the philosophy ofINTERNATIONALLAW
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the philosophy of.INTERNATIONALLAW.Edited bySAMANTHA BESSON AND JOHN TASIOULAS1
1Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dpOxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,and education by publishing worldwide inOxford New YorkAuckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong KarachiKuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City NairobiNew Delhi Shanghai Taipei TorontoWith ofﬁces inArgentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France GreeceGuatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal SingaporeSouth Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine VietnamOxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Pressin the UK and in certain other countriesPublished in the United Statesby Oxford University Press Inc., New York the several contributors, 2010The moral rights of the authors have been assertedDatabase right Oxford University Press (maker)First published 2010All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriatereprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproductionoutside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,Oxford University Press, at the address aboveYou must not circulate this book in any other binding or coverand you must impose the same condition on any acquirerBritish Library Cataloguing in Publication DataData availableLibrary of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataLibrary of Congress Control Number 2009943758Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, IndiaPrinted in Great Britainon acid-free paper byCPI Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, WiltshireISBN 978–0–19–920858–6 (hbk.)978–0–19–920857–9 (pbk.)1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
uctionixxixiii1Samantha Besson and John TasioulasPART I G ENERAL I S S UES I N THE P HI LOS OP HYOF I NTE RNATI ONAL LAWS E CTI ON I HI S TORY OF THE P HI LOS OP HYOF I NTE RNATI ONAL LAW1 State of Nature versus Commercial Sociability as the Basis ofInternational Law: Reﬂections on the Roman Foundations andCurrent Interpretations of the International Political and LegalThought of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf33Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann2 Immanuel Kant on International Law53Amanda Perreau-SaussineS E CTI ON I I LE G I TI MACY OF I NTE RNATI ONALLAW3 The Legitimacy of International Law79Allen Buchanan4 The Legitimacy of International LawJohn Tasioulas97
vicontentsS E CTI ON I I I I NTE RNATI ONAL D E MO CRACY5 Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions119Thomas Christiano6 Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-RepublicanPerspective139Philip PettitS E CTI ON I V S OURCE S OF I NTE RNATI ONAL LAW7 Theorizing the Sources of International Law163Samantha Besson8 The Sources of International Law: Some Philosophical Reﬂections187David LefkowitzS E CTI ON V I NTE RNATI ONAL AD J UD I CATI ON9 International Adjudication207Andreas Paulus10 International Adjudication: A Response to Paulus—Courts,Custom, Treaties, Regimes, and the WTO225Donald H. ReganS ECTI ON VI S OVEREI GNT Y11 The Logic of Freedom and Power245Timothy Endicott12 Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A ConstitutionalPluralist PerspectiveJean L. Cohen261
contentsviiS E CTI ON V I I I NTE RNATI ONAL RE S P ONS I B I L I T Y13 International Responsibility283James Crawford and Jeremy Watkins14 International Responsibility299Liam MurphyPART I I S P E CI FI C I S S UE S I N THE P HI LOS OP HYOF I NTE RNATI ONAL LAWS E CTI ON V I I I HUMAN RI G HTS15 Human Rights without Foundations321Joseph Raz16 Human Rights and the Autonomy of International Law339James Grifﬁn17 Human Rights357John SkorupskiS E CTI ON I X S E L F- D E TE RMI NATI ONAND MI NORI T Y RI G HTS18 Minority Rights in Political Philosophy and International Law377Will Kymlicka19 Two Conceptions of Self-Determination397Jeremy WaldronS E CTI ON X I NTE RNATI ONAL E CONOMI C LAW20 The Role of International Law in Reproducing Massive PovertyThomas Pogge417
viiicontents21 Global Justice, Poverty, and the International Economic Order437Robert Howse and Ruti TeitelS ECTI ON XI I NTERNATI ONAL ENVI RONMENTALLAW22 Philosophical Issues in International Environmental Law453James Nickel and Daniel Magraw23 Ethics and International Environmental Law473Roger CrispS E CTI ON X I I LAWS OF WAR24 Laws of War493Jeff McMahan25 Laws of War511Henry ShueS E CTI ON X I I I HUMANI TARI AN I NTE RV E NTI ON26 Humanitarian Intervention531Thomas M. Franck27 Humanitarian Militarism?549Danilo ZoloS E CTI ON X I V I NTE RNATI ONAL CRI MI NAL LAW28 Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy ofInternational Criminal Law569David Luban29 Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law589Antony DuffIndex605
Contributors.Samantha Besson is Professor of Public International Law and European Law,University of Fribourg, Switzerland.Allen Buchanan is James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy, Duke University, UnitedStates.Thomas Christiano is Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Arizona,United States.Jean L. Cohen is Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, United States.James Crawford is Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.Roger Crisp is Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St Anne’s College, Universityof Oxford, and Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford, UnitedKingdom.Antony Duff is Professor of Philosophy, University of Stirling, United Kingdom.Timothy Endicott is Fellow in Law, Balliol College, University of Oxford and Deanof the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.Thomas M. Franck was Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus, NewYork University, United States. He died in May 2009.James Grifﬁn is Emeritus White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Oxford University,United Kingdom.Robert Howse is Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law, New YorkUniversity, United States.Benedict Kingsbury is Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law, New York University,United States.Will Kymlicka is Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy, Queen’s University, Canada.David Lefkowitz is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Richmond,United States.David Luban is University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University, United States.
