Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information And Voting Behavior In .
Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California InsuranceReform ElectionsAuthor(s): Arthur LupiaSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 63-76Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944882Accessed: 22/08/2008 15:54Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available rms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained herCode apsa.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.org
American PoliticalScience ReviewVol. 88, No. 1March HUR LUPIA University of California, San Diego70ters in mass elections are notoriousfor their apparent lack of informationabout relevantpolitical matters. While some scholars argue that an electorateof well-informedvoters isnecessaryfor the productionof responsiveelectoraloutcomes, others argue that apparentlyignorant voters will sufficebecausethey can adapt their behaviorto the complexityof electoralchoice.To evaluate the validity of these arguments, I developand analyze a survey of Californiavoters whofaced five complicatedinsurance reform ballot initiatives. I find that access to a particularclass ofwidely available information shortcuts allowed badly informed voters to emulate the behavior ofrelatively well informedvoters. Thisfinding is suggestive of the conditions under which voters wholack encyclopedicinformationabout the content of electoraldebatescan neverthelessuse informationshortcuts to vote as though they were well informed.Vecades of survey research have provided uswith countless examples of voter ignorance.While the existence of the badly informedvoter is now a central part of political science'sintellectual heritage, the implications of voter ignorance continue to be vigorously debated. Many scholars and pundits argue that widespread voter ignorance leads to voting behavior and electoral outcomesthat are meaningless representations of voter interests.' Other political observers argue that votersfind ways to adapt to their apparent lack of information. These scholars conclude that voting behaviorand electoral outcomes provide valuable measures ofvoter interests.2To understand whether or not voters can successfully overcome their lack of information, it is instructive to consider briefly how voters can obtain information about the personal consequences of electoraloutcomes. I conduct this review in the particularlyappropriate context of a direct legislation election. Indirect legislation elections (e.g., the initiative and thereferendum), voters make selections from an exogenously determined menu of specific policy alternatives called propositions. A defining characteristic ofmany propositions is complexity.3 Since voters whoencounter a complex proposition for the first time arelikely to be confused about the consequences of itsapproval, the extent to which voters can adapt totheir initial condition of ignorance will determinehow well they can promote their own intereststhrough the act of voting.Voters who have an interest in the outcome of adirect legislation election might first consider gathering facts about a proposition from the official document that describes its content. However, these documents are usually lengthy and/or filled withtechnical language. As a result, voters in large electorates who consider their opportunity costs maydecide that the acquisition of "encyclopedic" information is not a worthwhile activity.As an alternative to the costly acquisition of ency-clopedic information, voters may choose to employinformation shortcuts. For example, voters can acquire information about the preferences or opinionsof friends, coworkers, political parties, or other groups,which they may then use to infer how a proposition willaffect them. The appeal of these information shortcutsis that they generally require relatively little effort toacquire. The drawback of these shortcuts is that theymay be unreliable, since relatively well informedinformation providers may have incentives to mislead relatively uninformed voters.Because many of my colleagues and I were curiousabout the extent to which relatively uninformed voters could use information shortcuts to cast the samevotes they would have cast if better informed, Idesigned and administered an exit poll of Californiavoters who, in 1988, were confronted by five distinctand complex insurance reform propositions. The survey responses allow me to identify a class of voterswho, while appearing to possess relatively low levelsof encyclopedic knowledge about the content of insurance reform initiatives, used an information shortcut that allowed them to emulate the behavior ofwell-informed voters. Specifically, I find that relatively uninformed voters who could correctly identifythe insurance industry's official position on a particular proposition were much more likely to emulatethe behavior of relatively well informed voters on thatproposition than were similarly uninformed voterswho did not know the insurance industry's position.I conclude from this finding that if relatively wellinformed voters are most likely to cast the votes thatare consistent with their own interests, then knowledge of the insurance industry's position allowedvoters who might otherwise be classified as ignorantto act as they would have if they had taken the timeand effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information. While the analysis I present does not lead meto conclude that shortcuts will always be sufficientto help uninformed voters overcome their lack ofknowledge, I believe that it is suggestive of theD63
