An Outstanding Amphibious

Air-Ground Warfare in Florida . . .OPERATION "COMBINE III"By Captain Gene A. Walters, Inf.THE MISSIONTHE BASIS of successful operationsagainst an enemy is competentcooperation between the differentarmed forces and mutual understandingof the capabilities, methods ofemployment, and tactical doctrines ofeach other. This is a particularlydesirable relation which must existbetween Ground and Air Forces in themajority of land operations. Theeffectiveness of air-ground cooperationattained in World War II indicated a direneed for promulgating and furthering thedevelopment of this relationship. It wasdeemed axiomatic, therefore, that allbranches must continually strive for theultimate coordination in peace time ifthis goal of successful prosecution ofoperations against an enemy is to beattained in war. In furtherance of thisrelationship, a mock warfare, termedOperation "COMBINE III," waspresented as a means of concisely andaccurately disseminating tactical airdoctrine and methods of air-groundoperations.The overall mission of Operation"COMBINE III" was to familiarizejunior and senior officers of the ArmedForces with the capabilities andlimitations of air power, and to portraythe achievements made possible bycloseandadequateair-groundcooperation. The basic probleminvolved in joint air-ground action isthe preparation and execution of a fireplan which is so concentrated anddesigned as to render maximum aid tothe supported ground units in attainingtheir objective. Joint planning andtarget selection seeks to integrate thefire power of all forces so as to use tobest advantage the capabilities of eachweapon employed. The primarymission of Operation "COMBINE III"was that of general orientation in themany intricate problems of teamworknecessary to achieve these aims and,therefore, required of all forcesinvolved in joint air-ground action.Under the responsibility of TacticalAir Command's Ninth Air Force,Operation "COMBINE III" waspresented in cooperation with ThirdArmy, Air Fleet Marine Force Atlantic,Commander Air Atlantic Fleet,Strategic Air Command, Twelfth AirForce, and the Air Proving GroundCommand. Representing the ThirdArmy in this operation was the 505thAirborne Infantry's formidable, wellrounded 3d Battalion Combat Team(reinforced) of the 82d AirborneDivision, namely: 3d Battalion, 505thAirborne InfantryBattery "B," 376th Airborne FieldArtillery BattalionCompany "B," 758th Heavy TankBattalionBattery "B," 98th Field ArtilleryBattalionDetachment, 82d Airborne ParachuteMaintenance CompanyDetachment, 82d Airborne MilitaryPolice CompanyIn the presentation of "COMBINEIII," two separate and distinct methodsof instruction were utilized. The first(the theoretical side of the mission) wasaccomplished by means of skits,demonstrations, and static displays. Thesecond (the practical side of themission) was accomplished by actualdemonstrations of tactical air powerworking in cooperation and conjunctionwith the above-listed army units.During the period 4 October to 10November1948,Operation"COMBINE III" was presented visually4at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, tovarious civil dignitaries, and to UnitedStates Army officers and officers ofallied nations attending ten of theforemost service schools of the Air andField Forces. In presenting Operation"COMBINE III," six distinct exercises,each of three days' duration, werepresented to combined student bodiesof the various service schools.THE SITUATIONAhypotheticalanduniquebackground, as the military situationfor this operation, was invented, basedupon the varied aspects of a surpriseoffensive. The situation involved twoimaginary adversaries, NAMORO andDELUVIA, sharing the island continentof DELMORO. These two nations hadengaged in periodical warfare for over500 years with neither being able toachieve a decisive victory over theother. Each nation was approximatelyequal in land area, population, rawmaterials, and industrial capacity. Theopposing armies, navies, and air forces,in size and equipment, wereapproximately the same althoughdifferinginorganization.TheNAMORAN military establishmentwas more comparable to that of theUnited States in that their Army, Navy,and Air Forces were each independentbut unified at high level.In view of intelligence reports to theeffect that DELUVIA was againcontemplating the undertaking of a warof aggression within the near future,NAMORO, for the first time in history,had decided to become the aggressor.NAMORO hoped to achieve adecisive victory primarily through her

