Screening For Counterfeit Electronic Parts - Univ-st-etienne.fr
J Mater Sci: Mater Electron (2011) 22:1511–1522DOI 10.1007/s10854-011-0500-0Screening for counterfeit electronic partsBhanu Sood Diganta Das Michael PechtReceived: 1 February 2011 / Accepted: 1 August 2011 / Published online: 23 August 2011Ó Springer Science Business Media, LLC 2011Abstract Counterfeit electronic parts have become asignificant cause of worry in the electronic parts supplychain. Counterfeit parts detected in the electronics industrycan be new or surplus parts that are modified in somemanner, or they can be salvaged scrap parts that arerefurbished to look like new. In the latter case, the packaging of these parts is altered to modify their identity ordisguise the effects of salvaging. The modification can beas simple as the removal of old markings and the additionof new markings, or as complicated as the recovery of a dieand repackaging in a new package. In this paper, we discuss the types of parts used to create counterfeit semiconductor parts and the defects/degradation inherent inthese parts due to the nature of the sources they come from.We also discuss proposed inspection standards and theirlimitations. The processes used to modify the packaging ofthese parts to create counterfeits are then discussed alongwith the traces left behind from each of the processes. Wethen present a methodology for detecting signs of possiblepart modifications to determine the risk of a part or part lotbeing counterfeit.B. Sood D. Das M. Pecht (&)Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE),Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Maryland,College Park, MD 20742, USAe-mail: pecht@calce.umd.eduB. Soode-mail: bpsood@calce.umd.eduD. Dase-mail: diganta@umd.edu1 IntroductionA counterfeit electronic part is one whose identity (e.g.,manufacturer, date code, lot code) has been deliberatelymisrepresented. Several factors contribute to the targetingof the electronic parts market by counterfeiters, includingrapid obsolescence of electronic parts and the long leadtime of parts from authorized sources. The absence ofpedigree verification tools in the electronics part supplychain and the availability of cheap tools and parts to createcounterfeits make the counterfeiting of electronic parts arelatively low risk operation for counterfeiters, while thecost of inspection/testing procedures make it harder for partusers to detect counterfeits.The effects of a counterfeit part and a sub-standard partmay be similar on a finished end-product, but there are twoimportant distinctions between the impacts of these twotypes of parts. First, the liability for the inclusion of acounterfeit part can be wholly on the organization thatprocures the counterfeit part, since the source of an originalpart is difficult to confirm. The judicial system and lawenforcement may not be able to offer assistance in identifying the original source of the part in order to attributeliability. In addition to liability, there is limited or nonexistent root cause failure analysis support from partmanufacturers in case of a counterfeit part that is purchasedout of the authorized supply chain.Unauthorized parts are parts that are circulated beyondthe authorized supply chain of part manufacturers, authorized distributors, and authorized aftermarket manufacturers. These parts can originate with any or all members ofthe part supply chain, as shown in Fig. 1. (In this figure,OEM stands for original equipment manufacturer and CMstands for contract manufacturer.) Counterfeiters haveaccess to reclaimed, scrapped, and excess parts, which are123
1512J Mater Sci: Mater Electron (2011) 22:1511–1522Fig. 1 Sources of unauthorizedelectronic parts from across thesupply chainOEMs/CMsCMsPackage Assemblyand urersScrap partsUnauthorizedpartsReclaimed parts fromdiscarded electronicsRecyclersCreation of CounterfeitsSold “As Is”easily available from unauthorized sources. There are relatively few incidents of illegal manufacturing of counterfeit parts in the electronics industry due to the high costsand sophisticated infrastructure involved in manufacturingelectronic parts such as integrated circuits. Counterfeitparts are generally relabeled parts (e.g., marked as highergrade or with a more recent date code, or as being RoHS1compliant), refurbished parts (i.e., a used part reworked toappear new), or a repackaged part (e.g., recovery of dieand repackaging). Table 1 shows the sources and attributesof various types of parts that can be used to createcounterfeits.Excess inventories comprise electronic parts that areno longer required by product manufacturers or contractmanufacturers for normal production needs [1]. Excessinventories arise for a variety of reasons, such as differences between forecasts and actual production schedules,delays in the discontinuation of slow-moving product lines,and economic recessions [2, 3]. The excess inventory canalso come from the release of parts kept as maintenancespares by OEMs or support companies. Disposal optionsfor excess inventories include alternate use within thecompany; returning the parts to original suppliers (manufacturers, distributors); disposal of parts into the graymarkets (unauthorized markets); and scrapping the parts.Out of these four disposal options, the selling of parts in thegray market creates a source of parts for counterfeiters.Improper scrapping procedures used to scrap the excessparts (in the absence of other disposal options) can alsoresult in counterfeiters salvaging the parts [4].The pedigree of excess parts is often unknown due to theanonymous nature of transactions. The quality of excessparts depends on prior storage conditions, the duration of1The RoHS Directive stands for the Restriction of the Use of CertainHazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment.123 Relabeling Refurbishing RepackagingTable 1 Types of parts used to create counterfeitsTypes of partsSources and attributesExcessinventoriesSources: OEMsa, contract manufacturersScrappedpartsSource: inspection fallouts from part manufacturers,testing companies, and contract manufacturersAttributes: handling-, packaging-, and storagerelated damage; defects due to aging; notraceability; unknown pedigreeAttributes: internal quality problems such as missingdie or bond wires; failed die; die contamination;part-termination damageReclaimedpartsaSource: recyclersAttributes: damaged terminations and body; inherentdefects induced during reclamation; unknownpedigreeOriginal equipment manufacturersstorage, and handling procedures. Depending on the construction, handling, and storage, excess parts can becomeunsolderable, contaminated, damaged, or otherwisedegraded during their storage. It is very unlikely that thestorage conditions of parts kept at any warehouse will bemade known to subsequent buyers. The purchase of parts inprotective packaging (e.g., moisture barrier bags, ESDbags) is no guarantee that the parts have been kept in theseconditions for the complete storage period.Part manufacturers and testing companies often scrapparts that fail quality checks and other screening tests (e.g.,functional tests, burn-in). Often, part manufacturers do notdestroy the parts in-house but instead rely on third partiesto perform the disposal. Some of these parts can escapedestruction and be salvaged by counterfeiters. Examples ofattributes of scrapped parts include manufacturing defectssuch as the absence of die, lifted wire bonds, missing or nobond wires, and damaged terminations (e.g., broken leads,
J Mater Sci: Mater Electron (2011) 22:1511–1522balls, or chip-out in the terminations of passive parts).Some scrapped parts may not meet the electrical specifications and get rejected in screening. Scrapped parts at thepart manufacturer level can also include rejected wafersand dice that can then be processed and packaged bycounterfeiters.Reclaimed parts are parts that have been recovered fromassembled printed circuit boards of discarded electronicassemblies and failed boards that are scrapped by contractmanufacturers. The pedigree of these discarded assembliesis often unknown. Parts that are reclaimed from suchproducts may have undetected defects or degradation.Reclaimed parts may also have defects induced duringreclamation procedures, such as damaged terminations,popcorn damage in the molding compound, and delamination of the molding compound from the die attach [5].Apart from excess inventories, scrapped parts, andreclaimed parts, counterfeiters may also buy new parts andrelabel or repackage them to make them appear to be different parts. Such parts may have handling- or packagingrelated damage, such as ESD2 damage.Unlike material characterization (e.g., X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy) and destructive tests (e.g., dieinspection after decapsulation) that require expensive toolsand equipment, visual inspection can be carried out with alight optical microscope. Yet while visual inspection canbe a first step in the detection process, it can never be theonly method. The visual inspection process also requiresaccess to original parts or part drawings and support frommanufacturers to obtain the actual attributes of parts, e.g.,date code validity.A plastic-packaged electronic part that has been remarked with good quality ink and without errors is hard todetect through the visual inspection method. Markingpermanency tests will not work in the case of laser-markedparts. Even in the case of ink-marked parts, marking permanency tests may erase the marking of an authentic part,thus giving the impression of the part being counterfeit.With the growing sophistication of technology, counterfeiters have been using better quality inks and laserequipment to create counterfeit parts. A salvaged scrappart, which has been scrapped because of internal qualityproblems, such as missing bond wires, may not be detectedthrough the visual inspection method or marking permanency tests. A part that has been repackaged (from the die)may have discrepancies (e.g., different manufacturers) inthe die and package markings. Such discrepancies can onlybe detected after destructive sample preparation techniques, such as delidding, have been conducted. Refurbishing techniques such as reballing and solder dippingmay initiate failure mechanisms, such as interfacial2Electrostatic discharge.1513delamination or bond pad corrosion, which can only