OIG-19-10 - CBP's Searches Of Electronic Devices At Ports Of Entry

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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEDHS OIG HIGHLIGHTSCBP’s Searches of Electronic DevicesAt Ports of EntryWhat We FoundDecember 3, 2018Why We DidThis AuditThe Trade Facilitation andTrade Enforcement Act of2015 (TFTEA) requires U.S.Customs and BorderProtection (CBP) to establishstandard operatingprocedures (SOP) forsearching, reviewing,retaining, and sharinginformation incommunication, electronic,or digital devices at U.S.ports of entry. The TFTEAalso requires the DHS Officeof Inspector General toconduct three annual auditsto determine to what extentCBP conducted searches ofelectronic devices inaccordance with the SOPs.What WeRecommendWe made fiverecommendations to improveCBP’s oversight of searchesof electronic devices at portsof entry.For Further Information:Contact our Office of Public Affairs at(202) 981-6000, or email us atBetween April 2016 and July 2017, CBP’s Office ofField Operations (OFO) did not always conductsearches of electronic devices at U.S. ports of entryaccording to its SOPs. Specifically, because ofinadequate supervision to ensure OFO officersproperly documented searches, OFO cannotmaintain accurate quantitative data or identify andaddress performance problems related to thesesearches. In addition, OFO officers did notconsistently disconnect electronic devices,specifically cell phones, from the network beforesearching them because headquarters providedinconsistent guidance to the ports of entry ondisabling data connections on electronic devices.OFO also did not adequately manage technology toeffectively support search operations and ensurethe security of data. Finally, OFO has not yetdeveloped performance measures to evaluate theeffectiveness of a pilot program, begun in 2007, toconduct advanced searches, including copyingelectronic data from searched devices to lawenforcement databases.These deficiencies in supervision, guidance, andequipment management, combined with a lack ofperformance measures, limit OFO’s ability to detectand deter illegal activities related to terrorism;national security; human, drug, and bulk cashsmuggling; and child pornography.CBP’s ResponseCBP concurred with our recommendations. Wehave included a copy of CBP’s response to ourdraft report at appendix hs.govOIG-19-10LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityWashington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.govDecember 3, 2018MEMORANDUM FOR:Todd OwenExecutive Assistant CommissionerOffice of Field OperationsU.S. Customs and Border ProtectionFROM:Sondra F. McCauleyAssistant Inspector General for AuditsSUBJECT:CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of EntryAttached for your action is our final report, CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devicesat Ports of Entry. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.The report contains five recommendations aimed at improving the overalleffectiveness of CBP’s oversight of searches of electronic devices at ports ofentry. Your office concurred with all five recommendations. Based oninformation provided in your response to the draft report, we consider the fiverecommendations resolved and open. Once your office has fully implementedthe recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30days so that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should beaccompanied by evidence showing completion of the agreed-upon correctiveactions. Please send your response or closure request toOIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we willprovide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight andappropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We willpost a redacted version of the report on our website.Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contactDonald Bumgardner, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at(202) 981-6000.LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityBackgroundU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) exercises law enforcement authoritywhen securing the Nation’s borders and 328 ports of entry. Electronic devices,such as computers, thumb drives, and mobile phones, are subject to search atU.S. ports of entry to ensure the enforcement of immigration, customs, andother Federal laws.CBP processed more than 787 million travelers upon arrival at U.S. ports ofentry in fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and searched approximately 47,400electronic devices. In fiscal year 2016, CBP processed more than 390 milliontravelers arriving at U.S. ports of entry and searched the electronic devices ofan estimated 18,400 of those inbound travelers (.005 percent). In FY 2017,CBP processed more than 397 million travelers and searched the electronicdevices belonging to more than 29,000 of those inbound travelers (.007percent).CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for determining theadmissibility of travelers at U.S. ports of entry. OFO officers conduct primaryinspections of all travelers arriving at ports of entry. During a primaryinspection, OFO officers review travelers’ passports and other documents todecide whether to admit travelers to the United States or refer them forsecondary inspection.During secondary inspection, an OFO officer may search a traveler’s electronicdevice to determine admissibility and identify any violation of laws. Forinstance, in March 2018, during a search of a traveler’s electronic device,officers found images and videos of terrorist-related materials. In anotherincident, officers found graphic and violent videos, including childpornography. CBP denied both travelers entry into the United States.A secondary inspection may involve a basic (manual) search, an advancedsearch, or both. The officer can make a referral for a manual search because ofinconsistencies in response, behavioral analysis, or intelligence analysis. Amanual search involves the OFO officer manually reviewing the information ona traveler’s electronic device.An advanced search, which OFO started as a pilot program in 2007, involves aspecially trained officer connecting external equipment to the traveler’s deviceto copy information. The officer uploads the copied information to CBP’sAutomated Targeting System (ATS) to be further analyzed against existing ATSinformation. CBP personnel provide real-time feedback to the OFO officer ofany identified derogatory information.www.oig.dhs.gov2LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOIG-19-10

