Report On Counterinsurgency Capabilities Within The Afghan National .

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Report on Counterinsurgency CapabilitiesWithin the Afghan National ArmyFebruary 2010Afghan National Army Lessons Learned Center

This report includes input from members of a Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) from the AfghanNational Army Lessons Learned Center and the US Center for Army Lessons Learned.–LTC Abdul Wali – Director, Afghan Lessons LearnedCenter.-LTC Mohammad Humayoon - Observer Analyst,Afghan Lessons Learned Center.–MAJ Ahmad Yar - Observer Analyst, AfghanLessons Learned Center.–CPT Rangeen- Observer Analyst, Afghan LessonsLearned Center.LTC Keith Stone – Center for Army LessonsLearned, Theater Observation Detachment Officerat the Afghan Lessons Learned Center–Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned Center–Page 2 of 17

Counterinsurgency is those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actionstaken by a government to defeat an insurgency (Ministry of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms).Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 3 of 17

Afghan National Army Training CommandDoctrine and Concepts Directorate22 February 2010This report brings together two very important military capabilities: Counterinsurgency Operations, andLessons Learned. Counterinsurgency operations are how we fight. The Lessons Learned process allowsus to change how we fight by showing the Amy what works, and what doesn’t work on the battlefield.The battlefield we fight on today is our own backyard. We are fighting an enemy who has the nerve tobring the fight to the streets, villages, and cities of Afghanistan. We must be able to call upon ourcountrymen to support our security forces as we fight for the protection of our country.One of the main tenants of counterinsurgency operations is the cooperation of the people. The peopleare our countrymen. They are our brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, cousins, and friends. If we lose themas allies, we have truly lost.MG SalemGeneral DirectorDoctrine & Concepts DirectorateAfghan National Army Training CommandReport on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 4 of 17

History and IntentIn August, 2009, the Afghan Lessons LearnedCenter began a five-month assessment ofcounterinsurgency capabilities in the AfghanNational Army. This assessment supports theAfghan National Army’s CounterinsurgencyDirector’s assessment of counterinsurgencycapabilities across the Afghan National Army.5,In order to assess counterinsurgencyoperations in the Afghan National Army, aCollections and Analysis Team from theAfghan Lessons Learned Center visited ANATCTraining Centers and the Corps to gatherinformation on current counterinsurgencyefforts. This report reflects the team’sfindings.The Collections and Analysis Team looked ateight aspects of counterinsurgencyoperations: doctrine, organization, training,materiel, leadership and education, personnel,and facilities.DoctrineThere are seven main documents in theAfghan National Army library that providemilitary doctrine for counterinsurgencyoperations. They are discussed here.Publication ANA 3-24, Counterinsurgency, isthe foundational doctrine for the AfghanNational Army’s counterinsurgencyoperations. Review was completed at ANATCin April 2009, and is currently being reviewedat General Staff level. This publication waswritten by contractors from the US. Much ofthe document adapted from US doctrine. It isnot the best doctrine for the Afghan Armyoperating in Afghanistan but it is a departurepoint. No Afghan officers interviewed at theCorps have read this document.Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 5 of 17

ANA 3-24.3, Company Commander’s COINPocket Guide was completed in May 2009 aswas ANA 3-24.4, the Kandak Commander'sCOIN Checklist. ANA 3-24.5. Brigade COINWorkbook, was completed in August 2009.These three checklists are being distributed infield-test form, and units that received themwill be queried for comment later in 2010.After a review of comments received, thesedocuments will be revised and sent throughthe formal approval process.-Chapter Nine of the Platoon Commander’sHandbook is perhaps the most used and mostread of doctrine that discussescounterinsurgency. The PlatoonCommander’s Handbook was released in draftin October 2009. It is already widely read bycommanders at all levels, not just at thecompany. Chapter nine covers Insurgency andCounterinsurgency.OrganizationThe Operations Coordination Center (Regionaland Provincial) are important organizations forbringing together military and non-militaryorganizations. For counterinsurgencyoperations, bringing organizations together iscritical.Operations Coordination Centers function asoperations center that enables AfghanNational Security Forces to synchronize,coordinate and monitor the security of thecountry.Army involvement with OperationsCoordination Centers at both Regional andProvincial levels is very important forcounterinsurgency operations.Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 6 of 17

