Chair: Nicolette D'Angelo North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationChair: Nicolette D’AngeloNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)Chair: Nicolette D’Angelo
NATO PMUNC 2016ContentsLetter from the Chair . . . .3Introduction to NATO. . . . .3Topic A: Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic . . 4History of the Topic . . . . . 6Current Status/Key Issues . . . 9Country Policy. . .13Keywords . . . . .17Questions for Consideration . . . . . .17Bibliography . . . .19Topic B: Counter-terrorism. . . .21History of the Topic. . . . 21Current Status .25Country Policy. . . . . .29Keywords .30Questions for Consideration. . . .32Bibliography .322
NATO PMUNC 2016Letter from the ChairDear Delegates,On behalf of Princeton and the International Relations Council, welcome toPMUNC 2016! My name is Nicolette D’Angelo, and I’m a sophomore from West Milford,New Jersey majoring in the English department. My main focus of study is poetics andantiquity, so I’m also pursuing certificates in Creative Writing and Humanistic Studies. Andwhile I did Model UN all throughout high school, this is my first time staffing a collegeconference. It's both an honor and dream-come-true to be your chair!When I'm not stalking Best Delegate, I'm also involved on campus editing theNassau Literary Review, singing with the Chapel Choir and working for the PrincetonWriting Center. Other hobbies include blogging, reading the Nass Weekly over brunch andbeing woefully overdressed for class. But enough about me - I'm so excited to meet you alland share our first PMUNCs together!That said, if you have any questions about this background guide - or about MUN,the committee or anything in general - please do not hesitate to contact me. I look forwardto seeing all of you in action very soon!Sincerely,Nicolette D’Angelondangelo@princeton.eduClass of 20193
NATO PMUNC 2016Introduction to NATOThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliancemade up of 28 member states throughout Europe and the Americas. First established onApril 4th, 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s creation at the beginning of theCold War was an attempt at balancing power between the East and West. More specifically,the rise of Soviet Union following WWII – and the widespread fear of the communism thatcame without it, especially in Europe – necessitated some form of intergovernmental actionthat would provide for the mutual protection of several allied nations in the North Atlantic.As such, NATO’s primary purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its membersthrough its most unique, enduring principle – the principle of collective defense.In the North Atlantic Treaty, collective defense is established in Article 5, wherein it isstated that “an armed attack against one or more [members] shall be considered an attackagainst them all.”1 However, Article 5 had never been formally invoked until the 9/11terrorist attacks against the United States. In so doing, the North Atlantic Council – thegoverning body of the organization – exhibited solidarity toward the US, as well as its powerto engage in collective action against counterterrorism. Among other things, this actioninvolved radar aircraft patrol, naval standing forces and efforts to “enhance intelligencesharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies.”The cooperation and sharing of NATO’s military assets follows both a civilian and amilitary structure. Of the former, each member state has at its disposal a delegation ofpermanent representatives, all of which are overseen by the NATO headquarters in Brussels.1 "The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016.http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official texts 17120.htm.4
NATO PMUNC 2016Of the latter, NATO military operations oversee forces placed under the organization’sjurisdiction by individual member states, along with associated command and controlstructures. These forces are available for NATO operations once they meet a specific set ofreadiness criteria, as well as rules of deployment that vary from country to country.In civilian and military matters alike, however, a consensus is taken by common consent.Since 1949, this principle of consensus has existed at every committee level, meaning thatany “NATO decision” passed is an expression of the collective will of the 28 sovereignstates participating in the Alliance.2 This system is interesting politically – and ratheridiosyncratic on the international stage – seeing as consensus decision-making means there isno voting within NATO. Consultations instead take place until a course of action that isacceptable to all is agreed upon. Surprisingly, this negotiation process happens rapidly sincemembers consult each other on a regular basis. They often can anticipate each other'spositions as a result.2 Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 49178.htm.5
