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Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Port Delfin LNG Project Deepwater Port ApplicationAppendix RMajor LNG Incidents

LNG IncidentHistoryMajor LNG Incidents Involving LNG ReleaseIncidentDateShip/FacilityNameLocationShip r1944East Ohio GasLNG TankClevelandNA128deathsNA1964 hortly afterleaving port(1965)NoneNoneCanveyIsland, UKTransferoperation1 ing afterdischargeUnderconstruction1965May 1965Jules l/ReleaseNAIncident SummaryTank failure and no earthen berm. Vaporcloud formed and filled the surroundingstreets and storm sewer system. Natural gasin the vapor izing LNG pool ignited.In 1964, a lightning strike to the forward ventriser of the Methane Progress ignited vaporwhich was being routinely vented through theventing system at the time. A similaroccurance also occurred in early 1965. Bothtimes, the flame was quickly extinguished bypurging with nitrogen through a connection inthe riser.YesDuring LNG transfer, an error resulted in therelease of LNG. The release became ignited,causing one person to be seriously burned.YesYesOverflowing of a cargo tank. Resulted in atank cover and adjacent deck fracture.NoYesYesValve leakage. Deck fractures.NAYesYesAn explosion occurred in an LNG tank underconstruction. No LNG had ever beenintroduced into the tank. The cause of theaccident was the accidental removal of blindsfrom natural gas pipelines which wereconnected to the tank. This led to the flow ofnatural gas into the tank while it was beingconstructed.K1

LNG onShip ll/ReleaseIncident Summary1971LNG shipEsso Brega,La SpeziaLNG ImportTerminalLa Spezia,ItalyUnloadingLNG into thestorage tankNAYesYesFirst documented LNG “rollover” incident,where two differing temperatures and densitiesof LNG mix. Tank developed a suddenincrease in pressure, causing LNG vaporto discharge safely from the tank safety valvesand vents. Tank roof slightly damaged. Noignition.January1972Montreal g defrosting, a back flow of natural gasfrom the compressor to the nitrogen valvewhen the valve remained unclosed causedover-pressurization of the compressor. Thisled to a leak and subsequent ignition.Staten Island,New YorkRepair onempty storagetankYes-37fatalities.YesNoNANoYesYesWhile repairing the interior of an emptystorage tank, a fire started. The increase inpressure inside the tank occurred so quicklythat the concrete dome collapsed down insidethe tank. 37 construction workers inside thetank were killed.Glass breakage. Small amount of LNG spilledupon a puddle of rainwater, and the resultingflameless vapor explosion, called a rapid phasetransition (RPT), caused the loud "booms.” Noinjuries resulted.In portNoYesNoFebruary1973Canvey Island,UK19731974MethaneProgressK2Touched bottom at Arzew.

LNG ettsLoadingNANAK3Yes40 gallons of LNG leaked during loading, as aresult of a power failure and the resultingautomatic closure of the safety valves. Theleak resulted in several fractures to the deckplates.

LNG DamageNANoYesNANot caused by LNG. An iso-pentaneintermediate heat transfer fluid leakcaught fire and burned the entirevaporizer area.Aluminum valve failure on contactwith cryogenic temperatures.Wrong aluminum alloy onreplacement valve. LNG wasreleased, but no vapor ignitionoccured.During filling, LNG overflowedthrough the vent mast. Possible casuewas difficulties in the liquid levelgauge system.Ship Status1975PhiladelphiaGas Works1977ArzewAlgeriaNA1workerfrozento aLoadingNoNoYes1979ColumbiaGas LNGTerminalCovePoint,MarylandNA1 killed1seriouslyinjuredYesYesApril 1979MostefaBenBoulaid ShipUnloadingNoYesYesApril 1979PollengerShipUnloadingNoYesYesK4Incident SummaryLNG leaked through the LNG pumpelectrical penetration seal and enteredthe substation. A circuit breaker ignitedthe natural gas-air mixture, resulting inan explosion.Valve leakage. Deck fractures.Valve leakage. Tank cover platefractures.

LNG IncidentHistory1979El PasoPaul KayserShipAt seaNoK5YesNoStranded. Severe damage to bottom,ballast tanks, motor was waterdamaged, bottom of containmentsystem set up.

