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The estimated cost of report orstudy for the Department ofDefenseisapproximately 25,000 in Fiscal Years 2013 –2014.Generated on 2014Feb04RefID: 3-1A3CBF5

Military and Security Developments Involvingthe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea2013A Report to CongressPursuant to the National Defense Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 2012Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law112-81, as amended by Section 1292 of the National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 2013, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in bothclassified and unclassified form, on the current and future military power of theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea” (DPRK). The report shall address an assessmentof the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the goals and factors shaping NorthKorean security strategy and military strategy, trends in North Korean security, anassessment of North Korea’s regional security objectives, including an assessment of theNorth Korean military’s capabilities, developments in North Korean military doctrine andtraining, an assessment of North Korea’s proliferation activities, and other militarysecurity developments.

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Table of ContentsEXECUTIVE SUMMARY1CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION3KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY3NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS4CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY6STRATEGIC GOALS6NATIONAL STRATEGY6REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR6CHAPTER THREE: FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS8OVERVIEW8MAINTAINING THE THREAT8AN AGING FORCE.9.WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES9CHAPTER FOUR: SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIESOF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES12CHAPTER FIVE: PROLIFERATION20OVERVIEW20CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE SALES20NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION20NORTH KOREA’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAMS20INTERDICTED TRANSFERS21

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’swillingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks onthe Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballisticmissiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United NationsSecurity Council Resolutions.Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy tocompel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic, and security interests; developmentof strategic military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK andthe U.S.-ROK Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under NorthKorea’s current leader, Kim Jong Un.North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflictserious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware.The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting large-scale attacks on the ROKprimarily due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, theDPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve nationalgoals. In 2010, it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navy sailors, andshelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities anddevelopment of intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected inthe December 2012 Taepo Dong-2 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test,underscore the threat to regional stability and U.S. national security posed by NorthKorea. These programs, and North Korea’s expressed hostility toward the ROK andproliferation of items prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718,1874, 2087,and 2094, make the DPRK a continued security challenge for the UnitedStates and its Allies and partners.North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and subsequent announcement ofplans to restart and refurbish nuclear facilities at Yongbyon highlight the continuedchallenge posed by its nuclear programs. The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement ofthe Six-Party Talks, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and2094 call for the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Given NorthKorea’s unwillingness to abide by these commitments, the U.S. Department of DefenseMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea1

will continue to manage the North Korean security challenge through closecoordination and consultation with the international community, particularly with ourROK and Japanese Allies.The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocationsand steadfast in its commitments to Allies in the region, including the security providedby extended deterrence commitments through the nuclear umbrella and conventionalforces.Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea2

CHAPTER ONE:ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATIONKEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHregime announced it would begin a“new strategic line” of simultaneousKOREAN AND mocraticendeditsinstitutionalreadjustment to Kim Jong Un’s leadershipandbeganimplementationofhisbroader national agenda. Much like hisfather, Kim Jong Un has adopted astrategy of using coercive acts—force theinfluenceachievepolicybeginningofhissecond year in power, Kim sought to useanother coercive campaign to advancethelongstandinggoalsofgaininginternational recognition and de factoacceptance as a nuclear state. TheDecember 2012 launch of the TaepoDong-2 (TD-2) intercontinental ballisticmissile(ICBM)/spacelaunchvehicle(SLV) led to a series of actions thatincluded a nuclear test in February 2013and public threats to strike the U.S.mainland with nuclear weapons. TheNorth also declared itself unbound fromcore diplomatic agreements, such as the1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement.In April 2013, after declaring it would nolongerdevelopmentandeconomic improvement. By late May,People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK orNorthweaponspursuedenuclearization,thethe regime began a campaign ofdiplomatic outreach to mitigate thelong-termpoliticalandeconomicdamage of its actions. North Koreabeganappealstotheinternationalcommunity for restored dialogue, anddispatched high-level envoys to Chinaand Russia. By mid-summer, North Koreaaccepted South Korean preconditions toresumeoperationsattheKaesongIndustrial Complex, after North Koreawithdrew its workers from the project inApril 2013.As of October, North Korea continued torepeat publicly that it was open toresuming dialogue with the United Statesand the region, but it was unlikely tomakesignificantconcessionsrelinquishing its nuclear program.onItsearlier campaign of diplomatic outreachwastemperedcancellation ofanditsbyitsSeptemberinter-Korean reunionsbellicoserhetoric,includingstatements defaming ROK President ParkGeun-hye. North Korea’s stated intent toadvanceitsnuclearprogramandcontinue ballistic missile/space launchvehicleeffortsimpliesthatMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Koreaitwill3

