Prudential Equity Group, LLC Research HOME EQUITY LOAN BUBBLE?

4m ago
13 Views
1 Downloads
1.14 MB
16 Pages
Last View : 4d ago
Last Download : 1m ago
Upload by : Arnav Humphrey
Transcription

Prudential Equity Group, LLCR e s e a r c hMay 24, 2004TopicalStudy#67All important disclosures can befound beginning on page 13.Dr. Edward Yardeni(212) 778-2646ed yardeni@prusec.comHOME EQUITY LOANBUBBLE?

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRESEARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?I. HELs As FWMDWarren Buffet, a.k.a. the “Sage of Omaha,” has famously warned that derivatives are financialweapons of mass destruction (FWMD):Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength—for thesake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try to be alert to anysort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensiveabout the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massiveamount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view,however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangersthat, while now latent, are potentially lethal.1On the other hand, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has extolled the virtues of derivatives. Theseinnovations have allowed lenders to use the capital markets to reduce their exposure tofinancial risk (see Appendix). I’m not sure who is right, but I lean towards the Sage rather thanthe Chairman.Instead of joining the debate, I would like to start one of my own. Could it be that home equityloans (HELs) are potentially a much more dangerous FWMD, and are more likely to detonatethan some of the other ticking time bombs in the financial markets? In my opinion, as they arebecoming more popular, they are helping to power the economic expansion. However, if homeequity loans continue to grow rapidly, they could reach enough critical mass in a few years toset off a dangerous financial chain reaction. In other words, they are currently like a nuclearpower plant. In the future, they could be more like a nuclear bomb.I still recall that, not too long ago, even during the 1980s, most people who purchased a homedid so with a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. They put up 20% of their own money as a downpayment and borrowed the remaining 80%. The down payment was the first payment for thehouse. The remaining installment payments were to pay the financing cost and the remainingprincipal. In other words, the intention was to pay down the mortgage loan over a 30-yearperiod. At the end of that period, the home would be fully owned, just in time for retirement.Admittedly, this is a bit of a caricature. Somewhere I recall seeing survey data that Americansmove, on average, every five years. During the 1980s and 1990s, fewer and fewer Americansexpected to remain in the same house for 30 years. So increasingly they opted for shorterduration mortgages, which became increasingly available.During the past three years, most households that still had a fixed-rate mortgage refinancedseveral times as mortgage rates plunged. Many also cashed out some of the appreciation in thevalue of their home by increasing the amount of their mortgage (Figure A). Over the past threeyears, I remained optimistic on the outlook for consumer spending largely because of the1Mr. Buffet is the Chairman and CEO and Charles T. Munger is the Vice Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Thequotation is from its 2002 Annual Report, available online at .2

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRESEARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?refinancing windfalls and the cash-outs. Yet I also questioned whether the cash-outs were allspent. I believed that much of the cash-outs were actually parked in low-yielding savingsdeposits as the preference for liquidity soared, especially among upper-income workers in theshaky technology and financial industries.Figure A: Excerpt From Fed’s Article On Consumer Finance Survey*Although home purchase remains the main purpose of home-secured debt, the incentive touse such borrowing for other purposes has been higher since the Tax Reform Act of 1986,which phased out the deductibility of interest payments on most debt other than that securedby a primary residence. In addition, declining mortgage interest rates since 1998 providedmany families the incentive to refinance existing mortgages. By refinancing for more than theexisting balance, many families were able to obtain funds for other purposes.The survey provides some evidence of such borrowing. Families that refinanced a mainmortgage were asked whether additional funds were obtained, and if so, how the funds wereused; families that carried a second mortgage, home equity loan, or home equity line of creditwere asked the purpose of the borrowing. Families that simply chose to take out larger initialmortgages to free up funds to spend for other purchases would not be captured by thesequestions. However, among families with any type of home-secured debt, the available datasuggest that the proportion who used such borrowing for a purpose other than just financingtheir home declined in the period after 1998. In that year, the proportion of families with suchborrowing was 33.6 percent, and in 2001 the figure was 32.1 percent; however, the 2001 levelis substantially above the 1995 level of 22.2 percent.Home equity lines of credit are a widely advertised source of tax-preferred borrowing. Amonghomeowners, the proportion of families with a home equity line edged up 0.4 percentagepoint, to 14.9 percent in 2001; the proportion actually drawing on such lines rose 0.7percentage point, to 10.6 percent.* The article, “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey ofConsumer Finances,” from the January 2003 issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, is availableonline at ull0103.pdf.Source: Federal Reserve Board.Now that mortgage rates are rising again, refinancing activity is falling, and so are cash-outs.Nevertheless, Americans are still tapping their home equity. They are doing it with HELs andundoubtedly spending the proceeds. Home equity loans outstanding at all U.S. commercialbanks soared to a record 324 billion in early May, up 36% from a year ago. They are thefastest-growing asset class in commercial bank balance sheets.A home equity loan is really money borrowed from a line of credit secured by the value of thehome. Typically, the borrower pays the prime rate. The rate is usually lower when more isborrowed, according to the terms set by the lender. It can be an alternative to a mortgage or asupplemental source of credit. In other words, the actual aggregate line of credit undoubtedlyexceeds the amount of HELs outstanding. I wouldn’t be surprised if the sum of all the lines is3

