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United States Government Accountability OfficeReport to Congressional RequestersDecember 2015MEDICARE ANDMEDICAIDAdditional OversightNeeded of CMS’sDemonstration toCoordinate the Careof Dual-EligibleBeneficiariesAccessible VersionGAO-16-31

December 2015MEDICARE AND MEDICAIDAdditional Oversight Needed of CMS’s Demonstrationto Coordinate the Care of Dual-Eligible BeneficiariesHighlights of GAO-16-31, a report tocongressional requestersWhy GAO Did This StudyThe Medicare and Medicaid programsspent an estimated 300 billion ondual-eligible beneficiaries—thoseindividuals who qualify for bothprograms—in 2010. Thesebeneficiaries often have complexhealth needs, increasing the need forcare coordination across the twoprograms. In 2013, CMS began theFinancial Alignment Demonstration,with the goal of integrating Medicareand Medicaid services and financingand improving care coordination.Thirteen states are participating.GAO was asked to examine carecoordination under the demonstration.GAO examined (1) how integrated careorganizations—which are health plansor other entities—are implementingcare coordination and (2) what, if any,challenges organizations haveencountered in implementing carecoordination and the extent to whichCMS oversees these care coordinationactivities. GAO interviewed officialsfrom CMS and, during site visits to anongeneralizable sample of the firstfive states to implement thedemonstration, interviewed stateofficials, organizations, advocacygroups, and providers. GAO alsoreviewed CMS guidance outliningCMS’s oversight role and themeasures it uses to monitor thedemonstration.What GAO RecommendsGAO recommends that CMS developnew comparable measures and alignexisting measures to strengthenoversight of care coordination. HHSproposed actions that it plans to take inresponse to GAO’s recommendations,as discussed in the report.View GAO-16-31. For more information,contact Kathleen M. King at (202) 512-7114 orkingk@gao.gov.What GAO FoundDue to the flexibility that states have in designing their Financial AlignmentDemonstrations, the integrated care organizations that GAO interviewed inCalifornia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Washington implemented carecoordination for dual-eligible Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries in a variety ofways. For example, these organizations assigned care coordinators tobeneficiaries using different approaches, such as assigning them by geographicproximity to the beneficiary or to the beneficiary’s primary care provider. Carecoordinators also used a range of interactions with beneficiaries in order tocoordinate care, including by mail, e-mail, telephone, or in person.The organizations GAO interviewed described facing challenges that affectedtheir ability to coordinate care, such as difficulties in locating beneficiaries.Specifically, organizations noted that certain characteristics of dual-eligiblebeneficiaries, such as high levels of transience, can make it challenging tocoordinate their care—one of the key goals of the demonstration. GAO’sinterviews with beneficiary advocacy groups and providers raised questionsabout the extent to which care coordination is actually occurring.The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within theDepartment of Health and Human Services (HHS), collects information thatassesses the extent to which care coordination is occurring, but not all of thisinformation is comparable across the states. To inform its oversight, CMS hasestablished a framework of monitoring activities, and one key component of thisoversight is the monitoring of core and state-specific measures for each of thetwo demonstration models that states can implement: (1) the capitated model,where organizations receive a capitated payment to provide integrated care, and(2) the managed fee-for-service (MFFS) model, where states are eligible forretroactive savings resulting from initiatives to integrate care with existing fee-forservice providers. CMS collects different sets of core measures from thecapitated and MFFS model states. Two out of 10 core measures in the capitatedmodel provide information on the extent to which care coordination is occurring,while no core measures in the MFFS model examine this area. The states in ourreview had state-specific measures that explored aspects of care coordination,but they were not comparable across the states or both demonstration models. Inaddition, CMS added comparable, demonstration-specific questions to theConsumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems, a survey that CMSrequires all organizations for the capitated model, and states for the MFFSmodel, to complete annually. While the results of the surveys are stillforthcoming, information from these questions may be able to provide CMS withimportant information about whether beneficiaries are meeting with their carecoordinators across both models. Federal internal control standards state thatmonitoring should be designed to help an agency accomplish its goals. Becausenot all of the information that CMS collects to examine the extent to which carecoordination is occurring is comparable, CMS does not fully know whether it hasachieved its goal of providing coordinated care to dual-eligible beneficiaries.Establishing additional measures that would allow CMS to obtain these datacould help it better understand the reasons why care coordination is or is notoccurring and thus help the agency to strengthen the demonstration.United States Government Accountability Office