LA\\' ENFORCEMENT SENSITn'EOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityAfter a secondary inspection, C BP personnel analyze t h e copied information inATS and other information provided by partner agen cies to link unlawfulactivities related to counterterrorism, narcotics, illicit trade, human smuggling,and special interest aliens.1 ATS is u dated as a ro riate based on CBP'sanal sis.Figure 1. Comparison of Basic Manual and Advanced SearchesBASIC (MANUAL) SEARCHADVANCED SEARCH) 1,0 ,.WOOffice of Field Op eration (OFO) officers mayperform a basic search with or withoutsuspicion based upon behavioral analysis,inconsistencies in response, and intetGgenceanalysis.O FO officers visually inspect in forma tionstored on device to fu rther adjudicateefforts in determining admissibility oridentifying violation of laws.The device is: returned to the traveler; detained for subject marter or technicalassistance; or seized due t o violation of law. OFO office rs use external equipment wcreate a copy of the information and uploadthe copy to the Automated TargetingSystem, CBP reviews uploaded informationThe copied information is eitherdestroyed or retained and the device Is: returned to the traveler; detained for subject matter ortechnical assistance; or seized due to violation of law.Not AppUcabl eSource: DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) based on CBP informationThe Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125(TFTEA), enacted on February 24, 2016, requires CBP to establish standardoperating procedures (SOP) for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharinginformation contained in communication, electronic, or digital devicesencountered at U.S. ports of entry. CBP must review and update these SOPsevery 3 years .2CBP has issued a series of memorandums and SOPs to govern searches ofe lectronic devices at ports of entry. According to CBP's SOPs, all searches ofe lectronic devices require supervisory notification. In addition, according to an1 Special interest aliens are aliens from special interest countries, which are generally definedas countries that are of concern to the national security of the United States, based on severalU.S. Government reports.2 TFTEA, § 802(a) (codified as 6 United States Code (USC) 21 l(k)(l)(A)).www.oig.dhs.gov3OIG-19-10LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityApril 2015 memorandum, an OFO officer may only conduct an advancedsearch if the travelerCBP uses the TECS3 module called Inspection Operations of Electronic Media,also known as an electronic media report (EMR), to document the bordersearches of electronic devices. The EMR provides information of the search,such as the device details, type of search performed on the device, and theofficer’s remarks of the inspection. In instances in which CBP detains or seizesan electronic device, CBP documents such incidents on CBP forms 6051D4 and6051S,5 respectively, to demonstrate CBP’s chain of custody.The TFTEA also requires DHS OIG to conduct audits to determine whether CBPis searching electronic devices in conformity with its SOPs and to compile andreport the following information:xxxxxa description of the activities of CBP officers and agents with respect tosuch searches;the number of such searches;the number of instances in which information contained in such devicesthat were subjected to such searches was retained, copied, shared, orentered in an electronic database;the number of such devices detained as the result of such searches; andthe number of instances in which information collected from suchdevices was subjected to such searches and transmitted to anotherFederal agency, including whether such transmissions resulted in aprosecution or conviction.6In this report, we present the results of our audit to determine whether CBPconducted searches of electronic devices in accordance with SOPs. Appendix Bcontains other information we are required to report under the TFTEA.TECS is not an abbreviation. It is the official name of the system.Detention Notice and Custody Receipt for Detained Property (CBP Form 6051D).5 Custody Receipt for Seized Property and Evidence (CBP Form 6051S).6 TFTEA, § 802(a) (codified as 6 USC 211(k)(5)).www.oig.dhs.gov434LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOIG-19-10