bedetected through more invasive techniques such as scanning acoustic microscopy. Visual inspection also cannotdetect discrepancies in termination plating materials. Suchdiscrepancies can only be detected through material characterization techniques such as XRF spectroscopy.The Independent Distributors of Electronics Association(IDEA) has developed a document providing guidelines forthe acceptability of electronic parts that are distributed inthe open market [6]. The document, IDEA-STD-1010A,3provides visual inspection techniques (including markingpermanency tests) and acceptance criteria for open marketparts. Electrical and destructive or invasive inspectiontechniques (e.g., delidding) are out of the scope of thisIDEA document, which only covers visual inspection ofthe markings, surface texture, mold pin, external packaging(tray or tube), and part body. Methods that use onlyexternal visual inspection are not sufficient for detectingcounterfeit parts. Besides the possibility of missing counterfeit part risks, visual inspection–based comparison withan original part is hampered by the fact that many materialand geometry changes are frequently made to an electronicpart by the part manufacturer, and there is no single‘‘golden’’ part to compare against. Table 2 shows a summary of limitations of visual inspection.Some test laboratories depend on electrical tests todetect sub-standard and counterfeit parts. Electrical testsinclude parametric and functional testing. Electrical testsare effective in detecting non-functional or failed parts.However, most counterfeit electronic parts are functional tosome extent and cannot be identified by electrical testsalone. It has been a long-standing problem for all electricaltesting companies to obtain or replicate the test vectorsused by part manufacturers to verify a part. It is a timeconsuming and expensive process to develop and programtest vectors to conduct part verification. There remains ahigh possibility of test escape for all but the simplest ofelectronic parts due the test coverage problem. Even forsimple parts, the detection of differences with original partsmay only be found at the corners of specifications (e.g.,temperature and voltage) and not at the manufacturer-recommended test conditions. Some counterfeit parts mayfunction properly during the electrical tests, but they mayhave inherent defects (e.g., contamination) induced duringrefurbishing or re-marking. There have been reportsof system-level failures attributed to excessive ioniccontamination levels in semiconductor packages. Thesecontaminants promote failure mechanisms, such as electrochemical migration, that can lead to a drop in insulation3There is a new version of this document slated for release in 2011,but at the time or writing that version had not been reviewed by theauthors of this paper.123
1514J Mater Sci: Mater Electron (2011) 22:1511–1522Table 2 Limitations of using visual inspection alone for detectingcounterfeitsTable 3 Processes used to create counterfeits and their associateddefectsTypes ofcounterfeit partsExamples of limitations of visual inspectionCounterfeitingprocessAssociated defectsRepackagedCannot detect internal discrepancies such asbond wire misalignment or missing bondwires, missing or damaged dieRelabelingMarking irregularities, poor quality marking,filled-in or unclean mold cavities, discrepanciesin package marking with the die marking, ESDdamageRepackagingDiscrepancies in package marking with the diemarking; workmanship issues such as missingbond wires or poor die paddle construction;internal defects such as moisture-inducedinterfacial delamination; poor materials usedRefurbishingBridged or improperly aligned terminations;internal defects such as interfacial delaminationand cracked passivation layer induced duringprocesses such as solder dipping, reballing, andrealignment of terminations; differences intermination plating material with original partCannot detect die and package markingmismatchesRemarkedFails if markings on counterfeit parts are of goodqualityRequires access to datasheets or support fromoriginal manufacturerRefurbishedCannot verify RoHS compliance claimsCannot detect termination plating discrepancieswith original partsCannot detect internal failure mechanismsinduced during refurbishing processes, such asinterfacial delaminationSalvaged scrappartsMarkings may be original manufacturer’s andthus it may be difficult to detect anydiscrepanciesInternal problems such as missing die or bondwires cannot be detectedresistance, causing leakage current paths and catastrophicfailures [7, 8]. Contaminants and other defects introducedduring the counterfeit part creation process can only bedetected through systematic packaging evaluation. In thispaper, we present a counterfeit detection process forsemiconductor parts that incorporates packaging evaluationusing tools and methods to detect signs of possible partmodification.2 Creation of counterfeit partsWith the easy availability of parts to create counterfeits,counterfeiters have developed inexpensive methods ofcounterfeiting that rely on modifying the packaging ofparts by processes such as relabeling or refurbishing. In thissection, we