ContentsLetter1BackgroundOrganizations Participating in CMS’s Financial AlignmentDemonstration Implemented Care Coordination in a Variety of WaysOrganizations Described Challenges in Coordinating Care, andthe Extent to Which Care Coordination Occurs in theDemonstration Is Not Fully KnownConclusionsRecommendations for Executive ActionAgency Comments and Our Evaluation51317303132Appendix I: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) State-Specific Measures for the FinancialAlignment Demonstration, by State35Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services40Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments44GAO ContactStaff AcknowledgmentsAppendix IV: Accessible Data444445Agency Comment LetterData Tables4550TablesTable 1: Required Care Coordination Components for the Centers forMedicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Financial AlignmentDemonstration for Dual-Eligible BeneficiariesTable 2: Core Measures for Capitated and Managed Fee-for-Service(MFFS) Models Required by the Centers for Medicare &Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Financial Alignment Demonstrationfor Dual-Eligible BeneficiariesData Table for Figure 1: Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries as a Share ofMedicare and Medicaid Enrollment and Spending, CalendarYear 2010Page i122350GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

FiguresFigure 1: Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries as a Share of Medicare andMedicaid Enrollment and Spending, Calendar Year 2010Figure 2: Status of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’(CMS) Financial Alignment Demonstration for Dual-EligibleBeneficiaries, as of September 2015611AbbreviationsCAHPSConsumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers andSystemsCMSCenters for Medicare & Medicaid ServicesCMTcontract management teamD-SNPdual-eligible special needs plansEDCDElderly or Disabled with Consumer DirectionHEDISHealthcare Effectiveness Data and Information SetHHSDepartment of Health and Human ServicesHOSHealth Outcomes SurveyICPindividualized care planThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in theUnited States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entiretywithout further permission from GAO. However, because this work may containcopyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may benecessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.Page iiGAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

ICTMACPACMFFSSNPPage iiiinterdisciplinary care teamMedicaid and Children’s Health Insurance ProgramPayment and Access Commissionmanaged fee-for-servicespecial needs plansGAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

Letter441 G St. N.W.Washington, DC 20548December 18, 2015Congressional RequestersAbout 10 million of Medicare’s approximately 50 million beneficiaries arealso eligible for Medicaid, a joint federal-state program that financeshealth insurance coverage for certain categories of low-income ordisabled people.1 Dual-eligible beneficiaries accounted for less than one-fourthof each program’s population but over one-third of each program’s spending—more than 300 billion—in 2010, the most recent year available.2 Dual-eligiblebeneficiaries are often in poorer health and require more care comparedwith other Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. They typically receivetheir benefits through each program separately, which can lead tofragmented care because the programs have different rules for providerreimbursement and benefits and may have conflicting financial incentives.For example, incentives may exist for providers to shift beneficiaries fromone type of service to another to increase their payments. These types ofprogram misalignments can result in unnecessary hospitalizations, whichcan reduce quality of care and increase costs. Recently, the federalgovernment, states, researchers, and advocates have focused increasedattention on care coordination for dual-eligible beneficiaries as a keystrategy for improving the quality of care while simultaneously reducingcosts.31Medicare is the federally financed health insurance program for persons 65 years of age or over,certain individuals with disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease. Medicare fee-forservice includes Medicare Parts A and B. Medicare Part A covers hospital and other inpatientstays. Medicare Part B is optional insurance, which covers hospital outpatient, physician,and other services and requires a monthly premium. Medicare Part B beneficiaries havethe option of enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan—a private plan alternative toMedicare fee-for-service that operates under Medicare Part C—to receive their Parts Aand B benefits. In addition, all Medicare beneficiaries may opt to receive prescription drugcoverage under Medicare Part D either through a separate Part D plan or through aMedicare Advantage plan.2Medicare Payment Advisory Commission and Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance ProgramPayment and Access Commission, Data Book: Beneficiaries Dually Eligible for Medicare andMedicaid (Washington, D.C.: January 2015).3Care coordination is the process of integrating all medical, behavioral health, and long-termservices and supports to ensure the proper providers and services are in place to meet thebeneficiaries’ needs.Page 1GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

