Ksc Safety Variance Re Q Ksc- 2007- 0004 - Nasa

KDP-KSC-F-3614Rev. BASICKSCSAFETYVARIANCERE QUESTNASAControlNumberKSC- 2007 -000422. Risk Matrix -Please see the attached Risk Assessments.5 X 5 Ris c MatrixVery Likely5L 18High4LIH0Moderate3L2gVer LowyEowCriticalityPrimaryRisks Insert"X" and "Y"into risk matrix1X Risk (in fu lcompliance;no vanance)1Very Low2345Low Moderate High Very HighyRisk (varianceapproved)CONSEQUENCES!23. What is the plan for ensuring future compliance or partial compliance, thereby eliminating the need forfuture variances? The planis to completethe refurbishmentactivities asquickly aspossibleandreducethe amountof exposuretopersonneland flight hardware.Working dualshifts on critical path itemswill helpinsure completionin a timely manner. USAOperationshascoordinatedin the pastand it is anticipatedthey will cooperatein the future,to performdynamicstackingoperationsonsecondandthird shifts,therebyreducingthe interruptionsto refurbishmentactivitiesandminimizing the quantityof personnelexposedto the risk.24.Commentsand/orRationalefor Disapproval:Page4 of 6Ksc-1001-0004.doc

,. .KSCKDP-KSC-F-3614Rev.BASICSAFETYVARIANCERE QUESTNASAControlNumberKSC- 2007 -0004ORGANIZATIONApproval25. InitiatorApprovalLevel(CircleSIGNATURE/DATEN/AM 1861-5461ApprovalUSK-455Integration& TestOpsMgr. ApprovalUSK-217SafetyOps MgrApprovalUSK-399861-5883FL ctureProgramMgr ApprovalUSK-277867-3625Approvaltorgr.Yes No N/AIf.l.I.LCODEUSK-730SystemEngineer 'NoOne)III' '/'." 82;vE- SystemEngineerConcurrentJ t -tY19SafetyProgramMgrConcurren5;11.1:'3S&MA Div ther(Optional)Concurren dvA- 10;;;) .t A-C'S -(' HConcurren27. Project DirectorAcceptance28. Director of S&MAConcurrenS A29. Center DirectorAcceptance/IA.3e, \J -" ,.Page5 of' (,A , \ c, @ 1 1.5II 0 7-69.r7()vl.l-1ito\8 v 1-2.-"2.':f')Us. .Ro.\KSCSafetyVarianceRequest-V AB Doors.Ksc.'2(»1.OC»Iof dO"'"

KDP-KSC-F-3614Rev. BASICKSC SAFETY VARIANCECONTINUATIONRE Q UESTNASA ControlNumberSHEETKSC-2007-000430. Additional infoffi1ation provided for Block Number 15, Item BDate November 17, 2006The following is a brief outline of the unplannedinterruptionsaffectingthe installationof the FRACO Mast Climberandreplacementof the Openingsiding:WeatherPartialDays Whole t64September40October62Total: 6541"ORerations"PartialDays Whole Days01140070303032116153303322371731. Additional infoffi1ation provided for Block NumberPage6 of 6DateKSC-t-. .d()c"J","" ""'"' ";""",,c.,,"",

