GAO-22-105002, DOD Financial Management: Additional Actions Would .

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United States Government Accountability OfficeReport to Congressional CommitteesMay 2022DOD FINANCIALMANAGEMENTAdditional ActionsWould ImproveReporting of JointStrike Fighter AssetsGAO-22-105002

May 2022DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENTAdditional Actions Would Improve Reporting of JointStrike Fighter AssetsHighlights of GAO-22-105002, a report tocongressional committeesWhy GAO Did This StudyWhat GAO FoundIn fiscal year 2019, DOD auditorsidentified a material weakness relatedto the JSF program. The JSF is DOD’smost costly weapon system in history,with overall costs estimated to be morethan 1.7 trillion over the program’s lifecycle. Auditors reported that DOD didnot report certain JSF program’sassets on its financial statements. Thisomission, as well as DOD’s inability toprovide supporting documentation forthe value of the assets, indicatedmaterial failures in controls forrecording joint programs at DOD.The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to address the materialweakness that auditors identified related to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)program, including establishing milestone dates for addressing underlying issues.However, GAO found that because it lacks a fully developed strategy, DOD hasnot met and subsequently revised the milestone dates. Without a documentedstrategy that includes detailed procedures for addressing the material weakness,DOD is at an increased risk that its effort to remediate the JSF financial reportingissues will not meet milestone target dates and will not be effective.This report, developed in connectionwith fulfilling GAO’s mandate to auditthe U.S. government’s consolidatedfinancial statements, examines theextent to which DOD (1) hasdeveloped and implementedprocedures for addressing the materialweakness and (2) tracks and recordsinformation about its joint programs.Further, GAO found that DOD designed inventory count procedures to verify thephysical existence of certain JSF assets such as support equipment held atcontractor facilities and included in property records; however, DOD did not verifythe completeness of assets, as directed by DOD guidance (see figure).DOD Inventory Count Procedures of Joint Strike Fighter AssetsGAO reviewed, among other things,relevant reports and accountingstandards, JSF documents, and DODpolicies and procedures; interviewedDOD officials; and conducted site visitsat three contractors’ locations.What GAO RecommendsGAO is making 12 recommendations,including for DOD to develop anddocument a strategy to address thematerial weakness and plans to verifythe completeness of JSF assetrecords, and to determine whetherinformation on joint programs issufficiently maintained for reportingpurposes. DOD concurred with 10 andpartially concurred with two of GAO’srecommendations. GAO continues tobelieve that all the recommendationsare warranted.View GAO-22-105002. For more information,contact Kristen Kociolek at (202) 512-2989 orkociolekk@gao.gov.Because DOD had never previously maintained its own complete JSF propertyrecords, it relied on contractor records to perform the inventory, but thesesometimes were inaccurate. For example, DOD was unable to verifyapproximately 16 million of JSF assets listed on contractor records. DODofficials said that these errors are likely to be significantly higher. Withoutproperly executed inventory procedures that verify both the physical existence ofthe assets and the completeness of the records, DOD management will not havethe information needed for reliable financial statement reporting and may not beable to identify if assets have been lost or stolen.DOD was unable to provide complete and consistent information about theuniverse of DOD joint programs. This limited GAO’s ability to fully examine anddetermine the extent to which DOD tracks and records information about its jointprograms. GAO found inconsistencies in DOD’s reported data about its jointprograms and in how DOD offices define and identify joint programs. Thisincreases the risk that financial data used for managing and reporting jointprograms will not be consistent, complete, or accurate.United States Government Accountability Office

ContentsLetter1BackgroundDOD Has Taken Steps to Address the JSF Material Weakness,but Challenges RemainDOD Cannot Provide Complete and Consistent Data on JointPrograms across All ACAT LevelsConclusionsRecommendations for Executive ActionAgency Comments and Our Evaluation633363739Appendix IComments from the Department of Defense42Appendix IIGAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments4714TableTable 1: Description of Acquisition Category (ACAT) I through IIIPrograms9FiguresFigure 1: Recording of DOD Accounting TransactionsFigure 2: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program’s Property CategoriesFigure 3: Locations of Sites Storing the Joint Strike FighterProgram AssetsFigure 4: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Material WeaknessRemediation Milestones with Initial and SubsequentTarget DatesFigure 5: F-35 Joint Program Office’s Inventory Procedures ofJoint Strike Fighter AssetsPage i711121620GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