Specifically, beginning in 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services’(HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) began implementingthe Financial Alignment Demonstration through its Medicare-MedicaidCoordination Office, which will integrate Medicare and Medicaid servicesand financing and improve care coordination for dual-eligiblebeneficiaries.4 Ultimately, CMS believes the Financial AlignmentDemonstration will reduce spending and improve the quality of care fordual-eligible beneficiaries. The demonstration allows states, throughcontracted integrated care organizations, to test models of care thatemphasize care coordination, including care coordinators, health riskassessments, individualized care plans (ICP), and interdisciplinary careteams (ICT).5 CMS is required by law to evaluate the quality of care furnishedunder these models. In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human Servicesmay, through rulemaking, expand the duration and scope of a modelunder specified conditions. As of August 2015, CMS had approved 13states to participate in the 3-year demonstration, and the agencyestimates that approximately 441,000 beneficiaries are enrolled.6You asked us to examine care coordination under CMS’s Financial AlignmentDemonstration. Specifically, we examined1. how integrated care organizations are implementing care coordination forbeneficiaries in the Financial Alignment Demonstration and2. what, if any, challenges the organizations have encountered inimplementing care coordination and the extent to which CMSoversees these care coordination activities.4The Financial Alignment Demonstration is also sometimes referred to as the Financial AlignmentInitiative.5For this report, integrated care organizations—which we refer to as organizations—include healthplans or other qualified entities participating in the Financial Alignment Demonstration. Inaddition, for this report, a care coordinator is the person responsible for facilitating thecoordination of services for the beneficiary. A health risk assessment examines abeneficiary’s needs. The ICP is a plan of care that includes the beneficiary’s goals andstrategies toward meeting those goals. The ICT is a team of providers, including the carecoordinator, that works closely with the beneficiary to implement and maintain his or herICP.6In July 2015, CMS gave states the option to extend their demonstrations for an additional2 years.Page 2GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

To describe how integrated care organizations are implementing carecoordination for beneficiaries in the Financial Alignment Demonstration,we reviewed CMS guidance. We also selected a nongeneralizablesample of five states—California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Virginia, andWashington—and examined their demonstration planning documents. Weselected these states because they were the first five states to beginenrolling beneficiaries on or before September 1, 2014.7 Because thedemonstration parameters are complex and involve many requirements, wefocused our review on the four care coordination requirements for thedemonstration, which are specified in CMS and state guidance: (1) a carecoordinator, (2) a health risk assessment, (3) an ICP, and (4) an ICT. Wealso interviewed officials from CMS’s Medicare-Medicaid CoordinationOffice about the care coordination requirements in CMS guidance andhow these requirements were being implemented by states involved inthe demonstration. We conducted site visits to each state and interviewedstate agency officials; officials from the CMS regional office; staff atintegrated care organizations, including care coordinators; staff frombeneficiary advocacy groups; and primary care providers. We selected 11integrated care organizations to interview within the five states8 (2 inIllinois, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Washington, and 3 in California) byidentifying organizations that had the highest level of enrollment in thedemonstration as of August 2014 (except for Washington, where we used7Of the five states we selected, the state with the earliest implementation date started enrollment inJuly 2013 and the state with the latest implementation date started enrollment in July 2014.8One of the organizations we interviewed in Massachusetts dropped out of the demonstration early,on September 30, 2015, noting that its participation was not economically sustainable. In addition,while Washington’s 3-year demonstration was initially planned to end after December 31,2016, the approved 2015-2017 Washington state budget did not authorize any funding forthe demonstration after December 31, 2015. However, as of November 2015, the state ofWashington decided to continue participating in the demonstration until at least June2016.Page 3GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