xcontributorsDaniel Magraw is President and Chief Executive Ofﬁcer of the Center for International Environmental Law, United States and Switzerland.Jeff McMahan is Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University, United States.Liam Murphy is Vice Dean and Herbert Peterfreund Professor of Law and Professorof Philosophy, New York University, United States.James Nickel is Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Miami, UnitedStates.Andreas Paulus is Professor of Public and International Law, Georg-AugustUniversity, Göttingen, Germany.Amanda Perreau-Saussine is Fellow and Lecturer in Law at Queens’ College, University of Cambridge, and University Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge,United Kingdom.Philip Pettit is Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and HumanValues, Princeton University, United States.Thomas Pogge is Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs, Yale University,United States.Joseph Raz is Thomas M. Macioce Professor of Law, Columbia University LawSchool, New York, United States.Donald H. Regan is William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law and Professorof Philosophy, University of Michigan, United States.Henry Shue is Senior Research Fellow Emeritus, Merton College and ProfessorEmeritus of International Relations, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.John Skorupski is Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews, UnitedKingdom.Benjamin Straumann is Visiting Assistant Professor in the History Department,New York University and Alberico Gentili Fellow at the School of Law, New YorkUniversity, United States.John Tasioulas is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, Oxford,and Reader in Moral and Legal Philosophy, University of Oxford, UnitedKingdom.Ruti Teitel is Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School,United States.Jeremy Waldron is University Professor in Law, New York University, UnitedStates.Jeremy Watkins is Lecturer in Philosophy, Queen’s University, United Kingdom.Danilo Zolo is Professor of the Philosophy of Law, University of Florence, Italy.
Acknowledgements.The editors and publisher gratefully acknowledge the following for permission toreproduce the copyright material in this book:Chapter 14: Cambridge University Press for Thomas Pogge, ‘Recognized andViolated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor,’ inLeiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), 717–45.The publisher apologizes for any errors or omissions in the above list and would begrateful if notiﬁed of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprintsor editions of this book.
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Preface.International law has recently emerged as a thriving ﬁeld of philosophical inquiry.This volume contains twenty-nine cutting-edge essays by thirty-three leadingphilosophers and international lawyers. An introduction co-authored by the twoeditors sets the scene by identifying the value of developing the philosophyof international law, addressing some of the main challenges it confronts, andpresenting the aims of the volume together with a brief summary of the essaysincluded in it. The ultimate goal is to help shape an agenda for future research in aburgeoning ﬁeld.The contributions to this volume, published here in English for the ﬁrst time,address central philosophical questions about international law. The volume’soverarching theme concerns the articulation and defence of the moral and politicalvalues that should guide the assessment and development of international law andinstitutions. Some of the essays tackle general topics within international law, suchas the sources and legitimacy of international law, the nature of international legaladjudication, whether international law can or should aspire to be ‘democratic’, thesigniﬁcance of state sovereignty and the contours of international responsibility. Theother contributions address problems arising in speciﬁc domains of internationallaw, such as human rights law, international economic law, international criminallaw, international environmental law, and the laws of war. Of course, the volumeis not exhaustive and many more issues could have been addressed in an evenlonger book.This volume is distinguished by its ‘dialogical’ methodology: there are two essays(and, in the case of human rights, three essays) on each topic, with the secondauthor responding in some measure to the arguments of the ﬁrst. At the sametime, each chapter may be read independently from the others, as a self-standingcontribution to the topic. Cross-fertilization and coherence among the differentthemes and trends in the book were created thanks to the excellent and intensivediscussions that took place in the two workshops that were organized in Februaryand September 2007, respectively in Fribourg and in Oxford.We wish to thank Mrs Joanna Bourke-Martignoni, research assistant at theUniversity of Fribourg from 2006 to 2008, for her editorial assistance, Mr KeithBustos, research assistant at the University of Fribourg from 2007 to 2008, for hishelp at early stages of the editorial process, and Mr Thierry Leibzig, research assistantat the University of Fribourg, for his meticulous work on this volume’s index. We
xivprefaceare grateful to Mr Peter Momtchiloff at OUP for his unfailing support and kindforbearance during the long, and sometimes challenging, process of putting thisbook together. We should also like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundationand the British Academy for providing vital ﬁnancial support for the conferencesin Fribourg and Oxford. Last but not least, our special thanks are owed to all of ourcontributors for making this ambitious inter-disciplinary project such a stimulatingand worthwhile experience.Samantha Besson and John TasioulasFribourg and Oxford, 20 April 2009