NATO PMUNC 2016Topic A: Hybrid Warfare in the BalticNATO was originally established to balance power between the Soviet Union and NorthAtlantic nations, and today, many of the Alliance’s recent actions still concern the relationshipof its member states to Russia. Especially in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s aggressive foreignpolicy and the annexation of Ukraine, Russia’s use of unconventional tactics has been acontroversial military Frankenstein – otherwise known as hybrid warfare, its tactics ofinternational conflict (for which there is no universal definition) have only furthercomplicated the already-delicate geopolitical status of the Baltic region. And in NATO’stenure of dealing with this threat, hybrid warfare increasingly has delegitimized the Alliance’susual posture of deterrence.DeterrenceHistorically, deterrence has always been a core element of NATO’s collective defensestrategy. It can be defined as “the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent fromtaking an unwelcome action.”3 The Alliance or a member state typically can deter anadversary in two ways: by the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) and/or byrejecting the validity of the adversary’s war aims (deterrence by denial).4 In both cases,deterrence seems to be a matter of displaying military prowess – of putting one’s power “ondisplay.” In theory, then, deterrence should never fail to be effective according to a costbenefit analysis of both parties’ security and interests: if all parties were to act “rationally,”3Collective Defence - Article 5." NATO. March 22, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 110496.htm.4 Ibid.6
NATO PMUNC 2016belligerence would often seem to be an unattractive option, especially when nuclear power isinvolved.Or at least one would think. Unfortunately, in the 21st century, conventional deterrencetechniques have often failed, especially in cases of hybrid warfare – that is, when an adversaryincorporates “a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, andcriminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain [a group’s] political objectives,”among other things.5History of Hybrid WarfareFor NATO to both understand the threat of hybrid warfare and make strides toneutralize it peacefully, it is necessary to fully explore how this tricky combination ofconventional and irregular war strategies has been used throughout history. In other words,the serious security challenge now called hybrid warfare is not nearly as new as it seems.As early as the Peninsular War in 1807, states have deployed hybrid warfare in thefollowing forms – through the use of regular and irregular forces, strong links with nationalor transnational criminal groups, unclear distinction between civilians and soldiers, and finally,military activities in the situation when war is actually not declared.6 For example, just asregular militiamen joined forces with Spanish guerillas under the British Army in theNapoleonic Wars, today’s hybrid tactics also involve a broad array of military, political,5By History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO Partners. "On Not-So-NewWarfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats - War on the Rocks." July 28, 2015. Accessed September 29, w-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.6 Šešelgytė, Margarita. "Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for Eastern Europe?"October 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016. n-europe 20257
NATO PMUNC 2016economic, information, and – now – even cyber instruments used by actors, be them nationstates or non-state actors without strict allegiance to any one state or sovereign body.This brings several salient examples of hybrid warfare to our attention, such as the 2006war between Israel and the Hezbollah; the September 11th attacks; and the 2014 IslamicState’s advance into Iraq.The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict is a well-trod example of hybrid warfare forseveral reasons. From 2000 to 2006, the Hezbollah – a militant Shia group supported by Iran,also known as the “Lebanese Party of God” – conducted over 200 attacks on the IsraeliDefense Forces, culminating in a proxy war in Lebanon lasting 34 days. The Hezbollah wassurprisingly successful in the efficacy of its regular troops, guerrilla forces and masscommunication disruption efforts – although Israel was ultimately able to deter furtherHezbollah attacks after the war, the group’s successful terrorist cells, Security Apparatus andmilitary units (all supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards) arguably make it the bestindicator of the direction of future hybrid conflicts, according to political theorist MarcinAndrzej Piotrowski. He points out the Hezbollah’s success in its “simultaneous use of aconventional arsenal, irregular forces and guerrilla tactics, psychological warfare, terrorismand even criminal activities, with support from a multi-dimensional organisation and capableof integrating very different sub-units, groups or cells into one united, large force.”7 As aresult, the Hezbollah has become a model not only for other terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda,but also for actors employing hybrid strategies. To again quote Piotrowski,“the Hezbollah case is of clear relevance to debates about the adaptation of NATO tothe new threats and hybrid warfare demonstrated by Russia in its conflict withUkraine The Russian combination of well-trained and organised forces, support7 Piotrowski, Marcin Andrzej. "Hezbollah: The Model of a Hybrid Threat." March 2, 2015.https://www.pism.pl/files/?id plik 19320.8
NATO PMUNC 2016with weapons and equipment, psychological warfare and cyberwarfare mighttransform them into a very dangerous and long-term threat.”Knowing this – and that, at its prime, the Hezbollah had within its capacities a missile arsenallarger than all NATO countries combined, except the US – reminds that deterrence is nolonger a standalone method for NATO to ensure the strategic security of its members againststate and non-state actors alike.Current StatusRecent developments in the deployment of hybrid warfare worldwide have largelyconfirmed that NATO’s leverage and deterrence strategy must now adapt to transcendmilitary means alone. This has been especially true in the case of North Atlantic relations withEastern Europe, particularly with Russia. The ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine is thusconsidered one of the greatest threats to the western world and the alliance of nations withinNATO, largely due to Russia’s illegal military intervention into Crimea as well as the supportit gives to separatist sentiment in the area.More specifically, the situation of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is comprised of severalsimultaneously-occurring forms of antagonism: guerrilla and conventional warfare, as well aseconomic, cyber and information warfare. It is important to note that this conflict is notfueled by the pursuit of Ukrainian territory, but rather for the ends of exacerbatingpreexisting weaknesses in the Ukrainian government and ultimately delegitimizing it.Key IssuesLegal Intervention in Eastern Europe9
