Weapons Of Terror

Chapter 7. Export controls, international assistance,and non-governmental actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153Export controls and other controls on the movement of goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154Control of movement of goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154International assistance for non-proliferation and disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . 155Sectoral roles: business, research, voluntary organizations,and the public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157The responsibility of companies and the business sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157The responsibility of scientists: codes of conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158Democratic control: role of representative institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159Democratic control: NGOs and transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160Public information and education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161Chapter 8. Compliance, verification, enforcementand the role of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175The role of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177The United Nations disarmament machinery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177The role of the UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180Beyond WMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Annex 1: WMDC recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188Annex 2: Work of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206Commissioners’ biographies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212Financial and organizational support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214Seminars and other public meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215Published WMDC studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

VMTCRNASANATONBCNGONPTNSGNWFZNWSAnti-ballistic missileAnti-satellite (weapon)Ballistic missile defenceBiological weapon/warfareBiological and Toxin Weapons ConventionConfidence-building measureChemical and biological weaponsConference on DisarmamentConventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty)Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty OrganizationCooperative threat reductionChemical weapon/warfareChemical Weapons ConventionFood and Agriculture OrganizationFissile material cut-off treatyGroup of Eight, group of eight leading industrialized statesGlobal Threat Reduction InitiativeHague Code of ConductHighly enriched uraniumInternational Atomic Energy AgencyIntercontinental ballistic missileInternational Court of JusticeIntermediate-range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)Low-enriched uraniumMutual assured destructionMultiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicleMissile Technology Control RegimeNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (US)North Atlantic Treaty ental organizationNon-Proliferation TreatyNuclear Suppliers GroupNuclear-weapon-free zoneNuclear-weapon state8

abbreviationsOIEOPCWP5PSIPTBTSARSSALT I, II, NMOVICUNSCUNSCOMWHOWMDWMDCWorld Organisation for Animal HealthOrganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical WeaponsFive permanent members of the United NationsSecurity CouncilProliferation Security InitiativePartial Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty Banning Nuclear WeaponTests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water)Severe acute respiratory syndromeStrategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Soviet-US)Stockholm International Peace Research InstituteSubmarine-launched ballistic missileStrategic Offensive Reductions TreatySpecial Session on Disarmament(of the UN General Assembly)Strategic Arms Reduction TreatyUnmanned aerial vehicleUnited Nations Disarmament CommissionUnited Nations Department for Disarmament AffairsUnited Nations General AssemblyUnited Nations Institute for Disarmament ResearchUnited Nations Monitoring, Verification andInspection CommissionUnited Nations Security CouncilUnited Nations Special Commission on IraqWorld Health OrganizationWeapon(s) of mass destructionWeapons of Mass Destruction Commission9

Chairman’s prefaceIN SEPTEMBER 2003 , the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, was bru-tally killed. Inspirational, young and full of initiative, she would have hadmuch more to contribute to making the world a better place.During the first months of 2003, Anna phoned me from time to time toinform herself about the United Nations inspection work in Iraq, for which Iwas responsible. She and many of her colleagues were very unhappy aboutthe drift towards military action against Iraq and felt that the inspectorsshould be given more time for their search for weapons of mass destruction.She also felt, however, that a sceptical attitude to armed action was notenough. It had to be matched by more active policies on the issue of nonproliferation. I fully agreed with her and was pleased to see that in June 2003she and her colleagues in the European Union declared new joint policies.These policies, in my view, started from sensible premises: that the bestsolution to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destructionwas that countries should no longer feel that they needed them; and thatviolators should be encouraged to walk back and rejoin the internationalcommunity. These policies stressed the need for a cooperative approach tocollective security and a rule-based international order. They highlighted therole of international verification and ‘effective multilateralism’. They alsosupported, as a last resort, however, the position that coercive measuresunder Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter could be taken with theSecurity Council as the final arbiter.By the end of June 2003, when the occupation of Iraq was a fact and I wasleaving the UN, Anna Lindh contacted me again. She thought that the timewas right not only for the new European policies but also for an idea firstadvanced by Jayantha Dhanapala, then UN Under-Secretary-General forDisarmament: the creation of an independent international commission toexamine how the world could tackle the problem of weapons of mass destruction. She asked if I would chair such a commission. I said I would.11

