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KenyaThe changing nature of local peacebuildingin Kenya’s north-eastern borderlandsAden Abdi and Jeremy LindJeremy Lind is a Research Fellow at the Institute ofDevelopment Studies at Sussex University. A humangeographer by training, his work explores the governanceand politics of development in the Horn of Africa, witha particular focus on pastoralist contexts.Aden Abdi is the Horn of Africa Programme Director atConciliation Resources (CR). Prior to joining CR in August2012, Aden worked with the UK Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) in Nairobi as a Senior ProgrammeOfficer, Somali Programme. Aden has lived and workedin northern Kenya.Kenya’s north-eastern borderlands, which neighbour Somaliato the east and Ethiopia to the north, have seen periods ofshifting stability and violence since the country’s independencein 1963. This reflects Kenya’s difficult experience with postcolonial statebuilding and incorporation into the wider politicaleconomy of the Horn of Africa. Effective peacebuilding effortsin north-eastern Kenya in the 1990s and early 2000s, where theauthority and legitimacy of state-led initiatives were limited,emphasised the significance of local, informal approachesand leadership. However, the scope of local peacebuildinghas become restricted over recent years as decentralisationhas elevated the importance of sub-national politics, andeconomic ties between the borderlands and the centre havealso strengthened.restrictive bureaucratic and security arrangements. Whilepre-independence consultations with residents of Mandera,Wajir and Garissa in 1963 yielded a preference for the mostlySomali-inhabited regions to join the Somali Republic, Britaininstead decided to create a new North Eastern Province aspart of an independent Kenya. As detailed by Whitaker (2015),local Somalis with the backing of the fledging Somali Republicgovernment started the Shifta insurgency (1963–67), in whichan estimated 4,000 people were killed. Negotiations betweenKenya and Somalia led to a ceasefire in 1967, slowing theinsurgency. However, the exclusion of the local leadershipfrom negotiations, Kenya’s suspicion of Somalia’s futureintentions in the region, and continuing local resentmentsustained high levels of hostility, and isolated incidents ofviolence persisted.This article traces the evolution of conflict and peacebuildingin Kenya’s north-eastern borderlands – from the postindependence period, when state security forces violentlyquashed an insurgency; to the early 2000s, by which timethe state sought to accommodate local efforts to strengthenand promote peace; and up to today. It looks at the shift fromlocalised tensions and competition between clans that wereaddressed through local customary structures, to conflictsinvolving increased transnational influence and elite competitionfor political and administrative positions and territorial control.Peacebuilding approaches in the region have had to adapt toovercome new challenges to governance and security and thechanging political economy, linked to growing transnationalinfluences and the establishment of new county governments.“Conflict and peacebuilding up to theearly 2000sConflict and peacebuilding in Kenya’s north-easternborderlands – an area encompassing Mandera, Wajir andGarissa counties – are shaped by a long history of separation,marginalisation and insurgency. Under British colonial rule,the region was part of the expansive Northern FrontierDistrict, which was governed under separate and more26 // Accord // Insight 4Post-colonial governments,like the colonial regime beforeit, used various strategies toestablish a social order thateffectively excluded KenyanSomalis from full citizenship.”As a result, relations between the centre and borderlandpopulations started on a contentious footing, and Kenya’sbureaucratic state and military remained decidedly suspiciousof ethnic Somalis. Post-colonial governments, like thecolonial regime before it, used various strategies to establisha social order that effectively excluded Kenyan Somalis fromfull citizenship, including restrictions on their freedom ofIllustration (opposite): Key features in the Kenya–Somali borderregion, including population centres and movements. Jon Sack
Borderlands and peacebuilding // 27
Map 1: Mandera, Wajir and Garissa Counties, northern Kenya bordering RAEl WakMoyaleMoyaleKENYAK EN YAN DN DL AL AB AB AJ UJ UUGANDAUGANDASOMALIASOMALIAMogadishuEl WakWajirWajirWAJIRWAJIRMogadishuLiboi DobleLiboi DobleDadaabDadaabTa n aKismayoRTa n a i v GarissaKismayoRiv GarissaMount KenyaMount Kenyaer erNairobiNairobiGARISSAGARISSAINDIAN OCEANI N DI A N OC EA NLamuLamuTANZANIATANZANIAMombasaMombasa00150 300km150 300kmMap 2: Regional location of the border between Kenya and Somalia.SUDANSUDANKENYAKENYAMount ANZANIANNDDLALAAABBJUJUUGANDAUGANDA28 // Accord // Insight 4300 600km300 0ETHIOPIAETHIOPIASOUTH IAN OCEANI N DI A N OC EA N