Informationand Voting BehaviorMarch 1994groups, who had been effectively shut out of theinsurance reform debate in the legislature, voicedtheir intent to place an initiative on the November1988 ballot. By submitting an initiative, consumergroups would not only gain control of the reformagenda, but they might also compel other groups,who would be opposed to their initiative, to spendmillions of dollars to protect the relatively favorablestatus quo. In order to avoid a costly initiative campaign, insurance industry representatives and theCTLA made several attempts to form coalitions withthe consumer groups that were preparing an electoralstrategy. In addition, insurer and attorney groupsattempted to form legislation-supporting coalitionswith each other and each drafted its own separateinitiative in the event that no agreement could bereached. By the time the deadline for qualifying ballotmeasures had arrived, however, no coalitions hadformed.6 As a consequence, the three groups (theinsurance industry, the trial lawyers, and the consumer activists) placed five different insurance reforminitiatives on the November 1988 ballot.Only one of the five qualifying propositions passedon Election Day: Proposition 103 was sponsored bythe consumer activist group Voter Revolt (whoseprimary spokesman during the campaign was RalphNader) and received 51.1% of the vote. Proposition103 called for the removal of the insurance industry'santitrust exemption, public hearings as a prerequisitefor rate changes, auto insurance premiums to bedetermined primarily by driving record (as opposedto where one lived), a premium discount for "gooddrivers," election of the state's insurance commissioner (rather than gubernatorial appointment), anda mandatory 20% reduction on all auto insurancepremiums.Of the four initiatives that lost, one was sponsoredby trial lawyer interests, and three were sponsored byinsurance industry interests. Proposition 100 wassponsored by the CTLA and received 40.9% of thevote. This proposition called for the reduction of"good driver" rates by 20% and the institution ofhealth insurance rate regulation. It also allowedbanks to sell insurance and allowed claimants to sueinsurance companies for acting in "bad faith." Proposition 104, the no-fault initiative, was the insuranceindustry's most favored proposition (as evidenced bythe fact that the insurance industry spent much moreto promote this proposition than it did to promote theothers). Despite this status, it was approved by only25.4% of the voters. This proposition called for theestablishment of a no-fault system of auto insurance(thus eliminating the need for many types of legalrecourse in the event of an accident), the reduction ofsome premiums by 20% for two years, a restriction onfuture insurance regulation legislation, limitations ondamage awards against insurance companies, limitations on attorney contingency fees, and the preservation of the insurance industry's antitrust status. Proposition 101 was sponsored primarily by one insuranceconditions under which voters who have not acquired encyclopedic knowledge can vote as thoughthey had.Next, I offer a brief history of the events leading upto the insurance reform elections. I then place relevant aspects of this history within the context ofprevious theoretical and empirical research on voterdecision making in order to generate predictionsabout how different types of information shouldaffect voting behavior. I then offer a description of thesurvey instrument's construction and execution andemploy a number of statistical tests to identify theeffects of certain types of information on respondentvoting behavior. With this survey, and related theoretical and experimental research on the responsiveness of direct legislation,4 I hope to advance moregeneral debates about the nature of voter competenceand the substantive meaning of electoral outcomes.INSURANCE REFORM AND THEINFORMATION PROBLEMWhat events led up to the insurance reform electionsand how do they figure in the context of previouswork on voter decision making?A Brief HistoryIn 1987, California drivers paid the third highest autoinsurance rates in the nation. Both the state's trialreceive half of their case load fromlawyers-whoautomobile accident claims (Reich 1988a)-and theinsurance industry recognized the widespread publicsupport for regulatory reform and both were interested in influencing the legislative reform agenda.Each group publicly blamed the other for the recentrapid increase in auto insurance premiums. Insurance industry spokesmen argued that higher rateswere caused by skyrocketing legal costs and publiclysupported regulatory reforms that assigned most ofthe costs of reform to trial lawyers (e.g., laws thatlimit attorney fees, decrease the likelihood of largesettlements, or both.) In contrast, the California TrialLawyers Association (CTLA) publicly portrayed theinsurance industry as greedy oligopolists who wereconspiring against consumers. The CTLA supportedregulatory reform that assigned most of the costs ofreform to the insurance industry (e.g., the elimination of the insurance industry's exemption frommany of California's antitrust laws).Both groups attempted to influence insurance reform through their lobbying efforts in the state capitol. In this domain, the insurance reform debate wasa battle of Titans. Both the insurers and attorneyshad what were among the most influential lobbiesin California (Reich 1987a). Perhaps coincidentally,all attempts at reform died in state legislative committees.5When the legislative stalemate seemed destined tocompany, received 13.3% of the vote, called for atemporary reduction of the bodily injury portion ofoutlast calendar year 1987, a number of consumer64
Vol. 88, No. 1American Political Science Reviewevaluate a candidate's credibility and potential effectiveness by reviewing particular features of the candidate's past. While credibility is less of an issue forthe content of a ballot proposition, an electorate'sability to evaluate the consequences of a particularproposition retrospectively could help it better understand the future consequences of the proposition'sacceptance. Unfortunately for voters, no such historywas available for the five insurance reform propositions, since none of the proposed laws had everpreviously been enacted in California.In addition to the absence of some common typesof information, the insurance reform elections included two sources of information that are not generally available in other electoral environments. First,the state provided a summary of each initiative. Thesummaries for the five insurance reform initiativesappear in Appendix A and were available in manyplaces, including on the ballot itself. The summarieswere between 25 and 100 words long and wereintended to help voters distinguish between theinitiatives. While each summary provided some information about an initiative, certain characteristics ofthe summary limited its effectiveness. For instance, asummary's brevity often resulted in the omission ofimportant components of a complex initiative.A second source of state-provided information wasthe California Ballot Pamphlet. The pamphlet for theNovember 1988 election was a thick document thatcontained, for each proposition, the summary justdescribed, one signed argument by proponents, onesigned counterargument by opponents, one signedargument by opponents, one signed counterargument by proponents, and the actual text of theproposed changes to the law. The fact that voterscould obtain a great deal of information from theCalifornia Ballot Pamphlet is not in question. However, whether voters might reasonably be expected tospend the time and effort required to learn from thepamphlet is questionable and undermines its potential effectiveness.A final source of information was the campaignwaged by the three affected interest groups: theinsurance industry, the CTLA, and consumer activists. Together, these three groups spent more than 82 million on the campaign. Table 1 details thenames, preferences, and expenditures of all the campaign organizations that were involved in the insurance reform campaign and registered with the stateboard of elections. Each organization is classified byits primary source of funding. After reading throughthe campaign receipt and expenditure documentsthat were filed with the state, I can confidently assertthat there did not exist an organization for which thisclassification was not obvious. (All contributors of 25or more must be listed by name and occupation in aCalifornia direct legislation campaign's contributionfilings.)A cursory inspection of Table 1 reveals more aboutthe campaign than just dollars expended. All of thelarge groups claim to be consumer- or citizen-ori-insurance premiums and limited injury claims forpain and suffering and required that all other sourcesof compensation be exhausted before an insurancecompany was required to pay. Proposition 106 wassponsored by the insurance industry and received46.9% of the vote. This measure placed limits onattorney contingency fees in tort cases.Several characteristics of the insurance reform elections made them particularly appropriate for testingthe effect of different types of information on votingbehavior. Two of these characteristics led me tobelieve that most voters would not take the time oreffort needed to become well informed about many ofthe issues relevant to the insurance reform debate.The first of these characteristics is that the text of thefive insurance reform ballot initiatives was lengthy(totaling over 26,000 words) and technical. Second,insurance reform voters were likely to have beenoccupied with other political matters, since the November 1988 general election ballot in California wasunusually long.7Other characteristics led me to believe that therewould also be a vigorous campaign. The first of thesecharacteristics is that reform of the state's insuranceregulation was-and still is-a highly salient issue.Each of the five initiatives corresponded to a significant change in the insurance regulatory frameworkand each had the potential to affect the price orexpected value of many insurance policies, as well asinsurance industry profits and trial-lawyer case loads.Second, the potential effect of different electoral outcomes on their profit margins led me to expect, apriori, that there would be high levels of campaignexpenditure by the insurance industry and trial lawyers. (Over 82 million was actually spent on theinsurance reform campaigns.) Because the insurancereform elections had these four characteristics, I expected that there would be complex electoral decisions, many confused voters, a vigorous campaign,and a unique opportunity to examine how differenttypes of information affect voter behavior.Sources of InformationInsurance reform voters had access to different typesof information than voters in candidate-based elections typically do. The most notable difference wasthe absence of two types of information that arewidely believed to affect voting behavior in electionsinvolving candidates. The first type of missing information was the partisan cue. Not one of the initiativeshad a party label attached to it.8 This absence isparticularly relevant because much of the contemporary understanding of voting behavior relies on thenotion of voters taking cues from party labels.The second familiar type of missing informationwas the past. Retrospective evaluations, of the typeconsidered by Downs (1957), Key (1966), and Fiorina(1981) are thought to help voters simplify their evaluations of electoral alternatives and depend on theexistence of relevant past histories. For instance,retrospectivevoting hypotheses tell us that voters canented. These claims are indicative of the campaign65