enrollment data as of February 2015).9 At most of the organizations in ourreview, we also observed ICT meetings conducted by organization staff.To obtain the perspective of beneficiaries, we asked officials from the fivestates to identify one beneficiary advocacy group that was a stakeholderin developing each state’s demonstration, and we interviewed staff at thatgroup. In addition, we spoke with seven primary care providers located inCalifornia, Illinois, and Massachusetts about their experiences with thedemonstration.10 We developed structured interview protocols to gatherconsistent information from CMS, the states, integrated careorganizations, beneficiary advocacy groups, and primary care providersabout their perspectives in implementing care coordination in thedemonstration. Our findings are limited to the five states in our review andare not representative of all states and integrated care organizationsparticipating in the Financial Alignment Demonstration.To determine what, if any, challenges the organizations haveencountered in implementing care coordination and the extent to whichCMS oversees these care coordination activities, we interviewed staff atintegrated care organizations located in the five states in our review aboutchallenges they have encountered. We also interviewed CMS officialsfrom the Medicare-Medicaid Coordination Office about the agency’soversight and monitoring of selected states’ demonstrations. In addition,we reviewed CMS guidance about the agency’s role and responsibility fordemonstration oversight, as well as CMS guidance describing the9Unlike the other state demonstrations in our review, after beneficiaries in Washington areautomatically enrolled in the state’s demonstration, care coordination services are not providedunless an enrollee elects to receive them. If an enrollee elects to receive services,Washington’s demonstration considers the beneficiary to be “engaged.” Since theenrollment numbers reported by the organizations in Washington only reflected the totalnumber of beneficiaries enrolled and not the number of engaged beneficiaries who wereactually receiving services, we also examined the total number of engaged beneficiaries toinform our selection of organizations in that state. We found that the two organizationswith the highest number of enrollees as of February 2015 also had the highest number ofengaged enrollees. In the other state demonstrations in our review, care coordinationservices were included among the services provided under the demonstration upon abeneficiary’s effective enrollment date.10The staff we interviewed at organizations in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Virginiagave us a list of primary care providers in their respective networks that cared for enrollees in thedemonstration. We contacted several providers in each state—18 in all. Of these, 7responded to our requests for an interview. We did not contact providers in Washingtonbecause, unlike the other state demonstrations in our review, the providers inWashington’s demonstration provide care to beneficiaries on a fee-for-service basisthrough existing Medicare and Medicaid service delivery systems.Page 4GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

measures that CMS regularly requires organizations and states to reportas part of the agency’s monitoring. We determined whether thesemeasures assessed the extent to which care coordination is occurring inthe demonstration—that is, whether care coordinators are meeting withbeneficiaries, health risk assessments are being completed, ICPs arebeing developed, and ICT meetings are occurring. We compared theseoversight activities to CMS’s goals for the demonstration and thestandards described in Standards for Internal Control in the FederalGovernment.11 We did not evaluate whether the demonstration had achievedcost savings or improved the quality of care.We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to December 2015 inaccordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Thosestandards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings andconclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidenceobtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusionsbased on our audit objectives.BackgroundCharacteristics of DualEligible BeneficiariesDual-eligible beneficiaries are a particularly vulnerable group. In general,these individuals are among the poorest and sickest beneficiariesenrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. For example, compared to otherMedicare beneficiaries, they are more likely to be disabled; report poorhealth status and limitations in their activities of daily living, such asbathing and toileting; and have cognitive impairments, mental disorders,and certain chronic conditions, such as diabetes and pulmonary disease.Therefore, dual-eligible beneficiaries tend to have higher rates of serviceuse and consequently, higher spending, compared to other Medicare andMedicaid beneficiaries. (See fig. 1.)11GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).Page 5GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