eventually return to coercive actions towhich serves to justify draconian internalachieve its goals in the future.security controls, vast expenditures onthe military, and continued rule by theNORTH KOREAN SECURITYKim family as the sole protectors of thestate.PERCEPTIONSNorth Korean threat perceptions areshaped by many factors. These include alegacy of guerilla warfare dating back insttheeconomicisolation, experience eliminating internalthreats to the Kim family, and a politicalculture that is defined by an unendingexistential struggle with outside forces.The regime sees threats emanating fromInternally,theKimregimeremainsconcerned with ideological control of itscitizenry, which has grown increasinglyless reliant on the state for basic goodsand services. In the absence of largescaleeconomicimprovement,theregime continues to prioritize tial treatment of the privilegedelite in Pyongyang and of select militaryunits.inside and outside the country. It doesnot fully trust regional actors, including itssupposed allies China and Russia, nordoes it trust its own population. Theregime continues to portray a garrisonstateworldviewofimminentthreat,Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea4

The Recent Purge of Chang Song-taekKim Jong Un’s decision in December 2013 to purge and execute his powerful uncle,Chang Song-taek, is unlikely to lead to major changes in defense policy or internalstability in the near-term. Chang was a four-star General and vice-chairman of theNational Defense Commission yet had little formal control over defense and militaryportfolios. His absence will most likely be felt in the economy, as Chang was in chargeof several high-profile initiatives, particularly with China, to attract foreign currencyand investment to North Korea.Chang was believed to be a relatively pragmatic advisor to Kim Jong Un, but hisinfluence probably waned in 2013. Chang’s public appearances with his nephew,which is used to signal an individual’s importance within the regime, dropped 50percent in 2013 compared to 2012. Chang’s execution is the most significant step todate in Kim’s establishment of his authority, eliminating arguably the most influentialsenior Party official remaining from his father’s era.The sudden and brutal purgesends a strong message to regime elites that the formation of factions or potentialchallenges to Kim Jong Un will not be tolerated.Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea5

CHAPTER TWO:UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGYSTRATEGIC GOALSsupports the Kim regime’s use of coerciveNorth Korean goals and strategies reflectstrategy.the reality of political isolation, significantprovocations―even those that are kineticeconomic deprivation, deterioration of itsand lethal in nature―such as militaryconventionalincreasingactions and small-scale attacks to gainpolitical, economic, and military power ofpsychological advantage in diplomacynearby states. The strategic goal of theand win limited political and economicregime is to ensure the survival of the Kimconcessions, all while likely believing itdynasty and ideological control over thecan control escalation.military,diplomacy as part of its larger diplomaticandNorth Korean population in s to achieve this goal under KimJong Un have not changed markedlyfrom those pursued by Kim Jong Il:international recognition as a nucleararmed state, maintenance of a viabledeterrent capability, and reunification ofKorea under North Korea’s control. TheNorth continues to use reunification withthe South as a key component of itsnational identity narrative, to validate itsstrategy and policies, and to justifysacrifices demanded of the populace.NorthKoreauseslimitedClosely tied to this strategy of politicalcoercion are North Korea’s nuclear andballistic missile programs. DPRK leaderssee these programs, absent normalizedrelationswiththeinternationalcommunity, as leading to a credibledeterrence capability essential to itsgoalsofsurvival,sovereignty,andrelevance and supportive of its coercivemilitary threats and actions.REGIONAL OBJECTIVES ANDBEHAVIORHowever, North Korea’s leaders almostcertainly recognize that achieving thisNorthKoreaobjective is, for the foreseeable future,extracting economic aid and diplomaticunattainable.concessions from regional nations whiledefendingNATIONAL usedNorthtoonitsKoreaoverturestoaregional states but such outreach failedandregimeto produce meaningful political gainsKoreanmilitarybecause of international concerns aboutnationalNorthsovereignty.remainsMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea6