.I NTROD UCTI ON.samantha besson and john tasioulasI. The Emergence of the Philosophyof International Law.Since the publication in 1961 of H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, powerfully augmented a decade later with the appearance of John Rawls’s A Theory ofJustice, the philosophy of law in the English-speaking world has enjoyed a renaissance. Legal philosophers during this half-century have engaged extensively withwhat might loosely be called conceptual questions about the nature of law, legalreasoning, and notions integral to an understanding of law, such as authority,obligation, and coercion. They have also addressed normative questions aboutthe values that the institution of law ought to serve and in light of which itshould be assessed and reformed—values such as justice, liberty, equality, toleration, and integrity. And, of course, they have reﬂected on the enterprises ofconceptual and normative philosophical inquiry into law, sometimes calling intoquestion the coherence or utility of any such distinction. The result has been anoutpouring of theories about the nature and value of law, many of them developedin considerable detail and with remarkable ingenuity, often as a result of sustained dialectical exchange among their various proponents. These developmentshave taken place both in General Jurisprudence, which addresses conceptual andnormative questions about law in general,1 and in Special Jurisprudence, withimportant contributions being made to the philosophical investigation of discrete1What follows is a highly selective list: Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (1961; rev. edn., Oxford: Clarendon,1994); Fuller, L. L., The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Raz, J., The Concept of aLegal System (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970); Dworkin, R. M., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1978); MacCormick, N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978); Raz,J., The Authority of Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1979); Finnis, J. M., Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford:Clarendon, 1980); Dworkin, R. M., Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Raz, J.,
2samantha besson & john tasioulasprovinces of law such as criminal law, contract law, and the law of torts, or speciﬁc types of law, such as municipal state law, judge-made law, and customarylaw.2The philosophy of international law can be readily envisaged as a branchof Special Jurisprudence, one that encompasses both conceptual and normativequestions about international law. The conceptual questions include those ofwhether international law is genuinely law (as distinct from a form of socialmorality or convention); how the existence and content of its norms is to beascertained; what relationship obtains between the international legal system, ifone exists, and the legal systems of individual states, among many others. Thenormative questions include those of whether state consent, democracy, or someother standard is the touchstone of international law’s legitimacy; whether humanrights and distributive justice, in addition to peace and co-operation, ﬁgure amongthe values international law should realize; what conditions must be satisﬁed tojustify the creation of international criminal law and the inﬂiction of punishmenton those who violate it; whether international environmental law should beultimately responsive only to the interests of (existing) human beings, among manyothers.Now, it is certainly true that philosophers from Grotius to Kelsen have grappledwith both conceptual and normative questions about international law. Yet it is alsothe case that, until comparatively recently, the post-1960 revival of legal philosophyhas tended to neglect international law. As a result, the philosophy of internationallaw is signiﬁcantly less developed than, say, the philosophy of criminal law. This‘poor relation’ status is probably attributable to a variety of causes. In part, it mayreﬂect a commendable intellectual prudence. For one might reasonably supposethat many of the questions of legal philosophy are best approached in the ﬁrstinstance via their application to municipal state legal systems, which are bothmore familiar and more highly developed, before advancing to their internationalcounterparts. Of course, one should guard against this prudential policy hardeninginto the dogma that the philosophical study of international law can shed noindependent light on philosophical questions either about law in general or itsmunicipal instantiations. However, there are probably less obviously benign causesas well. These include the relative insularity of international law as a ﬁeld withinEthics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); and Coleman, J., The Practice of Principle: In Defence ofa Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001).2 A merely indicative list includes the following: Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford:Clarendon, 1968); Fried, C., Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Feinberg,J., The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vols. 1–4 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984–8); Munzer, S. R., A Theory ofProperty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Coleman, J., Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1992); Weinrib, E. J., The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1995); Dworkin, R. M. Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1996); Duff, R. A., Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the CriminalLaw (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).