Figure 1: Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries as a Share of Medicare and MedicaidEnrollment and Spending, Calendar Year 2010Although dual-eligible beneficiaries have a higher rate of service usecompared to other Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, as a group, theyvary in terms of their need for health care services, reflecting differencesin the prevalence of disabilities and other health conditions. UnderMedicare, dual-eligible beneficiaries have coverage for most acute careservices, such as care provided by physicians or inpatient hospitals, postacute skilled nursing facility care, and prescription drugs. Under stateMedicaid programs, dual-eligible beneficiaries also have coverage forlong-term nursing facility care and home and community-based services.These beneficiaries may also qualify for payment of Medicare premiumsand cost sharing. Medicaid is the health care payer of last resort,meaning that Medicare pays to the extent of its liability before Medicaidmakes any payments. Because dual-eligible beneficiaries receive carethrough separate programs with different benefits and paymentprocesses, they are likely to be treated by many different health careproviders that may not coordinate their care, which can lead to increasedcosts and poorer patient outcomes.Page 6GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

Past Initiatives toCoordinate Care for DualEligible BeneficiariesPrior to the implementation of the Financial Alignment Demonstration in2013, the Medicare and Medicaid programs were separately responsiblefor covering certain services for most dual-eligible beneficiaries, and theremay not have been an incentive for one program to help control costs inthe other program. As we previously reported, any savings that wereachieved often resulted from services that were largely paid for byMedicare, such as reductions in the number and length of hospital stays,and therefore accrued to the Medicare program.12 Therefore, state Medicaidprograms did not have an incentive to better coordinate care or reducespending since they did not benefit from any savings that were achieved.However, increasingly there have been efforts to try to improveintegration of care between these two programs. For example, onespecific effort to integrate care for dual-eligible beneficiaries was theestablishment of dual-eligible special needs plans (D-SNP) in 2003.13 DSNPs are a type of Medicare Advantage plan exclusively for dual-eligiblebeneficiaries that provide specialized services targeted to the needs of theirbeneficiaries, including a health risk assessment and an ICT for eachenrolled beneficiary. About 1.9 million of the dual-eligible population wasenrolled in D-SNPs in 2014.14Financial AlignmentDemonstration: Design andImplementation, CareCoordination, and Sourcesof Potential SavingsDesign and Implementation ofthe DemonstrationCMS’s goal for the Financial Alignment Demonstration is to integrateMedicare and Medicaid services and financing and improve carecoordination for beneficiaries, therefore resulting in improved care and12See GAO, Medicare Special Needs Plans: CMS Should Improve Information Available aboutDual-Eligible Plans’ Performance, GAO-12-864 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2012).13Special needs plans (SNP), including D-SNPs, have been reauthorized several times since theirestablishment was first authorized in 2003. Dual-eligible beneficiaries may also choose to enroll inother types of SNPs for which they are eligible, including institutional SNPs for individualsresiding in nursing facilities or institutions, and chronic condition SNPs for individuals withsevere or disabling chronic conditions.14See GAO-12-864.Page 7GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

