UWB Rapid-Bit-Exchange System for Distance BoundingNils Ole TippenhauerHeinrich LueckenSingapore University ofTechnology and DesignSingapore 487372P3 group52070 Aachen, Germanyheinrich.firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.comMarc KuhnSrdjan CapkunWireless CommunicationsGroup, ETH Zurich8092 Zurich, SwitzerlandInstitute of InformationSecurity, ETH Zurich8092 Zurich, ABSTRACTcould be prevented by the use of distance bounding protocols between the communicating parties. Distance boundingprotocols allow the users to verify that their mutual distance is below some threshold (the distance bound). Manydistance bounding protocols have been proposed, amongthem [3,5–7,18,20–22,25,34–36,42]. So far, the main focus ofresearch on distance bounding protocols was on models forattackers and formal security properties [2, 20, 22, 25]. Someworks have shown that, in addition to the protocol analysis,attention needs to be dedicated to the physical-layer implementation of distance bounding protocols [9, 28, 29, 31]. Inonly few works, authors discussed possible implementationsof distance bounding protocols [17, 18, 30, 32, 33]. However,none of the proposals fully implement distance bounding andintegrate it with a functioning ranging system. In this work,we present the design and implementation of a UWB-baseddistance bounding system that enables accurate ranging andsecure distance bounding, even if the prover is untrusted.We discuss physical layer aspects of distance bounding implementations such as the modulation scheme, and the contributing factors for processing delay at the prover. In addition, we discuss security issues related to the preamble, andthe round-trip-time (RTT) measurements.At the core of our system is a rapid-bit-exchange (RBE)phase that provides the actual distance estimate in a securedway. Fundamentally, the RBE relies on RTT measurementstaken for a challenge and response message—to minimizedistance fraud attacks, the response must be generated withminimal processing delay. The complexity of this operationis often underestimated when only considering the protocolon an abstract layer. In particular, the resulting systemneeds high precision distance measurements, and very lowprocessing delay.In this work, we present the following contributions:Distance bounding protocols enable one device (the verifier)to securely establish an upper bound on its distance to another device (the prover). These protocols can be used forsecure location verification and detection of relay attacks,even in presence of strong attackers. The rapid-bit-exchangeis the core of distance bounding protocols—the verifier sendssingle bit challenges, which the prover is expected to answerwith minimal and stable processing delay. Based on themeasured round trip time of flight, the verifier calculates itsupper bound to the prover. Although several aspects of distance bounding implementations have been discussed in thepast, no full implementation of a wireless distance boundingsystem has been presented so far.In this work, we present the first full realization of arapid bit exchange system for distance bounding. Our system consists of an Ultra-Wideband (UWB) ranging radioand of an efficient digital processing implemented on anField-Programmable-Gate-Array (FPGA) board; it achievesa ranging accuracy of 7.5 cm and a short processing delay atthe prover ( 100 ns). This minimal processing delay is thelowest reported so far for provers that demodulate the challenge before responding.1.INTRODUCTIONIn the recent years, physical-layer attacks on wireless communications have received increased attention. Examplesfor this are relay attacks, which have been demonstratedon current-generation automatic car locks . In such relay attacks, the attacker relays signals to extend the communication range between a user and his car. As a result, the car key will unlock the car from a greater distance, without the knowledge of the user. Relay attacksPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are notmade or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bearthis notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for componentsof this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post onservers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or afee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org.WiSec’15, June 22 - 26, 2015, New York, NY, USACopyright 2015 ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-3623-9/15/06 . 15.00.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2766498.2766504. We design a system for UWB-based distance bounding. This system can be used to implement a broadrange of distance bounding protocols, including thosethat compute the reply based on the challenge and ashared key. We implement this system and show that it providesboth sufficient ranging accuracy and tight security guarantees: even a strong attacker cannot reduce the distance result more than 15.6 m.1