LNG onShip ll/ReleaseIncident Summary1980LNG LibraAt seaNoYesNoShaft moved against rudder. Tail shaftfractured.1980LNG TaurusIn portNoYesNoStranded. Ballast tanks all flooded and listing.Extensive bottom damage.1984MelroseAt seaNoYesNoFire in engine room. No structural damagesustained – limited to engine room.1985GradiniaIn portNoNotreportedNoSteering gear failure. No details of damagereported.1985IsabellaUnloadingNoYesYesCargo valve failure. Cargo overflow. Deckfractures.1989TellierLoadingNoYesYesBroke moorings. Hull and deck fractures.1990BachirChihaniAt seaNoYesNoSustained structural cracks allegedly stressingand fatigue in inner hull.K6

LNG IncidentNANoNAK7NALNG leak from open run-down line during a pipemodification project. LNG entered an undergroundconcrete storm sewer system and underwent a rapidvapor expansion that overpressured and rupturedthe sewer pipes. Storm sewer system substantiallydamaged.

LNG onShip ll/ReleaseIncident Summary2002LNG shipNorman LadyEast of theStrait ofGibraltarAt seaNoYesNoCollision with a U.S. Navy nuclear-poweredattack submarine, the U.S.S Oklahoma City.In ballast condition. Ship suffered a leakageof seawater into the double bottom dry tankarea.2004SkikdaAlgeriaNA27 killedYes72 injured(thecausalitiesare mainlydue to theblast, fewcasualtiesdue to fire)NAA leak in the hydrocarbon refrigerantsystem formed a vapor cloud that wasdrawn into the inlet of a steam boiler. Theincreased fuel to the boiler caused rapidlyrising pressure within a steam drum. Therapidly rising pressure exceeded thecapacity of the boiler’s safety valve and thesteam drum ruptured. The boiler rupturewas close enough to the gas leak to ignitethe vapor cloud and produce an explosiondue the confined nature of the gas leak andan ensuing fireball. The fire took eighthours to extinguish. The explosions and firedestroyed a portion to the LNG plant andcaused 27 deaths, and injury to 72 more.2006Train 2FacilityPortFortin,Trinidad,CaracasNo1 InjuryNoK8YesAtlantic LNG reported that an accidentoccurred at its Train 2 facility at PointFortin, Trinidad when a temporary eight inchisolation plug was blown by built-up pressure.The Train 2 facility had been shut down due tothe detection of a gas release from a two-inchpipeline. The release of natural gas was broughtunder control, and personnel returned. While thecompany was carrying out repairs the plug blewinjuring one worker. It had been filled with inertgas to facilitate repairs.

LNG IncidentHistory2009South HookLNG TerminalUKNANoNoYes2010Montoir ll BayfacilityAustraliaLoadingNoYesYesThe ship suffered cryogenic burns when 2,000to 4,000 litres of LNG were spilt.2011Yung An LNGTerminalTaiwanUnloadingNoYesYesThe vessel's master decided to suspend thedischarge and move the ship off the berth but theproblems were eventually rectified and thevessel returned to complete the discharge of itscargo.2011PyeongtaekLNG lgiumAt Sea1 InjuryYesThe ship disconnected from the berth after whatwas described as a very small leak of LNG wasreported around the top of one emergencyrelease coupler shortly after a scheduledoverhaul of the unloading arms had beencompleted. Seals and ball valves werereplaced on the unloading arms and dischargerecommenced using the remaining two arms.Al Oraiq involved in a collision with theDutch freighter, Flinterstar. Flinterstar sankwith all survivors rescued and one injury.The Al Oraiq suffered a slight gash andthere was some water ingress, however, thevessel was able to return to port with theassistance of a tug.2015Al OraiqA maximum of ten litres of LNG was spilled and“immediately vaporized”, because of theunintended activation of the emergencyshutdown system, which caused poweredemergency release couplings to separate,discharging LNG.The incident occurred when liquid passed intothe gas take-off line during discharge operations.The damage sustained extended to part of theship's manifold and its feed lines.Sources: CEC 2006, CEE 2012, Shipwrecklog.com, “Atlantic LNG Trinidad Train 2 accident injures employee,” November 2006, .K9

Note: There have been no reported incidents involving LNG shipping and shipping ports and terminals since 2015.HistoryK10LNG Incident

Appendix R . Major LNG Incidents . LNG Incident History K-1 Major LNG Incidents Involving LNG Release Incident Date Ship/Facility Name Location Ship Status Injuries/ Fatalities Ship/ Property Damage LNG Spill/ Release Incident Sum

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