IGOUSDOUSD (A&S)SFFASST/STEacquisition categoryaccountable property system of recordDefense Acquisition Visibility EnvironmentDefense Finance and Accounting ServiceDefense Logistics AgencyDepartment of DefenseDOD InstructionDefense Property Accountability SystemJoint Program OfficeJoint Strike FighterOffice of Inspector GeneralOffice of the Under Secretary of DefenseOffice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitionand SustainmentStatement of Federal Financial Accounting Standardssupport equipment/special tooling/special test equipmentThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in theUnited States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entiretywithout further permission from GAO. However, because this work may containcopyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may benecessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.Page iiGAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

Letter441 G St. N.W.Washington, DC 20548May 5, 2022Congressional CommitteesThe Department of Defense (DOD) has the largest discretionary spendingauthority of any agency in the federal government— 713 billion in fiscalyear 2021. Yet it remains the only major federal agency that has beenunable to receive an audit opinion on its department-wide financialstatements. 1 Sound financial management practices and reliable, useful,and timely financial information are important for ensuring accountabilityover DOD’s extensive resources and for efficiently and effectivelymanaging the department’s assets and budgets. Since 1995, GAO hasdesignated DOD financial management as high risk because of pervasiveweaknesses in its financial management systems, business processes,internal controls, and financial reporting. 2 These weaknesses haveadversely affected DOD’s ability to prepare auditable financialstatements, which is one of three major impediments preventing us fromexpressing an audit opinion on the U.S. government’s consolidatedfinancial statements. 3The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required theSecretary of Defense to ensure that a full audit was performed on DOD’sfiscal year 2018 financial statements and to submit the results to1Discretionary spending refers to outlays from budget authority that are provided in andcontrolled by appropriation acts, unlike mandatory spending, such as Medicare and otherentitlement programs. For fiscal year 2021, DOD received a discretionary budget authorityof 713 billion of the 1.6 trillion total discretionary budget authority of the federalgovernment.GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress inMost High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2021).23The other two impediments preventing us from rendering an audit opinion on the federalgovernment’s consolidated financial statements are (1) the federal government’s inabilityto account for intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities adequatelyand (2) the weaknesses in the federal government’s process for preparing theconsolidated financial statements. See GAO, Financial Audit: FY 2020 and FY 2019Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government, GAO-21-340R (Washington,D.C.: Mar. 25, 2021).Page 1GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

Congress no later than March 31, 2019. 4 DOD underwent a full audit foreach fiscal year, 2018 through 2021, and received a disclaimer of opinionfor each of these 4 years. 5 In fiscal year 2021, auditors reported 28material weaknesses in internal control related to DOD’s financialreporting processes. 6 One of the material weaknesses DOD auditorsidentified related to the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program(hereinafter referred to as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program), DOD’smost costly weapon system in history, with overall costs estimated to bemore than 1.7 trillion over the program’s life cycle. 7DOD auditors first identified the material weakness related to the JSFprogram in fiscal year 2019. Auditors reported that DOD did not reportcertain JSF program’s assets (hereinafter referred to as JSF assets) onits financial statements. 8 Further, auditors reported that the omission ofthese assets from the financial statements, as well as DOD’s inability toprovide documentation supporting the value of the assets, indicatedmaterial failures in internal controls for recording joint programs DODwide. The F-35 Joint Program Office (F-35 JPO) manages the JSF4Pub. L. No. 113-66, div. A, § 1003, 127 Stat. 672, 842 (Dec. 26, 2013). This provisionwas repealed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No.115-91, div. A, § 1002(b), 131 Stat. 1283, 1538 (Dec. 12, 2017), which instead enacted apermanent requirement for annual DOD financial statement audits, now codified assection 240a of Title 10, United States Code.5A disclaimer of opinion arises when the auditor is unable to obtain sufficient, appropriateaudit evidence to provide a basis for an audit opinion. The auditor concludes that thepossible effects on the financial statements of undetected misstatements, if any, could beboth material and pervasive and accordingly does not express an opinion on the financialstatements.6A material weakness is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in internal controlover financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a materialmisstatement of the entity’s financial statements will not be prevented, or detected andcorrected, on a timely basis. A deficiency in internal control exists when the design oroperation of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course ofperforming their assigned functions, to prevent, or detect and correct, misstatements on atimely basis.7The overall costs comprise approximately 400 billion in DOD’s planned acquisition costsand DOD’s estimated 1.3 trillion in costs to operate, maintain, and support the F-35aircraft, such as the supply chain for the delivery of spare parts. The 1.7 trillion reflectsthen-year dollars through the end of JSF program operations in year 2077. Then-yeardollars include the effects of projected inflation or escalation.8JSF assets consist of the global spares pool and support equipment/specialtooling/special test equipment, such as complete engines, landing gear, tires, trainingsimulators, and trailers.Page 2GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