We introduce the notion of a distance commitment andshow that measuring the RTT based on interleavedpreambles is secure, even if the preambles themselvesare static.This work is structured as following: in Section 2, webriefly introduce the core concepts of distance bounding protocols. We review related implementations in Section 3. InSection 4, we start by discussing security aspects of possible UWB modulation schemes and selecting a modulationfor our system. In Section 5, we propose and explain ourdesign in detail. We present the implementation of our system in Section 6, and give experimental results in Section 7.A discussion on distance commitments follows in Section 8.Section 9 concludes this work.2.Figure 1: The distance bounding protocol of Brands andChaum with its distinct rapid-bit-exchange phase.BACKGROUND ON DISTANCEBOUNDINGstructure of the protocols. Fundamentally, each protocolneeds at least two messages: an initial challenge and a response message. For security reasons, the challenge typicallycontains an unpredictable challenge value c and the responsemessage contains a value r, which is computed dynamicallybased on c and a shared secret. The time between sendingthe challenge message and the reception of the reply message determines the RTT between the verifier A (sendingthe challenge) and the prover B (sending the reply). Whiledistance bounding protocols generally differ in the way thechallenges are generated and how the prover computes appropriate replies in response to the challenges, all protocolsuse this basic concept of sending a challenge and responsemessage pair. As such, this message exchange is the coreof any such protocol, and needs special attention in securityanalysis and implementation.Figure 1 shows the original (untrusting) distance bounding protocol from Brands and Chaum . B starts the protocol by sending a cryptographic commitment to a noncem of B’s choice. A then sends a challenge c bitwise for bBrounds, bit ci at time tAsi . Upon reception of ci at time tri ,B computes ri ci mi and sends this as reply at timeAtBsi . Finally, the replies arrive at A at time tri each. Following the rapid-bit-exchange phase, B opens the commitmentto A. A can now validate the received replies and comApute the upper bound distance dmax maxi ((tAri tsi )/2 · v)(with signal propagation speed v). This distance estimateassumes that the processing time of B is constant and negBligible ((tBsi tri ) · v ), as this will increase the measureddistance. If a non-negligible constant processing delay atB is assumed by A (and compensated in the distance measurement), a malicious prover can gain a distance advantageby reducing this assumed processing delay. Given the highpropagation speed of wireless signals, processing delays inthe range of microseconds can provide a distance advantageof several hundred meters for strong attackers (15 cm/ns).Distance bounding protocols aim to securely provide anupper bound on the distance between a verifier and a prover,even if the prover is malicious and misbehaving. In additionto preventing misbehavior of the prover, the protocols protect the measurement against an active external attackerwho is able to jam arbitrary messages, eavesdrop on exchanged messages, and insert own messages. In order toachieve strong security results, strong attacker models areoften used in the context of distance bounding. Thus, boththe external attacker and a malicious prover are assumedto have “ideal” hardware, which allows him to reduce hisprocessing delays to the minimal feasible.In this setting, conventional systems to measure distancebased on the time-of-flight of radio signals are not sufficient.As an example, a malicious communication partner cannotbe trusted to be honest about the transmission time of an exchanged message—for example, the malicious prover couldsend messages earlier than claimed, effectively shorteningthe distance measurement result. An external attacker canalso impersonate replies of a prover if these are not properlyauthenticated and thus shorten the measured distance (suchattacks have been demonstrated on systems like GPS ).In particular, ranging systems based on 802.15.4a are vulnerable to a range of attacks as discussed in .These and other possible attacks on distance measurementsystems have been formalized as the following models in