NATO PMUNC 2016First and foremost, NATO is tasked with protecting the sovereignty and legalautonomy of its member states in/around Eastern Europe from Russian hybrid warfare.Those at risk today primarily include Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia,Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Albania, otherwise known as the memberstates who joined the Alliance in 1999 and 2004 after previously holding membership in therival Warsaw Pact. What this means is that, while Ukraine does not hold membership inNATO formally or otherwise, Russia’s hybrid warfare with and intervention into the nationhave direct ramifications into the wellbeing of NATO of nearby member states and theirwestern allies.The successful March 2014 referendum in Crimea to join Russia was the legal pretextof Russia’s hybrid warfare in the region. According to the referendum results, Crimeanssupported joining Russia by 96.77% of the vote with an 83.1% voter turnout.8 There havebeen multilateral efforts to try and declare the referendum invalid in 2015, such as throughthe EU and with a UN resolution, however Russia has vetoed these documents. Rather thandiscarding the referendum results, Russia has used them as legal means for annexation.Ethnic Divisions in the BalticsA related broad security threat is the persistence of ethnic minority divisions in theregion. Generally speaking, there are four sizeable groups to consider: first, the largest ethnicminority in every Baltic State is Russians; the second is Poles; and the third and fourth largestare Belarussians and Ukrainians respectively.9 Especially in Estonia and Latvia, RussianSeyfettin, Mehmet. "Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in Crimea." iewFile/5000159909/50001442689 Zvidrins, Peteris. "Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States." Centre of Demography,University of Latvia. http://epc2008.princeton.edu/papers/80280810
NATO PMUNC 2016authorities have accused the Baltic countries of “denying their ‘compatriots’ human rights,discriminating them on the basis of ethnic or linguistic differences, and restricted their civilfreedoms,” while, at the same time, endorsing a pro-Kremlin political party claiming to act inthe Lithuanian Poles’ favor.10 These machinations have only exacerbated existing tensionsamong the different ethnic groups of the Baltic in the interest of advancing Russian interestswithin Baltic parliaments and municipal councils.Military ProvocationsIn addition to the prolonged threat of conventional military attack, Russia has repeatedlyprovoked Baltic governments by air policing their territories, conducting multiple militaryexercises, and arresting an Estonian security officer, among other things, thereby obstructingdomestic security in the Baltic, as well as international infrastructural endeavors (ex. theNordBalt electricity link). Another hybrid military threat is the phenomenon of “little greenmen,” or the unmarked Russian soldiers who are smuggled into Baltic territories.As one of many countermeasures, NATO too has employed air policing as a “smartdefense” essential for safety in aviation and for the Allies. Especially since the 2014annexation, extra air policing missions have been deployed as part of a NATO Quick ReactionAlert (QRA) in order to guard the airspace over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However,questions of missile defense system placement,territorial disputes between the Baltic States andRussia, and military training all bear the risk ofprovoking Russia; meanwhile, economically, a10 Mickus, Justinas. "Baltic Security Overview: A Short Overview." Eastern European Studies Centre.September 2016. w-EESC.pdf11
NATO PMUNC 2016problem persists in that long-term prospects for the mission are dependent on increasedfinancial contributions and defense expenditures from struggling beneficiary states.“The Weaponization of Information”Another unique aspect of this ongoing crisis is Russia’s capacity for utilizing theinformational dimensions of hybrid warfare. NATO and much of the global community haverecognized that, through a remarkable capacity for propaganda, Russia has “spread lies amongits people and constructed alternative narratives and realities in cyber space which in turnamplify the conflict.”11 Propaganda efforts of this kind – more specifically, shutting downindependent press, sponsoring rallies, referendum advertisements, and pushing misinformationas well as oversimplified stories online and on television12 – all have been especially effective inRussia and Crimea, where the public has limited exposure to alternative media outlets andsources of information. Most notably, Russian TV channels in the Baltics and in Russia andvarious pages, groups, and personal profiles on social media platforms such as Facebook havealso been successfully subversive.13Ibid.Yuhas, Alan. "Russian Propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does It Work? Alan Yuhas andRaya Jalabi." The Guardian. March 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, , Edward. "The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report." June ssed.pdf12