1949unified military establishment, throughher well trained and equipped airbornearmies, her more advanced strategic,tactical, and troop-carrier air forces, andthrough fast, mobile land armiesreaching the capital and industrialcenters of DELUVIA in a very shorttime. By attacking first, the element ofsurprise was to have been a decisivefactor in permitting NAMORO tooverwhelm DELUVIA and to achieve adecisive victory.THE PRESENTATION OF SKITSThe initial phase of the exercise beganon Monday morning of each week. Aseries of skits, with short commentariesinserted to show a continuity ofplanning, were the basic vehicles ofinstruction pertinent to the academicportion of the exercise. Thesedramatized skits, six in number,portrayed broadly an ideal of integratedArmy, Air, and Naval Forces in action inthe operational planning stages for andduring action. The skits depicted theplanning for and implementation of thegeneral plan of operations from thehighest level in the NAMORANGovernment down to and includinginfantry battalion combat-team level.They established the plan of operationsfor the Task Force Combine III and theactual Wednesday morning Army-Airdemonstration which was shown to thestudent officers.The opening skit presented a "topsecret" meeting on D minus 90 in theoffice of the NAMORAN Secretary ofNational Defense. It depicted himbriefing the Chiefs of Staff on heNAMORAN oil fields. The generaltheme of this skit showed theimplementation highlights of a defenseplan alerted for immediate action and thenecessary first steps for offensive action.The second skit theoretically tookplace two months later, on D minus 30.The Supreme Commander of theprojected NAMORAN ExpeditionaryForces, together with the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, outlined their plans in overallstrategy to their Civilian Chieftain, theNAMORAN Secretary of NationalDefense. This skit portrayed the keybattle plan for the offensive. Problemsinvolved at this level, in addition to therole of air power, included timing ofOPERATION "COMBINE III"airborne and air-transport operations inconjunction with an amphibious assault.The third skit, on D minus ten,portrayed the Supreme Commander ashe monitored the coordination of finalbattle plans for Operation "COMBINEIII" by the Task Force Commander, hisintegrated command staff, and theirprincipal subordinates. At this time, thevarious plans for the launching ofairborne troops, air power, theamphibious landing, logistics, resupply,and consolidation of forces were agreedupon.On Tuesday, the three remaining skitswere presented. Each of these carried theoperation a little farther, and portrayedto the students the progress of theinvasion. The fourth skit, on D plus 21,found the Third Army and the Ninth AirForce commanders and their key staffofficers conferring on the generalsituation and outlining their plans for thefinal inland attack upon ATLANTIS.The last skit of the day, representing Dplus 30, took place in the forward fieldcommand post of one of the infantrybattalion commanders. In this skit, thebattalion commander and members ofhis staff discussed the plans for theirattack, which was a part of the maindrive on ATLANTIS.In addition to the above skits, enactedonatheaterstage,variousdemonstrations and displays of controlfacilities of a tactical air force wereinterestingly presented to the studentofficers. Among them were a jointoperations center, a tactical air controlcenter, and a tactical air direction center.Others included a tactical aerialreconnaissance demonstration and an airtransportability demonstration.AIR-GROUND DEMONSTRATIONThe highlight and climax of eachweek's operation was the Wednesdaymorning air-ground demonstration. Inpresenting this combined-arm team inaction, only a portion of the hypotheticaloperations of the southern task force,known as Task Force Combine III, waspresented to the student officers andvisitors. It was explained to them thatthey were privileged to observe theaction and operation of this small part ofa much larger force. Emphasis in thepresentation was on the Army-TacticalAir Force operations. The plan ofoperations for Task Force Combine III5was divided into three distinct phases inorder to show how a tactical air force isemployed in cooperation with armyforces under different tactical situations.These three phases covered thehypothetical periods D-Day through Dplus 18 for Phase I, D plus 19 through Dplus 29 for Phase II, and D plus 30through D plus 60 for Phase III.Phase IPhase I of the actual demonstrationdepicted the tactics and methodsemployed in obtaining air superiorityand in preparing the airborne andamphibious landing areas prior toinvasion by army forces. Also, in thisphase was demonstrated the airborne andtroop-carrier phases of operation in theestablishment of an airhead.The doctrine of joint employmentrecognizes without question that thegaining of air superiority is the firstrequirement for the success of any majorland operation. Land forces operatingwithout air superiority must take suchextensive security measures againsthostile air attack that their mobility andability to defeat the enemy land forces aregreatly reduced. The possession of airsuperiority means that destructive anddemoralizing enemy air attacks againstour ground forces will be minimized andthe inherent mobility of our modern landforces may be exploited to the fullest.This first phase of tactical air operations(air superiority) is a counter-air forceoperation, designed to gain mastery of theair, not by plane-against-plane combatalone, but by the destruction of enemyaircraft on the ground, enemy airdromeinstallations, factories producing airplanesand parts, gasoline supplies, bomb andammunition dumps, and lines of air-forcesupply. By destroying these things whichthe enemy requires for his application ofair power—his gasoline supplies so hisplanes can't fly, his ammunition dumps sohis guns are useless—and by preventingthe enemy air force from building upthrough replacements, enemy air power isrendered impotent, and air attacks on ourown troops are minimized.Local air superiority over theairhead area is a fundamentalprerequisite for successful airborneoperations. Reasonable assurance ofthis requirement was accomplished byalogicalandcontinuous

6THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNALbuild-up in preparation for the initialairborne assault. The principal missionof airborne forces is to move by aircraftto attack, seize, and hold importantobjectives, pending the arrival of otherground forces, and to occupy or toreinforce areas which are beyond theimmediate reach of other ground unitsbut which are considered vital to thesuccess of the main effort. The primarymissions of the troop-carrier units are: totransport airborne forces into combat, toinclude the towing of gliders; totransport supplies and cargo; and toevacuate casualties. Since airborneforces possess great strategic mobility,they must take advantage of this bymaking the greatest possible use on theground of speed, bold aggressive action,and surprise in the accomplishment oftheir mission.ThePathfinders.Droppingbyparachute in advance of the main airborneassault force was the airborne pathfinderteam. This team, consisting of one officerand nine enlisted men, includesspecialists in the use of radio, radar,visual, and navigational aids. It is theirresponsibility to precede the mainairborne assault echelons to the properdrop zone by approximately fifteenminutes on a daylight operation. Uponlanding, they recover and set up theirequipment, contact their main assaultforce, and assist in directing thesubsequent troop-carrier aircraft to theexact location to which they are to deliverthe airborne troops and equipment.Personnel of pathfinder teams must notonly be able to operate many and variedtypes of navigational aids, but also mustbe able to orient themselves quickly onthe ground and protect themselves againstenemy opposition until the arrival of themain assault force. A suitable drop zoneshould be sufficiently close to theobjective so that airborne troops canattack with surprise, but beyond the rangeof enemy small-arms fire, if practicable,in order that the airborne assault unitsmay be brought under effective commandcontrol before entering combat.The Airborne Assault Force. Theinitial objective of the airborne forceswas to establish an airhead in the EGLINarea on D-Day, with the mission ofsecuring vital air fields and beaches forsubsequent air and amphibious landings.Upon capture of these areas andinstallations, the lodgement wasexploited by amphibious forces whoseprimary objective was the port ofSACOLA and its major port facilities.After securing the port of SACOLA,additional army groups were landed anda major build-up effected, in order that adrive northward through the enemy'svital industrial zone might be effected.These airborne and amphibious assaultsin the EGLIN area constituted but onephase in the over-all plan of attackagainst DELUVIA. In the visualpresentation of this phase of thedemonstration, an airborne battalioncombat team, comprising only a verysmall element of the total force, was allthat could be seen by the spectators.The main airborne assault force wastransported by troop-carrier C-82 aircraft.They were flying in a flight of three-shipelement "V" formations, in column. Theformation used for the drop of paratroopsvaries with the size of the jumpingelements, whether a day or nightoperation, the size and conformation ofthe drop area, and the tactical situation.However, to achieve a concentratedground pattern in the jumping ofparachutists, a flight of nine ships in a"V" of "Vs" formation is normallyadopted as the basic flight formation.Even under the most favorablecircumstances, parachute troops make aconsiderably dispersed landing.Since troop-carrier aircraft areunarmored and are highly vulnerable toantiaircraft fire and enemy aircraft, avery close cover must be maintained bythe tactical air force in order to protectthem in their flight to and from the dropzones. On airborne invasions, intensefighter cover is vital for protection of thetroop-carrier serials. Therefore, on theday, or days, of the airborne operation,quite frequently every available fighterin the theater will guard the airbornemovement.Airborne troops are extremelyvulnerable during their landing andreorganization. Therefore, the mostcritical period of an airborne operation isfrom the time of the landing until thetroops are ready to move on to theirobjective, for functioning as a fightingunit is almost impossible untilorganization has been accomplished.The control and recovery of equipmentis of vital importance in assuring rapidreorganization and movement ofparachute