thecontext of distance bounding (see also ): Mafia Fraud attacks: the external attacker tries toshorten the distance between the verifier and honestprover . Distance Fraud attacks: the malicious prover tries toshorten the distance measured by the verifier . Terrorist Fraud attacks: the malicious prover cooperates with an external attacker to shorten the measureddistance, as long as this does not compromise his private secret . Distance Hijacking attacks: the external attacker abusesan honest prover to shorten the distance measured between verifier and attacker .2.13.DISTANCE BOUNDINGIMPLEMENTATIONSPractical implementations of distance bounding protocolshave been discussed in three application areas: wired systems, near field wireless communication, and ultra-wideband(UWB) wireless communications.Distance Bounding ProtocolsAs a consequence of the diverse attacker models, a widenumber of distance bounding protocols have been proposed.In this work, we focus on common implementation issues andnot the protocol layer, and we will only discuss the common3.1Wired Distance BoundingThe first implementation of distance bounding over a wiredchannel between FPGAs was presented in . As wired2
connection allow for a high signal bandwidth and severalparallel channels, the system could be implemented withminimal effort. A 200 MHz external clock is used to input the challenge and read out the reply from the proverFPGA, allowing an accuracy of 5 ns (0.75 m), which is alsothe limit for mafia fraud attacks. The processing of the challenge takes 8 ns in the presented system (using the external200 MHz clock provided by the verifier). A malicious proverwith zero processing delay could at most be 13 ns or 1.95 maway to respond in time (distance fraud). The implementation was tested for cable lengths of 0.3 m, 1.0 m, and 2.0 m.3.2ceiver typically selects the first (instead of the strongest)path in a multipath environment. The authors show thatthis can enable an attacker to trick the receiver to selecta manipulated, shorter, path. That allows an attacker toshorten the ranging result between two honest nodes. Inparticular, the attacks are possible due to the large integration window (128 ns) of the receiver. The authors proposeseveral countermeasures to mitigate the impact of such attacks, among them a suggestion to use a smaller integrationwindow (referred to as EDD). In our implementation, weuse an integration window of 4 ns for line-of-sight channels.We proposed a first design of a custom UWB distancebounding scheme in . Our work in this paper builds uponthe concept from  by extending its protocol design andpresenting an implementation. Based on the initial design asone integrated circuit, we estimated B’s minimal processingBtime δ B tBsi tri for such an optimized implementation toat most 4 ns, which translates to a maximal distance advantage for the attacker of 3.6 m in the case of distance fraud.Against mafia fraud, the system is estimated to be accuratewithin 1.5 m. The system is designed for ranges up to 10 m.RFID Distance BoundingImplementation ideas for wireless distance bounding forRFID tags with very short range (near field communication) and low accuracy appeared in , , and .Their low accuracy is mainly due to the very low bandwidthof common RFID communication standards. In , the authors propose to use effects similar to side-channel leakageto communicate the reply to the verifier, as this out-of-bandchannel would not be restricted by bandwidth regulations.In , the author extends the initial concept for distancebounding for RFID chips from . As the author considers RFID systems as provers, his transceiver proposal hasto rely on out-of-band reply signals generated by a customlogic. He experimentally shows that this logic can generateappropriate responses (near field), but does not present asolution to measure the RTT (the prover is either within1 m distance, or not). The scheme limits mafia fraud attacks to 1 m, and distance fraud attacks to 11 m . Dueto the limited range of RFID tags, the maximum distancebounding verification range is around 30 cm.3.33.4Conclusion on existing implementationsCompared to prior work, our proposed solution in thiswork is fully integrated with a UWB ranging platform, canenable distance bounding in applications for ranges greaterthan near-field-communication, supports the widest rangeof processing functions and protocols (e.g., derivatives ofBrands-Chaum and Hancke-Kuhn constructs), and is designed to minimize the advantage of a malicious prover.4.UWB Distance BoundingIn , a commercial UWB ranging platform without authentication support is used to construct a distance bounding