NATO PMUNC 2016Beyond the annexation of Crimea after the 2014 referendum, the consequences of this“weaponization of information” has led NATO to consider "strategic narratives that lead toaligned words and actions . appropriately adapted and culturally attuned to resonate with allaudiences and counter opposing narratives."14 In other words, it is important that the Allianceavoids countering propaganda with more propaganda.Similarly, NATO’s prime directive is not to isolate or weaken Russia. Since signing theFounding Act of Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security in 1997, and organizing theNATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, the Alliance is committed to working together withRussia in areas of mutual interest -- from counter-terrorism to mechanisms for emergencyplanning – all in the service of ensuring security and peace for a free Europe.Country PolicyNote: These policies often vary even within regional blocs, especially given the lack of bothunilateral and multilateral stances on the topic of unconventional tactics.1) The Baltic StatesThe majority of government responses to Russian hybrid warfare in the Baltic have beenunilateral. Multilaterally, a defining achievement on the part of NATO was establishing theNATO Centers of Excellence in Estonia and in Lithuania, thereby enabling better-coordinatedEuropean action (especially in the realms of energy and cyber-security) as well as giving the14Emmott, Robin. “NATO May Start Using Military Tactics to Try and Combat Russian Propoganda.” January27, 2016. Accessed September 30, 2016. bat-russiasinformation-weapon-document-2016-113
NATO PMUNC 2016Baltics a platform to speak about hybrid threats.15 However, these nations continue to feeldeep insecurity in the face of hybrid threats (given their failure to neutralize Russian threats inthe past) and know that any marked attempts to build up their defensive capacities willnecessarily result in a negative military response from Moscow. As such, a security dilemma isdelaying multilateral action – which, coupled with ethnic issues, economic insecurities, unequalaccess to EU resources, and suspicious attitudes toward politicians and national parties in eachnation – all combine to create a geopolitically destabilizing and disillusioned attitudes in theBaltic region as a whole.Policy recommendations have pointed to utilizing the OSCE (the Organization for Security &Cooperation in Europe) in order to improve conflict prevention mechanisms, border securitymanagement, combatting propaganda and corruption, and foster the inclusion ofminorities/easing ethnic tensions, in addition to NATO and the EU. Meanwhile, nations suchas Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have received a considerable amount of foreign assistance forthe aim of building security infrastructure and defense capacities through bilateral partnershipswith the US. In the East, these nations have also become proponents of the EU’s EasternPartnership countries, cooperating with the US in order to provide other methods ofassistance through the Emerging Donors Challenge Program.2)Western Europe/EU StatesWhile a united position on hybrid warfare has yet to be established by NATO membernations in Europe such as France, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom (et al.), it’s alwaysin the vested interest of these states to maximize the collective security and defense of Overview-EESC.pdf14
NATO PMUNC 2016Alliance members without using Article V, the collective defence clause. Nonetheless, a largersecurity presence has been demanded of these nations by the Baltic bloc.Financially, the money and resources needed to effect such a security presence would be astrain on many European economies, especially given the opportunity costs involved in theuse of sanctions against Russia following the Crimean annexation. The EU sanctionsannounced in September 2014 targeted Russia's state finances, energy and arms sectors,excluded Russian banks from raising long-term loans in the EU, banned EU-Russia armsdeals, and the limited the export of oil industry technology, among other things. At the sametime, dozens of senior Russian officials and separatist leaders are now subject to Westernasset freezes and travel bans.16 The tendency of the EU to pursue these exclusionary policieshas received both praise and criticism – domestically, much of the latter stems from the lossof Russia as a trading partner in various departments during an economically fragile period.It is also relevant to note that several NATO states in Europe are part of intergovernmentalinsitutions and coalitions aside from the OSCE, and have various degrees of leverage in thosesettings (for example, the OSCE).Eastern European member states (such as Turkey) have openly vowed to tighten cooperationagainst the hybrid warfare of which Russia has been accused,17 imploring the EU and otherintergovernmental institutions to adopt complementary strategies while sharpening theirknowledge-sharing ther-hybrid-warfare/27333967/15
