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AIR WAR COLLEGERESEARCH REPORT%%THENOF THE E-AEFALKLANDS WJAR: A REVIEWIAND ANTISUBMARINEAIRPOWER, SUBMARINEWARFARE OPERATIONSLOKKINSP USNCOMMANDER CRAIG J.DTICSFEB 0619908IED VCR PUBUICUJNIVERSIT1Y FORCEAIRUNITED STATES AIRBASE.,ALABAMAMAXWELL AIR FORCEaSE1ShBUK!4M1I
AIR WAR COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITYTHE FALKLANDS WAR: A REVIEW OF THE SEA-BASEDAIRPOWER, SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SUBMARINEWARFARE OPERATIONSbyCraig J. LokkinsCommander, USNA DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTYINFULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUMREQUIREMENTAdvisor:Captain Ralph J. Castor, USNMAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMAMay 198990 022
DISCLAIMERof the author andThis study represents the viewsdoes not necessarily reflect the rtheAirisDepartment ofForcethethe Air Force.Regulationpropertyopinions of niversityAlabama36112-5564[205] 293-7223 or AUTOVON 875-7223).iiobtained
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYTITLE:TheFalklandsA Review ofWar:theSea-basedAirpower, Submarine, and Anti-Submarine Warfare OperationsAUTHOR:Craig J. Lokkins, Commander, USN. Remarks on sea-based airpower, submarine, and antisubmarine warfare operations in the Falklands War of 1982.A review of the lessons learned regarding these operationsasinterpreted by the navies of the United States, GreatBritain, and the Soviet Union.Commentary by the authorwith respect to these lessons learned and implications forthe naval planner.Accesiot ForNTISCRA&IDTICTABU,.anno; iced-0USJustificationSDistribution IAvailability CodesDistiiiAvail and lorSpecr'a
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHCommander Craig J. LokkinsSanDiego)isananti-submarine(M.B.A., University ofwarfarepilotwhohasserved in both the LAMPS MK I (SH-2F) and LAMPS MK III (SH60B) communities.He has also served in the Air Departmentof an Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH).timestheHe has deployed fiveto the Western Pacific and most recently served inArabianGulfCommander LokkinsduringisEarnestWillconvoy operations.a graduate of the Air War College,class of 1989.iv
TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGECHAPTERDISCLAIMER .iiiEXECUTIVE SUMMARYivBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHIIIINTRODUCTION1SEA-BASED AIRPOWER4BackgroundBritish Sea-Based Air OperationsLessons LearnedCommentaryIIIIVii45610SUBMARINES AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFAREBackgroundBritish Submarine OperationsArgentine Submarine Operations13131415British Anti-Subiarine OperationsArgentine Anti-Submarine OperationsLessons LearnedCommentary16171719CONCLUSION23LIST OF REFERENCES25GLOSSARY27v
CHAPTER IINTRODUCTIONOn April 2, 1982, Argentine Marines landed on theFalkland Islandsin the South Atlantic.Seized on behalfof Argentina who renamed them the Malvinas, the British andArgentines had disagreed over the island's sovereignty tGreatBritainrespond with military force.forcesontheeffortsfeltOn June 14,Falklandstosurrenderedsolvethecompelledto1982, ntary, analysis, and lessons hformed the basis forconflict and antanalysis"bypublic opinion regardingForemost in this categorywere "popular" lessons learned regarding naval odexpeditingoccupiedtheArgentine redindiplomaticsolution.asmallforce,theirthethey could negotiate from a stronghadcarefullyexecutedanoperationwhose rules of engagement demanded no loss of British lifeand minimum property damage, they felt until very late that
ty of upgrading the Port Stanley airfield was- notseriously considered.As events showed, this strategy countedcontrolofatheislands,planned a four-phase naval strategy as follows:1.diplomaticthey(1:39)Enforce a 200-mile maritime exclusion zonewith submarines until the arrival of surface n for the landing.3.Establish a beachhead, support the troopsashore and protect them from air attacks.4.Support the land war and protectthe sealines of communication (SLOC).The warfollowedthesephases,buttheBritish did notachieve all the planned results.It is an important war for naval planners to studyfor many reasons, including the following: (2:23)--itsaw the firstcombat use of nuclear poweredattack submarines and vertical/short take-off and landing(V/STOL) aircraft.2