savings to Medicare and Medicaid. CMS gave the states flexibility indesigning their demonstrations because of the different needs of theirtarget populations, the geographic coverage areas, and the number ofeligible beneficiaries. For example, while Massachusetts chose to limit itstarget population to dual-eligible beneficiaries from age 21 through 64,California, Illinois, and Virginia chose to include all dual-eligiblebeneficiaries aged 21 and older as their target populations. CMS requiredstates to involve dual-eligible beneficiaries and other stakeholders, suchas beneficiary advocacy groups, in the development of theirdemonstrations to help design a person-centered system of care.Before any state’s demonstration becomes operational, CMS oversees amultistep approval process of the state’s demonstration design. First,states interested in participating in the demonstration submit proposals toCMS that provide a description of the demonstration’s design. CMS thenreviews the proposals and works with the states to develop amemorandum of understanding that further outlines the parameters of thedemonstration, which both the state and CMS sign.As part of their proposals, states generally opted to test one of twomodels—the capitated or managed fee-for-service (MFFS) models.15Under the demonstration’s capitated model, following CMS approval of thememorandum of understanding, the states work with CMS to select qualifiedintegrated care organizations to participate in the demonstration. Then, thestate, CMS, and an integrated care organization enter into a three-waycontract, and the integrated care organization receives a prospectiveblended capitated payment, which includes both Medicare and Medicaidpayments, to provide coordinated care across both programs. CMSreduces payment rates to organizations up front each year based on apredetermined Medicare and Medicaid savings estimate, with the amountof savings increasing each year, typically from 1 percent in the first yearto 4 percent in the third year of the demonstration. For example, inMassachusetts, contracted managed care health plans provide carecoordination services and integrate care between the two programs andreceive one combined payment from both Medicare and Medicaid for15Four of the five states in our review—California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Virginia—areimplementing a capitated model that will rely on qualified organizations, such as health plans, toprovide integrated care to dual-eligible beneficiaries under the demonstration. The remainingstate—Washington—is implementing an MFFS model that will rely on health homes,which are the organizations responsible for integrating care under the demonstration.Page 8GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

each enrollee. For states opting for the MFFS model, following CMSapproval of the memorandum of understanding, the state and CMS enterinto an agreement by which providers continue to receive fee-for-servicereimbursement for both Medicare and Medicaid services. The state isthen eligible for a portion of any retroactive savings resulting from stateinitiatives designed to improve quality and reduce spending for dualeligible beneficiaries. One state, Washington, is using Medicaid healthhome agencies to coordinate Medicare and Medicaid services amongexisting fee-for-service providers for dual-eligible beneficiaries.The organizations in the capitated model, and the states in the MFFSmodel, then undergo a CMS review to ensure they are prepared to beginenrolling dual-eligible beneficiaries. Once they have passed CMS’sreview, they can begin enrolling beneficiaries. In general, under thecapitated model, eligible beneficiaries—those dual-eligible beneficiarieswho meet the state’s age, geographic residency, and other requirementsfor the demonstration—can enroll voluntarily into the demonstration andchoose a participating integrated care organization. Dual-eligiblebeneficiaries who choose not to enroll voluntarily can be assigned by thestate Medicaid agency to a participating organization, in a process knownas “passive enrollment.” Once a beneficiary is enrolled into thedemonstration, the state will send the beneficiary’s contact information tothe relevant integrated care organization. The state or CMS may alsoprovide Medicaid or Medicare claims data, medical history,hospitalizations, and pharmacy use for the beneficiaries. The organizationthen typically assigns a care coordinator and begins coordinating thebeneficiary’s care. In the MFFS model, beneficiaries are automaticallyenrolled in the demonstration, and following enrollment, the carecoordinator will perform outreach to the beneficiary and give thebeneficiary the option to elect to receive care coordination services.Under both models, beneficiaries can opt out of the demonstration at anytime.Implementation of the Financial Alignment Demonstration began in July2013 when the first state, Washington, began enrolling beneficiaries.Since then, CMS has approved 12 other state demonstrations and all butone of these states has begun enrolling beneficiaries. Two states—Connecticut and New York—had proposals pending approval from CMSPage 9GAO-16-31 Dual-Eligible Demonstration

as of September 2015.16 (See fig. 2 for a demonstration map.) The agency isno longer accepting new proposals from states.16CMS has approved New York’s capitated demonstration model, which targets dual-eligiblebeneficiaries over the age of 21 wh

and Medicaid services and financing and improving care coordination. Thirteen states are participating. GAO was asked to examine care coordination under the demonstration. GAO examined (1) how integrated care organizations—which are health plans or other entities—are implementing care coordination and (2) what, if any,

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