movement, forced ‘villagisation’ (the resettlement of nomadicand scattered populations into concentrated villages), militarycoercion and collective punishment. Such state violencecontinued long after the Shifta conflict ended, including the1984 Wagalla Massacre – a collective punishment operationthat Anderson (2014) reports took the lives of up to 3,000 menfrom the Degodia clan. Restrictions on freedom of movementand special identity requirements for Kenyan Somalis wereonly lifted in 1997, although in practice Kenyan Somalis haveremained prone to routine police harassment and coercivepayment of bribes. Restrictions also impacted cross-borderrelations between populations. While some communities livingcloser to the border were able to maintain family connectionsand travel, such as for business, schooling and livestockgrazing, movement was mostly regulated through formalborder crossings.Conflict in the Kenyan border regions in the 1990s involvedcommunal tensions within and among Somali clans. Suchconflict was localised and included competition over grazingand water access as well as clan boundaries. Open fightingwas typically short-lived and involved few casualties, and wasaddressed through local structures and processes involvingcustomary and clan authorities with backing from localadministration officials. However, the collapse of centralgovernment in Somalia in 1991 and associated violence spilledover into north-eastern Kenya, in particular through thehardening of clan identities, the proliferation of arms and influxof refugees. Clan divides, which were a key mobilising factorin the Somali war but had previously not been a significantpolitical factor for Kenyan Somalis, began to play out on theKenyan side, in particular border towns. Violence eruptedbetween clan groups, particularly over control of towns andtrade routes. By this time, the state had retreated from itsrole in managing security, with security forces (who were nottrusted by most of the local population) becoming indifferentto conflict events in the region. The absence of effective stateresponses emphasised the role of local peacebuilding efforts.Dekha Ibrahim, the Wajir peacebuilding pioneer, reflectedin a 2010 interview on the shifting nature of conflict innorth-eastern Kenya as the region became more integratedin wider affairs:[T]he tensions were within the community and withinKenya. But over time they took on a regional dynamic.There were refugees streaming over the borders fromEthiopia and Somalia, as well as arms. We becamekeenly aware of the international dimensions ofconflicts, including the Cold War. We could see signseverywhere around us. National and internationalpolitics played out in our community. Religious tensionswere not at all obvious or pronounced in the early years,but they did emerge, within the Muslim community andbeyond, as the broader world intruded more and moreinto our lives.The advent of multi-party democracy in Kenya and the collapseof Somalia’s central government in the 1990s opened upspace for community mobilisation and leadership. Kenya’spolitical and security leaders were no longer threatened by thepossibility of covert Somali government support to resistancein Kenya’s north-eastern borderlands. Clan elders andSomali customary law (Xeer) provided ready leadership andmechanisms to resolve conflicts and encourage peace.The perceived partiality of (male) elders towards their own claninterests led to a notable development in local peacebuildingefforts – the emergence of women as key interlocutors andmobilisers for peace. In 1993 a group of local women in Wajirled by Ibrahim began to identify ways to respond to worseningconflict. Initially they reached out to religious leaders and clanelders, and by doing so began to develop cross-clan support.Over time their efforts grew into the Wajir Peace andDevelopment Committee (WPDC), formed in 1995. Critically,the Committee’s efforts gained traction due to the strongleadership from women and their efforts to engage differentlocal stakeholder communities, including civic leaders andadministrative and security officials. International NGOs andrelief organisations, which had a large presence in the regionin response to the refugee influx from Somalia and chronicfood insecurity, lent financial and other material support to theCommittee. According to Menkhaus (2008), the WPDC was‘unquestionably instrumental in the remarkable turnaround ofWajir district from one of the most anarchic to one of the morestable border zones of Kenya’. In 2010 Interpol called Garissatown the safest city in East and Central Africa.