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityResults of AuditDuring our review of a sample of border searches of electronic devicesconducted between April 2016 and July 2017, we determined that OFO did notalways conduct the searches at U.S. ports of entry according to its SOPs.Specifically, because of inadequate supervision to ensure OFO officers properlydocumented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data oridentify and address performance problems related to these searches. Inaddition, OFO officers did not consistently disconnect electronic devices,specifically cell phones, from networks before searching them becauseheadquarters provided inconsistent guidance to the ports of entry on disablingdata connections on electronic devices. OFO also did not adequately managetechnology to effectively support search operations and ensure the security ofdata. Finally, OFO has not yet developed performance measures to evaluate theeffectiveness of a pilot program, begun in 2007, to conduct advanced searches,including copying electronic data from searched devices to law enforcementdatabases.These deficiencies in supervision, guidance, and equipment management,combined with a lack of performance measures, limit OFO’s ability to detectand deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug,and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.Searches of Electronic Devices Not Always Properly DocumentedOFO officers did not always properly document actions and complete therequired chain of custody forms when conducting searches of electronicdevices. This occurred because supervisors did not always adequately reviewdocumentation to ensure officers properly documented searches at the ports ofentry.CBP Directive 3340-049, Border Search of Electronic Devices ContainingInformation, dated August 20, 2009, was in effect at the time of our review.According to the directive, CBP officers are responsible for completing allapplicable documentation in the appropriate CBP systems of record whenconducting electronic searches. Reports are to be created and updated in anaccurate, thorough, and timely manner. Reports must include all informationrelated to the search through the final disposition, including supervisoryapprovals and extensions when appropriate. In addition, the duty supervisor isto ensure the officer completes a thorough inspection and that all notification,documentation, and reporting requirements are accomplished.www.oig.dhs.gov5LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOIG-19-10

LA\\' ENFORCEMENT SENSITn'EOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityWe reviewed 194 EMRs and identified 130 (67 percent) that featured one ormore problems, which totaled 147 overall. See table 1. Md. CBP Elect ron1cTable 1 : Pr0 blems Ident fi11ed IDe 1a Report sInsufficient or Inaccurate InformationNumber of EMRsVague narrative describing border search62Inaccurate notes or action details31No witnessing supervisor documented29Detention and Seizure Chain of Custody FormsMissing information on Forms 6051D & 6051S7Late Supervisory ReviewReview more than 7 days from incident18Source: OIG analysis of EMRs from CBPWithout accurate and complete documentation of border searches of electronicdevices, OFO cannot maintain reliable quantitative data, identify and addressperformance problems, and minimize the risk of electronic devices becominglost or misplaced.Data Connections Not Consistently Disabled Prior to Searching ElectronicDevicesA border search of an electronic device conducted by an OFO officer shouldinclude an examination of only the information that is physically on the device,not information stored on a remote server. To avoid retrieving or accessinginformation stored remotely, officers should either request that the travelerdisable connectivity to any network (e.g., by placing the device in airplanemode) or, in instances warranted by national security, law enforcement, officersafety, or other operational considerations, officers will disable networkconnectivity. However, OFO officers did not consistently disconnect electronicdevices, specifically cell phones, from the network before searching them. Thisoccurred because headquarters provided inconsistent guidance to the ports ofentry on disabling electronic devices' data connections.Specifically, in April 2017, OFO issued a memo7 that claimed to reaffirm itsexisting policy and protocol for disconnecting electronic devices from internetaccess (i.e., disabling network connections) before a search.a Unless eachdevice's network connection is disabled, OFO could potentially retrieveinformation from external sources, leaving the results of the border searchquestionable. However, Directive 3340-049, the policy at the time, did notrequire disabling data connections prior to conducting a search. Of the 194EMRs we reviewed, 154 were completed prior to the issuance of the April 20177 Border Search ofElectronic Devices Containing Infonnation, dat ed April 13, 2017.a Disabling data connections ensures that electronic devices are limited to the data on them.www.oig.dhs.gov6OIG-19-10LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland Securitymemo. None of the 154 contained evidence that data connections were disabledon electronic devices searched.In addition, the April 2017 memo required OFO officers to document in theEMR whether cellular and data connections were disabled prior to conductinga search and further required supervisors to confirm connections were disabledin a statement in the EMR before approving it. Despite these requirements,OFO supervisors did not provide adequate oversight to ensure officers disableddata connections on electronic devices prior to searching them, nor did thesupervisors properly review EMRs. We reviewed 40 EMRs completed after theissuance of the April 2017 memo. Even though OFO supervisors reviewed andapproved EMRs, more than one-third of the EMRs (14 of 40) lacked astatement confirming that the electronic device’s data connection had beendisabled.Since we began the audit, CBP has taken action to improve in this area. InOctober 2017, CBP completed system enhancements to their EMRs in TECS.Those enhancements include a mandatory data field to allow officers to select,rather than compose, a statement to confirm disabling a device dataconnection. Additionally, on January 4, 2018, CBP issued Directive 3340049A, Border Search of Electronic Devices, which supersedes Directive 3340049. Unlike the superseded directive, the newly issued directive expresslystates, “Officers will either request that the traveler disable connectivity to anynetwork (e.g., by placing the device in airplane mode); or, where warranted bynational security, law enforcement, officer safety, or other operationalconsiderations, officers will themselves disable network connectivity.”External Equipment and Data for Border Searches Not Well ManagedAccording to the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) Standards forInternal Control in the Federal Government, Sections 10.03 and 12.01,management is responsible for establishing physical control to secure andsafeguard vulnerable assets and implement control activities through policies.However, OFO is not managing the external equipment used to conductadvanced border searches of electronic devices well. Specifically, OFO did notrenew software licensing agreements for external equipment expeditiously andmaintained information copied on thumb drives that should have been deleted.www.oig.dhs.gov7LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOIG-19-10