discuss the three most commonly used methodsused by counterfeiters to create counterfeits. It is possiblefor a counterfeiter to use a combination of these methodsduring various steps of the creation of a counterfeit. Table3 shows a summary of the defects associated with the threecommon methods of counterfeiting.2.1 RelabelingRelabeling is the process of altering the markings on a partto make it appear to be a different part. A typical partmarking includes part number, some type of location andtime of manufacture identification, and the manufacturer’s123logo. The relabeling process includes erasing the originalmarking by methods such as blacktopping or sand blastingand applying a new marking to create a counterfeit part.Sandblasting involves smoothing, shaping, or cleaning ahard surface by forcing solid particles across that surface athigh speeds. Blacktopping is a process in which a layer ofmaterial is applied to the top surface of a part to cover overthe old marking.Relabeling may be carried out according to the need ofthe customer to have higher grade parts (e.g., changingprocessor speed), different parts with the same pin countand packaging type, different vintage parts (e.g., changingdate code), or different military specifications (e.g., JAN,883 screen). There may also be marking irregularities suchas spelling errors, discrepancies in part number, or anincorrect logo.GIDEP4 issued an alert about the operational amplifierLT1057AMJ8/883 with date code 0122 in 2006. LinearTechnology Corporation (LTC) received the parts from acustomer when the parts failed functional tests at the customer’s facility. Destructive and physical analysis (DPA)of the parts revealed the die to be an original LTC diemanufactured in October 1995 as a military lot. The partswere found to have been relabeled to make them appear tobe new parts [9].Relabeling leaves behind traces that can be detectedthrough visual inspection or marking permanency tests.Some of the traces left behind are part-marking irregularities such as spelling mistakes; different marking techniques used (e.g., laser marking instead of ink marking);dual part markings; part markings with invalid date codesor part numbers; parts (ink-marked) failing marking4GIDEP: Government-Industry Data Exchange Program.
J Mater Sci: Mater Electron (2011) 22:1511–1522permanency tests; a filled-in or unclean pin-1 cavity; andabsence of country of origin marking.2.2 RefurbishingRefurbishing is a process in which parts are renovated in aneffort to restore them to a like-new condition in appearance. The terminations of refurbished parts are realignedand re-finished (in the case of leads) or undergo reballing(in the case of ball grid array (BGA) type interconnects).Refurbishing is often carried out in conjunction with relabeling to sell used parts as new parts. Refurbishing is alsocarried out to hide defects that arise during the reclamationof parts from circuit boards and improper handling.Refurbishing may induce defects or degradation such asbridged balls, missing balls, broken leads, popcorning,warpage, or localized delamination.Realignment of leads (such as straightening) is oftencarried out on reclaimed or scrapped parts that have bent ornon-aligned leads caused during reclamation of the partsfrom printed circuit boards or poor handling. The realignment of leads may cause damage to terminations such asbroken leads or improperly aligned leads. The realignmentprocess may also cause internal defects such as interfacialdelamination and cracked passivation layers.Solder dipping is frequently used to change the leadfinish, e.g., from a lead-free (Pb-free) finish to a lead finishor vice versa. Solder dipping is also used to improve orrestore the solderability of parts. If the quality of the finishis poor, then subsequent storage reliability and manufacturability may be degraded, or defects in the terminations,such as bridging across leads, can be introduced. Uncontrolled thermal shock experienced during a poor-qualitysolder dipping process can lead to internal delamination,leading to package cracking, a cracked passivation layer,and deformation in die metallization [10].Reballing is a process carried out on BGA parts toreplace damaged balls or change the termination materialfrom Pb-free to lead or vice versa. Counterfeiters oftenuse the reballing process to refurbish the part terminations(BGAs) of reclaimed or used parts (with damaged balls)to make them appear to be new parts. Inconsistenciesduring reballing can cause defects such as incorrectlysized solder balls, missing solder balls, damaged pads,loss of coplanarity, and bridged balls. Other defectscaused by improper reballing affecting the package arewarpage, popcorning, and local delamination between thedie and mold compound or the substrate and moldcompound.Many of the problems arising out of refurbishing arehard to detect at the package level by inspection alone. Inmany cases, their manifestation comes at the boardassembly stage.15152.3 RepackagingRepackaging is the process of altering the packaging of apart in order to disguise it as a different part with a different pin count and package type (e.g., dual-in-linepackage (DIP) or plastic leaded chip