Syndications And Loan Sales May - Bostonfed

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oan syndications have become an increasingly important part ofthe financial landscape. A syndicate is a group of banks making aloan jointly to a single borrower. Several factors are responsiblefor the desire to share a large loan among several lenders, chief amongthem the banks’ need to achieve diversification in their loan portfolios.Limitations on interstate banking closely link the fortunes of small andmid-sized banks to those of their local and regional economies. Participating in syndicated loans can give these banks a chance to lend toborrowers in regions and industries to which they might otherwise haveno convenient access.Capital constraints also promote loan syndications. Banks that findthemselves with capital-asset ratios below or close to regulatory minimums may not want to increase assets by adding large loans to theirbalance sheets and may choose, instead, to share them with other banksby syndicating them. Furthermore, banks are limited in the size of theloan they can make to any one borrower. Typically, a bank may not lendto any one borrower an amount in excess of 15 percent of its capital.Participating in a syndicated loan thus allows a small bank to make aloan to a large borrower it could not otherwise make.While considerations of capital and diversification encourage thedevelopment of syndications, they may pose an increased risk for thebanking system. Lead banks in syndications are responsible for providing credit information and loan documentation to participating banks.To the extent that lead banks may behave opportunistically and withhold unfavorable information from participating banks, the latter maybe misled into making loans that are riskier than they had thought.This article provides empirical tests to determine the relative importance of the various factors that play a role in bank syndications. Despitea significant number of problem credits among the syndicated loansstudied, it finds little evidence of opportunistic behavior by the leadbanks in syndications. At the same time, it finds substantial support forLKaterina SimonsEconomist, Federal Reserve Bank ofBoston. The author thanks ClaireDesjardins, Richard Kopcke, RichardRandall, and Eric Rosengren for helpful com nents. Michael Jud providedvaluable research assistance.

the importance of bank regulation, in the form ofcapital requirements and lending limits, to the existence of the loan syndication market.Section I of the article describes the practice ofsyndication and distinguishes it from other forms ofsecondary intermediation, such as assignments andparticipations. Section II discusses loan classificationsby examiners, used here to measure the quality ofsyndicated loans, and describes the new data set, theShared National Credit Program, that provided theinformation. Section III reports the empirical tests ofthe reasons for syndication. The last section discussesimplications of the findings.L Syndications and Loan SalesWhen a syndication is undertaken, one bank,known as the lead bank, acts as syndicate manager,recruiting a sufficient number of other banks to makethe loan, negotiating details of the agreement, andpreparing documentation. The manager/lead bankhandles disbursements and repayments and is responsible for disseminating the borrower’s financialstatements to the syndicate members. The manager/lead bank is paid a fee by the borrower for theseservices. Sometimes, the manager hires one or moreother banks as co-managers who share in the fee inreturn for helping with the manager’s duties.Loan syndications must be distinguished fromloan sales, where a single bank makes the loan andsubsequently sells portions of it to other banks. Loansales are of two types: "participations" and "assignments." A participation creates a new contract between the original lender and the loan buyer. Thecontract between the borrower and the originallender remains unchanged. The borrower may noteven be aware that the loan has been sold. Anassignment, on the other hand, creates a new financial obligation between the borrower and the loanpurchaser, which replaces the contract between theborrower and the original lender. In contrast to bothtypes of loan sales, a loan syndication creates acontract from the beginning between the borrowerand each syndicate member.Loan syndications and sales are by no meansmutually exclusive ways to accomplish a financing.After a syndication is completed, syndicate memberscan sell assignments or participations in their sharesin the secondary market. While legal and contractualdifferences exist between syndications and loan sales,their economic function is similar. In all cases, the46 Januany/February 1993bank acts as an intermediary between the borrowerand the institution that ultimately holds the loan onits books.Syndications and loan