and glider units from the dropJanuary-Februaryzone. Immediately after reorganization,unless otherwise planned or ordered,troops will proceed on their assignedmission, exploiting speed, surprise, andaggressive action to the fullest.The shock action and surpriseemployment of airborne forces producesan adverse effect upon enemy morale.The sudden destruction of vitalinstallations or the surprise occupationof positions by airborne forces tends todisorganize the enemy and decrease hiscapacity for coordinated action. In orderto produce the maximum effect, airborneforces are normally employed in mass soas to overwhelm the enemy before he isable to prepare an effective defense orcounteroffensive. The limited amount ofequipment, transportation, and suppliesthat can accompany airborne troopsdetermines their ability to maintaineffective sustaining action. Therefore,the overall plan of employment ofairborne forces must include a timewhen support or link-up is expectedfrom cooperating ground and air forces.Although the mission of airborne troopsin the initial phase of an operation isusually one of offensive action, atransition to defensive action, in holdingthe position or objective, is normallyrequired pending reinforcement by otherground troops. Once the objective hasbeen taken and defensive positionsestablished, it is most important that theforce constantly harass the enemy, ainvigorouscounter-patrol activity, and ambush hisforces.The Airborne Artillery. Followingclosely behind the attacking infantrycame the airborne artillery battery,which was initially attached as anintegral part of the airborne battalioncombat team. In order to facilitate andexpedite control, it was deemed moredesirable to drop the field artilery batteryas a unit, rather than with the infantryassault echelons.The primary mission of the airbornefield artillery was to assist theadvance of the infantry by furnishingclose fire support and by neutralizingor destroying those targets whichwere most dangerous to the assaultinginfantry forces. After the battery haddropped, the pieces were assembledby section and, where necessary, wentinto action immediately

OPERATION "COMBINE III"194975-mm pach howitzer loads start their drop from a C-82.as individual sections. Every effort wasmade, however, to speed the assemblyand reorganization of the sections of thebattery so as to permit the fire power ofall pieces to be employed as a unit.The movement of weapons, supplies,and ammunition in an airborne fieldartillery battery which is committed byparachute must be accomplished by handor by captured transportation untilgliders arrive with prime movers. Sincethe initial ammunition supply is limitedand resupply is often difficult,conservation of ammunition must beconsidered essential. The first round isoften fired at the actual target, sincethere may be little or no time in which toregister prior to the taking of the initialtarget under fire. Because of the fluidsituations frequently encountered inairborne operations, individual sectionsand even the battery must be prepared toshift fire readily and support an attack inany direction, to the front, flanks, orrear. For the protection of reorganizationareas, initial fires are frequently of adefensive nature. For the delivery offires in close support and for localsecurity, fire on targets is often by directlaying. Initially, little opportunity willexist in airborne operations for thedelivery of fires other than by forwardobserver methods. Of course, whenopportunity permits and when theobjective has been secured, the initiationof surveys will be undertaken, utilizingmethods most appropriate to theparticular situation. (For a detaileddiscussion of the types, organization,weapons,transportation,andemployment of airborne artillery, see theNov.-Dec. 1947 issue of THE FIELDARTILLERY JOURNAL.)The Glider Serial. The heavy wallopand mobility of an airborne force istransported by the gliders. Normallythey are employed initially in anairborne operation to carry the essentialtransportation for command, heavy7weapons,artillerypiecesandammunition, items of heavy equipmentand supply, and the necessary personnelto handle and operate such. Since thegliderborne element was carrying justsuch a load belonging to the elementsalready committed by parachute, andwas not an independent, integral fightingunit itself, it was landed in the areaalready secured by the parachutistelements. This, however, does notpreclude the need to provide their ownsecurity; the glidermen must be preparedto fight in order to clear their landingzone prior to unloading. On the otherhand, had the gliders been transportingan independent and complete fightingunit, they might have landed either asdescribed above, or simultaneously withthe parachutist elements in an entirelydifferent area.

of Engineers, Ordnance Department, Transportation Corps, and Quartermaster Corps. Other salient points of the reorganization are: (1) Transfer of the Judge Advocate General's Office from the Administrative Services to the . Lt. Col. Beverley E. Powell . Lt. Col. Robert F. Cocklin .