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Date: 10/10/2006SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENTTitle: Vehicle Assembly Building Construction Activities Inside High Bay 1 RSRM Reduced SafetyControlled Area With The Crane ----------Description: In order to support contractual obligations for the HB1 project, USA’s contractmanagement has identified the need for allowing Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) constructiontasks to continue within the High Bay (HB) 1 reduced Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)safety controlled area with the overhead crane and RSRM static during STS-117 assembly. Analternative option would be to stack STS-117 RSRMs in HB 3 and roll the partial stack into HB 1to complete the Vehicle assembly.USA’s subcontractor Met Con will have completed High Bay (HB) 1 Horizontal and Vertical Doorrenovations and repairs by mid-November. However, there is exterior siding adjacent to theDoors that requires replacement and there is the need to dismantle the construction equipmentused in support of the siding replacement. These tasks will not be completed until after stackingof STS-117 Vehicle has commenced in HB1.Approximately twenty-six personnel are required to complete the sixty to seventy feet of uppercanopy area between top vertical door and roof, the north and south counter weight wells(including flat panel siding), and to remove the Mast Climber equipment. All 26-constructionworkers will be required to egress to and from their workstations through the safety controlledarea. Approximately ten of these workers will be in the interior of the facility located in HB1.Technically, construction personnel working the exterior siding are outside the safety controlledarea. However, these exterior personnel are exposed to the same risks as the personnel whoare working the interior of HB1.The NASA Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics, NSS 1740.12, andthe Florida Safety Operating Plan FSOP 6100, Vol. 2, have requirements that either prohibithaving non-essential personnel for the hazardous (explosive) operation in the hazardouslocation or that would prohibit contractor personnel working in any safety controlled area.To date, operational impacts to USA and NASA construction contractors have been minimizedby a limited flight schedule and through coordinated scheduling from both Shuttle Operationsand VAB renovation contractors, implementation of engineering and/ or operational controls,and risk acceptance through the safety variance process. USA FSOP 6100 variance U2006006, U2006-007 and U2006-008 are currently in place which allows contractor crew accessthrough safety controlled areas, allows contractor operations when SRB segments are staticand approximately 3 ft. from mate, and permits dual operations (i.e. hazardous operationaloperations and non-hazardous refurbishment operations in the hazardous location).This risk assessment identifies the risk and scores the risk using the SFOC Risk AssessmentScore Card. Risks will be presented to senior management and should management accept therisk, a safety variance will be required to permit limited VAB construction work in the safetycontrolled area. To date, management has only accepted the risk of contractor personnelegress through the safety-controlled area.Background: Age, weathering, minimal building maintenance and hurricane damage hasnecessitated the need for major renovation projects to restore the Vehicle Assembly Building(VAB) back to its original design requirements and operational configuration. Both NASA andUSAGO are involved in the management of these projects.1

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Date: 10/10/2006Projects in work or scheduled over the next several years include roof repairs, High Bays 1, 2,3, and 4 vertical and horizontal doors refurbishment; and replacement or refurbishment of thesiding and translucent panels. Because of the strategic importance of the VAB to operationalprocessing, it was determined that these renovation projects could only be completed in parallelwith operational processing. It was also noted in the Request For Proposals (RFP) tocontractors that construction interruptions would occur as the result of VAB processingoperations.Operationally, the VAB is the only KSC facility that can accommodate Space Shuttle Vehicleintegration. Integration of the SSV is completed in either High Bay 1 or HB 3. RSRMs, a Class1.3 explosive (mass fire), are usually present within the facility. While the RSRM quantity mayvary, the facility is sited for a maximum of 16 segments for nominal operations. However,nominal operational quantities are currently limited to 8 RSRMs because of the HB 1construction door work. This limitation will continue, as HB 3 door work will immediately followHB 1 door work completion. Additionally, with an Orbiter present, the residual NitrogenTetroxide (N2O4), Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH), and Hydrazine have an equivalency ofapproximate 450 pounds of TNT a Class 1.1 explosive. As a result, the VAB is designated apotential explosive site (PES) per the NSS1740.12.It should be noted that during the months of May through November, HB 2 is designated as“Safe Haven” for hurricane contingencies. For short periods during a hurricane, the number ofRSRMs in the VAB could increase to a maximum of 24 segments. Whenever hurricanepreparations are activated, shuttle processing operations and VAB renovation activities ceaseas the facility is prepared for hurricane protection.Shuttle Processing OperationsNominally aft booster mate to the hold down posts is completed during 2nd and 3rd shifts. Thereare occasions where shimming operations extended into 1st shift. Center and forward RSRMstacking operations start on 2nd or 3rd shift with the lifting of the segment from the transfer aisleinto a position approximately 3 ft. above SRB stack. Installation of the joint enclosure, RSRMmeasurements, and final joint preparations creates a 10 to 12 hour static period in the mateprocess. The task sequence that accomplishes final lowering from approximately 3 ft throughsoft mate takes technicians approximately 6 hours to complete. Consequently, final jointpreparations and final joint mate nominally occurs during 1st shift.Facility RenovationsContractor operations introduce their own risks into the VAB environment. These risks include(1) “hot work” operations that could result in a fire and damage the VAB, (2) contractor tasksthat introduce noise above background that could interfere with critical crane or other operationsand may result in flight hardware damage, and (3) particulate contamination.Currently there are approximately 180 contractor personnel participating in Vehicle AssemblyBuilding door and roof renovation projects. However, for this assessment only the 26 personnelidentified in the description are under consideration to be allowed access to and egress throughthe HB 1 safety controlled area.2

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Date: 10/10/2006Risk Categories: Table 1 – Operational Risks Incurred If VAB Renovation Contractors Allowed to Work In HB1 During STS StackingTable 2 – Stack RSRMs in HB3, Roll Around To HB 1 (Option)Risk Causes:See table matricesConsequences:See table matricesLikelihood of Occurrence:See table matricesMitigation Options:See table matricesImpact to HRs/CILs/Safety Requirements: Safety variance required to (1) NASA GeneralSafety Program Requirements NPR 8713.3A, para. 3.11.1 and para 3.11.2, (2) NASA SafetyStandard for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics, NSS 1740.12, para. 201a, and (3) USAFlorida Safety Operating Plan (FSOP) 6100, Vol. II, appendix Q Operation 8,3

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Date: 10/10/2006ASSESSMENT MATRIXTable 1Operational Risks Incurred If VABRenovation Contractors Allowed toWork In HB1 During STS Stacking:ConsequencesCatA. Inadvertent RSRM ignition caused byfailure of the overhead crane during finalRSRM mate operations could result inthe loss of life of non-essential VABrenovation contractor personnel.B. Inadvertent RSRM ignition caused byfriction of the segment tang being matedagainst loose propellant in the SRB clevisjoint during final mate could result in theloss of life of non-essential VABrenovation contractor personnel.C. Loud noise(s) created by renovationwork and equipment while modifying theVAB structure interferes with critical tasksthat could result in significant damage tocritical elements or cause a less than 7day slip in SSP 15Safety3Schedule2934Mitigation6 Crane designFunctional check of Crane for each flowScheduled crane maintenanceCrane operations are static whenconstruction personnel are in the safetycontrolled area Construction personnel performing HB1renovations will not be permitted insideHB1 nor allowed to work the exteriorsiding during dynamic crane operations Secondary badge board will be used tocontrol construction personnel inside thereduced controlled area Tang and clevis of RSRMs are cleanedand inspected numerous times prior tojoint mate, including final inspection justprior to the final mate sequence. Loud noise tasks are not permittedduring critical operational tasks Scheduling meetings are used tominimize conflicting tasks Renovation tasks are closed down if thegenerated noise interferes withprocessing tasks

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Table 1Operational Risks Incurred If VABRenovation Contractors Allowed toWork In HB1 During STS Stacking:Date: 10/10/2006ConsequencesCatD. Fires caused by renovation taskscould result in significant damage to acritical facility (VAB)E. Contractors working in counterweightwells are struck by counterweightsduring VAB Vertical Door operationsresulting in permanent disability or deathF. Contractor violates safety clear area,which could result in personnel injury or aminor operational slip.G. Siding panels and/or otherconstruction materials impact flighthardware causing significant damage tocritical ety3Schedule12Safety33621Schedule5Mitigation33 Hot work is not expected for exteriorsiding Hot work Mast Climber (haunch)disassembly operations will becompleted after Vehicle is moved to Pad If hot work required Hot work permits Fire watch Fire alarms clear the entire VAB Dual (USA and Metcon) Lockout Tagoutprocedure utilized Scheduling meetings Contractor safety briefings Control areas identified by safety signsand barriers Security escort observation in place Vertical and horizontal doors will beclosed during all construction tasks(alternate venting configuration will beused) Counterweight “wells” provide“containment” and protect flighthardware during interior work Tethering policy enforced