program and relies on both federal employees and contractors to providesupport for its strike fighter aircraft (F-35 aircraft). The F-35 JPO uses twoprime contractors, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, to not onlysupport the aircraft and engines, respectively, but also to maintainrecords of its JSF assets, such as the quantity purchased and locationand cost of the assets.We have previously reported that DOD initially did not intend to own theJSF assets, but in 2012 the JSF program’s executive steering boardissued a memorandum declaring the JSF assets be titled to the U.S.government when they are not installed on an aircraft. However, becauseDOD did not develop a plan to address this memorandum on how tomaintain accountability over the assets that it already owned or wouldpurchase in the future, the prime contractors continued to maintainaccountability and provide data for the JSF assets they managed. 9DOD management reported in its fiscal year 2021 agency financial reportthat the department’s failure to account for, manage, or record JSF assetsin an accountable property system of record (APSR), and reliance oncontractor records to value these assets, contributed to the materialweakness. 10 Additionally, in 2019, we reported that DOD has spentbillions of dollars on JSF assets but does not have records for all theparts it has purchased, where they are located, or how much they cost. 11We made several recommendations, such as identifying and establishingsteps to implement a policy for maintaining accountability of JSF assetsand developing a methodical approach for obtaining cost information forthese assets. However, DOD has not completely implemented theserecommendations, as discussed in more detail later in this report.We performed this audit in connection with fulfilling our mandate to auditthe U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements, which cover allaccounts and associated activities of executive branch agencies; theseinclude DOD because of the significance of the military services’ auditactivities to that audit. This report examines the extent to which DOD (1)has developed and implemented procedures for addressing the auditor9GAO, F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Substantial Supply ChainChallenges, GAO-19-321 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2019).10Department of Defense, Department of Defense Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year2021 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2021).GAO-19-321.11Page 3GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

identified material weakness regarding the JSF program and (2) tracksand records information about its joint programs.To address both objectives, we reviewed reports that GAO and the DODOffice of Inspector General (OIG) issued and DOD agency financialreports for fiscal years 2018 through 2021 and the Notices of Finding andRecommendation and corresponding corrective action plans for fiscalyears 2019 through 2021 to gain an understanding of the issues relatedto joint programs, including the JSF program, across DOD. To examinethe extent to which DOD has developed and implemented procedures toaddress the JSF program material weakness, we interviewed officials withthe Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) (Comptroller),OUSD for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)), F-35 JPO,Department of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps,Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Contract ManagementAgency, and DOD contractors to evaluate the processes and controls that DOD has established and implemented toperform inventory counts of JSF assets, capabilities of the Defense Property Accountability System (DPAS)and whether DPAS meets DOD’s requirements for an APSR, and methodology DOD has developed to capture costs of JSF assets.Additionally, we obtained the status of DOD’s plan for reporting the JSFassets on its department-wide and component-level financial statements.We also reviewed DOD documents, such as the F-35 AccountableProperty Management Framework, and department-wide andgovernment-wide policies and standards, such as DOD’s FinancialManagement Regulation, DOD instructions and manuals, relevantStatements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS), and theStandards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, to obtaininformation on DOD’s accountability over and financial management ofthe JSF program. 12 To understand how JSF assets are stored at thecontractors’ facilities and the controls the contractors have over theseassets, we conducted site visits at two Pratt & Whitney locations in FortWorth, Texas, and Jupiter, Florida, and also a subcontractor location inGAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).12Page 4GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

Stuart, Florida. 13 We determined that the control activities component ofinternal control standards was significant to this objective, specifically theunderlying principle that management should design control activities toachieve objectives and respond to risks. We also determined that themonitoring component of internal control standards was significant to thisobjective, specifically the underlying principle that management shouldremediate identified internal control deficiencies on a timely basis.To examine the extent to which DOD tracks and records informationabout its joint programs, we reviewed DOD policies and procedures forjoint acquisition programs. We also interviewed officials from the JointChiefs of Staff, OUSD (Comptroller), OUSD (A&S), the military services(Air Force, Navy, and Department of the Army), and the Defense HealthAgency to determine how joint programs are defined, initiated, andoverseen. To identify a complete population of joint programs at DOD, wefirst requested a list of joint programs as of May 2021 from OUSD (A&S).Next, to verify the completeness of the joint programs recorded on theOUSD (A&S) list, we requested a list of joint programs from each DOD participant identifiedon the OUSD (A&S) list; reviewed the list of joint programs recorded in the fiscal year 2020OUSD (Comptroller) Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon Systembook; developed a list based on our search of active acquisition programs inthe Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) for programnames and descriptions that contained the word “joint” or adescription of a joint program; and reconciled the lists from OUSD (A&S), DOD participants, OUSD(Comptroller), and our own search of DAVE.We followed up with DOD officials on discrepancies we found through thereconciliation. We determined that the control activities component ofinternal control standards was significant to this objective, specifically theThe three contractors’ sites were selected based on the quantity and variety of JSFassets located at each site, as well as the timing of the planned inventory schedule. Forthis report, unless otherwise specified, contractors’ facilities refers to those operated bythe two prime contractors, domestic and international contractors, subcontractors, lowertier contractors, and vendors that provide parts and services to the JSF program.13Page 5GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