introduction3legal studies, widespread scepticism about whether international law is really law,as well as the nagging suspicion that, with its cumbersome and obscure methods ofnorm-creation and its frail enforcement mechanisms, international law does not yetconstitute a worthwhile subject for normative inquiry. Another likely cause is thecorrosive inﬂuence of the general ‘realist’ thesis that political morality does not reachbeyond the boundaries of the state, or that only a very minimalist morality does, ormore charitably still, that although a richer political morality might eventually cometo apply globally, to elaborate on it in the current state of the world is to engage ina wistfully utopian endeavour. Finally, there is a comparative dearth of empirical,as opposed to doctrinal, investigation of international law, which in itself poses aproblem for any philosophical theorizing about international law that ‘pretends tobe grounded in reality and to have practical import’.3To the extent that international law has been the object of theoretical attentionin recent decades, much of it has come from writers drawing on either internationalrelations theory or various approaches inspired by post-modernism. Whatever one’sview of the respective merits of these two schools of thought, their prevalence has hadthe consequence of sidelining the discussion of philosophical questions, particularlythose of a normative character. Adherents of both schools tend to be scepticalabout the coherence, tractability, interest, or utility of the conceptual questionsaddressed by philosophers. More importantly, the purportedly scientiﬁc, ‘valueneutral’ method favoured by the great majority of international relations theorists,especially adherents to the dominant ‘realist’ tradition, and the scepticism aboutreason endorsed by post-modernists, seem to allow little scope for an intellectuallyrespectable form of normative inquiry. So, from the perspective of contemporarylegal philosophy, the similarities between these two camps are perhaps at least asimportant as their differences. But this common ground is hardly surprising giventheir shared historical lineage; in particular, it is worth noting that a theorist whohas exerted a remarkable degree of inﬂuence on both the realist and post-moderntraditions of thought about international law, in the former case indirectly throughhis follower Hans Morgenthau, is the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt.From Schmitt they inherit—philosophically—both a grim view of human natureas driven by a quest for power and a general scepticism about the possibility ofreasoned normative argument and—politically—a hostility to a broadly ‘liberal’agenda aimed at the global spread of principles of human dignity and humanrights.43 This last theme is well developed in Buchanan, A., ‘International Law, Philosophy of’, in Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge; retrieved 18 July 2008, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/T070SECT4 ).4 For a general discussion of Schmitt’s life and ideas, including his role as Hitler’s ‘crown jurist’, see Lilla,M., The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001), ch. 2. For a criticalappraisal of his ideas on international law, see Koskenniemi, M., The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise andFall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 6.
4samantha besson & john tasioulasThe marginalization of normative inquiry into international law is especially regrettable, since the most pressing questions that arise concerning international lawtoday are arguably primarily normative in character. On the one hand, the ambit ofthe authority claimed by international law has grown exponentially in recent years,with the proliferation of international legal institutions and norms entailing thatmany more aspects of life on our planet are now governed by international law thanever before in human history. For example, post-war institutions such as the UnitedNations, and its judicial arm, the International Court of Justice, have been joinedin recent years by new institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),the International Criminal Court (ICC), a plethora of human rights treaty bodies,regional organizations and courts, and so on. On the other hand, the emergence andintensiﬁcation of various problems with a strong global dimension—widespreadviolations of human rights, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the riseof global terror networks and the ‘war on terror’ launched by some states in reactionto them, the mutual interdependence and vulnerability wrought by economic globalization, the environmental crisis, the threat posed by pandemics, illegal movementsof people across state boundaries, and so on—appears to outrun the problemsolving capacity of any individual state or group of states to deal with adequately, andseems to necessitate the development of appropriate international legal frameworks.One manifestation of the pressing nature of these normative questions is thateven those international relations and post-modern theorists who purport to desistfrom any form of ethical advocacy often seem, at least to their opponents, to beoperating with a normative agenda. But surely it is preferable to be explicit aboutone’s normative commitments? And this self-consciousness is in turn a necessarypreliminary to defending, or else revising or abandoning, that agenda in light of thecriticisms it attracts as well as the results of trying to implement it in practice. Now, ofcourse, it is possible to adopt a self-critical normative approach to international lawwithout drawing on anything recognizable as a tradition of philosophical thought.The writings of the New Haven School, and especially those of its most inﬂuentialcontemporary representative, Richard Falk, offer ample testimony of the potentialvalue of such an approach.5 So too do some critical writings on international lawthat draw their inspiration from the feminist, environmental, and anti-globalizationmovements. It would be a mistake to suppose that the normative questions thrownup by international law can only be fruitfully clariﬁed and addressed by recognizablyphilosophical modes of inquiry. Nonetheless, this book has its origins in theconviction that the philosophical tradition in which both Hart and Rawls are centralﬁgures has an important contribution to make to both of these tasks.5From among his many publications on international law over many years, see Falk, R. A., Law in an EmergingGlobal Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1998). The work of theCambridge international lawyer Philip Allott, although in some ways more philosophical in orientation thanthat of Richard Falk, deliberately distances itself from Anglo-American philosophy of the last hundred years orso. See Allott, P., Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).