“Relations between the centreand borderland populationsstarted on a contentious footing,and Kenya’s bureaucratic stateand military remained decidedlysuspicious of ethnic Somalis.”Seeing how effective the Committee was, the nationalgovernment supported the expansion of the model toneighbouring administrative districts. This ‘hybrid governance’involved the state ceding some of its core functions, such asmaintaining peace and security, to various local non-state andinformal stakeholders including clan elders, businesspeople,women, youth, and locally based state and security officials.Many donors supported the government’s efforts, echoingglobal peacebuilding trends in the early 2000s that emphasisedthe role of non-state actors, particularly community groupsand civil society. Ibrahim and the other women who started theWPDC became celebrated peacebuilding advocates, travellingthe world to share their stories.Shifts in political economy since theearly 2000sThe early 2000s saw changes in the political economy of theregion that significantly shifted the nature of conflicts. The endof emergency rule in 1991 allowed Kenyan Somali traders –using their clan, business and religious connections in Somaliaand Gulf Arab states – to move goods into and through Kenyanmarkets, and on to markets in Uganda and the Great Lakesregion. Border regions and northern Kenya more widely wereviewed as rich with resources and new markets to help secureBorderlands and peacebuilding // 29
the country’s economic growth. No longer dismissed as aninconsequential borderland, national business and politicalelites now sought to establish links in the borderland regionfor investment, trade and political power. This was a markedreversal from the region’s marginalised past and its exclusionfrom wider development planning and investment.Economic change also hastened pastoralist ‘sedentarisation’.For example, the drilling of boreholes in the 1980s and 1990sencouraged both settlement and competition. By wrestingcontrol of water points, clans created new permanentsettlements and asserted territorial claims and pressurefor political recognition. Small and medium-sized townsthroughout the region experienced exceptional growth,especially after 1991 once the state of emergency was liftedand refugees arrived from Somalia.From 2003, the Kenya state began to support new socialinfrastructure like schools and clinics as well as administrativeoffices through Constituency Development Funds (CDFs),contributing further to town growth. In recent years, Garissahas become the country’s fastest-growing city, while Dadaab,home to the world’s largest refugee camp, now ranks asKenya’s third largest city. As sedentarisation accelerated andtowns expanded, demands for the supply of goods heightened.The volume of transport services increased as goods andpeople moved between growing centres in the region like Wajir,Mandera, Garissa and Isiolo, as well as between these townsand larger cities like Nairobi and Mombasa. This increasingconnectivity between the centre and borderlands, and withinthe borderlands, signified north-eastern Kenya’s growingencapsulation into wider Kenyan political and economic life.“In recent years, Garissa hasbecome the country’s fastestgrowing city, while Dadaab, hometo the world’s largest refugeecamp, now ranks as Kenya’sthird largest city.”Livestock marketing and trade, the backbone of locallivelihoods and economic life, continued to flourish despiterecurring drought and the Somali war, increasing demandfor transport links. Much of this trade was cross-border intoSomalia, with elites such as wealthy businesspeople, largelivestock owners and clan leaders making use of differentiatedconditions on either side of the border. Insecurity and lack ofpoor governance in Somalia meant an absence of enforcedtaxation rules and unregulated access to ports. The proximityof centres in the north-eastern borderlands between Nairobiand Kenya’s central highlands, and Kismayo port in Somalia,made them a ready market for transiting goods. A key exampleis the growth of the Garissa livestock market in the regionsince the 1990s, now one the largest such markets in theHorn of Africa.30 // Accord // Insight 4The borderlands economy has changed with the growth oftowns, multiplying transport connections, accessible andunregulated sea ports in southern Somalia, and expandingtransnational flows of goods. The improving position of KenyanSomali business elites, and refugee elites that control traderoutes from Somalia to Dadaab refugee camp, has alsogenerated increasing flows of investment into Kenya’s northernborderlands, in areas such as property, agriculture, haulageand financial services, as well as illicit trade in goods suchas charcoal and sugar. Nonetheless, human developmentindicators remain largely very poor. According to the WorldBank, the average poverty rate in north and north-easternKenya is 68 per cent (compared to 38 per cent nationally),primary school attendance is 55 per cent (82 per cent nationally),women’s literacy is 41 per cent (89 per cent nationally), andaccess to safe water 57 per cent (72 per cent nationally).The impact of devolutionPolitical developments have also been a key factor inchanging dynamics: Kenya’s 2010 constitution paved the wayfor devolution and the creation of new county governments thatreceive the equivalent of 15 per cent of national revenue. Whilemany in north-eastern Kenya