its nuclear weapons program. The Northpunishing North Korea too severely orlikely believes a “charm offensive” willcutting off diplomatic or economic hipsandingradualNorthKoreaadvancement of its strategic relationship is less robust than NorthrelationshipwithChina.Inrelations over the summer of 2013 cameSeptember, Russia opened a new rail linktointo North Korea.astand-stillwhenNorthKoreaDuring a Novembercancelled inter-Korean family reunionssummit with South Korean President Park,just four days before their scheduled late-President Putin signed a memorandum ofSeptember start.understanding encouraging ROK privateAlthough North Koreahas pressed for a resumption of tourismsector investment in the rail link.on Mount Kumgang, a potential sourcestalled plans for the creation of a naturalof revenue for North Korea, the ROK isgas pipeline from Russia to South Koreaunwilling to begin discussions absentthrough North Korea – a project thatprogress on family reunions.Despitecould earn North Korea millions of dollarsthese setbacks, the ROK shows no signs ofannually in transit fees – have made littleabandoning the Park Administration’sconcrete progress in recent years. Thetrustpolitik policy and remains steadfast inNorth remains willing to disrupt relationsinsisting that a return to Six-Party Talks bewith regional neighbors temporarily andpredicatedKoreaabsorb the associated cost when itdemonstrating its serious commitment tobelieves coercive actions toward Southdenuclearization.Korea or the United States will advance ic objectives.China as a key diplomatic and economicNorthbenefactor, and North Korea is consciousthawed somewhat in 2013. In May, theof China’s anger at its actions as it seeksNorth accepted a visit by a Japanesetomissiledelegation and indicated it might becapabilities. Although the North Koreanwilling to discuss the longstanding issue ofregime is aware that China disapprovesJapanese citizens abducted by Northof its nuclear program and use ofKorea in the 1970s and 1980s. To date, nocoercive actions, the regime likely thinksfurther progress has been made on thisChina is primarily interested in swithJapanregional stability and will refrain fromMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea7

CHAPTER THREE:FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDSOVERVIEWdeterrentNorth Korea’s large, forward-positionedforces.superiormilitary can initiate an attack against theROK with little or no warning, even thoughit suffers from resource shortages andaging equipment. The military retains thecapability to inflict significant damage onthe ROK, especially in the region from thedemilitarizedzone(DMZ)toSeoul.Although North Korea is unlikely to attackon a scale it assesses would risk its survivalby inviting overwhelming counterattacksby the ROK and the United States, NorthKorea’s calculus of the threshold forsmaller,asymmetricattacksandprovocations is unclear. North Korea’sspecial operations forces (SOF), forceforprovidesmall-scaleattacks that could rapidly spiral into alarger conflict.large arsenalofmostlyoutdated conventional weapons. It hasreinforced long-range artillery forces nearthe DMZ and has a substantial number ofmobile ballistic missiles that could strike avariety of targets in the ROK and Japan.However, the DPRK’s emphasis will likelybe on defensive and asymmetric .conventionalNorth Korea will seek to continue todevelopandtest-launchmissiles,including the TD-2 ICBM/SLV. Missile testsand programs to improve denial anddeception,electronicwarfare,road-mobile ICBM development, and SOF, aredrivenbyNorthKorea’sdesiretoenhance deterrence and defense, andto improve its ability to conduct limitedattacks against the South.MAINTAINING THE abilities, the North Korean militaryposes a serious threat to the ROK, its otherneighbors, and U.S. forces in the region.North Korea is making some efforts toupgrade itstoanditwillattempttoleverage the perception of a nuclearAmid a period of heightened tensions InMarch, North Korean media highlightedKim Jong Un's approval of the StrategicRocket Force's (SRF) “firepower onsincludedphotographs of Kim Jong Un ingplans—likelyaspirational—against the United States.Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea8

AN AGING FORCE.Air and Air Defense. The North Korean AirThe Korean People’s Army (KPA)―anthan 1,300 aircraft, primarily legacy Sovietumbrella organization comprising ground,models.air, naval, missile, and SOF―ranks incombat aircraft are its MiG-29s, procuredpersonnel numbers as the fourth largestfrom the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.military in the world. Four to five percentNorthof North Korea’s 24 million people serveacquisitionon active duty, and another 25 to 30surreptitiously purchased used MiG-21spercent is assigned to a reserve orfrom Kazakhstan.Force (NKAF) operates a fleet of 1999aircraftwhenitparamilitary unit and subject to wartimefieldsAs the NKAF’s aircraft continue to age, itlegacy equipment, either produced in, orincreasingly relies on its ground-based airbased on designs of, the Soviet Uniondefenses and on hiding or hardening ofand China dating back to the 1950s,assets to counter air attacks. During thoughafewmilitarytechnology, the KPA has not kept pacemobilewithlauncher and accompanying radar. weapons systems are based on e(SAM)bore external resemblance to the Russiandevelopments.S-300 and Chinese HQ-9.WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIESDuringmilitaryparadesheldNorth Korea publicized a March 2013inPyongyang over the last three years,manynewweaponsystemsweredisplayed for the first time, highlightingcontinued efforts to improve the al hardships.newly identified North Korean equipment,tanks,featured an unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV) in flight. The drone appeared to bea North Korean copy of a RaytheonMQM-107 Streaker target drone. NorthKorean press coverage of the eventdescribed the UAV as being capable ofprecision strike by crashing into theGround. The parades featured severalincludingmilitary live-fire drill that for the first timeartillery,andotherarmored vehicles. New infantry weaponswere also revealed. The display of thesesystems shows that North Korea continuesto produce, or at least upgrade, limitedtypes and numbers of equipment.target. The drill also featured the UAV asa cruise-missile simulator, which was thenshot down by a mobile SAM.Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) hasdisplayed limited modernization efforts,highlighted by upgrades to select surfaceshipsandacontinuedprogramMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Koreato9