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Table 1Operational Risks Incurred If VABRenovation Contractors Allowed toWork In HB1 During STS Stacking:Date: 10/10/2006ConsequencesCatH. Contractor operations generateparticulate contamination, which couldcontaminate RSRM joints or the LO2/LH2 ET connection resulting in damageto flight hardware and/or greater than a7-day slip in an SSP milestone.I. Falling debris from Mast ClimberBridge causes significant damage toflight hardware during Safety3Schedule3331J. Rainwater intrusion through buildingopenings (removed siding) contaminatesincomplete RSRM stack resulting in aschedule delay of greater than 30 days.Safety10564 Contractor corrosion control uses“vacuum” control at point of operation Installed RSRM joint enclosures protectfield joint during final mate tasks RSRM field joint inspections prior to softfinal mate Projected completion of all HB1Construction activities prior to ET mate ET contamination barriers protectionduring ET mate Mast Climber Bridge scheduled to beremoved prior to rollout If bridge in place, pre-cleaning/FODwalk down by MetCon and USApersonnel will be conducted32ScheduleMitigation8 Minimize opening sizesMonitor weatherTemporary siding coverings as requiredRSRM joint protection enclosure

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Date: 10/10/2006Table 2Stack RSRMs in HB3, RollAround To HB 1 (Alternative)ConsequencesCatA. VLD Work Platform (Toaster)relocation cannot be completed due tooperational interruptions (i.e. potentialcrane failure, fit, interferences, etc.)resulting in greater than 7-day slips inan SSP milestone, recovery costbetween 1M – 5M and a temporaryloss in production.LikelihoodRiskScoreMitigationScore VLD Work Platform is scheduled forSchedule362Cost36Supportability487relocation during a period whenoperational interruptions has leastimpact on shuttle processingschedule

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Date: 10/10/2006Conclusion: Age, weathering, minimal building maintenance and hurricane damage hascaused NASA to seek and award contractual bids for VAB renovations. It has been estimatedthat a minimum of seven years are required to complete all the renovations currently identifiedfor the facility. Because these renovations are required to preserve the functionally of thefacility, NASA made the decision to integrate and work the renovations in parallel with theoperational environment of the Shuttle program, even though the facility is classified as anexplosive site.VAB safety requirements have a direct impact on VAB construction contractors and the tasksthey perform. These impacts range from complete construction shut down during RSRMsegment lift/softmate operations to daily exposure to explosives (RSRM propellant and ResidualHypergolic fluids) in a designated ordnance facility.To date, a limited flight schedule, coordinated scheduling efforts between Shuttle Operationsand VAB renovation contractors, implementation of engineering and/ or operational controls,and risk acceptance by senior management has minimized impacts to USA and NASAconstruction contractors.Three variances U2006-006, U2006-007, and U2006-008 authorize USA and NASA VABconstruction contractor personnel access through safety controlled areas established for RSRMfinal mate preparations, when SRB segments are static and approximately 3 ft. from mate.Construction variances also permit dual operations.Processing a variance to NPR 8713A, NSS 1740.12, and FSOP 6100 authorizing approximatelyten construction personnel into a safety control area located in an active processing High Bayand authorizing and additional 13 construction workers egress to and from their workstationsthrough the safety controlled area is contingent upon senior USA and NASA managementaccepting the risks presented in this assessment.VAB construction personnel performing renovations and repairs to the HB 1 exterior siding areexposed to the same inadvertent RSRM ignition risks as the personnel inside the VAB interiorareas.SFOC Risk Matrix (Safety)Likelihood5LegendHigh4Medium31C, 1D2Low1F1J1A, 1B,1E1G, 1H,1I11234Consequence85

Control Number: 5451-06-RA-029Date: 10/10/20

to a rope to support installation. The Siding is also tied down onto the FRACO Mast Climber while being moved to it's installation location. While Flight Hardware is in HB-1, no work on the siding will be performed while the VLDs are open. For the two scenarios, noise generation will be limited so as not to interrupt flight hardware processing.