12weapons of terrorAfter Anna Lindh’s death, the Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson,and Anna’s successor as Foreign Minister, Laila Freivalds, gave me a free handto establish the Commission. I have been fortunate to secure the participation of high-calibre members, who have contributed their ideas, knowledge,judgement – and texts. They have all taken part in practical political, diplomatic or military work related to the maintenance of peace and the reductionof armaments. The Commission has not aimed at utopian goals but hasardently and jointly sought to exercise judgement and point to constructiveavenues out of difficulties, which are still with us. While this preface is mine, thereport and its recommendations reflect the joint effort of the Commission.The Swedish Government has generously financed most of the costs of theCommission and – as separately acknowledged – several other governmentsand other sources have kindly contributed, especially the Simons Foundationin Vancouver, Canada.Three previous independent international commissions have presentedvaluable reports in the same field.In 1982, a commission headed by Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden submitted a report entitled Common Security. It argued that the nuclear armsrace and mutual assured destruction (MAD) could destroy human civilization and that security could only be attained through cooperation and disarmament. It pinned its hopes on the strong antiwar opinion, which feared nuclearannihilation. Although the Cold War continued, significant bilateral armscontrol agreements were concluded between the United States and the SovietUnion, and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europewas a harbinger of a new climate.In 1996, there appeared the Australian Government-sponsored Report ofthe Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Afterthe end of the Cold War, this was a period of bright hope. After the successfulUN -authorized Gulf War in 1991, which stopped Iraq’s aggression againstKuwait, President George H.W. Bush talked about ‘a new world order’. Theindefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was achieved in 1995after commitments to nuclear disarmament had been reaffirmed by the fivenuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty. The Canberra Commission urgedthat practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons should be taken immediately.In August 1998, just months after Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear tests,the Government of Japan organized the independent Tokyo Forum forNuclear Non-Proliferation and Diasarmament. Its final report, issued a yearlater, presented an ‘Action Plan’ dealing with nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and terrorism.

chairman’s prefaceSoon thereafter, however, the US Senate declined to support ratificationof the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. With little or no progress onnuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation an ongoing reality, and growingfears of the dangers of terrorism, the post-Cold War window of opportunitywas closing, even despite other more positive trends.In the ten years that have passed since the Canberra Commission reportwas published, global economic interdependence has accelerated. All statesof the world have come to face the same environmental threats and risks ofcontagious diseases. There have been no serious territorial or ideologicalconflicts between the major military powers. Yet, amazingly, the climate foragreements on arms control and disarmament has actually deteriorated.Efforts to consolidate global treaties, like the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, have stagnated,ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remain missing,and negotiations have not even opened on the much needed treaty to stop theproduction of fissile material for weapons.There are even some waves of new armaments: the US missile shield maybe triggering countermeasures by China and Russia in the nuclear weaponsarea; and nuclear weapons with new missions may be developed in the USand elsewhere. While the peaceful uses of space and satellites are developingat a dizzying pace, facilitating global information and communication, themost advanced military powers are calculating how they can most effectivelypursue war in this environment.In spite of all this, governments and world public opinion are paying lessattention to the global regimes for arms control and disarmament. One reasonis the intense and justified focus on the war on terrorism and the handling ofspecific cases of actual or potential nuclear proliferation. Another reasonmay be that global treaties did not help to prevent the terrorist attack on theUnited States on 11 September 2001 and constituted insufficient barriersagainst the efforts of Iraq, North Korea and Libya to acquire nuclear weaponsand against Iran to conceal a programme for the enrichment of uranium.While the reaction of most states to the treaty violations was to strengthenand develop the existing treaties and institutions, the US, the sole superpower,has looked more to its own military power for remedies. The US NationalSecurity Strategy of 2002 made it clear that the US would feel free to usearmed force without authorization of the United Nations Security Council tocounter not only an actual or imminent attack involving WMD but also aWMD threat that might be uncertain as to time and place. The declared USpolicy – reaffirmed on this point by the strategy issued in March 2006 – has,13