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRESEARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?twice or even three times as large as total HELs, i.e., 649 billion to 973 billion in early May(Figure 2). By comparison, the total of mortgages held by all commercial banks was 2.4trillion in early May. Anyway you slice it or dice it, banks already have a very large exposure toHELs borrowing, and the exposure appears to be heading higher fast.II. Good News. Bad News.For now, the surge in home equity loans is providing extra spending money for homeowners.Over the past year, these loans are up 36%, or 86 billion (Figures 3 and 4). By comparisonconsumer credit is up 99 billion over the past 12 months through March. Together, consumercredit and home equity loans are up 178 billion over the past year (Figures 4 and 5).Together, they totaled 2,330 billion during March, or 27% of disposable personal income.This is historically high, and somewhat worrisome. On the other hand, the ratio of savingsdeposits plus retail money market funds to disposable personal income is also historically highat 47.3%. Consumers have the equivalent of almost a half year of income in “mattress money”(Figure 6).The close correlation between the Refinancing Index compiled weekly by the Mortgage BankersAssociation and the three-month annualized change in savings deposits supports my view that asignificant portion of cash-outs during mortgage refinancing may have been saved as theliquidity preference has increased in recent years because of job insecurity as well as theturmoil in financial markets and the geopolitical arena (Figure 7). Unlike cash-outs, proceedsfrom home equity loans are undoubtedly completely spent on goods and services.I will be monitoring HELs very closely. I suspect that more and more Americans may use themto finance a lifestyle they may be unable to support on their incomes alone. Tapping homeequity to buy new furniture or to fill up the gasoline tank could set the stage for major financialtrouble down the road. On the other hand, it is possible that some borrowers may be using themoney to remodel a kitchen or add a bathroom. Such activities would add back to the value ofthe home and homeowners’ equity.The Federal Reserve publishes quarterly data on the value of residential real estate andmortgage loans outstanding, including home equity loans. During the fourth quarter of lastyear, our homes were valued at 15.2 trillion. We had 6.8 trillion in mortgages and 8.4trillion in owners’ equity in household real estate. In other words, the banks own 45% of ourhomes and we own the remaining 55%, which is the lowest percentage on record and wellbelow the 70% readings of 20 years ago (Figure 8).It is possible to calculate a sort of P/E ratio for household real estate by dividing the Fed’s dataon the market value of houses by disposable personal income. This ratio soared to a recordhigh of 1.8 at the end of last year (Figure 9). On a trend basis, real estate values have beenrising faster than incomes since the mid-1970s. Should we be worried? Falling interest ratestend to raise the stock market’s P/E. The same is true for real estate. Lower mortgage rates4

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRESEARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?mean that for any given income, people can afford to pay more for a house. Home mortgages asa percent of disposable personal income soared to a record 82% at the end of last year (Figure10). While there may be no bubble yet in home prices, I do worry that there may be a bubble inthe financing of homes and in the increasing use of home equity as a source of credit.III. SeductiveEarlier this year, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan assessed the financial position of the householdsector and concluded that all is well:In evaluating household debt burdens, one must remember that debt-to-incomeratios have been rising for at least a half century. With household assets rising aswell, the ratio of net worth to income is currently somewhat higher than its long-runaverage. So long as financial intermediation continues to expand, both householddebt and assets are likely to rise faster than income. Without an examination of whatis happening to both assets and liabilities, it is difficult to ascertain the true burden ofdebt service. Overall, the household sector seems to be in good shape, and much ofthe apparent increase in the household sector’s debt ratios over the past decadereflects factors that do not suggest increasing household financial stress. And, in fact,2during the past two years, debt service ratios have been stable.I generally agree, and the data generally support the Fed chairman’s optimism (Figure 11). Fornow, the extra cash is boosting consumer confidence and spending, and the overall economy(Figure 12). The problem is that home equity lines of credit are seductive. In most cases, themore you borrow the lower the interest rate. If you can’t make the payment this month, thebank will take what is due from the credit line. If more households tap more of their homeequity—effectively turning their home into a credit card—then I can foresee that such adevelopment could seriously exacerbate the next economic downturn.***2Excerpt from the Fed chairman’s speech, “Understanding household debt obligations,” at the Credit UnionNational Association 2004 Governmental Affairs Conference in Washington, D.C., on February 23, 2004. The fulltranscript is available online at 004/20040223/default.htm.5

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRESEARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Appendix: Excerpt From Alan Greenspan’s Speech On Derivatives*Financial derivatives, more generally, have grown at a phenomenal pace over the past fifteenyears. Conceptual advances in pricing options and other complex financial products, along withimprovements in computer and telecommunications technologies, have significantly loweredthe costs of, and expanded the opportunities for, hedging risks that were not readily deflectedin earlier decades. Moreover, the counterparty credit risk associated with the use of derivativeinstruments has been mitigated by legally enforceable netting and through the growing use ofcollateral agreements. These increasingly complex financial instruments have been especialcontributors, particularly over the past couple of stressful years, to the development of a farmore flexible, efficient, and resilient financial system than existed just a quarter-century ago.Greater resilience has been evident in many segments of the financial markets. One prominentexample is the response of financial markets to a burgeoning and then deflating telecom sector.Worldwide borrowing by telecom firms in all currencies amounted to more than the equivalentof a trillion U.S. dollars during the years 1998 to 2001. The financing of the massive expansionof fiber-optic networks and heavy investments in third-generation mobile-phone licenses byEuropean firms strained debt markets.At the time, the financing of these investments was widely seen as prudent because the telecomborrowers had very high valuations in equity markets that could facilitate a stock issuance, ifneeded, to take down bank loans and other debt. In the event, of course, prices of telecomstocks collapsed, and many firms went bankrupt. In decades past, such a sequence would havebeen a recipe for creating severe distress in the wider financial system. However, a significantamount of exposure to telecom debt had been laid off through instruments that mitigate creditrisk, such as credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and credit-linked notes.Taken together, these instruments appear to have significantly reduced telecom loanconcentrations and the associated stress on banks and other financial institutions.More generally, such instruments appear to have effectively spread losses from defaults byEnron, Global Crossing, Railtrack, WorldCom, and Swissair in recent months from financialinstitutions with largely short-term leverage to insurance firms, pension funds, or others withdiffuse long-term liabilities or no liabilities at all. In particular, the still relatively small butrapidly growing market in credit derivatives has to date functioned well, with payoutsproceeding smoothly for the most part. Obviously, this market is still too new to have beentested in a widespread down-cycle for credit. But so far, so good.* The Fed chairman’s speech, “World Finance and Risk Management,” was delivered onSeptember 25, 2002. The full transcript is available /2002/200209253/default.htm.Source: The Federal Reserve Board.6

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRE S E ARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Home Equity LoansFigure 1.HOME EQUITY LOANS320 (billion dollars, sa)340Home equity loans aresoaring. They shouldcontinue to do so ashomeowners use themto tap their homeequity, especially nowthat higher mortgagerates are depressingrefinancing 220200200At All Commercial ardeni1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 200520Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.Figure 2.HOME EQUITY LOANS2400 (billion dollars, sa)2600The actual lines ofcredit could be two tothree times biggerthan the outstandinghome equity loans.Maybe even At All Commercial Banks1600140014001200120010008006005/12Home Equity Loans * 1Home Equity Loans * 2Home Equity Loans * 360040020001000800400200Yardeni1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.724000