constructsmallsubmarines.Theon six road-mobile butlaunchers (TELs) during military parades indurable, demonstrated its capabilities in2012 and 2013. If successfully designedMarch 2010 when it covertly attackedand developed, the Hwasong-13 likelyand sank the ROK warship CHEONAN withwould be capable of reaching much ofan indigenously producedthe continental United States, assumingsubmarinetheand torpedo.Special Operations. In addition to the SOFwartime mission of deep-strike infiltrationsin a combined arms peninsular attack,North Korea could also use its SOF in anasymmetric attack for political aims.ambitious ballistic missile obilecapableofreaching targets throughout the ROK,Japan, and the Pacific theater. Sinceearly 2012, North Korea has made effortsto raise the public profile of its allyrepresentative of missiles that will befielded. However, ICBMs are extremelycomplex systems that require multipleflight tests to identify and correct designormanufacturingdefects,andtheHwasong-13 has not been flight-tested.Ballistic Missile Force. North Korea has anprogrammissilestheStrategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Kim JongUn’s reference to the SRF during an AprilWithout flight tests, its current reliability asa weapon system would be low.North Korea continues to develop the TD2, which could reach the United States ifconfigured as an ICBM. In April andDecember 2012, North Korea conductedlaunches of the TD-2 configured as aSpace-Launch Vehicle (SLV). The Aprillaunch was a failure but the Decemberlaunch was a success.15, 2012 speech seemed to elevate theDeveloping an SLV contributes heavily tocommand to a status on par with theNorth Korea’s long-range ballistic missileNavy and Air Force. During heighteneddevelopment, since the two vehiclestensions on the Korean Peninsula InhaveMarch 2013, North Korea made the SRFHowever, a space launch does not test athe focus of its threat to launch a nuclearreentry vehicle (RV). Without an RVattack on U.S. and ROK targets.Thecapable of surviving atmospheric reentry,mainland,North Korea cannot deliver a weapon totargetsincludedtheU.S.Hawaii, Guam, U.S. bases in the ROK, andthe ROK President’s residence.manysharedtechnologies.target from an ICBM.North Korea showcases its ballistic missileNorth Korea displayed what it refers to asforce in high-level national celebrations.Hwasong-13 missiles, which appear to beMost of North Korea’s ballistic missilesintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),were paraded in July 2013. In addition toMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea10

theHwasong-13,theyunveiledanoperations (OCO) capability. Implicatedintermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)in malicious cyber activity and cyberand a version of the No Dong medium-effectsrange ballistic missile (MRBM) fitted with aKorea may view OCO as an appealingcone-cylinder-flare payload at paradesplatformduring the last three years. To date, theintelligence and cause disruption in SouthIRBM, like the new mobile ICBM, has notKorea.been flight-tested and its current reliabilityas a weapon system would be low.Development also continues on a iverysystems, coupled with developments innuclear technology discussed in Chapter5, are in line with North Korea’s statedobjective of being able to strike the U.S.homeland.NorthKoreafolloweditsFebruary 12, 2013 nuclear test with uncementsreaffirming its need to counter perceivedU.S. hostility with nuclear-armed ICBMs.North Korea continues to devote scarceresources to these programs, but thepace of its progress will also depend, inpart, on how much technology and otheraid it can gain from other countries.toNorthcollect From 2009 to 2011, North Korea wasallegedly responsible for a series ofdistributed denial of service attacksagainstSouthKoreangovernment, andin2009,commercial,military websites,rendering them briefly inaccessible. North Korea was allegedly behind twoseparate cyberattacks in 2013, whichtargetedSouthKoreanbanking,media, and governmental networks,resulting in the erasure of critical data.Given North Korea’s bleak economicoutlook, OCO may be seen as a costeffective way to develop asymmetric,deniable military options. Because ofNorth Korea’s historical isolation fromoutside communications and influence, itis also likely to use Internet infrastructurefrom third-party nations. This increases therisk of destabilizing actions and escalationon and beyond the Korean Peninsula.Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Koreaprobably has a military offensive cyberMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea11

