Iranian UAV Attack Against MOTOR TANKER MERCER STREET 06 August 21

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UNCLASSIFIEDIranian UAV Attack AgainstMOTOR TANKERMERCER STREET06 August 211UNCLASSIFIED

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREETEXECUTIVE CONCLUSION: The confluence of multiple components with very specific and matching identities to previously exploited (andknown) Iranian one-way attack UAVs. The use of Iranian designed and produced one way attack “kamikaze” UAVs is a growing trend in theregion. They are actively used by Iran and their proxies against coalition forces in the region, to include targets in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.Summary: Early on 29 July, Liberian-flagged M/T MERCERSTREET, operated by Zodiac Maritime Limited(chaired by Israeli businessman), came underattack from two one-way UAVs while transitingin international waters off the coast of Oman. After first failed UAV attack, crew was able torecover some UAV debris. On 30 July, in a separate and deliberate attack,MERCER STREET was struck by another drone,killing the ship’s master (Romanian citizen) anda security officer (UK citizen). This second attack required calculatedand deliberate retargeting of M/TMERCER STREET by Iran(U) M/V MERCER STREET (Stock Photo)(U) Damage Caused by Iranian UAV Attack The crew followed appropriate procedures,gathered in safe haven inside the ship, andinformed their company of an attack. The company informed UK Maritime TradeOrganization (UKMTO) of the incident, who thencommunicated the matter to Headquarters, USNaval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT).2(U) Debris From Failed Iranian UAV Attack(U) Iranian UAV ImpactLocationUNCLASSIFIED

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET USNAVCENT directed aircraft carrier USSRONALD REAGAN with escort (USSMITSCHER), to close the coast of Oman,establish communications with the MERCERSTREET and render assistance. A US dronewas also directed to the area to assist. A helicopter from USS RONALD REAGANlocated the MERCER STREET in a remotearea of the Arabian Sea. Working through UKMTO and Zodiac,communications were established withMERCER STREET; surviving crew confirmedMaster and a Security Officer had been killed.(U) EOD Site Assessment of Iranian Attack(U) Internal View of Iranian UAV Impact Site In early afternoon, an Explosive OrdnanceDisposal (EOD) team from USS RONALDREAGAN fast-roped onto MERCER STREETto ensure vessel security, verify no furtherexplosive-related danger existed, facilitatevessel communications with Zodiac, andgather debris from the incident. By 31 July, the US EOD team was extractedand returned to USS RONALD REAGAN.Material gathered from the scene wastransported to NAVCENT Headquarters forforensic analysis. By 2 Aug, a multi-lateral exploitation team2 initiated analysis of the recovered debris.(U) From UAV on MERCER STREET(U) Vertical Stabilizer on Iranian UAVFORENSIC CONCLUSIONS: 1) Verified components of the Iranian one-way attack UAVwere identical to previously identified Iranian unmanned one-way attack systems, and2) Confirmed the Iranian UAV was explosive laden.

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET(U) Vertical Stabilizer Identical to Iranian UAV(U) Side and Top View of Iranian UAV Fin

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREETIranian Delta Wing UAS FamilyFORENSIC CONCLUSIONS: US Experts concluded, based on the vertical fin beingidentical to those identified on one of the Iranian designed and produced one-way attack“kamikaze” UAV family, that Iran was actively involved in this attack.

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET(U) Vertical Stabilizer Identical to Iranian UAV

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET(U) Top View of Iranian UAV Fin

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET(U) Side View of Iranian UAV Fin

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET(U) Internal View of Iranian UAV Impact Site

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET(U) Internal View of Impact Site from Iranian UAV Attack

29-30JULY2021: IRANIAN UAV ATTACKON M/T MERCER STREET(U) Internal View of Impact Site from Iranian UAV Attack

ON M/T MERCER STREET. 2. UNCLASSIFIED. Summary: Early on 29 July, Liberian-flagged M/T MERCER STREET, operated by Zodiac Maritime Limited (chaired by Israeli businessman), came under attack from two one- way UAVs while transiting in international waters off the coast of Oman. After first failed UAV attack, crew was able to recover some UAV debris.

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