sales add an extra step tosimple financial intermediation and represent whatmay be termed "secondary intermediation" betweenthe borrower and other financial institutions. Whyhas this process evolved? Penacchi (1988) suggestsone reason might be avoidance of the effective regulatory tax arising from capital and reserve requirements. This explanation applies when the sellingbank carries a higher regulatory burden in the form ofcapital requirements than the buying institution.While this is undoubtedly true in some cases, muchof the secondary intermediation takes place amongbanks facing similar regulatory requirements.In general, secondary intermediation allowsbanks to reduce their exposure to any one borrowerand to reduce undesirable concentration. By allowingthe bank to serve more borrowers, secondary intermediation provides the bank greater geographic andindustry diversification. Some of this diversificationmay be necessary to comply with government regulations. In particular, syndications and loan salesmake it possible for a small bank to participate in aloan to a large borrower, which may otherwise nothave been possible because of legislatively mandatedlending limits.While secondary intermediation can have undeniable benefits, it may also result in additional risk forSyndications and loan sales maybe termed "secondaryintermediation’" between theborrower and other financialinstitutions.participating banks. In theory, syndicators and sellershave a legal obligation to make all relevant information about the borrower available to buyers andsyndicate participants. Failure to do so constitutes abreach of fiduciary duty that is actionable in court.Moreover, syndicate members and loan buyers areexpected to perform their own analysis and creditevaluation rather than rely solely on representationsmade by syndicators and sellers. In practice, howNew England Economic Review

ever, buyers rely on the loan documentation provided by sellers to conduct their credit evaluation.This leaves open the possibility that buyers are notfully informed and are sold loans of inferior quality orare not adequately compensated through interest andfees for the risks they are taking. This potential riskfor the buyer, resulting from opportunistic behaviorby the seller, may be present in different degreesamong the various forms of secondary intermediation, such as syndications, participations, or assignments, because of the varying amount of contractual"distance" they put between the borrower and theultimate holder of the loan. This distance is thesmallest for syndications, where a separate contractexists at the outset between the borrower and eachsyndicate member, making syndications the formleast susceptible to abuse. Assignments occupy anintermediate position because a contract does existbetween the buyer and the borrower, though it is notcreated at the time the loan is underwritten. Finally,participations are the most susceptible to abuse because the buyer must rely exclusively on the sellingbank for information, monitoring, and enforcementof the loan covenants.One mechanism that could protect buyers ofparticipations and assignments is recourse, that is, acontractual obligation by the seller to buy back theloan at face value if it fails to meet certain standards ofperformance. However, for banks to be able to takethe loans they sell off their balance sheets, regulatorsrequire that the loans be sold without recourse. If aloan is sold with recourse, the sale is considered aborrowing for regulatory purposes. The bank mustthen retain the loan on its balance sheet and reservecapital against it, thus defeating the major purpose ofthe sale. For this reason, most loans are sold withoutrecourse. Nevertheless, it is possible that some sort ofimplied unofficial recourse takes place in the market,anyway. A bank that sells a loan that subsequentlydefaults may take it back to preserve its reputationand the good will of the buyer, even if it has nocontractual obligation to do so. The evidence for theexistence of this practice is mostly anecdotal, and itsvery nature makes it difficult to ascertain its frequency and importance in protecting buyers.This article focuses on loan syndications ratherthan participations or assignments because data onthe quality of individual loans sold are not available.In contrast, data exist on the supervisory ratings ofsyndicated loans, and on the shares retained by agentbanks. These data make it possible to compare theway lead banks syndicate high-quality and low-qualJanuary/February 1993ity loans. Specifically, it can be determined if leadbanks keep a smaller portion of low-quality loans forthemselves, letting other banks pick up a largerportion. In addition, the importance of lending limitsand capital constraints can be tested by examiningrelationships between the size of the syndicated loan,the amount the lead bank keeps for itself, and