CHAPTER FOUR:SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIESOF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCESThe KPA is a large ground force-centricmm guns and 240-mm multiple rocketmilitary, supported by a large ballisticlaunchers (MRLs), many of which nddeployed along the DMZ and pose aforces.Withconstant threat to northern parts of theapproximately 70 percent of its groundROK, including its capital city, Seoul.forces and 50 percent of its air and navalforces deployed within 100 kilometers ofthe DMZ, which has served as the defacto shared border since 1953, the KPAposes a continuous threat to the ROKand deployed U.S. forces. However, afterdecades under a failed economy andresulting food shortages, the KPA is aweakenedforcethatsuffersfromlogistical shortages, aging equipment,and inadequate training.Air Forces. The Air Force is primarilyresponsible for defending North Koreanair space. Its other missions include SOFinsertion,transportationandlogisticssupport, reconnaissance, and bombingand tactical air support for KPA groundforces.However,becauseofthetechnological inferiority of most of itsaircraftfleetandrigidairdefensecommand and control structure, muchof North Korea’s air defense is providedGround Forces. The KPA’s ground forcesby SAMs and antiaircraft artillery (AAA).are dominated by regular and lightinfantry units, supported by armor andmechanizedunitsandheavyconcentrations of artillery. These forcesare forward-deployed, fortified in severalthousand undergroundfacilities, andinclude long-range cannon and rocketartillery able to fire deep into the ROK,from the DMZ to Seoul, from eMiG-29combatandMiG-23fighters, and its SU-25 ground-attackaircraft. However, the majority of aircraftare less capable MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG19s(F-6),andMiG-21s.TheNKAFoperates a large fleet of AN-2 COLTaircraft, which are 1940s vintage singleengine, 10-passenger, biplanes, likelytasked with inserting SOF into the ROK.The ground forces possess numerous lightThe air force is rounded out with severaland medium tanks, and many armoredhundred helicopters, predominantly lery force includes long-range 170-andU.S.-madeMD-500helicopters obtained by circumventingMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea12

U.S. export controls in 1985. The rotary-StrategicSOFunits dispersed acrosswing fleet is used for troop transport andNorth Korea appear designed for rapidground attack.offensive operations, internal defenseagainst foreign attacks, or limited attacksNorthKoreapossessesadense,overlapping air defense system of SA-2,SA-3, and SA-5 SAM sites, mobile SA-13SAMs, mobile and fixed anti-aircraftartillery(AAA),andnumerousman-against vulnerable targets in the ROK aspart of a coercive diplomacy effort. SOFoperate in specialized units to includereconnaissance, airborne and vementandNaval Forces. The North Korean Navyairlifted by AN-2 COLT or helicopters (andportable air-defense systems like the SA-emphasizeothersurprisespeedofattacktoaccomplish their missions. SOF may be(NKN) is the smallest of the KPA’s threemainservices.Thiscoastalforceiscomposed primarily of aging, thoughnumerous, small patrol craft that carry avarietyofanti-shipcruisemissiles,torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintainsone of the world’s largest submarineforces, with around 70 attack-, coastal-,and midget-type submarines. In addition,the NKN operates a large fleet of aircushioned hovercraft and conventionallanding craft to support amphibiousoperations and SOF insertion. The force isdivided into East and West Coast Fleets,which each operate a range of lAirAdministrationtransports), moved by maritime insertionplatforms, and on foot over land or viasuspectedunderground,cross-bordertunnels to attack high-value targets likecommand and control nodes or airbases.Theater Ballistic Missiles. North Korea hasseveral hundred Toksa, SCUD SRBM andNo Dong MRBM missiles available for useagainst targets on the Korean Peninsulaand Japan. The developmental IRBM,though untested and unreliable as aweapon, could also be launched attargets in the region.submarines, and landing craft.IntelligenceSpecial Operations Forces. North KoreanSOF are among the most highly trained,well-equipped,best-fed,andhighlymotivated forces in the KPA. As NorthKorea’sconventionalcapabilitiesdecline relative to the ROK and UnitedStates,NorthKoreaappearstoincreasingly regard SOF capabilities asvital for asymmetric coercion.Services.NorthKorealeverages information collected by fourintelligence organizations to plan andformulateinternalpolicyandtoundermine the political stability of SouthKorea. North Korean intelligence andsecurity services collect political, military,economic, and technical alshumanintelligenceMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea13

l.TheDPRKintelligence collection targets are SouthNational Defense Commission (NDC) isKorea, the United States, and Japan.the symbolic nominal authority over theNorth’s military and security services. TheThe Ministry of State Secu

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States' most critical security challenges . These include North Korea's for many reasons willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic

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