carrier (PLCC)). Theprocess involves recovery of the die (by removing theoriginal packaging) and molding the die into the desiredpackage type. The process of removal of the die canintroduce defects in the die, its terminals, and passivation.Counterfeiters are unlikely to use proper handling procedures, tools, and materials for repackaging the die, whichmay lead to defects or degradation in the repackaged partssuch as die contamination, moisture-induced interfacialdelamination, and cracks in the passivation layer. Therepackaged parts may also suffer from problems such asmissing bond wires, missing die, bond wire misalignment,or poor die paddle construction. The marking on repackaged parts also may not match with the die markings. Thelabeling problems seen in relabeled parts can be found inthese parts too. Counterfeiters are also likely to use inferiormaterials of varying quality to package the die, such as lowcost and low quality filler materials or flame retardants.It can also be inferred that, in most cases, the counterfeiters will not use the qualification processes used byoriginal part manufacturers. They are also unlikely to useprocess control techniques during the manufacturing steps,and, as a result, there is likely to be large part-to-partvariation. In the presence of large part-to-part variation, theuse of any sampling technique to inspect parts for counterfeit risk identification will be of very little value.In addition to repackaging, counterfeiters may alsopackage available excess dice. In that case, the steps toextract a die from its original package are eliminated, butthe risks from low quality packaging processes still remain.3 Detection of counterfeit partsMost of the counterfeit parts detected in the electronicsindustry are either new or surplus parts or salvaged scrapparts that are modified. The modification can be as simpleas the removal of marking and re-marking or as sophisticated as recovery of the die and repackaging. Most of thesemodifications leave behind clues that can be uncovered inorder to establish the authenticity of the part. In this section, we present a sequence of detection techniques that canbe applied for detecting signs of possible part modification.Detection is an important step to determine the risk of apart or part lot being counterfeit. The evaluation methodology begins with steps that can be implemented in thereceiving department. The steps can include a thoroughevaluation of shipping packages and inspection of humidity123
1516J Mater Sci: Mater Electron (2011) 22:1511–1522Table 4 Inspection methods, severity, and tools or equipment requiredInspection methodIncoming inspectionSeverity and tools or equipment requiredSeverity: non-destructive, may induce handling-related damage such as ESD if precautions are not takenTools/equipment: Low-power stereo macroscope, bare eyes, ruler, weighing balance. Information on originalpart material may be needed.External visual inspectionSeverity: non-destructive, may induce handling-related damage such as ESD if precautions are not takenTools/equipment: low-power optical macroscope, optical microscope, solvent for marking permanency tests,part datasheet informationX-ray inspectionSeverity: non-destructive, may induce handling-related damage such as ESD if precautions are not taken.Instances of part damage due to X-ray radiation exposure are also reported.Tools/equipment: X-ray machine, X-ray images of an authentic partMaterial evaluation andcharacterizationSeverity: may be destructive or non-destructive depending on the type of equipment usedPackaging evaluationSeverity: non-destructiveTools/equipment: XRF, environmental scanning electron microscope (E-SEM), energy dispersive spectroscopy(EDS), differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), thermo-mechanical analyzer (TMA), dynamic mechanicalanalyzer (DMA), hardness testers, Fourier transform infrared spectroscope (FTIR). Information on originalpart material may be needed.Tools/equipment: scanning acoustic microscope (SAM), ion chromatography.Die inspectionSeverity: destructiveTools/equipment: automatic chemical decapsulator; can also be carried out through manual etching;information on original die markings and attributes needed; wire pull, ball bond, and solder ball shear testing,environmental testing, and micro-sectioningindicator cards, ESD bags, tube and tray materials, andshipping labels. Inspection procedures of higher sophistication levels can then be applied. These steps includeexternal visual inspection, marking permanency tests forexternal compliance, and X-ray inspection for internalcompliance. These inspection processes are followed bymaterial evaluation in destructive and non-destructivemanners such as XRF and material characterization of themold compound using thermo-mechanical techniques.These processes are typically followed by evaluation of thepackages to identify defects, degradation, and failuremechanisms that are caused by the processes (e.g., cleaning, solder dipping of leads, reballing) used in creatingcounterfeit parts. This method of assessment is necessary,since the electrical functionality and parametric requirements may be initially met by the counterfeit