--it wasthefirsttimesince World WarIIthatnaval forces were subjected to sustained air ps of a major navy for the first time.--itwasaconflict betweentwo Western nationsusing Western equipment.Althoughthisconflictproduced numerousvaluablelessons for naval planners, this study will focus on two ofthe most important areas, sea-based airpower and submarineand anti-submarine warfare (ASW).oftheconflictregardingtheseBy reviewing the lessonsoperations,for today's naval planner will be presented.3implications
CHAPTER IISEA-BASED e the British carriers playedof theintheWithout the air assets the carriers bingofArgentinaincludedthefollowingitself, etc.).TheBritishtaskforcecarriers: (3:346)Aircraft Deployedat Beginning of ConflictNameDisplacementHermes28,700 tons12 Sea Harriers, 18 Sea KingsInvincible19,810 tons8 Sea Harriers, 15 Sea KingsThe Argentine carrier, Veinticinco De Mayo, did notparticipate in operations againstthe British task force.It did, however, provide air cover for Argentina's invasionof the Falklands.4
British Sea-based Air lklandsfirstwereusedonApriltaking placebothsupport (CAS) al1982,withMay 1, 1982.defenseandSeacloseairSea Harriers in the air defense rolewere equipped with two AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles and two30mm Aden cannons.These missions lasted 90 minutes, whichallowed only 20 minutes of actual on-station R-3aircraft, primarily ground support assets, deployed onboardH'rnies.Eventually, a total of 28 Sea Harriers and 14 RAFHarriers wereHarriersdeployedtoflew over 1100theSouth Atlantic.TheSeaair defense missions and 90 CASsorties, while the RAF Harriers flew in excess of 125 CASsorties. (2:27)Sea Harriers performed well in the air defense rolewith 20 confirmed and three probable kills, of which 16 -9LArgentineoflimitedTen Harriers were destroyed, four to enemyfivetooperationalsurface-to-air missile.lackedtoAirborneEarlyaccidents, and one(4:19)Warning5toaBecause thetask(AEW) assets,low-
flyingenemy aircraftprudentrjrtheweredifficultcarrierstoto detectoperatewellmaking iteastoftheFalklands, limiting the patrol time of the Sea Harriers.Poorbudgets ofAEWGreatcapabilitywasBritain incarriers were intendedthearesultof1960s andtheaustere1970s.Theseto be used as ASW platforms in theNATO environment, not as power projection vehicles.In theNATO scenario they would rely on land-based or US carrierbased AEW assets for needed warning information.Lessons tethat18 months,ifArgentinahadthe British wouldhave had no available sea-based airpower.HMS Invinciblehad already been sold to Australia in February 1982 and HMSHermes was due for retirement in 1983. vernmentavailableFollowing theannouncedforthat,deploymentat"twoshortTo ensure this, a third carrier will be maintainedin refit or reserve and we shall not proceed with the saleof HMS Invincible."(4:33)This British policy turnaroundcertainly highlights the advantages derived from dthefitting of Searchwater AEW radars to Sea King helicopterstoprovideamoderateHarriers with greaterAEWcapabilityendurance.6andimprovedThese upgradesSeatogether
represent ovideBritishforasea-basedmoreviableforward presence without US or NATO assistance.TheUSexperienceforce evedthattheirinsistenceoncarrierhostile air attack.thefirmlytheBritishmaintainingalarge carriers and their very capable lockE-2HawkeyeearlyAEWwarningofThese same aircraft could then controlF-14Tomcatfighterof attacking planes.aircraftAs oneforearlyUS analyst wrote,"it is highly probable that if it had been our fleet in theSouthAtlantic,closer thanhitnoFalklandshadincarrierswaygaveimportance ofhavegottenProbably not a singlenotIntoUnionintheoneship would havesea-based encesthetotheaircraftnotingto warfare atsea.Recognizing7oftoevaluationsSoviets notseemed nevitablequestion obsolesence"carriers,scored, andwould(6:895)Attitudescarriersaircraft50 miles to our ships.would have beenbeen sunk."TheArgentinewhetherthe(7:5)tohavethe limitations ofa matteroftimebefore
al fixed-wing aircraft.War,FalklandsTheSoviet interestperformancetoseemedhowever,revivein V/STOL carriers due to British lity and basing flexibility of the Harriers werewidelypraisedaircraft,bythethe YAK-36Soviets(7:10)Forger, wasThe Soviet V/STOLclearlyinferiortotheBritish Harrier, however, lacking equivalentsto the learlymaneuverability,AIM-9LSoviet improvement in V/STOL es a three-to-one advantage in fighter-bombers overthe British.totheBut because of the proximity of the ly a strong argument in favor of sea-based airpower.(9:145)These comments regarding V/STOL aircraft, however,didnotreducenaval strongbeliefinland-basedThe Soviets were impressed with the ndismayedatKapitanets"thethethetasklevel ct8BritishoneBalticother
essential factor of naval wa'rfare--the need for mbatantswith deck-based multi-mission flying craft, as well as forindependent actions against enemy combatants at sea and aft carriers for air superiority only when owerhistorical lack of need to project power overseas.Much has been written about the superiority of theincombatair-to-airHarrier inThethe Falklands War.number of kills scored by the Harriers is impressive.storyTheof the actual air combat is most enlightening.Two factors assured Harrier victories against theAir-to-air missile differences were the AIM-9Bs,firstgeneration weapons suitable only for attack from the rear.TheBritish aircraftthey were(9:148)could makeeven head on attacks asthe much moreequipped withadvanced AIM-9Ls.A Falklands War historian asserts that, "in everycase in which a [British] Sidewinder locked on, the enemyaircraftwasdestroyed."(3:207)travelBritish task force.secondfactorthe distance each Argentineassuring British success wasaircraft had toThefrom its land base to attack theBecause of their critical fuel states,Argentine pilots did not seek aerial combat. One observer9
noted that,there were never dogfights in the conventional ation, of which so much was made during speculation in the press about air combat, was never relevant.There was merely a struggle between the interceptingHarrier with its superb acceleration, and the enemytwisting and dodging to escape . If the enemy usedhisafterburner to increasehisspeed, he merelyprovided a brighter target for the homing missile andensured his own collapse from lack of fuel before hereached home.Air combat, from beginning to end, wasan entirely one-sided affair, the enemy's inability todogfight perhaps flattering the performance of the SeaHarrier a little. ontation was unique to the Falklands War and is not agoodpredictor of futurebattle.Asonerespecteddefense analyst observed.V/STOL fighter capability was proven.Without itBritain could not have fought the battle, as both sidesacknowledge.And yetthis does not mean thatconventional sea-based airpoweris tobe ruled out if itcan be afforded. V/STOL proved that with a minimum ofcash, sea-based airpower canbe projected effectively,and maintained in a fluid front line. (11:155)CommentaryAll wars are different.onefeature,notlikelytoYet, the Falklands War hadbeduplicatedinfutureconflicts, that played a decisive role in this conflict-the distanceAsAdmiralthat separated the Falklands from Argentina.Stansfieldbeen 100 miles closerlikely have won;Turnerobserved,"had theislandsto Argentina, Argentina would veryor had they been 100 miles further away10
from Argentina, Britain would not haveit did in powerNavalcarefully evaluatesuffered the lossesthewasplannersaandveryscenariocritics need toFalklands campaign before making adecision in the small versus large carrier controversy.TheBritishandcarriersneverobtainedwere fortunate indeed to be ableairsupremacyto remain in attack-freeoperating areas protected by their distance from Argentina.V/STOL carriers are certainly a welcome addition toany fleet, but not as air superiority and power projectionplatforms.V/STOIcarriersareamphibious assault ships such eparedfieldsthatconventionalalways beandthemakeenvironment.enables V/STOL aircrafthowever,asUS Navy LHD, LHA, and LPHAmphibiousinideal,requirementV/STOLaircraftBut until technologyto have performance the ships of choice for those navies requiring amaritime power projection rceeraWithlevelofStateswiththeaircraftof 15continuedhascontinuedcarriers.carriers mitedtroubling, however, in thisnavalthe introduction of theitsmodernizationandgrowth.SV-22 Osprey V/STOL aircraft11
into the fleet in the 1990s, it would be advantageous toreestablish a class of ASW escort carriers (CVS) with SV-22and SH-60 ASW aircraft embarked.These relatively low-cost(in comparison with CVNs) ships would be extremely usefulin a sea control environment and could provide the largercarriers additional protection against the Soviet nuclearsubmarine threat.12
CHAPTER IIISUBMARINES AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFAREBackgroundIn the Falklands conflict, submarines were though not representative of a US versus Soviet ubmarineand anti-submarine warfare.Participants from the Royal Navy included:SubmarineName (4:37)TypeCharacteristics (13:546-548)TorpedoTubesSpeedConquerorNuclear Attack (SSN)6-21 Inch28 KtsCourageousNuclear Attack (SSN)6-21 Inch28 KtsSpartanNuclear Attack (SSN)5-21 Inch30 KtsSplendidNuclear Attack (SSN)5-21 Inch30 KtsValiantNuclear Attack (SSN)6-21 Inch28 KtsOnyxDiesel-Electric Attack (SS)8-21 Inch17 KtsParticipants from the Argentine Navy included:SubmarineName (2:61)Characteristics (13:9)TorpedoTubesSpeedTypeSante FeDiesel-Electric ATK (SS)10-21 Inch15 KtsSan LuisDiesel-Electric ATK (SS)8-21 Inch22 KtsTheArgentinessubmarines, onesimilar toownedofthe SanwhichtwowasLuis, butadditionalanotherneitheroperations during the conflict. (2:63)13diesel-electricGerman-type209was availablefor
British Submarine OperationsBritishThreeand HMSSplendid,HMSSpartan,European waters between MarchThey had quickly loadedathigh sustained30 and April 4, 1982.to thefromdeployedConqueror)stores and weapons,speeds(HMSsubmarinesattacknuclear(4:7)then proceededFalklands area, a regionapproximately 8,000 miles from Britain.On April ands using the attack substhis edict.anyOn April 23,threateningapproachdealt with appropriately.reinforcement ofthearoundnow on station to enforcethe British further warned thatbyArgentineforceswouldbeThe blockade effectively stoppedArgentinegarrisons by sea,asonlyone resupply ship arrived after the blockade was announced.(4:8)Most(lessof the water of the blockade area bmarinesshallowthetothethepoorquality of Argentine ASW forces.un May 2, tineforcethe mostplace.twoTheescortof thearmeddecisiveArgentinedestroyersFalklands bywith14submarine eventcruiserwereGenerallocatedHMS Conqueror.Exocet225Thissurface-to-surface
With themissiles was considered a threat by the British.approvalof higher authority, HMS Conqueror attacked thecruiser successfully with two MK-8 pre-World War II designtorpedos.After the attack, Conqueror easily evaded theArgentine destroyers.hadcontactonThere is no evidence that they thetonevercoast(aspermitted by the British total exclusion zone of May 7) forthe remainder of the war. (14:121)Britishsubmarinesalsoservedasplatforms against Argentine air ngsubmarinesprovidedusefulinformation about Argentine air operations to the Britishtask force.informationAlthough inefficient, this operation s. (4:9)Argentine Submarine ishoperationsthat tookworthyof study bynavalplanners.The Argentine submarine Sante Fe evaded detectionby HMS Conqueror in the South Georgia area.It remainedundetected until it surfaced at the main port of Grytvihen.15
It was discovered and attacked by British helicopters armedwithAS-12badlywire-guided aftertheTheboat'swatertight integrity was destroyed. al rnoftheGerman-builtIt made a patrol of 36 days ndforoperatedseveralinthedays.TheArgentines claim they fired torpedos at the British carrierInvincible,butwereunsuccessfulbecauseof faulty mainand backup torpedo fire control panels. (2:61-63)British Anti-Submarine OperationsThemissionBritishconsistsnavy hemanyveryprimarily an ASWTheASWlimitedopentasksurfaceArgentinemuch concern for the British.every ASW weaponinthetaskNATO'sforceshipsinfleet whosesealinesoftheFalklandsand helicopters.submarinethreatcausedDespite expending virtuallyforce,theBritishwereunable to destroy the San Luis which operated in their areafor several days.Argentine(1:40)submarinewasAs discussed earlier, the otherdestroyedonthesurface,afterhaving gone undetected by the British submarine Conqueror.NoinformationonpossibleASWsubmarines was found.16operationsbyBritish
Argentine tethattheArgentines attempted any ASW operations after the Belgranoincident.3ASWThe lone Argentine carrier did carry S-2 and SH-aircraft,participatebased ASWinbuttheaspreviouslywar.Nooperations usingmentionedinformationdidregardingnotland-these aircraft was discovered.The Argentine submarine on patrol concentrated on anti-taskforce operations.Lessons LearnedAnalysts were united in their unabashed enthusiasmforthevalueoftheFalklands ulubiquitousmeasurenorOfficial US Navy comments noted that itsattack submarine force could operate in a similar manner viet navaltoASWleaders also gthepreeminencesubmarines in offensive naval :92)The Sovietsalso observed that submarines allowed the British to sustain17
to the west of the Falklands wherean effective romArgentine air attacks. (16:18)Analystswerelessunifiedconventional submarine operations.intheiropinionofThe British governmentdid not discuss in their official account of the conflicttheroleofconventionaltheirsubmarine,HMS Onyx.ASoviet article, however, stated that HMS Onyx was part ofthe British surface force ASW screen (16:18), arriving inthe Falklands area May 28. (3:399)thethreatstatingtroopcaused bythat"thetransportthesubmarineon patrol,of a British aircraft carrier orlosstoArgentineThe US Navy recognizedattacksubmarinemightwellhavecurtailed the entire British effort." ish tersely commented that, "the operations highlightedthe difficulty of conducting ASW in shallow water." (4:23)The US Navy felt that the British ASW activities may e"water conditions in the Falklands area were very poor yadvantagesViking fixed-wing ASW aircraft"statesofthatUS navalcarrier-basedS-3and "large numbers of UScruisers, destroyers, and frigates with high-powered activesonars and towed, passive accoustic arrays which would havebeen more effective in the Falklands environment."18(2:36)
"the British expended ASWThe US Navy also commented ll observerswereandcoordinatedpoorlythat Argentine ASW operationsagreeinthe U.S.withconjunctionAn"all the years of UNITASArgentine analyst commented that,exerciseineffective.completelyLatin America had been for nought."thoseNavy nes.Fast, difficult to detect, and deployable for long cereports,ASWbeensuccess,dominatedbutthebynuclear submarines in this conflict had they been availablethefiring panel ofIn reality, had the torpedoto ntheresults of the war may have been significantly leASWsystemsloseitscarriers or major troop sthesubmarineNavy19threattoits
fleet.In fact, however, the British ASW assets availableduringthe conflict were not significantly different fromthose the US would utilize in similarly restricted whetherinrestrictedwatersprosecution of the targetsuccess.ornot,activethe greatest chance ofYet in its lessons learned, the US Navy curiouslymentions the fectiveinboththeseof S-3 Viking aircraft and towedprimarilypassivesystems,circumstances. Nuclearsubmarinesdepend on passive methods of conducting llyinasbeingalsoYet, waters such as those in the vicinity of the Falklands.TheUS Navy also mentioned active sonar prosecution by icthreat, the Sea King ASW helicopter with its high-poweredactive dipping sonar, has proven itself over many years tobe the ASW platform of choice.fleet hadand15wouldfar moreon HMSanomaly detectionisineffectiveSea Kings availableInvinciblea US fleet.Interestingly, the British(3:346)versus6(18on USAdditionally,on HMS Hermescarriers)thethanmagnetic(MAD) system used by all US ASW aircraftagainstnon-magnetic20hullsofsubmarines