thelead bank’s capital.IL The DataThe Shared National Credit Program is jointlyadministered by the three federal regulatory agencies-the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "and the Office of the Comptrollerof the Currency--with the participation of state banking regulators. This program was established to ensure efficient and consistent supervision of largemulti-creditor loans. Before the program was implemented five years ago, portions of the same syndicated loan could be examined by different agencies indifferent banks, resulting in an unnecessary duplication of effort. In addition, because evaluations ofcredit quality inevitably involve an element of subjectivity, multiple examinations could also result in thesame loan being given different classifications atdifferent banks. In contrast, under the Shared National Credit Program, each syndicated loan is examined at least once a year at the lead bank (with anadditional follow-up examination if the loan is atroubled one), and all the syndicate members thenreceive the same classification for the loan. Becauseexaminer classifications of individual loans are confidential, this study reports only aggregate results.Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the1991 Shared National Credit data set analyzed in thisstudy. The data set contains 4,332 credits (whichTable 1Descriptive Statistics of Syndicated Loans,1991Number of LoansNumber of BorrowersAverage Size of LoanAverage Share Kept by AgentLargest Share Kept by AgentSmallest Share Kept by Agent4,3323,601 131,434,00034.6%98.8%0%Source: Shared National Credit Program.New England Economic Review 47

includes unused portions of credit lines, as well asloans), extended.to 3,601 borrowers. The average sizeof the credit is 131 million. On average, the agentbank retains on its books a little over one-third ofeach credit it syndicates, though the agent’s sharevaries from zero to 99 percent.Loan Classification and Credit Qualil yDuring bank examinations, examiners classifyloans into five categories, according to their creditquality. Loans that are deemed to present no creditproblems are called "Pass." The rest are problem or"Criticized" loans. They are classified into four categories: "Specially Mentioned," "Substandard,""Doubtful," and "Loss." Specially Mentioned loanshave only a small potential weakness, and Substandard and Doubtful have an increasing possibility ofsustaining a loss for the bank, while Loss loans areconsidered uncollectible.This study uses these examiner loan classifications as a proxy for the riskiness of loans. Thisapproach is open to criticism on the grounds that loanclassification is an ex post measure of credit qualityrather than an ex ante measure of risk, that is, itreflects outcomes rather than risks as they wereperceived at the time the loans were made. While it isundoubtedly true that a bank would not make a loanin the certain knowledge that it would be criticized byexaminers, using ex ante measures of risk would failto capture the asymmetry of information between thelead bank and the other syndicate members that mayexist despite the legal obligation to share all information. Such ex ante measures of risk as are available toa researcher, for instance, financial ratios and bondratings of the borrower, are also known to the syndicate members, and so cannot reflect the possibledisadvantage of syndicate participants. Thus, in order to reflect the fact that lead banks may haveprivate information unavailable to other market participants, loan quality, an ex post measure, is used asa proxy for ex ante credit risk.Table 2 presents aggregate results for the loanclassifications in the data set. The overall creditquality appears to be rather poor, with criticizedloans reaching nearly 28 percent of the total numberof loans in the sample and constituting 18 percent ofthe total loan value. The credit quality in the programappears to have worsened in the last few years;criticized loans constituted 19 percent of the totalnumber of loans in 1990 and only 12 percent in 1989.(The percentage of criticized loans by value was notavailable for the preceding years.) This deteriorationcould be the result of several factors, among themproblems with leveraged buyout loans and commercial real estate loans caused by the economic downturn. In addition, worsening of credit quality in theprogram may be due in part to the expansion of itsscope to include the U.S. branches of foreign bankswhich, according to an examiner familiar with theprogram, have somewhat lower underwriting standards than the U.S. banks.Possible opportunistic behavior by syndicatorswould be indicated if syndicated loans were of worsecredit quality than single-lender loans. Unfortunately, the data do not permit such a comparisonbecause single-lender loans are not examined asfrequently as syndicated loans. Moreover, the examined loans are usually not a random sample, butrather are confined to industries or sectors of the loanTable 2Credit Quality of Syndicated Loans, 1991Loan ClassificationPassCriticizedSpecially of TotalPercent ofTotal Value72.3927.617.9615.793.79.07Value( ,863100.0081.8418.167.298.802.06.01Source: Shared National Credit Program.48 January/February 1993New England Economic Review