celebrate devolution as a formof ‘home rule’ signifying the region’s greater autonomy fromthe centre, in practice it is one of the most ambitious effortsto expand state power into the borderlands.Devolution has also brought new forms of conflict, includingshifts in inter-clan rivalries. The greater integration of theborderlands with political and economic processes in Kenyaand transnationally has led local elites to seek to control bothterritory and political-administrative positions in order toassert and consolidate power. The creation of Wajir, Garissaand Mandera counties in 2013 sharpened the trend of risingclan-based competition to control sub-national political offices.Positions in county governments carry with them the power todecide the distribution of public resources for development butalso the ability to wield influence over institutions that allocatecontracts and tenders, jobs and scholarships.As a result, fragmentation at sub-national level along clan andsub-clan fault-lines, already evident since the early 1990s, hasincreased. Clan identities have increasingly become crucialmarkers in conflict dynamics as a way to stake and contestclaims to resources, including rangelands, water points,irrigable land and political positions. Local clan leaders andelders, and the use of Xeer, have become less prominent inresolving localised conflicts, which more easily spread intohigher-level conflict dynamics.Al Shabaab’s influence has also increased. The Somalia-basedmilitant group has waged an intensifying campaign of attacksin Kenya since 2008. By 2015, Lind (2018) reports, it wasimplicated in nearly 40 per cent of all conflict events innorthern Kenya, concentrated in Mandera, Wajir and Garissacounties. Al Shabaab propaganda refers to Somali-inhabitedareas of Kenya as ‘colonised territories’, drawing on longstanding local grievances against the Kenyan state and thesense of marginalisation among borderlands populations thatfuelled the earlier Shifta conflict. State security responsesincluded extrajudicial killings, a crackdown on refugees,
Woman herding goats at a waterpoint near Wajir, north-east Kenya. CGIAR/Flickr Creative Commonsamendments to security laws and police swoops on certaincommunities. As in earlier times, these were felt as a formof collective punishment, reconstituting the wedge betweenKenyan Somalis and the state while doing little to curb thethreat of Al Shabaab attacks.“Along the Kenya–Somaliaborder, cross-border peacecommittees – adapted fromthe original Kenyan WPDCcommittee model – developedin the 2000s with membershipdrawn from both sides ofthe border.”Peacebuilding todayChanges in clan conflict dynamics and the impact ofAl Shabaab operations emphasised the need for effectivepeacebuilding work. However, the influence of peacecommittee structures that evolved in the late 1990s began todecline in the 2000s. In essence, the local peace committeesbecame victims of their own success. The formalisation ofpeace as part of a national peace accord following postelection violence in 2007–08 introduced regular allowances,elected positions, and links to formal governance and securitystructures. These incentives opened up the peace committeesto capture and manipulation by political elites.Instead, other structures and processes began to addresspeace needs in the region, including religious leaders butincreasingly also politicians and local business elites. Theprevious peacebuilding achievements of the WPDC stemmedfrom its diverse membership that transcended narrow claninterests and its ability to cultivate relations between localcommunities and the Kenyan state. The loss of pioneerlocal peacebuilders such as Dekha Ibrahim through deathand old age undermined local peacebuilders’ capacity andinstitutional relations at a time when new and innovativeapproaches and skills were needed. In Garissa and Mandera,religious leaders, seen as impartial and above parochial claninterests, formed mediation councils and have played animportant role in resolving some clan conflicts where clanelders and peace committees could not succeed. Yet theability of religious leaders to mediate Al Shabaab-relatedconflicts appears to be minimal in the borderlands, and clanidentity has remained influential in mediating cross-borderAl Shabaab-related violence.Along the Kenya–Somalia border, cross-border peacecommittees – adapted from the original Kenyan WPDCcommittee model – developed in the 2000s with membershipdrawn from both sides of the border. They grew organically,responding to the need to address cross-border conflictand criminality. Connecting through clan networks with civilBorderlands and peacebuilding // 31
society, women’s groups and clan elders, they have beeneffectiv
26 // Accord // Insight 4 Kenya The changing nature of local peacebuilding in Kenya’s north-eastern borderlands Aden Abdi and Jeremy Lind Jeremy Lind is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University.
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