NATO PMUNC 20163)North AmericaSimilar to the EU nations in NATO, the United States and Canada occupy a similarlycomplicated position in relation to hybrid warfare in the Baltic, and also lack a cohesivestrategy for neutralizing it. Nonetheless, the Pentagon has stressed its concern aboutcombatting specifically the aspects of hybrid warfare which involve “stealth invasion, localproxy forces and international propaganda that Russia used to annex Crimea and destabilizeeastern Ukraine.”18In 2015, to combat these unconventional threats, the US announced that it would becontributing troops and “enabling capabilities” to NATO’s new Spearhead task force thatwould include surveillance aircraft and additional Special Operations forces; more specifically,American defense personnel stated that “the task force would be augmented to help countercyberthreats and other dangers.”19Economically, the US has also enacted sanctions against Russia, in addition to asset freezes onbanks, businesses, and notably wealthy individuals. The EU still conducts considerably morebusiness with Russia than the US does; however, the American security assistance provided tothe Baltic region is rather extensive. According to the White House Press Office, the USprovides millions annually “to improve Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian defense and securityinfrastructure, strengthen national resilience, and build defense capacity through programssuch as the European Reassurance Initiative, Foreign Military Financing, and InternationalMilitary Education and Training programs ( )This assistance helps increase 5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61 story.html19 Ibid.16
NATO PMUNC 2016interoperability and build national resilience in the face of both traditional and nontraditionalhybrid threats.”20Key Terms Hybrid Warfare Deterrence Strategy Article V/Collective Defence Cyber Warfare/Propaganda Ethnic Minority Divisions Security Dilemma Multilateral VS Unilateral Action Non-State Actors The Kremlin Annexation Little Green MenQuestions to Consider There is currently no agreed-upon definition for hybrid warfare. How should it bedefined internationally? To what extent has your country experienced hybrid warfare and/or its stonia-latvia-andlithuania-%E2%80%93-nato-allies17
NATO PMUNC 2016 How can the security of the Baltic be reconciled with the collective security of NATO?What limits exist in NATO’s jurisdiction? How should political disturbances in Ukraine/Crimea be addressed by the Alliance,given that Ukraine is not a member state? How should propaganda and cyber warfare be thwarted on an international scale? How should non-state actors be addressed in their role in this conflict, if at all? What readiness action plans can be put into effect during ‘peacetime’ or proxy wars, ifat all? How should NATO utilize its standing forces/other military means in relation to theBaltic situation? How will this (or any other resolutions) be funded? Consider revisiting the North Atlantic Treaty once more. What changes could be madeto the existing institutional framework of the Alliance to better adapt it to the threatsof hybrid warfare?18
NATO PMUNC 2016BibliographyBy History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO Partners. "On NotSo-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats - War on the Rocks." July 28, 2015.Accessed September 29, 2016. ve Defence - Article 5." NATO. March 22, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 110496.htm.Emmott, Robin. “NATO May Start Using Military Tactics to Try and Combat RussianPropoganda.” January 27, 2016. Accessed September 30, Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. AccessedSeptember 29, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 49178.htm.Lucas, Edward. "The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report." June ssed.pdfMickus, Justinas. "Baltic Security Overview: A Short Overview." Eastern EuropeanStudies Centre. September 2016. wEESC.pdfPiotrowski, Marcin Andrzej. "Hezbollah: The Model of a Hybrid Threat." March 2, 2015.https://www.pism.pl/files/?id plik 19320.Seyfettin, Mehmet. "Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in Crimea." iewFile/5000159909/5000144268"The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016.http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official texts 17120.htm.Weitz, Richard. “The US Faces Rival Powers Waging Hybrid Warfare.” YaleGlobal.edu.January 12, 2016. Accessed July 2016. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-faces19
NATO PMUNC 2016Yuhas, Alan. "Russian Propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does It Work? Alan Yuhas and Raya Jalabi." The Guardian. March 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, /crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media.Zvidrins, Peteris. "Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States." Centre ofDemography, University of Latvia.Šešelgytė, Margarita. "Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for EasternEurope?" October 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, astern-europe 202520
NATO PMUNC 2016Topic B: Counter-terrorismIntroductionCountering terrorism is, and always has been, an enduring security priority for NATOand its constituent nations. From the 1972 hostage situation at the Olympic games in Munich,to the infamous Lockerbie attack that killed over 200, terrorism has remained embedded inthe psyche of the western world.21 However, although the intimidating specter of terrorismhas always remained a constant, such cannot be said for the the structure, tactics, and goals ofthe organizations that perpetrate terrorism. In the past two decades, the nature of terrorismhas evolved dramatically. Modern terrorist organizations are decentralized, diffuse, and playby a different set a rules than those of the 20th and early 21st centuries. In order to combatthese emergent threats, NATO will need to entirely rethink the way it approaches terrorism.The organization will need to develop a different set of principles and strategies to ensure thatNATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliance made up of 28 member states throughout Europe and the Americas. First established on April 4th, 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's creation at the beginning of the Cold War was an attempt at balancing power between the East and West. More specifically,
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