system. To authenticate the exchanged messages, custom MAC-layer identifiers are used as replacement for challenges and replies. The resulting system has an RTT measurement precision of 1 ns (15 cm) and can protect againsta limited external attacker who is not able to mount anearly-detect / late-commit attack . Within the standardattacker model for distance bounding, a distance fraud canhave an advantage of up to 56 µs, which translates to 7.5 km.In , the authors discuss an adaption of the UWB distance measurement specification of the IEEE 802.15.4a standard with communication range 20-30 m. As 802.15.4a usesBPPM/BPSK data symbols, early-detection/ late-commitattacks are possible. The authors discuss the impact of suchattacks with respect to rake and energy detection receivers.They also propose a set of countermeasures to improve thesecurity of 802.15.4a for distance bounding. In this paper,we our design intentionally does not use BPPM or BPSKsymbols. In , the authors also discuss full-duplex transmission of challenges and replies as proposed in . Theyconclude that such a scheme would limit the effectiveness ofmafia fraud and distance fraud attacks to 10 m. We notethat in  itself, only a prover design to minimize the delay is discussed, but no details on range measurement orphysical-layer protocol are provided.In , the authors show that the synchronization betweensender and receiver can itself be manipulated by an attacker.As part of the synchronization, in ranging systems the re-UWB IMPULSE RADIO BASEDRAPID-BIT-EXCHANGEIn this section, we will discuss a transceiver design fora UWB rapid-bit-exchange phase. In particular, we willstudy which modulation scheme is best suited to implementrapid-bit-exchange given a fixed bandwidth. We will startby arguing why UWB is well suited for distance boundingapplications. Most important is the need for (i) precise distance measurements and (ii) minimal processing delay δ atthe transceivers during the rapid-bit-exchange phase.The high bandwidth of UWB enables precise distance measurements based on time-of-arrival measurements with resolution in the order of nanoseconds , which is the basis for our DB system. The reason for the high accuracyis that multipath components are separable at the receiver– which allows for precise distance measurements, even incase of multipath propagation. Narrowband localizationsystems, such as GPS or Wi-Fi-based positioning, fail toachieve accurate measurements in environments with multipath since they cannot distinguish the line-of-sight (LOS)signal component from reflections or scattered signal components. Moreover, UWB technology offers a huge design spacewith many trade-offs–from high rate transceivers with coherent receiver structures (for instance UWB based wirelessUSB) to UWB impulse radio transceivers with low complexity due to simple transmitters and noncoherent receivers.BThe minimal Processing time δ B tBsi tri is the second crucial aspect for distance bounding systems, i.e. thetime between the challenge bit is received, the response bitis computed, and then sent. The delay itself is not a problem regarding accurate distance measurements: As long as3
it is known, distances can still be computed with high precision. However, a malicious prover may exploit high expectedprocessing delays to shorten measured distance by replyingearly, for instance using a sophisticated receiver structurewith lower receive processing delay. Hence, it is advantageous to detect UWB pulses and transmit answers as fastas possible. The use of UWB impulse radio enables the implementation of low complexity (short delay) and low powertransceivers. In particular, noncoherent receivers can be implemented very efficiently .4.1Figure 2: Overview UWB symbols transmitted (TX) andreceived (RX). In standard UWB receivers, the integrationwindow is long enough to collect most multipath channelresponses (Tint ). The sender transmits only short pulses oflength Tpul , with symbol perdiod Ts .Security Aspects of WirelessRapid-Bit-ExchangeIn the following, we discuss digital modulation schemessuited for the rapid-bit-exchange phase. In particular, weuse fc to denote the carrier frequency, Tpul to denote thelength of UWB pulses, Ts for the symbol period, and Tint asreceiver integration window length (see Figure 2).The security implications of symbol modulation in RTTbased secure ranging protocols have been discussed in .The authors show that attacker can also gain a distance advantage by misbehaving in the (de)modulation—to mitigatethis, they suggest the following principle:symbols and introduces coding delay. Without channel coding, the bit error