introduction5Indeed, in many ways this volume owes its existence to the fact that philosophershave already started tackling such questions over the last few decades. Comparativelyearly landmark works on international themes in normative political philosophy,such as Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars,6 Charles Beitz’s Political Theoryand International Relations,7 and Henry Shue’s Basic Rights: Subsistence, Afﬂuence,and U.S. Foreign Policy8 have more recently been joined by the inﬂuential writings of philosophers and lawyers such as James Nickel, Onora O’Neill, ThomasPogge, Fernando Teson, Martha Nussbaum, Larry May, Mortimer Sellers, JamesGrifﬁn, and William Twining.9 Special mention should be made of three importantmonographs. The ﬁrst is Thomas Franck’s treatise Fairness in International Law andInstitutions published in 1995, a pioneering effort by a distinguished internationallawyer to apply Rawls’s theory of justice to large tracts of international law, one thatoutdoes Rawls himself in its ambitions for international justice.10 Especially important, given his dominant inﬂuence on Anglo-American political philosophy, hasbeen the publication in 1999 of John Rawls’s ﬁnal work, The Law of Peoples, whichhas already sparked a voluminous secondary literature.11 Finally, Allen Buchanan’sJustice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for InternationalLaw, which appeared in 2004, is arguably the most systematic and comprehensivediscussion of the morality of international law by a contemporary philosopher.12The rapid growth of the philosophy of international law as a ﬁeld of inquiry is6 Walzer, J. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (1977; rev. edn., New York:Basic Books, 2006).7 Beitz, C., Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).8 Shue, H., Basic Rights: Subsistence, Afﬂuence, and US Foreign Policy (1980; 2nd edn., Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1996).9 Nickel, J., Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reﬂections on the Universal Declaration of HumanRights (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987; 2nd edn., Oxford: Blackwell, 2007);Teubner, G., Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997); Twining, W., Globalisation andLegal Theory (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2000); O’Neill, O., Bounds of Justice (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2000); Pogge, T. W., World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilitiesand Reforms (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002; 2nd edn., Oxford: Polity Press, 2008); Teson, F., A Philosophy ofInternational Law (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998); Nussbaum, M. C., Women and Human Development:The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Buchanan, A., Justice, Legitimacy,and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); May,L., Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Sellers,M. N. S., Republican Principles in International Law: The Fundamental Requirements of a Just World Order(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); May, L., War Crimes and Just War (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2007); May, L., Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008);Grifﬁn, J., On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Twining, W., General Jurisprudence:Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).10 Franck, T. M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Oxford Unive
law, such as human rights law, international economic law, international criminal law, international environmental law, and the laws of war. Of course, the volume is not exhaustive and many more issues could have been addressed in an even longer book. This volume is distinguished by its 'dialogical' methodology: there are two essays
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Le genou de Lucy. Odile Jacob. 1999. Coppens Y. Pré-textes. L’homme préhistorique en morceaux. Eds Odile Jacob. 2011. Costentin J., Delaveau P. Café, thé, chocolat, les bons effets sur le cerveau et pour le corps. Editions Odile Jacob. 2010. 3 Crawford M., Marsh D. The driving force : food in human evolution and the future.
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