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRE S E ARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Home Equity Loans4540HELs are the fastestgrowing bank asset.Figure 3.COMMERCIAL BANKS(yearly percent change)45405/1235303530Home Equity Loans2525All Assets2020151510105/125500-5-5-10Yardeni1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005-10Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.200180Consumers areborrowing almost asmuch with HELs aswith consumer credit.Figure 4.CONSUMER CREDIT & HOME EQUITY LOANS(12-month change, billion dollars)180160160140140120100Consumer CreditHome Equity Loans120Mar5/12801008060604040202000-20Yardeni1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.8200-20

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRE S E ARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Consumer Credit & LiquidityFigure 5.CONSUMER CREDIT PLUS HOME EQUITY LOANS*200 (12-month change, billion dollars)220180Over the past 12months, consumersborrowed 178 billionusing consumer creditand home 806060404020200-200Yardeni84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06-20* Home equity loans data start in June 1987.Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.50Sweet and Soar:Consumer credit plusHELs are at a recordhigh relative toincome, but liquidassets are equivalentto almost a half-year’sincome.Figure 6.MEASURES OF CONSUMER LIQUIDITY(as a percent of disposable personal income)50Mar4545404035Saving Deposits PlusRetail Money Market Mutual Funds353030Mar25Consumer CreditPlus Home Equity Loans25201520Yardeni84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.915

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRE S E ARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Home Mortgages650Figure 7.SAVINGS DEPOSITS & REFINANCING ACTIVITY8000Apr550There seems to besome correlationbetween refinancingactivity and savingsdeposits inflows.4503507000Savings Deposits(3-month change, billion dollars, saar)6000Refinancing Index(13-week moving average, March 16, 1990 deni1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 20050Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Mortgage Bankers Association.During the fourthquarter of 2003,household real estatewas worth 15.2trillion, with equity of 8.4 trillion andmortgage debt of 6.8trillion. Owners’ equityincreased to 55.1%during the fourthquarter from 54.4%during the thirdquarter.987654321075Figure 8.REAL ESTATE(trillion dollars, not seasonally adjusted)Owners’ Equity in Household Real EstateHome Mortgages*987654321075OWNERS’ EQUITY AS A PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLD REAL ESTATE707065656060Q45550Yardeni60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06* Includes home equity loans and second mortgages.Source: Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts.10Q45550

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRE S E ARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Home Mortgages2.6Figure 9.MARKET VALUE OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSEHOLD REAL ESTATEQ42.4Real estate valueshave risen faster thandisposable incomeover the past twodecades as mortgagerates fell.2.22.6As a ratio of disposable personal incomeexcluding personal current transfer paymentsand other labor income2.42.22.02.0Q41.81.81.61.61.41.4As a ratio ofdisposable personal income1.21.01.2Yardeni58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 061.0Source: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau ofEconomic Analysis.1.2Figure 10.HOME MORTGAGES OUTSTANDING*Q41.1The ratio of homemortgages todisposable income isat a record high.1.21.01.0.9.9Q4.8.7As a ratio of disposable personal incomeexcluding personal current transfer paymentsand other labor income.8.7.6.6.5.5.4.4As a ratio of disposable personal income.3Yardeni58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06* Includes home equity loans and second mortgages.Source: Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau ofEconomic Analysis.111.1.3

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRE S E ARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Household Debt Service2019The household debtservice ratio is high,but seeminglymanageable.18Figure 11.HOUSEHOLD DEBT SERVICE AND FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS(as a percent of disposable personal income)Household Financial Obligation*2019Q418171716161515141413Household Debt Service**Q4131212111110Yardeni80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 0610* Also includes auto lease payments, rental payments on tenant-occupied property, homeowners’ insurance,and property tax payments.** Estimated required payments on outstanding mortgage and consumer debt.Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.150Consumers are feelingbetter about theirfinancial position.Figure 12.CURRENT FINANCIAL POSITION COMPARED TO A YEAR tter Minus Worse Plus 100Yardeni50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08* Quarterly data prior to 1978, three-month moving average since 1978.Source: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.128070