probability of the system needs to be considered as well, as decoding errors cannot be compensatedbased on error correcting channel codes. This problem hasbeen discussed in [23, 27, 36].While the transmission of only one short UWB pulse perbit helps to reduce the processing delay, the main contributor to δ is the demodulation process delay. The dispersivewireless channel attenuates the pulse strongly and the receive energy is split between many multipath components.An optimal receiver uses all multipath components of thesymbol in the decoding process. Therefore, the requiredreceiver processing time is typically chosen such that it covers the whole symbol and the expected delay spread of thechannel (see Figure 2). Depending on the environment, thisdelay spread can reach up to 60 ns or more , while theUWB pulse itself can be less than a nanosecond long.As the receiver will collect all signal energy during thisperiod, the attacker’s maximum gain with a late bit commitor early-detection attack is limited by the observation window length Tint , and not the symbol length Tpul . Shorteningthis time window in the decoding process mitigates these attacks but reduces the collected symbol energy and, hence,the decoding performance. We discuss performance tradeoffs related to the decoding window length in Section 4.2.Given these prerequisites, the state-of-the-art does not offer UWB transceivers that are suitable for secure rangingwith high accuracy. Therefore, we present a new frameworkfor the development of UWB rapid-bit-exchange systems. Inparticular, we consider short range systems (such as WBAN,WPAN) and focus on minimum processing delay as well ason low complexity, low power and low cost designs.“Minimize the length of the symbol used torepresent this single bit. In other words, output the energy that distinguishes the two possible transmitted bit values within as short a timeas is feasible. This leaves the attacker little roomto shorten this time interval further.”This suggestion is based on several attacks which can givethe attacker a distance advantage up to the length of thesymbol, as discussed in . In early-bit-detection attacks,the attacker uses ideal receiving equipment to demodulatethe symbol after receiving only a small fraction, thus yieldingthe data earlier then expected. In a deferred-bit-signalingattack, the attacker will send symbols such that he only hasto commit to the data value of this symbol after a certainfraction of the symbol length. As a result, the attacker canreduce the RTT by up to Tpul .This principle of  is another reason why the use of UWBcommunication is advantageous for ranging protocols from asecurity perspective. Compared to conventional narrowbandsystems, the large bandwidth of UWB allows very short symbol timings in the order of nanoseconds, which “minimizethe length of the symbol” representing a single bit. The useof UWB impulse radio is chosen here because the rapid-bitexchange can be implemented by an exchange of single UWBtransmit pulses that have duration of few nanoseconds.As conclusion of the discussion above, a single UWB pulseshould be used to represent a single bit. This is the reason why many conventional UWB systems are not suitedfor distance bounding. In standard systems, a symbol often consists of more than one UWB pulse. For instance, inIEEE 802.15.4a, several pulses per bit are transmitted toachieve a sufficient energy per bit at the receiver. This increases the processing time of the receiver for decoding onebit, making the system more sensitive to the mentioned attacks. The same holds for UWB based Wireless USB, wherea single OFDM symbol takes more than 300 ns . For thesame reason, we omit channel coding during the rapid-bitexchange phase, as it spreads the information over multipleProposed receiver structure: The minimum processing delay requirement constrains the receiver processing tostructures that can be implemented in an analog fashion. Areceiver with analog processing is faster than digital signalprocessing, as it is used for conventional decoders based onOFDM or channel matched filtering. The analog processinglimits the design space of the receiver since not all operations can be implemented. Due to the high bandwidth itis difficult to realize arbitrary filters that can be adaptedto the channel conditions. The analog implementation ofRAKE receivers requires high complexity due to the highnumber of fingers . With the minimum processing delay requirement, coherent receivers are not the method ofchoice to achieve low complexity and low costs. Therefore,4