LA\\' ENFORCEMENT SENSITn'EOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityOFO Did Not Renew Software Licensing of External Equipment ExpeditiouslyOFO purchased thetool, which is a computertriage tool that enables examination of laptopSoftw are licen s inghard drives, USB9 drives, and multimedia cards,a gree m e n ts w er e not inohibit importation of illegal materials. Theeffectfrom Fe bruary 1,tool requires an annual license renewal that 2 01 7 , throu gh Septe mberencompasses a warranty, support, maintenance,12, 2017 .and software upgrades to maximize securityeffectiveness. We reviewed software licensingagreements of t he tool from 2016 and 2017 and found a licensing lapse.Because OFO headquarters did not renew the software licensing of the tool expeditiously, licensing agreements were only in effect from January 20,2016, through January 31, 2017; and from September 13, 2017, throughSeptember 12, 2018.According to an OFO official, there is no dedicated funding for externalequipment such as t he tool because it is part of the advanced searches ofelectronic devices pilot program. According to the same official, due to the lackof dedicated funding and the combination of budgetary issues and otherfunding priorities, the initial vendor estimate he received for the purchaseexpired. Therefore, he had to obtain another vendor estimate, which caused adelay in promptly submitting the license renewal documentation.Without a valid software license, OFO officers could not conduct advancedsearches of laptop hard drives , USB drives, and multimedia cards at the portsof entry. This deficiency limited OFO's ability to obtain evidence of criminalactivity and to detect and deter illegal activities, such as child pornography.Additionally, it hinders OFO's ability to mitigate the risk of criminals enteringthe United States with unexamined national security or law enforcement related information on their laptops.OFO Does Not Always Delete Travelers' Information Copied during AdvancedSearchesDuring advanced searches, OFO officers connect external equipment toe lectronic devices and copy information onto a thumb drive; the copiedinformation is uploaded via the thumb drive to the CBP's ATS for furtheranalysis. According t o two OFO training officials, once an OFO officercompletes an ATS u pload, he or she should immediately delete all copiedinformation from the thumb drive, but OFO could not provide written policy orprocedures related to the training officials' oral requirement.9Universal Serial Bus is a common interface that enables communication between devices anda host controller such as a personal computer.www.oig.dhs.gov8OIG-19-10LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityWe physically inspected thumb drives at five ports of entry. At three of the fiveports, we found thumb drives that contained information copied from pastadvanced searches, meaning the information had not been deleted after thesearches were completed. Based on our physical inspection, as well as the lackof a written policy, it appears OFO has not universally implemented therequirement to delete copied information, increasing the risk of unauthorizeddisclosure of travelers’ data should thumb drives be lost or stolen.OFO Has Not Developed Performance Measures for the Advanced Searchesof Electronic Devices Pilot ProgramAccording to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,management should establish activities to monitor performance measures andindicators. These may include comparisons and assessments relating differentsets of data to one another so that analyses of the relationships can be madeand appropriate actions taken.OFO has not developed performance measures to assess the effectiveness of itsadvanced searches of electronic devices pilot program. In 2007, four ports ofentry used external equipment for OFO’s advanced searches of electronicdevices pilot program; OFO has now expanded the pilot to 67 ports of entry.Although OFO maintains quantitative data on the number and location ofadvanced searches, it has not developed performance measures. One area tomeasure is the number of instances in which information collected fromsearches resulted in a prosecution or conviction, but according to OFO, it doesnot track this information.Without performance measures, OFO cannot evaluate the effectiveness of thepilot program. OFO will not be able to determine whether the advancedsearches are achieving their intended purpose or whether the use of advancedsearches should be expanded to other ports of entry.ConclusionIn FY 2017, CBP searched electronic devices belonging to more than 29,000inbound travelers. Given the number of searches, it is important that OFOensure the searches are properly documented and that OFO officersconducting the searches are adequately overseen. Properly managing theequipment used to conduct advanced searches is also critical to make certainofficers are not limited in their ability to detect and deter illegal activities. Asthe world of information technology evolves, techniques used by OFO must alsoevolve to identify, investigate, and prosecute individuals who use newtechnologies to commit crimes. Finally, to demonstrate OFO is meeting itssecurity mission, developing performance measures will be essential to assessthe effectiveness of OFO’s pilot program of advanced searches, which has beenwww.oig.dhs.gov9LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOIG-19-10