such as the German-type 209.thatBritishtheyencounteredASW(4:10)It seems, therefore,capability le to thatof the US fleet in that scenario.Superior US passive tagainst nuclear submarines, would not have been critical inthe Falklands War.The US fleet would have faced less threatsubmarinethreat,operating area.however,becauseofitsfrom theextendedThe longer range US carrier aircraft wouldhave enabled the US carriers to have much more freedom ditionalsubmarines'areawouldlocationandtargeting ned of the major navies.This is no doubt a and British osubmarines may makeundercertaintheinandthe US,is important, however, todiesel-electricrestricted waters.circumstancessubmarinesnuclear uietnesscomparedthe conventional submarinegreatestthreat.The USNavy remains opposed to conventional submarines for its ownmissions, butstatesthat,"this would not be21the case if
itwellwere not esel-electricare availabletocarry out those responsibilities. (2:8)The submarine has been and remains a great threat.Admiral Gorshkov observed that in World War II there were25 allied ships and 100 aircraft involved in ASW operationsfor each submarine at sea. submarine warfarethisimbalancestill
CHAPTER IVCONCLUSIONThere were many usefulFalklands campaign.lessons to learn from theForemost was the confirmation of thedecisive role of naval power, which allowed military forceto be brought to an unanticipated remote battlefield.ForGreat Britain, the quintessential seapower, ecentforpolitical and economic ased airpower to surface navy and amphibious operations.The ability of Great Britain to deploy their small force alklands ssets,a limited warwasunabletoobtain air supremacy, the British suffered serious losses,includingthesinking of fourwarships.FortheUnitedStates, this experience indicates its investment in largeaircraftcarriers is warranted.unheededbytheSovietnavyThis lesson is not goingeither,asitcontinuestobuild more capable aircraft carriers of its own.The roleexercisedforsurprisingly,of the submarine in maritime battle wasthethefirstBritishtimesincenucleardominated the Argentine surface navy.23WorldWarsubmarinesII.NotcompletelyNot as widely known,
ntine diesel-electric submarine to confound the antisubmarinewarfareeffortsoftherestricted waters of the Falklands.number of shipsBritishnavyintheIt appears that theand aircraft necessary to prosecute evenone submarine is unacceptably high, a serious implicationfor naval strategists.The warFormostfamiliarreaffirmedfamiliarproduced dywarfare,knew.thewarand much herent flexibility of maritime power and the folly of t.24maritime
LIST OF REFERENCESTrain, Admiral Harry D.1.Malvinas Islands Campaign."Winter 1988, pp. 33-50.2.United States Navy.Lessons of the Falklands.February 1983."An Analysis of the Falkland/Naval War College Review,Office of Program Appraisal.Summary Report.Washington,3.Hastings, Max, and Jenkins, Simon. The Battle for theFalklands. New York, NY.:W.W. Norton and Company, 1982.4.Secretary of StateCampaign:The Lessons.Office, 1982.for Defence (UK).The FalklandsLondon: Her Majesty's Stationary5.Record, Jeffery."The FalklandsQuarterly, Autumn 1982, pp. 43-51.War."6.Housman, Damian."Lessons of Naval Warfare."Review, July 23, 1982, pp. 894-896.WashingtonNational7.Petersen, Charles C. "Aircraft Carrier Development inSoviet Naval Theory." Naval War College Review, JanuaryFebruary 1984, pp. 4-13.8.Nutwell, Commander Robert M."Postscript:TheFalklands War."U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January1983, pp. 82-83.9.Bruner, Major Ralph M."Soviet Military Science andthe Falklands Conflict."U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,December 1985,pp. 142-148.10.Papworth, Lieutenant
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