we propose to use non-coherent UWB communication for the RBE. The energy detection receiver is well knownfor its efficient analog implementation, while still achievingsufficient performance for short range systems. It processesthe bandpass filtered received signal r̃B (·) as follows:Z t2y(t) r̃B(τ )dτ.010strong multipathmoderate multipath 110E /N 12 dBBERbt TintTypically, the energy detection receiver is used in conjunction with binary pulse position modulation (BPPM). Here,the symbol is split into two time slots of length Tslot each.A pulse is transmitted in the first time slot for a Zero and inthe second for One. The receiver estimates the energy thatis received in both time slots and compares their values asfollows: 20E /N 15 dB10b0Eb/N0 18 dB 310 410510152025Tint in [ns]303540Figure 3: Bit-error-rate (BER) of energy detector vs. Integration window length Tint for different Eb /N0 , whereEb denotes the energy per bit and N0 /2 the noise powerspectral density. Channels measured in indoor environment(BPPM), frequency range 3-6 GHz, see  for details.ĉi 0y(iTs ) y(iTs Tslot ) 0.ĉi 1In , the authors presented an energy detection basedultra-low power UWB system design with a very low overall current consumption. The theoretical feasibility of thepresented design respecting FCC power limits  togetherwith transmission of only one pulse per bit has been shownby means of computer simulation and over the air . Aswe will show, the security of our distance bounding solutionrelies on the ability to transmit a bit with only one pulse.The security aspects of secure ranging protocols can nowbe discussed for the specific implementation with energy detection receivers. We agree with the general intuition of theprinciple in , but would reformulate it in the followingway:4.2Low Complexity, Minimal DelayUWB TransceiverA minimal delay UWB transceiver is well suited to fulfillthe requirements we summarized. In particular, a noncoherent energy detection receiver is able to combine very precisedistance measurements (even in multipath) with low processing delay as well as low complexity and low power consumption. In the following, we will discuss two remainingimportant parameters of this transceiver design: (i) the minimization of the integration window of the energy detector,and (ii) the choice of the modulation scheme.“Minimize the length of the symbol used topresent a single bit as well as the processing timethe transceiver needs for demodulating a singlebit challenge and sending the response bit. Inother words, distinguish the two possible transmitted bit values at the receiver within as shorta time as is feasible and send an answer as fastas possible. This leaves the attacker little roomto shorten this time interval further.”Performance trade-off related to the integration window length:: Shortening the sampling interval at the receiver (e.g., by using a smaller integration window of theenergy detector) mitigates the effects of late-bit-commit orearly-detection attacks. However, it also reduces the decoding performance as less signal energy can be collected. Thiseffect can be seen in Figure 3. Increasing the observationwindow length leads to a decreasing bit error probability.Choosing the integration window too long increases the biterror probability again, as no additional signal energy is recovered (only noise is added). Tint also depends on the targetchannel—we are considering line-of-sight applications in thiswork.In [28, 29], the authors discuss attacks on the preamblesynchronization in 802.15.4a. Essentially, these attacks allow the attacker to manipulate the starting time of the sampling window for the data pulses relative to the original position of the pulses. This can be achieved by manipulatingthe leading-edge detection schemes often used in receivers.If the sampling window is advanced to cover only the mainpulse (and not the multipath components), the measuredRTT is shortened without requiring the attacker to manipulate data symbols themselves. As with early-detection orlate-commit attacks, the maximal gain for the attacker hereis limited by the length of the integration window Tint atthe receiver. In fact, such preamble manipulation attacksallow the attacker to influence the receiver to involuntarilyperform an early-detection reception himself.Tint presents an upper bound on the possible advantagefor the attacker, even if late-commit and synchronizationmanipulation attacks are combined.Modulation scheme:: PPM shows vulnerabilities regarding early-detection attacks due to its symbol structure. Tomitigate this problem, a modulation scheme called SecurityEnhanced Modulation (SEM) was proposed in . Thisscheme is based on binary PPM and mitigates the effect ofsuch attacks. The price for the increased protection is areduced receiver SNR leading to a higher bit error probability. Similar to binary PPM, SEM uses two symbol slots, butonly encodes the data content in the second slot. The firstdata slot is used to improve the demodulation accuracy. Todemodulate such a symbol, the receiver compares the integrated energy of the second slot with the integrated energyof the first slot. If more energy is collected in the second slot,the symbol gets demodulated as One symbol, otherwise asZero, so no fixed threshold is necessary. The polarity of both5
