law enforcement personnel of potential security risks and mitigationstrategies they may employ or support.Overall, the overseas communication industry has built-in resiliency for regular, standard,operational single point cable failures. However, a serious simultaneous, multioccurrence event, be it natural, accidental or malicious could have serious consequencesfor U.S. businesses and government entities, including the national financial system.Many of these organizations may not be aware of the threat and, therefore, may have nomitigation or business continuity plans in the case of such events.This study aims to foster greater discussion between private and public entities to educatethe community to increase their resiliency.Critical Findings & RecommendationsThe Resilience of the Undersea Cable Communication Network Submarine cable networks experience few disruptions in proportion to their heavydistribution throughout the world.There have been very limited reports of undersea cable attacks. Terrestrialportions of cable networks are more vulnerable and have been more activelytargeted (e.g. The SAM-1 cable across Argentina).The majority of undersea cable disruptions are caused by accidents (e.g. fishingnets, dredging, dragging anchor) and natural events (e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis,submarine avalanches, scraping against irregular ocean floor terrain, sharks). For6

increased protection, cables near shore are trenched into the groundapproximately two to six feet deep, depending on the environment and bottom soilcomposition.Through automated detection, signal re-routing, robust physical and logicalredundancy, and a network of repair ships, undersea cable networks have a highdegree of resilience from a single-point-of-failure perspective. Numerous andsimultaneous cable faults (e.g. caused by natural disaster or targeted attack) canlead to significant service disruption or lags before full restoration is possible.Conceptual Submarine Cable Segment Threat MatrixThe following table, developed by the AEP team, illustrates the various types of threatswhich may affect submarine cables to varying degrees, depending on their depths as theytraverse the ocean floors to worldwide landing stations.[Threat Impact Legend: Green Low; Yellow Medium; Red High] 1Overland &Last TsunamiAccidentalFishingAnchor draggingDredgingMaliciousCyber AttackVandalismActivistsTheft1Table definitions can be found under ANNEX II7Near-Shore 130ftOffShore130 - 300ftContinentalShelf300 - 600 ftDeep Sea 600 ft