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRESEARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?Important DisclosuresRating Distribution05/21/04Overweight(Buy)*Neutral Weight(Hold)*Underweight(Sell)*Prudential Equity Group, LLCResearch UniverseConsolidatedInvestment Banking Clients34.00%1.00%44.00%2.00%22.00%1.00%Excludes Closed End al 3.00%21.00%Investment Banking 0%Investment Banking 0%Investment Banking Clients2.00%3.00%1.00%Excludes Closed End Funds12/31/03Overweight(Buy)*Neutral xcludes Closed End Funds09/30/03Overweight(Buy)*Neutral Weight(Hold)*Underweight(Sell)*Excludes Closed End Funds* In accordance with applicable rules and regulations, we note above parenthetically that our stock ratings of “Overweight,” “Neutral Weight,” and “Underweight” mostclosely correspond with the more traditional ratings of “Buy,” “Hold,” and “Sell,” respectively; however, please note that their meanings are not the same. (See thedefinitions below.) We believe that an investor’s decision to buy or sell a security should always take into account, among other things, the investor’s particularinvestment objectives and experience, risk tolerance, and financial circumstances. Rather than being based on an expected deviation from a given benchmark (as buy,hold, and sell recommendations often are), our stock ratings are determined on a relative basis (see the, as defined below).When we assign an Overweight rating, we mean that we expect that the stock's total return will exceed the average total return of all of the stocks covered by theanalyst (or analyst team). Our investment time frame is 12-18 months except as otherwise specified by the analyst in the report.When we assign a Neutral Weight rating, we mean that we expect that the stock's total return will be in line with the average total return of all of the stocks covered bythe analyst (or analyst team). Our investment time frame is 12-18 months except as otherwise specified by the analyst in the report.When we assign an Underweight rating, we mean that we expect that the stock's total return will be below the average total return of all of the stocks covered by theanalyst (or analyst team). Our investment time frame is 12-18 months except as otherwise specified by the analyst in the report.Prior to September 8, 2003, our ratings were Buy, Hold, and Sell. A Buy rating meant that we believed that a stock of average or below-average risk offered the potentialfor total return of 15% or more over the following 12 to 18 months. For higher-risk stocks, we may have required a higher potential return to assign a Buy rating. Whenwe reiterated a Buy rating, we were stating our belief that our price target was achievable over the following 12 to 18 months. A Sell rating meant that we believed that astock of average or above-average risk had the potential to decline 15% or more over the next 12 to 18 months. For lower risk stocks, a lower potential decline may havebeen sufficient to warrant a Sell rating. When we reiterated a Sell rating, we were stating our belief that our price target was achievable over the following 12 to 18months. A Hold rating signified our belief that a stock did not present sufficient upside or downside potential to warrant a Buy or a Sell rating, either because we viewedthe stock as fairly valued or because we believed that there was too much uncertainty with regard to key variables for us to rate the stock a Buy or a Sell.When we assign an industry rating of FavorableFavorable, we mean that generally industry fundamentals/stock prospects are improving.When we assign an industry rating of NeutralNeutral, we mean that generally industry fundamentals/stock prospects are stable.When we assign an industry rating of UnfavorableUnfavorable, we mean that generally industry fundamentals/stock prospects are deteriorating.13

Prudential Equity Group, LLCRESEARCHHome Equity Loan Bubble?To view charts associated with the stocks mentioned in this report, please visit http://cm1.prusec.com. In addition, the applicablethdisclosures can be obtained by writing to: Prudential Equity Group, LLC, One New York Plaza – 17 floor, New York, NY 10292 Attention:Equity Research.The research analyst, a member of the team, or a member of the research analyst’s household does not have a financial interest in any of the stocks mentioned in thisreportThe research analyst or a member of the team does not have a material conflict of interest relative to any stock mentioned in this report.The research analyst has not received compensation that is based upon (among other factors) the firm’s investment banking revenues as it related to any stockmentioned in this report.The research analyst, a member of the team, or a member of the household does not serve as an officer, a director, or an advisory board member of any stock mentionedin this report.The methods used to determine the price target generally are based on future earning estimates, product performance expectations, cash flow methodology, historicaland/or relative valuation multiples. The risks associated with achieving the price target generally include customer spending, industry competition and overall marketconditions.Additional risk factors as they pertain to the analyst's specific investment thesis can be found within the note/report.Prudential Equity Group, LLC has no knowledge of any material conflict of interest involving the companies mentioned in this report and our firm.Any analyst principally responsible for the analysis of any security or issuer included in this report certifies that the views expressed accurately reflect such researchanalyst's personal views about subject securities or issuers and certifies that no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to thespecific recommendation or views contained in the research report.When recommending the purchase or sale of a security, Prudential Equity Group, LLC is subject to a conflict of interest because should such advice be followed, andresult in a transaction being executed through Prudential Equity Group, LLC, Prudential Equity Group, LLC stands to earn a brokerage compensation on the transaction.In addition, any order placed with Prudential Equity Group, LLC may be executed on either agency basis resulting in a commission payment to Prudential Equity Group,LLC or on a principal basis, versus Prudential Equity Group, LLC’s proprietary account, resulting in a mark-up or mark-down by Prudential Equity Group, LLC.Any OTC-traded securities or non-U.S. companies mentioned in this report may not be cleared for sale in all jurisdictions.Securities products and services are offered through Prudential Equity Group, LLC, a Prudential Financial company.24-0406 Prudential Equity Group, LLC, 2004, all rights reserved. One New York Plaza, New York, NY 10292Prudential Financial is a service mark of The Prudential Insurance Company of America, Newark, NJ, and its affiliates.Information contained herein is based on data obtained from recognized statistical services, issuer reports or communications, or other sources, believed to be reliable.Any statements nonfactual in nature constitute only current opinions, which are subject to change.There are risks inherent in international investments, which may make such investments unsuitable for certain clients. These include, for example, economic, political,currency exchange rate fluctuations, and limited availability of information on international securities. Prudential Equity Group, LLC, its affiliates, and its subsidiariesmake no representation that the companies which issue securities which are the subject of their research reports are in compliance with certain informational reportingrequirements imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Sales of securities covered by this report may be made only in those jurisdictions where the security isqualified for sale. The contents of this publication have been approved for distribution by Prudential-Bache International Limited, which is authorized

undoubtedly spending the proceeds. Home equity loans outstanding at all U.S. commercial banks soared to a record 324 billion in early May, up 36% from a year ago. They are the fastest-growing asset class in commercial bank balance sheets. A home equity loan is really money borrowed from a line of credit secured by the value of the home.

Related Documents:

Prudential Inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) Final Report On 28 August 2017, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA} announced it would establish a Prudential Inquiry into the CBA. This followed a number of incidents in recent years that have damaged the reputation and public standing of the CBA group.

A Prudential Financial Company 751 Broad Street, Newark, NJ 07102-3777 PRUDENTIAL PREMIER INVESTMENT VARIABLE ANNUITYSM (“B SERIES”) PRUDENTIAL PREMIER INVESTMENT VARIABLE ANNUITYSM (“C SERIES”) Flexi

Part I – KM1 4 Part I: Key prudential ratios, overview of risk management and RWA Template KM1: Key prudential ratios Purpose: To provide an overview of an AI’s key prudential ratios. Scope of application: The template is mandatory for all AIs incorporated in Hong Kong. Content: Key prudential ratios related to reg

Callan Periodic Table of Investment Returns Returns Ranked in Order of Performance (as of June 30, 2019) Equity Cap Large-9.11% Equity Cap Large-11.89% Equity Cap Large-22.10% Equity Cap Large 28.68% Equity Cap Large 10.88% Equity Cap Large 4.91% Equity Cap Large 15.79% Equity Cap Large

Prudential BlackRock Aquila (50:50) Global Equity Index fund (series 4) The investment strategy of the fund is to purchase units in the BlackRock Aquila (50:50) Global Equity Index Fund. This fund invests primarily in equities, both in the UK and overseas markets. The fund has approximately 50% invested in the shares of UK companies. The .

All contiguous periods from 1996 to 2015 show a private equity PME 1 except for 2006 to 2015 Kaplan: " Phalippou's definition of private equity is too broad" Phalippou's private equity universe includes real assets, real estate, infrastructure and energy. When private equity is defined just as buyout, growth equity and venture capital

BRONZE Citi Publicis OneTeam Citi & No Kid Hungry: Dine & Do Good SOCIAL MEDIA NON PAID CORPORATE IMAGE GOLD Prudential In-House Prudential Veterans Social Media SILVER Prudential In-House Everyday Bravery BRONZE Lincoln Financial Group GMR Marketing @LincolnFinatic B2B GOLD PwC US In-House #AuditorProud

56. Winn-Dixie Logistics, LLC 57. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC 58. Winn-Dixie Montgomery Leasing, LLC 59. Winn-Dixie Properties, LLC 60. Winn-Dixie Raleigh Leasing, LLC 61. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, LLC 62. Winn-Dixie Stores Leasing, LLC 63. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. 64. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc. 65. Winn-Dixie Warehouse Leasing, LLC

1207 kennedy st. nw llc 1208 meigs place ne llc 1209 u street llc 121 53rd st se dc l.l.c. 121 associates limited partnership 121 hawaii ave, llc 121 strategies & government relations ltd 1210 18th place ne llc 1210 shepherd st nw llc 1211 18th pl ne llc 1212 connecticut associates limited partnership 1215 kenilworth avenue llc 1215 penn street .

Prudential plc Peer average. 1. 0.50% 0.75% 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 1.75% 2.00% 2001 2002 2003 Prudential plc Peer average. 1 Source: FSA returns - Form 9 and Form 41 (expenses/assets) Note: 1 Peer average includes Aviva, Friends Provident, Legal & General, Scottish Widows and Standard Life

Prudential Premier Investment Launched April 2014 3Q14 YTD Sales: 59 million MetLife and AIG Launched November 2014 0 2,500 5,000 7,500 10,000 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14 Jun-14 Sep-14 Jackson AXA Prudential Lincoln Jefferson Jefferson National Monument Adv

Prudential Annuities Distributors, Inc., Pruco Life Insurance Company of New Jersey and Pruco Life Insurance Company Prudential Premier Retirement Variable Annuity and Prudential Premier Retirement Variable Annuity NY 15.00 25.00 3.0 million Transamerica Capital, Inc.

Are you still employed by Prudential or its affiliates? Yes No PRUDENTIAL EMPLOYEE SAVINGS PLAN (PESP) Ed. 10/2021 Important information and signatures required on the following pages Instructions Request for Disbursement About You Please print using blue or black ink. Keep a copy for your records and send completed form to either of the following:

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”). 2. Plaintiff asserts his claims against the Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”), the Prudential Employee Savings Plan Administrative Committee

Jennison Mid-Cap Growth Fund, Inc. Exact name of registrant as specified in charter Gateway Center 3, 100 Mulberry Street, Newark, New Jersey 07102 . JennisonDryden, Jennison, Prudential Financial and the Rock Prudential logo are registered service marks of The Prudential Insurance Company of America, Newark, NJ, and its affiliates. .

Jennison Mid-Cap Growth Fund, Inc. (f/k/a Jennison U.S. Emerging Growth Fund, Inc.) Address of principal executive offices: Gateway Center 3, . JennisonDryden, Jennison, Prudential Financial and the Rock Prudential logo are registered service marks of The Prudential Insurance Company of America, Newark, NJ, and its affiliates. .

financing for your Home Equity/Home Equity Line of Credit loan. This application will help you provide the information necessary to process your financial statement for your Home Equity/Home Equity Line of Credit loan request. If you are not able to provide all of the reques

BASF SE Public Equity 5,750 Keyence Corp Public Equity 5,741 Exelon Corp Public Equity 5,689 Leidos Holdings Inc Public Equity 5,684 Thomson Reuters Corp Public Equity 5,662 CGI Inc Public Equity 5,628 UEP Investment Holdings as of March 31, 2021 1

American Equity Growth Fiera U.S. Equity Fund, Series A 2.39% 0.06% Long-term capital growth Low Volatility American Equity (TDAM) American Equity Value TD U.S. Low Volatility Fund, Investor Series 0% 2.23%4 Better risk-ajusted total return than the Index U.S. Small-Mid Cap Equity (AGF) US Small/Mid Cap Equity Growth AGF U.S. Small-Mid Cap Fund .

PRINCIPLES OF COUNSELLING HANDOUT Introduction Counseling is a process, as well as a relationship, between persons. Contrary to what some people believe, counseling is not concentrated advice-giving. The aim of the counselor is usually to assist the person or persons (client or clients) to realize a change in behavior or attitude, or to seek achievement of goals. Often there are varieties of .