March 1994Information and Voting BehaviorCampaign Expenditure by OrganizationRECOMMENDEDVOTEEXPENDITURE( )yes on 104 and 106, no on 100 and 103no on 100 and 103yes on 101yes on 106yes on 104no on 100 and 103 3 65,048,985yes on 103no on 106no on 106no on 106no on 106 13,786,653624,449401,704172,73720,000 15,005,543yes on 103no on 101,104, and 106yes on 100, no on 101, 104, and 106yes on 100, no on 104 1,932,90224,00522,5006,117 1,985,524 itizensfor No FaultCaliforniansagainst UnfairRate IncreasesConsumersfor LowerAuto InsuranceRatesCommitteefor onCommitteefor FairAuto InsuranceRatingsTotalTriallawyersGood DriverInitiativeNo on 106ConsumerCoalitionagainst 106No on Proposition106 CommitteeConsumer/LegalEqualJustice CommitteeTotalConsumeractivistsVoter Revoltfor LowerInsuranceRatesCaliforniansfor Honest InsuranceFriendsof MotorcyclingSanta CruzCommitteefor ConsumerJusticeTotalrelevant in attempting to understand the behavior ofinsurance reform voters.Particularly appropriate for this case study are thedynamics described in strategic models of communication, more commonly known as "signaling"games. In a signaling game, a relatively well informed information provider has information that isrelevant to a relatively uninformed decision maker.9The information provider can attempt to affect thedecision maker's behavior by sending a "signal"about the consequences of the decision maker's actions. The inferences that the decision maker is ableto draw from the content of the signal depend onprior beliefs about both the information provider'sknowledge and the information provider's incentivesfor truth telling. Since the information providers inthe insurance reform example also drafted the propositions, I proceed as though it were common knowledge that the information providers understood thecontent of the propositions and focus this review onthe relationship between an information provider'scredibility and voter inference.When either the information provider or the content of the signal is known to be perfectly credible,several scholars have argued that voters can use thecontent of a signal to make more accurate inferencesabout the personal consequences of an electoral outcome. Calvert (1985), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985,1986), and Grofman and Norrander (1990) use spatialmodels of candidate-centered elections, while I (Lupia 1992) used a spatial model of direct legislation, toidentify conditions under which the existence ofperfectly credible signals are sufficient to allow in-strategies employed by the large information providers. In the advertisements purchased by the insurance industry and trial lawyers, the identity of thesponsor was as well hidden as the law would allow.Except for the small print at the bottom of printadvertisements or the rapidly disappearing disclaimer that surfaced in broadcast media, the fact thata particular message was associated with the preferences of the insurance industry or trial lawyers wasnot mentioned. These strategies gave all of the paidadvertisements the quality that groups supporting aninitiative attempted to represent themselves, andtheir initiative, as "proconsumer," regardless of theirsource of financial support, while groups opposingan initiative represented the initiative they werecampaigning against as "anticonsumer". So, unlikeeither scientists and engineers (Kuklinski, Metlay,and May 1982) or major political parties in candidatecentered elections, the insurance industry and triallawyers did not want to be used as reference groupsby the voters-a circumstance that further complicated the voters' ability to understand the likelyeffects of five complex propositions.Shortcuts and Voter InferenceIf insurance reform voters faced complex alternatives,were too busy or disinterested to acquire encyclopedic information, and could rely on neither the pastnor partisan cues, how did they decide which propositions to vote for? To place this case study in abroader context and to motivate the empirical teststhat follow, I briefly review some research that is66
Vol. 88, No. 1American Political Science Reviewcompletely informed voters to emulate the behaviorof better or completely informed voters. In thesestudies, uninformed voters tend to find it in theirinterests to cast the same vote as the informationprovider when they know that they and the information provider have similar preferences over outcomes. The same dynamic allows relatively uninformed voters to emulate the behavior they wouldexhibit if well informed by voting against the information provider's preferred alternative when theyknow that the information provider's interests arecontrary to their own. Unfortunately, these arguments are of limited helpfulness when we attempt tounderstand voter decision making in circumstanceswhere information providers are not perfectly credible and may, in fact, have an incentive to misleadvoters.Sobel (1985) and Brady and Sniderman (1985) havepresented arguments suggesting that the existence ofa "reputation for honesty" or "likability" is sufficientto allow voters to condition their voting behavior onthe content of a signal provided by an informationprovider who is not perfectly credible. Sobel uses arepeated-play signaling model to show that if aninformation provider (who is not initially assumed tobe perfectly credible) can establish a reputation forsome consistent quality, like honesty, then badlyinformed decision makers can make more accurateinferences about the options available to them fromthe content of a signal whose truthfulness cannototherwise be easily established. Brady and Sniderman use the National Election Studies to show thatvoters in candidate-centered elections rely on theirfeelings toward information-providing groups betterto understand the relationship between their ownpreferences and those of the candidate.10In the absence of perfectly credible signals, couldinsurance reform voters have used their knowledgeor perceptions of a particular information provider'sreputation to help them understand the personalconsequences of a particular electoral outcome? Theothers like themtheories I have reviewed-andsuggest that the answer is yes, but only if voterperceptions