portfolio of particular concern to examiners.1Instead of comparing syndicated loans to singlelender loans, a comparison can be made of thepercentages kept by the lead banks in syndications ofloans of varying quality. As Table 3 shows, leadbanks in syndications do not foist a larger share ofinferior quality loans on participating banks. On thecontrary, the proportion retained by the agent bankactually increases with the severity of credit problems. In fact, the largest proportion retained (47percent) was of "Loss" loans. However, since theentire sample contained only three "Loss" loans, thisobservation qualifies, at best, as a casual empiricism.Several factors could explain syndicators’ apparent reluctance to part with inferior loans. First, theseloans may look less attractive to participants evenbefore they have been criticized by examiners. Consequently, the lead banks could have difficulty convincing other banks to participate in these deals andbe forced to retain a greater share on their own booksfor the syndications to go through. Second, the leadbanks’ concern with maintaining their reputations inthe marketplace may lead them not only to avoidabuses but to promote risky loans even less aggressively than safe loans.IIL Empirical AnalysisWhile Table 3 shows a relationship between loanquality and the share of the loan retained by the leadbank, this relationship should be viewed in thecontext of other factors influencing the behavior oflead banks in syndications. This section provides amore systematic analysis of these factors. In particular, it investigates the effect of the lending limit asmeasured by the loan-to-capital ratio and the effect ofcapital requirements as measured by the capital-toasset ratio. The regressions described below employtwo alternative dependent variables. The first is theShare of the syndicated loan retained by the lead bankfor its own portfolio. The second variable is the ratioof the amount of the loan retained by the lead bank tothe lead bank’s capital. While less simple and intuitively appealing, it may be a better measure of thelead bank’s exposure to a particular borrower becauseit takes account of the bank’s capital. Clearly, for alead bank with a given capital, a 10 percent share of abillion dollar loan represents a larger commitmentthan a 90 percent share of a million dollar loan.If lead banks behave opportunistically, we wouldexpect loan quality to be positively related to the leadJanuand/Februand 1993Table 3Loan Quality of Syndicated Loans andAverage Share Retained by Agent, 1991Loan ClassificationPassSpecially MentionedSubstandardDoubtfulLossSource: Shared National Credit Program.Average ShareHeld by Agent(Percent)17.418.029.430.547.3bank’s exposure to the loan as measured by thedependent variables described above. Since the fiveloan quality categories--Pass, Specially Mentioned,Substandard, Doubtful and Loss--are qualitativeconcepts, they must first be converted into a formusable in regressions. The simplest way to do this isto create a binary variable that takes a value of 1 for"good" loans and a value of 0 for all problem loans.However, this method ignores the degrees of severityof credit problems that are conveyed by the differentratings. To capture this information in the regressionsthe qualitative ratings were converted to numericalequivalents. These equivalents are based on the classified asset weights used by bank examiners to estimate a bank’s asset quality ratio. These loss estimatesare as follows: "Substandard"--20 percent, "Doubtful"--50 percent, and "Loss"--100 percent. Accordingly, the variable "Quality" was assigned the following values: 1, if the loan is classified as "Pass," 0.8 ifit is "Substandard," 0.5 if it is "Doubtful" and 0 if itis "Loss." No commonly used loss estimate is available for "Specially Mentioned," so these loans were1 To get a rough idea of relative creditworthiness of syndicatedversus single-lender loans, this study compared criticized loanswith nonperforming loans, that is, loans that are non-accruing orare 90 days or more past due. At the same time, the nonperformingratio for business loans only (a group more comparable to syndicated loans) was 6 percent. This is substantially less than the 18percent of criticized loans for the syndicated loans. Even if oneexcludes the least impaired category and considers only loans withmore serious problems, those classified substandard or worse,these loans still constitute almost 11 percent of the total, as can beseen from Table 2. This comparison is problematic, however,because while all nonperforming loans will be criticized, thereverse is not true---many criticized loans will be still performing,thus biasing the comparison against syndicated loans.New England Economic Review 49