intFigure 5: Prover design: On the left, the receiver frontend components. The right part is performing the actualdemodulation on the FPGA. The transmit (TX) and synchronization path is not shown in detail.Figure 4: Abstract model of the rapid-bit-exchange system:Verifier, channel, prover, and involved information flow.pulses, ai 1, is chosen randomly to avoid discrete spectral lines in the spectrum of the transmit signal. Thus, thedata part of the challenge and reply signal is given bysA (t) NXi 1ai b0 p(t iTs ) NXci ai b0 p(t Tslot iTs ),i 1with the normalized pulse shape p(t), a transmission powerscaling b0 , b1 for the first and second pulse (e.g., b1 2b0 ),and N bits of challenge transmitted in total.As our choice of a low complexity, minimal delay UWBreceiver is based on a noncoherent energy detector, we decided to use SEM in our system design. In combinationwith other receiver structures, particularly coherent structures, many more modulation schemes are an option, as forex
we present the design and implementation of a UWB-based distance bounding system that enables accurate ranging and secure distance bounding, even if the prover is untrusted. We discuss physical layer aspects of distance bounding im-plementations such as the modulation scheme, and the con-tributing factors for processing delay at the prover. In .
- Impulse Radio (IR-UWB has been chosen for PHY) - Low/moderate data rate DS-CDMA UWB (IEEE 802.15.3a) - High data rate - UWB Forum supporting DS-UWB Multi-Band OFDM UWB (IEEE802.15.3a) - High data rate - MBOA (MBO Alliance) 8 Applications of IR-UWB in WPAN - Short range wireless communication, home network - Sensor networks (USN) -Radar and
Since commercial ultrawide band (UWB) systems which workfrom.GHzto. GHzareallowedbyFederalCom-munication Commission (FCC) [ ], the technology of UWB is concerned by academia and industry due to its candi-date for various applications. As an essential part of the UWB system, the UWB antenna, has drawn heavy attention from researchers.
energetically efﬁcient. All those characteristics make the UWB a suitable solution as the sensing and an infrastructure-free communication technology for our CN, see Fig. 2. In our work, the speciﬁc UWB transceiver that we use is the DWM1000 UWB transceiver by the DecaWave Inc, which is one of the most popular UWB micro-chips in the market.
This thesis focuses on UWB antenna design and analysis for two di erent frequency bands, the rst UWB antenna designed for frequency range from 3.1 GHz to 10.6 GHz and the second one is a MM wave UWB antenna which is centred around 60 GHz and ranges from 57 GHz to 64 GHz. Studies have been undertaken covering the areas of UWB fundamentals and .
the theoretical analysis. I. INTRODUCTION Ultra-WideBand (UWB) technology is deﬁned as a transmis-sion scheme that occupies a bandwidth of more than 20% of its center frequency, or typically more than 500 MHz. The Multiple-Access (MA) capability of UWB system can be attained by incorporating the UWB signal with a pseudo-random Time
41dBm/MHz. UWB implies time shifting mechanism to broadcast binary data having rate in million pulses per second. In this 7.5 GHz bandwidth, several narrow band systems pre-exist. Interference problems emanate from these narrow band systems. UWB system is affected by WiMax(3.3 to 3.7 GHz), WLAN (5.15 to Design of a Novel UWB Hexagonal Patch
This paper focuses on UWB planar printed circuit board (PCB) antenna design and analysis. Extensive investigations are carried out on the development of UWB antennas from the past to present. First, the planar PCB antenna designs for UWB system is introduced and described. Next, the special design considerations for UWB antennas are summarized.
by presenting in a unitary form a possible and effective design of passive UWB-RFID networks, with particular emphasis on system-related aspects.1 The considered UWB-RFID network is composed of readers monitoring an area where tags have to be localized. In particular, tags are semi-passive and based on UWB backscatter modulation, where the low .