Operations Coordination Centers bringtogether:Afghan National ArmyAfghan National PoliceAfghan Border PoliceNational Directorate of SecurityCivil organizationsLocal political & religious leadersClose coordination with these organizations isvital to proper counterinsurgency operations.During the presidential elections of 2009,Operations Coordination Centers proved to bevery effective in helping Afghan NationalSecurity Forces maintain security. Dailymeetings with Corps and Brigade staff werevery effective in giving the Army and Police away to divide territory and assign posts. Thisallowed the Army and Police to cover moreterritory, and maintain the peace.,After the elections, the OperationsCoordination Centers were not used as much.In some areas, there have been no meetingssince the end of the elections. In other areas,meetings have continued. Where meetingshave continued, important information hasbeen passed to the Army about insurgencyoperations. In one Corps area, informationabout a bomb was passed to the Army. Thebomb was taken apart by engineers and noone was hurt.Some centers have participation from localReport on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 7 of 17

religious leaders. These centers have hadgood success.Army units that have a good relationship withtheir police counterparts have better successin counterinsurgency operations. This is due,in part to the fact that the Afghan Policetypically serve in their home province, whilethe Army is ethnically balanced. This hasadvantages and disadvantages incounterinsurgency operations.In some tribal disputes, the police are seen asbetter arbitrators because they know thehistories of the tribal factions involved. Inother disputes, the Army is the preferredarbitrator because they are seen as impartial.TrainingThe main Counterinsurgency training for theAfghan National Army takes place at theCounterinsurgency Training Center atDarulaman. The 5-day CounterinsurgencyLeaders Course is taught to coalition andAfghan students in the same classes. TheCounterinsurgency Training Center also offers2 and 3-day versions of the class throughmobile training teams that can go to the Corpsto teach.In Corps areas close to Kabul, many staffofficers have attended training at theCounterinsurgency Training Center. Thefurther the Corps is from Kabul, the fewerofficers have attended resident classes. In twoof the Corps, no officers have attended formaltraining.,,The officers who did attend training at theCounterinsurgency Training Center said thatthe training was very good, and helped themto plan counterinsurgency operations better.Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 8 of 17

In some Corps and Brigade areas, MPRIcontractors are teaching classes like thosetaught at the Counterinsurgency TrainingCenter. Afghan officers who attended thislocal training stated that the training hashelped them to plan counterinsurgencyoperations.,MPRISome officers attended training that wasconducted by Counterinsurgency TrainingCenter Mobile Training Teams. These classeswere held at the unit. This training helpedstaff officers to plan counterinsurgencyoperations. Some of the students did notknow that the training they had was fromCounterinsurgency Training Center instructors.Officers who attended counterinsurgencytraining held by the unit or by theCounterinsurgency Training Center were ableto properly discuss “ASCOPE.” Most know itby the English word, and understand that itstands for Area, Structures, Capabilities,Organizations, People, Events. ASCOPE wasseen to be used in CORPS and Brigadeoperations orders, and in general when unitsplan combat operations.,,,,,,The Counterinsurgency Training Center istraining Afghan counterinsurgency instructorsto teach the classes currently being taught bycoalition instructors. The Afghan instructorsare being very effective in this training.In addition to the Counterinsurgency trainingoffered at the Counterinsurgency TrainingCenter, field work at the Squad Leader Courseand the Platoon Sergeant Course involvecounterinsurgency operations. These classes,Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 9 of 17