somewhat arbitrarily assigned the value of 0.9 (corresponding to a 10 percent loss) in order to distinguish them from the "Pass" loans.2 To test therobustness of the proxy, regressions were run forboth the binary and the weighted classification variables. In addition to the quality variable, the regressions included an additional proxy for risk. Thatproxy was whether or not the purpose of the loanwas construction or commercial real estate, sincethese are generally considered to have been theriskiest of loan categories in the past several years.This variable took the value of 1 if the loan was forconstruction or commercial real estate, and 0 otherwise.Two independent variables measure the leadbank’s capital constraints. The first is the capital-toasset ratio. Regulators expect banks to maintain minimum capital-to-asset ratios, and most banks operatewith capital ratios above the minimums. A bank thatfinds itself constrained in its capital-to-asset ratio,either because of regulatory requirements or becauseof its own internal standards, will be reluctant tolower the ratio by putting a large loan on its balancesheet and may choose instead to syndicate a portionof the loan. Therefore, the capital-to-asset ratio can beexpected to be positively related to the lead bank’sexposure to the syndicated loan.The second measure of capital constraint is thesize of loans extended to a borrower as a percentageof the bank’s capital. In fact, the lending limit mandated by federal law prohibits national banks fromlending to any one borrower an amount exceeding 15percent of the bank’s capital.3 While lending limitsthat apply to state-chartered banks can vary widelyfrom state to state, some, mainly in New York Statewhere many syndicating banks are chartered, followfederal law on lending limits.Lending limits are sometimes cited as one of thereasons for the emergence of loan syndications andsales, since banks obviously have limited discretionover how much of a large loan they can retain. To testthe importance of the lending limit for the sample ofloans, this study calculated the ratio of syndicatedloans to each borrower originated by each agent bankto that bank’s capital.4 (Multiple loans to the sameborrower were aggregated since the lending limitapplies to borrowers, not individual loans.) Somewhat surprisingly, the loan-to-capital ratio exceeded15 percent for only 20 percent of syndicated loans inthe data set. This result understates the importance oflending limits to the extent that agent banks also holdnon-syndicated loans to the same borrowers--these50 January/February 1993loans also count for the lending limit. And even if theexternally imposed lending limit does not present abinding constraint for many syndications, banksthemselves often have a self-imposed limit on theirexposure to individual borrowers that may be up to50 percent below the legislated limit. Consequently,the size of the loan relative to the agent-bank’s capitalcan influence the decision to syndicate the loan, evenif it does not exceed the lending limit.Tile RegressionsThe regression results are shown in Tables 4 and5. In Table 4, the dependent variable is th6 percentage of the loan retained by the agent bank. In Table 5,the dependent variable is the agent’s share of eachloan relative to its capital.Tables 4 and 5 each report two regressions,which differ in the form of the loan quality variable.The first regression in each table, with the coefficientsand the t-statistics shown in columns (1) and (2)respectively, has the weighted quality variable thattakes account of each loan classification category. Thesecond regression, shown in columns (3) and (4), hasthe binary quality variable, which takes the value of 1if the loan is classified as "Pass" and 0 otherwise.The regressions show clearly the importance ofthe agent bank’s capital. The coefficient for the capital-to-asset ratio is positive and highly significant inall regressions, indicating that the higher the agentbank’s capital the more of the loan it will keep, bothas a share of the loan and as the ratio of the amountof the loan to capital. The effect is particularly dramatic for the share of the loan retained by the agent(Table 4), where the coefficient implies that a givenchange in the agent’s capital-to-asset ratio results in afourfold increase in the share of the loan the agentwill keep. In contrast, the effect is more muted for theamount of the loan as a share of capital (Table 5),where a given increase in the capital-to-asset ratioresults in an increase only 17 percent as large.The loan-to-capital ratio has a more ambiguous2 In cases where the loan’s classification is split betweenratings, or where the bank has several loans with different classifications to the same borrower, the value of the "Quality" variableis the weighted average of the component ratings.3 The limit may be higher for loans secured with certain typesof collateral. The federally mandated lending limits are containedin 12 USC 84.4 The data on capital for each bank were obtained from theCall Reports for the 2nd quarter of 1991, the time that would mostclosely correspond to the Shared National Credit examinations.New England Economic Review