Windows XP Professional 32-Bit/64-Bit, Windows Vista Business 32-Bit/64-Bit, Red Hat Enterprise Linux WS v4.0 32-bit/64-bit, Red Hat Enterprise Desktop v5.0 32-bit/64-bit (with Workstation Option), SUSE Linux Enterprise (SLE) desktop and server v10.1 32-bit/64-bit Resources Configuration LUTs
high user capacity, small low latency, and potentially small device size and processing power . The advantages of UWB open a door for high data rate intra-vehicle wireless communications and intra-vehicle UWB becomes a hot area. Since 2006, research on intra-vehicle UWB channel measurement, experiment, statistics, and other
GHz to 10.6 GHz band as UWB spectrum in 2002; since then, particular attention has been received to design the UWB antenna in this range . Several techniques available in the literature for the design of UWB antennas are discussed here. An antenna with a double Y-shape slot that provides
Design and Analysis of Printed UWB Antenna with Du al Band-notched Characteristics 1 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Broad Band Wireless Technologies 1.2 Ultra-wide Band (UWB) Technology 1.3 Development of UWB antennas 1.4 Motivation of the present thesis 1.5 Organization of the thesis
UWB antennas have a small gains and omnidirectional radiation patterns [7,8]. The UWB array can be good choice to achieve good gains and directional radiation patterns. In , an UWB MIMO antenna with compact size was presented. The antenna consists of 2 identical monopole antennas and the isolation was improved with a comb-line
due to problem of sever dispersion, the full UWB band has recently been separated into the lower UWB band (3.1 -5.15 GHz) and the higher UWB band (5.875 -10.6 GHz), with the lower band being far more commonly used. Consequently, the design requirement has been relaxed to certain degree . In this paper, we proposed a tapered shape slot antenna.
The deployment and use of UWB will presumably increase in the future. The FiRa consortium  has been founded to contribute to the development and widespread adoption of UWB technologies in the context of secured ﬁne ranging and positioning. The Car Connectivity Consortium recently published Digital Key Release 3.0, enabling PKES via UWB
a second design of balun LNA is proposed for UWB applications in the frequency range of 3.1to10.6GHz. The speci cations of UWB are in con-trast with the narrow-band design. The UWB radio technology introduces signi cant adanvtages for short-range communications systems. This tech-nology requires a wide bandwidth, which allows Gigabit data rates .
8127FS–AVR–02/2013 4. Register Summary Note: 1. For compatibility with future devices, reserved bits should be written to zero if accessed. Reserved I/O memory addresses Address Name Bit 7 Bit 6 Bit 5 Bit 4 Bit 3 Bit 2 Bit 1 Bit 0 Page 0x3F SREG I T H S V N Z C Page 12 0x3E SPH Stack Poin
Microsoft Windows 7, 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows 8 & 8.1, 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows 10, 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Microsoft Windows Server 2012, 64-bit only RAM: Minimum 2 GB for the 32-bit versions of Microsoft Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10.
Implementation o Load bit o Read logic o Write logic Multi-bit register Bit out load in if load(t-1) then out(t) in(t-1) else out(t) out(t-1) 1-bit register o Register’s width: a trivial parameter o Read logic o Write logic Bit. . . w-bit register out load in w w Bit Bit Aside: Hardware Simulation Relevant topics from the HW simulator tutorial:
Consider the task of buying a copy of AI: A Modern Approach from an online bookseller. Suppose there is one buying action for each 10-digit ISBN number, for a total of 10 billion actions. The search algorithm would have to examine the outcome states of all 10 billion actions to ﬁnd one that satisﬁes the goal, which is to own a copy of ISBN 0137903952. A sensible planning agent, on the .