of an information provider's preferences(i.e., the information provider's reputation for supporting certain types of policy) were correct. If correct, perceived information-provider preferences areequivalent to the information providers having aknown and informative reputation for supportingcertain types of policy. If incorrect (which is quitepossible in this case considering the insurance industry and trial-lawyer attempts to shield their identities), then perceived information-provider preferences will not be sufficient to allow badly informedvoters to overcome their lack of encyclopedic knowledge.For our purposes, it is unfortunate that evaluatingthe accuracy of insurance reform voter perceptions isquite difficult. Fortunately, we need not make thisexplicit evaluation to determine whether knowledgethough they were well informed. We can simplycompare the behavior of voters who differ only in theamount and types of information they possess. Withthis type of comparison in mind, I developed andexecuted an exit poll of insurance reform voters. In anattempt to distinguish relatively informed votersfrom those who were relatively uninformed, I designed the survey to provide individual-level measures of the amount of encyclopedic information thata respondent possessed. To determine what impact,if any, information shortcuts had on voting behavior,I also asked respondents to report their perceptionsof opinions that could have been used as shortcuts,relevant demographic questions, and their votingbehavior.My plan was to use these measures to comparethe behavior of well-informed voters, relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut, and relativelyuninformed voters who did not know that shortcut.Finding that the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut" was significantly different from the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who did not know a shortcut"would lead me to reject the hypothesis that knowingthe shortcut did not affect voting behavior. Findingthat the voting behavior of "relatively uninformedvoters who knew a shortcut" was also very similar tothe voting behavior of "relatively informed voters"would provide support for the assertion that voterswho appeared to possess low levels of encyclopedicknowledge used certain types of shortcuts to emulatethe voting behavior they would have exhibited if theywere relatively well informed. In contrast, findingthat the voting behavior of "relatively uninformedvoters who knew a shortcut" was very different fromthe voting behavior of "relatively informed voters"would suggest that knowing the shortcut was insufficient for voters to overcome their lack of encyclopedic information.of a prominent information provider's preferencesallowed otherwise uninformed voters to vote asnology, CaliforniaState University (Northridge),andPasadena City College. The pollsters received extraA SURVEY TO TEST FOR THE EFFECTSOF INFORMATIONThe survey consists of exit interviews with 339 votersin Los Angeles County. Respondents were askedhow they voted on the insurance reform propositions, socioeconomic and insurance-rate-relatedquestions, and a series of questions designed to elicitthe level of information (or confusion) that eachrespondent had on the issue of insurance reform. Theinformation questions were designed to learn notonly what respondents knew about the content of theinsurance reform debate but also to gauge respondent beliefs about information-provider preferences.The information questions used in the analysis appear in Appendix B.To execute the survey instrument, I recruited 30undergraduates from the California Institute of Tech-67
Informationand Voting BehaviorMarch 1994credit in political science and economics classes inexchange for attending two instructional sessions andadministering the poll for four hours on Election Day.Lecturers at these institutions received a day off fromlecturing in exchange for providing me with access totheir students. In effect, I received low-cost pollstersin exchange for lecturing about the results of the exitpoll in the students' classes. The entire survey wasconducted for less than three hundred dollars.In the instructional sessions, I stressed carefulexecution of the polling, as opposed to maximizingthe number of respondents. I directed the pollsters touse a randomizing mechanism to select respondentsin the hope that this would dampen any selectionbias. Specifically, I instructed pollsters to chooseevery fifth exiting voter, with counting to begin onlyafter an interview was completed. In addition, therewas no reward to a pollster for the number of surveyscompleted.The sample we obtained is neither large enoughnor diverse enough to make broad generalizationsabout insurance reform voting behavior. Fortunately,making these generalizations was not our intention.Our purpose was to contact voters with varyingamounts and kinds of information in an attempt tolearn more about the effect of different types ofinformation on voting behavior. Financial and physical limitations led me to restrict our polling universeto a ten-city a
SHORTCUTS VERSUS ENCYCLOPEDIAS: INFORMATION AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN CALIFORNIA INSURANCE REFORM ELECTIONS ARTHUR LUPIA University of California, San Diego V 70ters in mass elections are notorious for their apparent lack of information about relevant political matters. While some scholars argue that an electorate of well-informed voters is
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Encyclopedias and information literacy Organizing synthesizing 4. Organizing and synthesizing of the selected information in order to develop knowledge and solutions. Adopting - Knowing a) Discriminating between fact and opinion - Up to the 1860s most British and German encyclopedias openly revealed that the articles reflected
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