Table 4Dependent Variable--Share of Loan Retained by the Agent BankRegression ResultsExplanatory VariablesConstantCapital-to-Asset RatioLoan-to-Capital RatioReal EstateLoan Quality (weighted)Loan Quality (binary)R squaredNumber of 4.44)*.O5.05290429O4"Significant at the 1 percent level.Sources: Loan classifications, Shared National Credit Program; capital, Call Reporls.Table 5Dependent Variable--Ratio of Agent Bank Loan Exposure to Bank CapitalRegression ResultsExplanatory VariablesConstantCapital-to-Asset RatioLoan-to-Capital RatioReal EstateLoan Quality (weighted)Loan Quality (binary)R squaredNumber of -3.92)*.90.9O29042904*Significant at the 1 percent level.Sources: Loan classifications, Shared National Credit Program; capital, Call Repeals.effect. Its coefficient is negative and significant in theregressions in Table 4, meaning that the syndicatorsretain a lower proportion of the loan, the larger theloan relative to the syndicator’s capital. On the otherhand, as Table 5 shows, the relationship betweenloan size and the amount retained by the agent bankbecomes positive when both are measured in units ofbank capital, so that the larger the loan, the larger theamount the agent bank retains when both are measured in terms of bank’s capital.The coefficient for the real estate variable ispositive and significant in all regressions, indicatingthat syndicators keep a larger share of constructionJanuary/February 1993and commercial real-estate loans than of other, presumably less risky loans. Loan quality has a negativeand statistically significant effect on the lead bank’sexposure to the loan, whether measured by aweighted or a binary variable. Table 4 shows thatsyndicators keep lower shares of higher-qualityloans, while Table 5 suggests that they have lowerexposures to better-quality loans as a percentage oftheir capital. Clearly, the results of the multivariateanalysis confirm that lead banks keep larger shares ofriskier and lower-quality loans than they do of safer,higher-quality loans, even after such factors as loansize and bank capital are taken into account.New England Economic Review 51

IV. DiscussionThis study found that loan syndications aredriven primarily by the lead bank’s capital considerations, both in the form of its capital-to-asset ratioand its loan-to-capital ratio. It found no evidence thatlead banks exploit participating banks by persuadingthem to take a larger share of inferior loans. The lackof evidence of such opportunistic behavior in syndications does not necessarily mean that it is alsoabsent in loan sales, which may be more susceptibleto it because of their contractual nature. For example,Mester (1992) found diseconomies of scope betweenthe traditional banking activities of originating andmonitoring loans and the less traditional activities ofselling and buying. Mester found that it is less costlyfor a bank to monitor a loan it has originated itselfthan to monitor a loan it has purchased. The relativeabsence, however, of such problems in syndicationsis relevant to the securities activities of banks. MostU.S. banks are prohibited from being directly involved in underwriting corporate securities, by theGlass-Steagall Act and other laws. Therefore, secondary intermediation in the form of syndications andloan sales can be seen, in part, as a substitute forunderwriting securities. To the extent that the marketfor corporate securities is more transparent and lesssubject to information asymmetries than the marketfor bank loans, eliminating such restrictions andallowing banks to underwrite and hold corporatebonds would reduce the overall risk of bank portfolios.ReferencesMester, Loretta. 1992. "Traditional and Nontraditional Banking:An Information-Theoretic Approach." Journal of Banking andFinance, vol. 16, pp. 54 66.52 January/February 1993Penacchi, G.G. 1988. "Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital."Journal of Finance, vol. 43, pp. 375-96.New England Economic Reviezo

loan sales, where a single bank makes the loan and subsequently sells portions of it to other banks. Loan sales are of two types: "participations" and "assign-ments." A participation creates a new contract be-tween the original lender and the loan buyer. The contract between the borrower and the original lender remains unchanged. The borrower .

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