are taught at the Bridmal Academy.ANA soldiers need more than two weeks tolearn how to drive. Improper driving iscausing Afghan National Security Forces toupset pedestrians. Minor accidents areupsetting other drivers. Major accidentswhere Afghan National Security Forces cause adeath due to improper driving have causedtribes to turn against the Army. Up-armoredHumvees are more difficult to drive thanstandard civilian vehicles, so additionaltraining is required.The Afghan National Army Training Commandis under great pressure to grow the Army by35,000 each year. This growth is taking theresources that could otherwise be used totrain the Army in COIN principles.Development of Branch Capabilities,particularly Intelligence Branch andCommando, will add trained resources to thecounterinsurgency fight. As the Army grows,it must simultaneously conductcounterinsurgency operations. To supportthis, all schools, including the developingbranch schools, must developcounterinsurgency.Afghan Defense University (ADU). Theestablishment of the ADU will provide the ANAwith a single focus for intellectual leaderdevelopment. It will encompass the AfghanStaff College, National Military Academy (WestPoint equivalent), COIN Centre, LanguageInstitute and Sergeant Major Academy. Phase1 is already under construction at Qargah(West Kabul).Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 10 of 17

MaterielA common theme at operational units wasthat the insurgents own the night. Lack ofnight vision equipment is allowing this tohappen.In one Corps area, the Afghan Army hashelicopters. When the helicopters operate inthe unit’s area of operation, the local peoplesee the Army as a strong Army. This display ofstrength is important; because it lets the localsknow that the Army is here, and that it iscapable of defeating the insurgency. The localpeople are more likely to support a strongArmy that is capable of protecting them.LeadershipOne of the signs that a Unit’s leadership isfocusing on the local population is thecommander’s information and intelligencerequirements. These requirements are listedin:Commander’s Critical InformationRequirementsFriendly Forces InformationRequirementsPriority Intelligence RequirementsEssential Elements of FriendlyInformationThe Collection and Analysis Team noted thefollowing as good examples of InformationRequirements that focus on the localpopulation:Location and time of any attack on aMosque, Non-GovernmentOrganization, or school in the Unit’sarea of operationLocation of any violent or illegalReport on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 11 of 17

demonstration in the Unit’s area ofoperationAny injury to a civilian by any unitsoldierAny event that is likely to producenegative media reportsWhat local leaders in the Unit’s area ofoperation are hostile to the IRoA?What tribal conflicts threaten stabilitythe Unit’s area of operation?What specific routes are used forenemy movement into the Unit’s areaof operation?What villages assist enemy movementinto the Unit’s area of operation?Which village elders and shuras in theUnit’s area of operation support theenemy?Which mullahs in the Unit’s area ofoperation preach against the IRoA?Events or conditions requiringhumanitarian assistanceSPlanned meetings of district shuras inthe Unit’s area of operationCoalition mentoring of leaders has haddifferent levels of success at differentCorps. In units where the coalitionmentors are of comparable rank to theirAfghan counterparts, mentoring goes well,and Afghan officers, NCOs, and soldierswere able to learn a great deal aboutcounterinsurgency operations. When thecoalition mentors were significantly lowerranking than their Afghan counterparts,mentoring did not go well. In one Corps,for example, a US Staff Sergeant wasassigned to mentor an Afghan Colonel.While the Colonel publicly respected theStaff Sergeant, his resentment for theReport on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterE6Page 12 of 17

arrangement was clear in privateconversations.PersonnelSeveral units noted that lack of femalepersonnel is hindering operations. Acommon insurgent tactic is to use femaleinsurgents to carry weapons, ammunition,messages and other items through Armyor Police checkpoints. If there is not afemale security officer at the checkpoint,then females are not searched. Theinsurgents are using this weakness to theiradvantage.Several units noted the lack of trainedintelligence NCOs. These NCOs are neededto process intelligence reports and collectintelligence from the local people.FacilitiesAs with the equipment program, most newfacilities constructed throughout theaccelerated growth period have beentemporary. The requirement to buildpermanent facilities will compete with therequirement to house newly fielded forceelements. It will be essential to identify forcelay-down as early as possible, allowing NTMA/ CSTC-A engineers at least 12 months leadin time to commence construction of newfacilities whilst making temporaryconstructions permanentLessonsWe are facing with two types of insurgents. Fundamentalist OpportunistsReport on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 13 of 17