parts butauthenticity can only be evaluated after complete evaluation of the package. The latent damages caused by thecounterfeiting process can only be detected by a thoroughpackaging evaluation. The following subsections discusseach of the inspection methods whose severity and requiredtools are listed in Table 4.bags. Not only should the as-received state of the abovematerials be noted, but their authenticity should also beverified. Instances of counterfeit or fake HIC cards are onthe increase.Incoming inspection should start with verification of thereceiving documents and external labels on shipping boxesand matching the details in the purchase order with theshipping list enclosed with the shipment. Manufacturers’logs and shipping origin should also be checked and verified. Any certificate of conformance (CoC) should also beinspected for authenticity and cross-checked with existingCoCs from the same distributor or part manufacturer. Thenext step is an inspection of the ESD and moisture barrierbags to check for any damage or sealing issues. The HICshould also be checked to verify that it is genuine and,based on the color indicator, that the shipment has not beenexposed to elevated levels of humidity that may provedetrimental to the functioning and reliability of the electronic part. The brands of the tray, tube, and reels used inthe shipment should also be inspected. Single shipments ofcounterfeit parts have been known to be shipped in trays ofdifferent brands.3.1 Incoming inspection3.2 External visual inspectionIncoming inspection is the process of verifying the conditions of materials used for shipping the suspect packages.Attributes to inspect for include the status of humidityindicator cards (HIC), moisture barrier bags, and ESDExternal visual inspection is a process of verifying theattributes of parts such as package and part markings (partnumber, date code, country of origin marking), part termination quality, and surface quality. Visual inspection is123
J Mater Sci: Mater Electron (2011) 22:1511–1522performed on a sample of parts from a given lot. Theresources required for carrying out visual inspectioninclude the standard tools for handling electrostatic sensitive parts [11], part datasheet information (part numberformat, dimensions, number of pins, and package type), amicroscope with at least 309 magnification (the magnification of the microscope can be adjusted to inspect certainfeatures of the part), a camera built into the microscope(some of the processes for identifying a counterfeitrequire sending copies of images to different resourcesfor evaluation), and a solvent to check for part-markingpermanence.Visual inspection begins with the inspection of the labelon the packaging in which the parts were shipped. Featuresto inspect include spelling errors on the manufacturerlabels, the validity of the manufacturer codes on the labels(such as codes that contain information on the manufacturing location), verification of whether the date codes onthe external packaging match the date codes on the parts,and the validity of the date codes. The packaging inspection also includes any part-specific requirements, such as adry pack and a humidity indicator card for moisture-sensitive parts.The next step in the inspection process is the verificationof whether the part markings, such as the logo, part number, lot code, date code, and Pb-free marking (if any),conform to the shipping and purchase order information.This is followed by verification of the validity of the partnumber, date/lot codes, and Pb-free marking (if any) withthe original part manufacturer requirements. In some cases,even though the original manufacturer may have shifted toPb-free manufacturing, counterfeiters might not place Pbfree marking on the parts (when they relabel the parts withnewer date codes). The part should also be inspected forany dual part markings, such as marking on the top
A counterfeit electronic part is one whose identity (e.g., manufacturer, date code, lot code) has been deliberately misrepresented. Several factors contribute to the targeting of the electronic parts market by counterfeiters, including rapid obsolescence of electronic parts and the long lead time of parts from authorized sources. The absence of
6. Reporting and quarantining of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts. 7. Methodologies to identify and rapidly determine if a suspect counterfeit part is, in fact, counterfeit. 8. Design, operation, and maintenance of systems to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic .
AS5553, Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation and Disposition, current version - DoD Adopted 31 Aug 2009 AS6081, Distribution Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance Protocol, Distributors, current version - DoD Adopted 10 Jun 2013 EPRI TR -1019163, Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Substandard Items,
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Oct 09, 2008 · released SAE AS5553, “Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition.”3 n Industry to improve counterfeit reporting, develop counterfeit parts con
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