underlying principle that management should design control activities toachieve objectives and respond to risks.We conducted this performance audit from February 2021 to May 2022 inaccordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtainsufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for ourfindings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe thatthe evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings andconclusions based on our audit objectives.BackgroundDOD’s Financial ReportingProcessTo ensure sound management and long-term stability in their operations,organizations track their financial activities (hereinafter referred to astransactions), such as expenses they incur and income they generate. 14Organizations record their daily transactions, which increase or decreaseaccount balances, in their accounting systems. For example, anorganization’s “cash balance” account increases when customers makepayments due for goods or services previously provided, while otheraccount balances, such as “accounts receivable” (the amount owed to anorganization for goods or services provided), decrease becausecustomers are paying part of what they owed to the organization.At DOD, as seen in figure 1, DOD’s individual components perform thisdaily process of recording transactions in accounting systems. 15 Thesecomponents use multiple accounting systems to record and summarizetheir financial transactions. 16 Each month, quarter, and year, componentssend summarized financial information to the Defense Finance andIn addition to financial activities such as expenses and income, transactions at DOD alsoinclude actions to JSF assets, such as inventory adjustments, changes to condition,receipts, and disposals, which should affect DOD asset balances on its financialstatements.14DOD is composed of over 50 individual components. These components are subsidiaryorganizations within DOD and include the following: Office of Secretary of the Defense;the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff; the DOD OIG; the militarydepartments (Army, Air Force, and Navy); other defense agencies, such as DLA; DODfield activities; the combatant commands; the Uniformed Services University of the HealthSciences; and all nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.15Most components have several accounting systems that record and summarize theirfinancial transactions. For example, the General Fund Enterprise Business System is theArmy’s primary accounting system used to record the majority of its transactions.16Page 6GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

Accounting Service (DFAS), the DOD agency that provides accountingsupport for DOD. 17 DOD’s core financial reporting system consolidatesthe summarized financial information from individual components intoDOD’s department-wide financial information. 18Figure 1: Recording of DOD Accounting TransactionsFinancial statements provide information about an organization’s financialposition—such as assets (what it owns) and liabilities (what it owes)—asof a certain point in time, in addition to the financial results of itsoperations—such as revenue (what came in) and expenses (what wentout)—over a period of time, such as a fiscal year. Financial statementsare prepared based on the summarized, or consolidated, financialinformation from an organization’s accounting systems. Their reliabilitydepends on there being accurate financial information in the accountingsystems.There are three Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sites that performfinancial reporting functions, which are located in Cleveland, Ohio; Columbus, Ohio; andIndianapolis, Indiana. DFAS Cleveland supports the Navy and Marine Corps, whereasDFAS Columbus supports the Air Force. DFAS Indianapolis provides most of the Army’saccounting support, but DFAS Columbus also provides a small portion.17The one exception at DOD is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which prepares its ownfinancial statements using core DOD processes and, with DFAS support as needed,submits its financial information for DOD consolidation purposes.18Page 7GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

DOD aggregates the summarized financial information from the individualcomponents to produce its consolidated financial statements. 19 DOD,along with other federal agencies, submits financial information to theDepartment of the Treasury, which then aggregates the information forpresentation on the consolidated financial statements of the U.S.government. Reliable and complete financial information is necessary tohelp agency management and Congress understand the agency’sfinances, make informed policy and resource decisions, and hold agencyofficials accountable for their use of these resources.DOD’s Acquisition Processand ProgramsThe financial position of DOD includes the assets it acquires, such asweapon systems and equipment to support its military operations. DOD’sacquisition programs, which DOD uses to direct and fund its acquisitions,follow one of six acquisition pathways. 20 These pathways provideprocedures for managing different types of acquisition programs. Ourfocus for the purposes of this report is on the major capability acquisitionpathway, which is the process designed to support major defenseacquisition programs, systems, and other complex acquisitions. Forexample, the Army’s Black Hawk helicopter is a major capabilityacquisition program. The Black Hawk is a troop-carrying helicopterdesigned for all intensities of conflict, without regard to geographicallocation or environmental conditions. For acquisition programs followingthe major capability acquisition pathway, DOD designates an acquisitioncategory (ACAT) I through III to facilitate decentralized decision-making,execution, and compliance with statutorily imposed requirements such assubmitting Selected Acquisition Reports. 21 ACATs are based onestimated program costs and the type of acquisition (see table 1).Office of Management and Budget guidance requires nine DOD components to prepareannual financial reports, and DOD policy requires an additional 15 components to prepareannual financial reports. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2021 Department of Defense Reporting Entities (Washington,D.C.: May 11, 2021). Further, DOD is required by law to prepare audited financialstatements annually covering all accounts and associated activities of each of itscomponents, which it prepares by consolidating all DOD financial information from these24 components as well as 34 other components. 31 U.S.C. § 3515(a).19The six pathways include urgent capability acquisition, middle tier of acquisition, majorcapability acquisition, software acquisition, acquisition of services, and defense businesssystems.20Selected Acquisition Reports provide the status of total program cost, schedule, andperformance to Congress and report increased program risk.21Page 8GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

Table 1: Description of Acquisition Category (ACAT) I through III ProgramsACAT levelACAT IACAT IIACAT IIICriteria for ACAT designation Major defense acquisition program estimated to require an eventual total expenditure for research,development, and testing and evaluation of more than 525 million in fiscal year (FY) 2020 constantdollars or, for procurement, of more than 3.065 billion in FY 2020 constant dollars, or Designated by the milestone decision authoritya as a major defense acquisition program, or Designated by the milestone decision authority as a special interestb Does not meet criteria for ACAT I Major system estimated to require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, and testingand evaluation of more than 200 million in FY 2020 constant dollars or, for procurement, of more than 920 million in FY 2020 constant dollars, or Designated by milestone decision authority as a major system Does not meet criteria for ACAT II or above Is not designated as a “major system”Source: Department of Defense Instruction 5000.85, Major Capability Acquisition, (Aug. 6, 2020). GAO-22-105002aThe milestone decision authority is an individual who has the overall responsibility for the acquisitionprogram and is accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to a higher authority,including congressional reporting.bThe special interest designation is typically based on one or more of the following factors:technological complexity; congressional interest; a large commitment of resources; or the program iscritical to achieving a capability or set of capabilities, part of a system of systems, or a joint program.Programs that already meet the major defense acquisition program thresholds cannot be designatedas special interest.Acquisition programs that contribute to joint capabilities or provide abudgetary or financial advantage may be managed as joint acquisitionprograms. Some of the benefits of making an acquisition program jointinclude coordination that results in less duplication and overlap of effort;reduced development and production costs; and reduced logisticsrequirements, such as storage and training. According to DOD officials,joint acquisition programs follow the same acquisition process as otherDOD acquisition programs. One example of a joint acquisition program isthe JSF program, which follows the major capability acquisition pathway.JSF ProgramThe JSF program is DOD’s largest acquisition program in terms of totalestimated lifetime acquisition cost. Initiated in November 1996, the JSFprogram is a joint, multinational acquisition program intended to developand field a family of F-35 aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and MarineCorps; seven international partners; and six foreign military salesPage 9GAO-22-105002 Joint Strike Fighter Asset Accountability

customers (collectively hereinafter referred to as program participants). 22The F-35 JPO, which manages the JSF program, is responsible forestablishing the requirements, managing the funding, developing thecontracts, and providing the directions for and overseeing the executionof the program. 23 DOD’s two prime contractors, Lockheed Martin andPratt & Whitney, are responsible for supporting the aircraft and engines,respectively, including the development, repairs, and management of JSFprogram property.As seen in figure 2, the JSF program property is grouped into thefollowing four major categories: F-35 aircraft, global spares pool, supportequipment/special tooling/special test equipment (ST/STE) and internaluse software. 24 The JSF program is unique from other joint programsbecause, as part of the F-35 supply chain, all program participants haveaccess to the shared global spares pool and ST/STE (hereinafter referredto as JSF assets), which DOD owns. 25 The program participants do notpurchase these JSF assets directly, but rather pay for access based onprojected use, which is estimated based on how many F-

JSF assets currently held at contractor facilities. One of the challenges in establishing this baseline was that DOD has never maintained its own complete JSF property records that contained data elements indicating how many JSF assets it has purchased, where the assets are located, descriptions of the assets, or the full cost paid for the assets.

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