Fundamentalists believe that they areglorifying Allah by taking up arms againstSecurity Forces, or by killing themselves to killsecurity forces and the coalition.Opportunists are looking for a way to feedtheir families. According to units visited, themain cause of the current insurgency is lack ofjobs. When people cannot feed their families,they become desperate. Desperate people dodesperate things.Regional violence, looting, and killings oftencause those who suffered to take theirrevenge on Afghan National Security Forces.Corruption is a significant problem in theAfghan Army. Improper actions of somemembers of the Army threaten the goals forgetting support of the local population.Corruption must be reduced to improveconfidence in the military. Corruptionenhances the idea that the insurgents arelegitimate.RecommendationsReview and rewrite ANA 3-24,Counterinsurgency.Comments about doctrine released asfield tests should be sent from theCorps to the Doctrine Director.The Counterinsurgency Training Centershould continue to develop Afghaninstructors as a priority.Meetings at Operations CoordinationCenters must continue on a regularlybasis. Corps and Brigade commandersand staff should attend thesemeetings. Meetings should be at leasttwo times a month.Religious and Cultural Affairs Officers-Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 14 of 17

should attend the meetings atOperations Coordination Centers.They should encourage local religiousleaders to attend as well.Operations Coordination Centers at theRegional and Provincial levels shouldbe mandated. Areas where there isstrong resistance to standing up theseCenters should be watched closely.There will likely be a strong Talibanpresence in these areas.Commanders should review theirCommander’s Critical InformationRequirements and includerequirements that focus on the localpopulation.Mobile Training Teams from theCounterinsurgency Training Centershould focus on units that are not ableto go to resident courses.Commanders and primary staff officersshould attend Counterinsurgencytraining. Priority should go to Kandak,Brigade, and Corps-level S2, S3,commanders, and senior NCOs.ASCOPE-based planning for operationsshould continue as standard operatingprocedure.Command and Staff College, OfficerCandidate School, and BridmalAcademy should work with theCounterinsurgency Training Center tofurther develop counterinsurgencytraining in the schools.The Counterinsurgency TrainingCenter should continue to develop anAfghan training base as a priority.A block of instruction should be addedto driver training that teaches drivershow to drive in a friendly manner, andwhy that is important.Units should train for and do nightoperations.Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 15 of 17

Units should be equipped for nightoperations.As classes are developed for BranchSchools, counterinsurgency trainingmust be considered and included.Sufficient Army and Police personnelare required to establish control of keyremote areas.The Army must take action toeliminate corruption within its ranks.The Army must increase theintelligence capabilities by fullydeveloping G2 and S2 capabilities.ConclusionThis report has been prepared by the jointlessons learned and coin collection teams. Asthey were deployed to corps, brigades andbattalions on different times. All the reportsare prepared based on the interviews donewith corps, brigade and battalion authorities.We tried to write up the important issues ofour collection in this report. In order toinform the chains of command at corps andunits, this report will be presented to them totake necessary actions and solve the currentissues in the units.This assessment will also support the AfghanNational Army’s Counterinsurgency Director’splans to further counterinsurgency trainingand capabilities within the Afghan NationalArmy.Report on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 16 of 17

Annex A- ANA Garrison LocationsReport on Counterinsurgency Capabilities within the Afghan National ArmyAfghan National Army Lessons Learned CenterPage 17 of 17

Afghan National Army's Counterinsurgency Director's assessment of counterinsurgency capabilities across the Afghan National Army. In order to assess counterinsurgency operations in the Afghan National Army, a Collections and Analysis Team from the Afghan Lessons Learned Center visited ANATC Training Centers and the Corps to gather .

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