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland Securityin place for 10 years.RecommendationsRecommendation 1: We recommend the Executive Assistant Commissionerfor the Office of Field Operations ensure its officers properly document theiractions when conducting searches of electronic devices, and supervisorsprovide adequate and prompt review of electronic media reports and relatedinformation.Recommendation 2: We recommend the Executive Assistant Commissionerfor the Office of Field Operations ensure supervisors oversee the disabling ofdata connections prior to conducting searches of electronic devices.Recommendation 3: We recommend the Executive Assistant Commissionerfor the Office of Field Operations ensure all equipment used during advancedsearches is accounted for and all software licenses are renewed expeditiously.Recommendation 4: We recommend the Executive Assistant Commissionerfor the Office of Field Operations ensure that travelers’ copied information isimmediately deleted from thumb drives after successful upload to theAutomated Targeting System.Recommendation 5: We recommend the Executive Assistant Commissioner ofthe Office of Field Operations:a) Develop and implement performance measures for the advancedsearches of electronic devices pilot program.b) Evaluate the effectiveness of the pilot program to determine whether theadvanced searches are achieving the program’s intended purpose.c) Work with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection toevaluate the performance of Office of Field Operations in the advancedsearches of electronic devices pilot program and, based on the results ofsuch evaluation, decide whether to discontinue or establish it as apermanent program of record.www.oig.dhs.gov10LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOIG-19-10

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityManagement Comments and OIG AnalysisCBP concurred with the recommendations. Appendix A contains a copy ofCBP’s management comments in their entirety. We also received technicalcomments and incorporated them in the report where appropriate. We considerthe five recommendations to be resolved and open. A summary of CBP’sresponses and our analysis follows.CBP Response to Recommendation 1: CBP concurred with therecommendation. OFO Tactical Operations Division’s (TOD) National ProgramManagers will provide oversight of EMRs on a monthly basis. TOD is developinga process to conduct annual Field Office reviews at the ports of entry. TOD willwork with OFO’s Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PPAE)Directorate to enhance and update the current self-inspection worksheet toensure the worksheet addresses proper documentation of officer actions whenconducting searches of electronic devices. CBP estimates these actions will becompleted by June 30, 2019.OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when wereceive documentation showing that CBP has begun providing oversight ofEMRs on a monthly basis and developed a process for annual reviews at theports of entry, as well as incorporated use of the self-inspection worksheet.CBP Response to Recommendation 2: CBP concurred with therecommendation. OFO is developing a process to conduct annual Field Officereviews that will observe operations and procedures in place to ensure thatsupervisors oversee the disabling of data connections prior to conducting asearch of an electronic device. TOD will also work with OFO PPAE to enhanceand update the current self-inspection worksheet to ensure the worksheetaddresses proper documentation of officer actions when conducting searches ofelectronic devices, as well as adequate and prompt supervisory reviews. CBPestimates these actions will be completed by June 30, 2019.OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when wereceive documentation showing that CBP has developed a process for annualField Office reviews to oversee disabling data connections and incorporated theself-inspection worksheet.CBP Response to Recommendation 3: CBP concurred with therecommendation. OFO is developing a process to conduct annual Field Officereviews at ports of entry. The TOD National Program Managers will observeoperations and procedures in place to ensure that software licenses arewww.oig.dhs.gov11LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOIG-19-10

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVEOFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland Securitypromptly renewed annually. CBP estimates these actions will be completed byJune 30, 2019.OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when wereceive documentation showing that CBP has developed a process to conductannual Field Office reviews to ensure that software licenses are renewedannually.CBP Response to Recommendation 4: CBP con

electronic devices. In fiscal year 2016, CBP processed more than 390 million travelers arriving at U.S. ports of entry and searched the electronic devices of an estimated 18,400 of those inbound travelers (.005 percent). In FY 2017, CBP processed more than 397 million travelers and searched the electronic

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