14weapons of terroras I see it, parted ways with the UN Charter provisions on self-defence. Theaim of the strategy was said to be ‘to help make the world not just safer butbetter’, indicating that the US believed that this policy had benefits for all.No one underestimates the difficulties on the road to disarmament and tooutlawing nuclear weapons in the same manner in which the other weaponsof terror – biological and chemical weapons – have been outlawed.Some of the current stagnation in global arms control and disarmamentforums is the result of a paralysing requirement of consensus combined withan outdated system of bloc politics. However, a more important reason isthat the nuclear-weapon states no longer seem to take their commitment tonuclear disarmament seriously – even though this was an essential part of theNPT bargain, both at the treaty’s birth in 1968 and when it was extendedindefinitely in 1995.The devaluation of international commitments inherent in these positionsrisks undermining the credibility and effectiveness of multilateral treatycommitments.Against a generally gloomy short-term outlook for arms control and disarmament, some positive features can be discerned in the broader field ofsecurity. The number of interstate armed conflicts has been declining. Peacekeeping operations have prevented and continue to prevent shooting wars inmany places. Efforts to reform the UN have borne some fruit and more may behoped for. The new UN Peacebuilding Commission will assist states emerging from conflicts, thereby reducing the risk of their relapse into violence.The Security Council has recently adopted an important resolution obligating member states to adopt domestic legislation designed to prevent theproliferation of WMD. The precedent is constructive. But if the Council wereto further use and develop its quasi-legislative potential, it would need toensure that it acts with the broad support of the UN members. In the longerrun this would entail making the Council more representative of the UNmembership.Lastly, in today’s rapidly integrating world community, global treaties andglobal institutions, like the UN, the IAEA and the OPCW, remain indispensable.Even with their shortcomings they can do some important things that statesacting alone cannot achieve. They are therefore essential instruments in thehands of the state community to enhance security, to jointly operate inspection systems and to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction.Governments that have shown disenchantment with global treaties and institutions will inevitably return and renew their engagement.

chairman’s prefaceWhen there is a greater general readiness to return to a cooperative multilateral system in the sphere of arms control and disarmament, the Commission’s report, I hope, will contribute to the practical agenda. Some ideas andrecommendations are new, but the Commission also espouses and argues infavour of some well-known existing proposals.Indeed, at the present time it seems to me that not only successes in thevital work to prevent proliferation and terrorism but also progress in twoadditional areas could transform the current gloom into hope. Bringing theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force would significantly impedethe development of new nuclear weapons. The weapons that exist today arebad enough. Negotiating a global treaty to stop the production of fissilematerial for weapons would close the tap for new such material and helphinder possible arms races – notably in Asia.In both these areas the US has the decisive leverage. If it takes the lead theworld is likely to follow. If it does not take the lead, there could be morenuclear tests and new nuclear arms races.Hans BlixWMDC ChairmanMay 200615

WEAPONS OF TERRORFreeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical ArmsSynopsisWHY ACTION IS NECESSARYNuclear, biological and chemical arms are the most inhumane of all weapons. Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they can, in the hands of eitherstates or non-state actors, cause destruction on a vastly greater scale thanany conventional weapons, and their impact is far more indiscriminateand long-lasting.So long as any state has such weapons – especially nuclear arms – otherswill want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any state’sarsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design oraccident. Any such use would be catastrophic.Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War balance of terror, stocks of suchweapons remain extraordinarily and alarmingly high: some 27,000 in thecase of nuclear weapons, of which around 12,000 are still activelydeployed.Weapons of mass destruction cannot be uninvented. But they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons already have been, and their usemade unthinkable. Compliance, verification and enforcement rules can,with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even theeventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world’s reach.Over the past decade, there has been a serious, and dangerous, loss ofmomentum and dire

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC Nuclear/biological/chemical NGO Non-governmental organization NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NWFZ Nuclear-weapon-free zone NWS Nuclear-weapon state. OIE World Organisation for Animal Health OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons