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Journal of Strategy and Politics (2017), Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 18-63. Institute for the Study of Strategy and Politics 2017. Published subject tothe conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution License.Eisenhower and SoutheastAsia, Part I: BuildingContainmentRichard C. ThorntonInstitute for the Study of Strategy and PoliticsThis essay represents an initial attempt to analyze theEisenhower Administration’s policy toward Indochina in thecontext of the global Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Bydefinition, the analysis of U.S. foreign policy and the strategy onwhich it was based cannot be conducted in a vacuum, or in adiscreet bipolar compartment, but must be part of a global matrixthat includes an analysis of Soviet strategy and foreign policy, aswell as the strategies and policies of the relevant participants. Inthis case, these were The People’s Republic of China, GreatBritain, France, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (NorthVietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), Laos, andCambodia. The picture that emerges from such a global,strategic approach is markedly different from the conventionalview.The bipolar structure of the Cold War in fact disguised agreat strategic triangle comprised of the United States, theSoviet Union, and China. The tripolar structure emerged with theproclamation of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949,but it was quickly obscured by the Sino-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship and Alliance, which, on paper, bound Moscow andBeijing together for thirty years. NSC-68, its secret reciprocal, setforth the U.S. strategy of global Containment.These arrangements served both Moscow’s andWashington’s purposes in insuring that China remained within

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 19the Soviet security sphere. For Moscow, the Sino-Soviet allianceremoved a threat to the Soviet Union’s Far East. ForWashington, at least initially, keeping the Communist powerstogether justified the cost of maintaining a global forwardpresence on the Eurasian landmass to contain them. TheKorean War and China’s entry onto the field of battle against theUnited States reinforced this disguised tripolar structure, but it1did not long outlast Stalin’s death in March 1953.Eisenhower and the Building of ContainmentInitially, based on American strategic weaponssupremacy, the Eisenhower Administration continued and addedto the Truman Administration’s Containment strategy,supplementing the collective security arrangement of NATO withstructurally similar arrangements in the Middle East andSoutheast Asia, ringing what was then perceived as a unifiedCommunist bloc. By the middle of the decade, however, theemergence of the intercontinental ballistic missile forever alteredthe nature of international politics. Varying perceptions of whichside held the strategic weapons advantage affected the contentand timing of the conduct of foreign policy on the part ofWashington and Moscow, often in unpredictable ways.Strategic differences also emerged within both camps.China’s break with the Soviet Union and France’s break with theUnited States affected both powers differently as the SovietUnion sought to contain China while promoting a change in itspolicy and leadership and the United States played down whatwas a growing antagonism with France. Both developmentswould have a major impact on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.Based on these larger developments, the thesis of thisessay is that while the Eisenhower Administration carefullymonitored and quickly responded to changes perceived to be1For the strategic steps that led to the Korean War, see the author’s Odd ManOut: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War (Dulles: Brassey’s,2000).

20 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O Noccurring in the strategic weapons balance with the SovietUnion, it utterly failed to take account of, let alone takeadvantage of, the Sino-Soviet split, or, indeed, of the Frenchbreak with the United States in its policy toward Indochina.Worse, the failure of the administration to develop acounterinsurgency capability for its allies left it incapable ofmeeting challenges to Containment as they occurred. Indeed,these strategic omissions led to the failure of the administration’spolicy in Southeast Asia.President Eisenhower and Secretary of StateJohn Foster Dulles wielded U.S. nuclearsupremacy to gain concessions from Moscow.Image source: Wikimedia Commons.At the outset of his administration, Eisenhower employedboth carrot and stick in his Containment-building efforts. Whilewielding America’s nuclear supremacy in a coercive mode, healso offered to reach mutually acceptable settlements ofcontentious issues with Moscow. Most importantly, he was alsothe beneficiary of a fortuitous development within two months ofassuming office that offered an unparalleled opportunity to move

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 21forward on his agenda. This was the death of Stalin on March 5,1953.As it became apparent that the Soviet leaders wereundergoing a succession crisis, Eisenhower offered Moscow acarrot. In a speech on April 16 he sought “concrete evidence” ofthe Soviet Union’s desire for peace. If Soviet leaders wouldassist in resolving such problems as the Korean stalemate andthe Austrian impasse (a treaty ending WWII had not yet beenconcluded), the United States would be prepared to work out“just political settlements for the other serious and specific issuesbetween the free world and the Soviet Union [includingpromotion of] a broader European community and a free and2united Germany.”A few weeks later, following a non-committal reply from3Moscow, he brandished the stick. As the president put it in hismemoir, “we dropped the word, discreetly, of our intentions. Wefelt quite sure it would reach Soviet and Chinese Communistears.” In the absence of “satisfactory progress” on reaching anarmistice in Korea, “we intended to move decisively withoutinhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be4responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean peninsula.” Tounderscore the nuclear threat, Washington transferred atomicwarheads to Okinawa. When an armistice agreement was signedon July 27, 1953, both Eisenhower and his Secretary of State,John Foster Dulles, believed that the agreement was reached inno small part due to the administration’s threat to use its atomicpower.At the same time, and perhaps for the same reason,Eisenhower chose this moment to resolve a festering anddebilitating crisis between Great Britain and Iran. London and2“Text of Speech By Eisenhower Outlining Proposals For Peace in World,” NewYork Times, April 17, 1953, 4.“Text of the Soviet Union’s Statement Replying to President Eisenhower’sSpeech,” New York Times, April 26, 1953, 64.4Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Years, I: Mandate for Change (New York:Doubleday, 1963), 181.3

22 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O NTehran had been locked in a two-year struggle over British oilrights in Iran with no positive outcome in sight, and with agrowing prospect of a Soviet-inspired coup by the Tudeh Party.Eisenhower assumed, however, that the Russians were toopreoccupied with internal matters to interfere, and in early April1953 he authorized the CIA to cooperate with British intelligence5to bring about the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran.Restoring the shah to power established Iran as a strongally of the United States for the next twenty-five years andopened the door to American oil companies’ access to Iranianoil, the issue which had precipitated the original dispute withGreat Britain. The Iranian coup revealed the dual nature ofAmerican strategy. Not only did the United States move toconstruct an important segment of the anti-Communistcontainment structure around the Eurasian periphery, but did soin part at the expense of the former colonial power, Great Britain.Meanwhile, with the proclamation of the People’sRepublic, the Chinese leadership turned to the domestic task oftransforming the rudimentary party, military, and stateorganizations that had emerged during the revolution into aninstitutionalized and centralized state structure. Disagreementover form and content pitted Gao Gang, the Manchurian partychief, and Rao Shushi, the East China chief, against MaoZedong, who was able to surmount their challenge with supportfrom Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. In return fortheir assistance in defeating the Gao-Rao challenge, Maopromoted Liu and Deng to high positions in the newly created6Party-State structure.5“Memorandum of Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National SecurityCouncil,” Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, Iran, 19511954, Volume X, eds. Carl N. Raether and Charles S. Sampson (Washington:United States Government Printing Office, 1989), Document 312.6See the author’s China: A Political History, 1917-1980 (Boulder: Westview,1982), 238-42.

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 23Contrary to appearances of Sino-Soviet collaboration,Mao wanted to pursue an independent course.Image source: Library of Congress Prints and PhotographsDivision. Digital ID cph.3c11093Following Stalin’s death, China’s leaders also began todebate the nation’s future strategy and global orientation.Chairman Mao, refusing to accept subordination to the SovietUnion, argued in favor of shifting China out of the alliance andinto an independent position, while Vice-Chairmen Liu and Deng,based on their new positions in the leadership hierarchy, arguedthat China should remain within the Sino-Soviet alliance. The riftcreated a permanent split in the leadership between pro-Maoand pro-Soviet groups that would be a crucial factor shapingMoscow’s policy calculations toward China.

24 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O NVietnam and the Strategic TriangleThe French position in Indochina had been deterioratingsteadily through the early1950s. During World War II, PresidentRoosevelt had consistently opposed the French return toIndochina, seeking instead to organize a trusteeship for theregion. President Truman continued to uphold FDR’s policy eventhough the French had in the meantime returned to Indochinawith British assistance after the war. Their return quickly led tothe outbreak of war as the Communist Viet Minh took up armsagainst the French.The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 broughtabout a change in American policy toward Indochina. As part ofthe larger strategic decision to pursue global containment,President Truman extended U.S. support to the French inIndochina. Although Washington granted over 2 billion in aid tothe French, by the time Eisenhower assumed office, the Frenchposition had reached a crisis point.Eisenhower initially continued the Truman policy ofsupport for the French cause in Indochina, underwriting in the fallof 1953 the Navarre Plan designed to defeat the Viet Minh andsecure French control. In an attempt to deter Beijing fromcountering French efforts with additional support to the VietMinh, or, perhaps direct military intervention, Secretary of StateDulles raised for the second time the U.S. nuclear threat. Hewarned “the Communist Chinese regime should realize that sucha second aggression [after Korea] could not occur without grave7consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.”Neither the Navarre Plan nor U.S. attempts atdeterrence succeeded, and by early 1954 the looming Frenchcollapse at Dien Bien Phu persuaded the EisenhowerAdministration to change course and seek a diplomatic solution.Fortuitously, but for entirely different reasons, both the leaders in7Seth King, “Dulles Rules Out Yalu ‘Sanctuary’ If Foe Renews War,” New YorkTimes, September 3, 1953.

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 25Moscow and in Beijing sought the same end. Indeed, theresulting Geneva Accords would be, perhaps, the only instanceduring the entire Cold War when all three powers would act inparallel to achieve a common end, in this case at the expense oftheir respective allies, the French and the Viet Minh.The French collapse in Indochina in 1954 offeredKhrushchev an opportunity to reinforce the alliance with Chinaand to strengthen his own position in the post-Stalin successionstruggle. It gave Mao the opportunity to establish a defensiblesecurity structure along the southern border. And it offeredPresident Eisenhower the chance to construct the SoutheastAsian sector of global Containment.At first, the crisis at Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954produced a U.S. attempt to work out a multi-national supporteffort on behalf of France, which the Laniel government spurned.Although the United States provided some clandestine airsupport to French forces, defeat became inevitable and with itthe French decision to terminate its military involvement inVietnam.The French thereafter pursued a complex strategy somedescribed as a “double game,” designed on the one hand towithdraw forces from Indochina, while retaining economic andcultural ties to the region. On the other hand, Parisacknowledged the de facto control of the Viet Minh in Hanoi,while granting de jure recognition to the Government of Vietnamin Saigon. The Communist powers recognized the DRV—theDemocratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, while the westernpowers recognized the GVN—Government of (South) Vietnam.As military victors, the Viet Minh sought complete Frenchwithdrawal and immediate control of all Indochina—Cambodia,Laos, and Vietnam—the “Big Vietnam” concept. They proposedthe division of Vietnam at the thirteenth parallel, which wouldhave given them control of most of Vietnam and all of Cambodiaand Laos, and left the Government of Vietnam in control of a

26 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O Nsmall portion of territory comprising Saigon and the surroundingMekong Delta. Finally, they demanded unsupervised immediateelections carried out by local governments to legitimize theoutcome.Hanoi’s dreams quickly fell victim to the strategies of themajor powers, principally, the United States, the Soviet Union,and China. Failing to obtain British and French support for apolicy of United Action, in mid-April U.S. Secretary of StateDulles set in motion his own plan. First, he put forward theconcept that would in September become the South East AsiaTreaty Organization, or SEATO, a regional collective security8component of the global Containment strategy.On April 25, a few days before the Geneva conferenceopened, Dulles announced that the United States would notsupport any agreement contrary to its interests, and advancedthe idea of the partition of Vietnam. The next day, a Sovietdelegate approached the U.S. delegation to say that Moscowagreed with the idea of partition and that “the establishment of abuffer state to China’s south would be sufficient satisfaction of9China’s security needs.” (The United States purposely had nointeraction with the Chinese, so the Soviets played the role ofintermediary.)Thus, at the very outset of the Geneva conference,American, Soviet, and Chinese leaders had already decidedupon the fundamental outcome of a divided Vietnam. Dulles,acting from behind the scenes largely through British ForeignMinister Anthony Eden, followed up on this commonunderstanding with a seven point proposal that repudiated all ofthe Viet Minh’s demands and was largely accepted by both theSoviet Union and especially by China, whose representative,8“U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver, January-July, 1954,” UnitedStates-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, Report of the Office of the Secretary ofDefense Vietnam Task Force,* Part III, A1-A9 [Online atwww.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers. ] *Hereafter referred to asPentagon Papers.9“Sino-Soviet Objectives and Strategy,” Pentagon Papers, Part III, C22.

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 2710Zhou Enlai negotiated the main outlines of the accords. Indeed,although never publicly acknowledged, Dulles’ seven-pointproposal would constitute the essential framework of agreements11that became known as the Geneva Accords.The seven-point proposal would split off Cambodia andLaos from Vietnam, rather than including them as the Viet Minhdemanded. Vietnam would be more equitably divided at theseventeenth parallel, not the thirteenth. Elections would notoccur immediately, but only after two years and were to besupervised by an International Control Commission, notmanaged by the Vietnamese themselves. Vietnamese would bepermitted to relocate to either side of the parallel, as desired, andno impediment would be placed in the way of eventualreunification of the country.Dulles’ seven-point proposal offered a solution, but itwas Khrushchev and Mao who brought it to fruition. Theoutcome was largely the work of Khrushchev, who, seeking tostrengthen the Sino-Soviet alliance, negotiated a far-reachingagreement with Mao, of which the Geneva Accords were a part.Not only did Khrushchev agree to establish a North Vietnamesebuffer state on China’s southern border, but he also agreed towithdraw Soviet troops from Manchuria, returning full control toBeijing. In addition to satisfying Mao’s territorial interests,Khrushchev also agreed to additional economic aid, includingSoviet assistance in constructing two railroad lines to connect to12the Soviet rail system.Mao’s strategy in Southeast Asia only became apparentin the course of time. Although professing support for the VietMinh, he opposed Hanoi’s “Big Vietnam” strategy, seekinginstead the establishment of buffer states on China’s southern10Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Raleigh: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2000), 92-112.“U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver, January-July, 1954,”Pentagon Papers, Part III, A-37-A-39.12Thornton, China: A Political History, 239.11

28 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O Nborder. He assumed that a fragmented region, even with theUnited States supporting the GVN, meant that Vietnam wouldnot emerge as a threat on China’s southern border. In the shortrun, this objective was accomplished by the creation of the DRVand the putative independence of Laos and Cambodia.The irony of the Geneva Accords was that the Frenchwere put into the position of negotiating their own exit, on termsthat were determined by the United States, the Soviet Union, andChina. The French and the Viet Minh were the only signatoriesand were the only responsible parties tasked with theimplementation of the accords. In particular, they were tomanage the elections two years hence. But the French becameconsumed by the Algerian revolution and devoted few resourcesto Indochina; the Viet Minh would not permit free elections in theNorth and could not force them in the GVN.The GVN, now led by President Ngo Dinh Diem, hadrejected every provision in the accords, publicly declared thatthey would not comply, and did not sign them—even though theaccords conferred international legitimacy on the Government ofVietnam. Declared to be temporary, the seventeenth parallelbecame a de facto division line, and nationwide elections werenever held.The two-year election reprieve gave both Vietnamesegovernments the opportunity to consolidate their respectiveregimes, the north more successfully than the south. SecretaryDulles, publicly dissociating the United States from the accords,quickly established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization(SEATO), which included a protocol extending its protection tothe free states of Laos, Cambodia, and the Government ofVietnam. Washington immediately extended aid programs tothem, replacing the French in South Vietnam, and supplementing13them in Laos and Cambodia. The Mendès France governmentaccepted the inevitable, but with great resentment. French13SEATO membership was: United States, United Kingdom, France, Pakistan,Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 29indignation found expression in Paris’ rejection of the U.S.sponsored, but French-devised, European Defense Communityplan a month after the end of the conference.The Fifties’ Strategic CrucibleThe mid-1950s saw the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese,Laotian, and Cambodian leaderships go through a tortuousdecision-making process to make strategic choices that wouldgovern their respective foreign policies for the next two decades.thKhrushchev began the process in early 1956 at the 20 PartyCongress with his speech denouncing Stalin and proclamationchanging Communist doctrine from the inevitability of war topeaceful coexistence. These changes were a startling reversal ofthe Stalinist policies he himself had espoused in the first phaseof his struggle with Georgi Malenkov for Stalin’s mantle. Then, ithad been Malenkov who advocated détente with the west andKhrushchev who had opposed it.In repudiating Stalin and switching to peacefulcoexistence, Khrushchev set about attempting to change theleaderships throughout the Communist world, whether thoseinstalled by Stalin, as in Eastern Europe, North Korea, and NorthVietnam, or those who had arisen through indigenous struggleagainst Stalin’s men, as in Yugoslavia and China. The ensuingturmoil led to rebellion that fall throughout Eastern Europe,resulting in Soviet military interventions in Hungary and Poland.Accompanying political turmoil in North Vietnam, Laos, andCambodia would lay the foundation for the war in Vietnam.In China, pro-Soviet leaders Liu and Deng forced Mao toconcede some portion of his power, but could not dislodge him.thAt the 8 Party Congress in the fall of 1956, the new partyconstitution emphasized collective leadership, instead ofpromoting Mao Zedong as sole ruler. Liu was named chairmanof the newly created politburo standing committee and Deng wasnamed to head the party secretariat, promotions that gave both

30 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O Nmen control over the party apparatus. Mao, it seemed, was beingeased upstairs to a largely ceremonial role, while his adversarieswielded real power.Continuing the peaceful coexistence line, in late January1957, the Soviet Union sponsored a crafty UN scheme to seatNorth Vietnam and North Korea. In response to a proposal fromone of their friends in the assembly to seat South Vietnam andSouth Korea, the Soviets proposed to seat North Vietnam and14North Korea, too. Within a few weeks, by early March,however, the Soviets themselves scotched this scheme, but itwas too late to avoid the consequences, especially in Indochina.The thrust of the proposal to bring both North and SouthVietnam into the UN implied that the conflict in Indochina wasover, which greatly incensed the North Vietnamese, then alreadydiscussing their response to Diem’s refusal to hold elections.That same thrust encouraged the neutralist Royal LaoGovernment to press for an end to conflict in their land. Withinweeks, however, by early March, Khrushchev reversed course inthe Far East because it had become clear that his expectationsthat a pro-Soviet leadership would emerge in Beijing would bedisappointed.As Mao had done before and would do again, in early1957, he began the battle to reclaim lost power. Mao’s speech inlate February, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Amongthe People,” signaled the beginning of his comeback. It wouldkick off a six-month “hundred flowers campaign,” an extensivepurge and promotion process throughout the central andprovincial party apparatuses. At the same time, Mao may alsohave supported Khrushchev’s internal adversaries, who mountedan effort to remove him from power in what became known as15the “anti-party crisis” of June 1957.14Mari Olsen, Soviet-Vietnamese Relations and the Role of China 1949-64,Changing Alliances (New York: Routledge, 2006), 73-74.15Khrushchev certainly thought so. Later, in 1963 when the Sino-Soviet conflicthad erupted in open polemics, Khrushchev warned the Chinese publicly not to try

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 31During a four-day Politburo session, June 18-21,Khrushchev’s adversaries exercised a seven to four votingmajority in an attempt to oust him. Malenkov, Molotov,Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Saburov, Bulganin, and Voroshilovvoted against Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov, and Kirichenko.However, Khrushchev challenged the validity of the vote,charging the majority with illegal action based on a 1922 partyban on factional activity. Taking the issue to the CentralCommittee, where he held the majority, his supportersoverturned the Politburo vote and in addition voted to removefive of the seven Politburo members who had voted againstKhrushchev. Only Bulganin and Voroshilov were retained andthe Politburo itself was enlarged from eleven to fifteen members,giving Khrushchev a clear majority.The “anti-party crisis” was a turning point in Soviethistory, but the strategic issue in question was never disclosed,except to say that the anti-party group were “shackled by oldnotions and methods, that they fail to see the new conditions,the new situation, that they take a conservative attitude and clingstubbornly to obsolete forms and methods of work that are nolonger in keeping with the interests of the movement toward16communism.”In retrospect, from the policy shift that occurred at thistime, it is apparent that the issue over which the Politburo hadfought was Khrushchev’s proposal to adopt a more muscularstrategy. A review of subsequent Soviet policy behavior allowsreconstruction of its main thrusts.Two points were cardinal. The first was a decision toutilize the power of a new weapon that would soon revolutionizeworld politics: the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). TheRussians held an early lead in ICBM development and“to change the leadership in our country and not poke your noses in ourcountry.” See “N.S. Khrushchev, Speech to Visiting Hungarian Delegation,” 19July 1963, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, July 22, 1963, BB 13-14.16Pravda, July 4, 1957, 1.

32 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O NKhrushchev sought to employ this advantage against the UnitedStates in geopolitical crises as part of an effort to leapfrog theContainment structure. (Of course, as we know, Khrushchevoverestimated Soviet missile capabilities, as would bedramatically demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis, buthe in fact subtly employed Soviet missile claims to advantage17during the Syrian-Turkish crisis of late 1957.)The second point was a decision to adopt an activecontainment strategy against China to forestall a break. Takingthe initiative in the incipient Sino-Soviet conflict, Khrushchevstrove to contain China by improving relations with its neighbors,even while attempting, as we shall see, to support Mao’sopponents. Thus, he moved to strengthen relations with India,North Korea, and North Vietnam, even Indonesia. The key stepwas the reversal of policy toward North Vietnam.Following the failure to hold nationwide elections in1956, the North Vietnamese leadership had begun to debate theway forward toward South Vietnam. The question was shouldHanoi embark on full-scale war against the South, as proposedby the pro-Soviet Le Duan, or move to low-level insurgency, asthe pro-Mao Truong Chinh advocated? Through 1956, it seemedthat Truong Chinh would prevail.Mao’s resurgence in early 1957, however, persuadedKhrushchev to reverse his earlier position, which led to the “antiparty” crisis in mid-year. In pursuing his containment strategyagainst China, he offered to support a decision for war thatwould satisfy North Vietnam’s long-term objective of establishinga Big Vietnam. Khrushchev also calculated that war in Vietnamwould heal the breach in the Sino-Soviet alliance, if the UnitedStates and China were drawn into conflict. It would be a replay ofa similar scheme that Stalin had crafted during the Korean War.Mao, hoping to avoid another conflict with the United States onChina’s border, consistently advocated the lesser of two evils—a17For a discussion of the crisis, see Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria(London: Oxford, 1965), 303-305.

IKE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:B U I L D I N G C O N T A I N M E N T 33low-level insurgency against South Vietnam, which would notentangle China, while Liu and Deng supported a big war.With Soviet support, Ho Chi Minhsought to unify Vietnam underCommunist control. Image: Portrait ofRaging throughthe second half of theyear,followingaMaoist-like“hundredflowers” movement anddissident purge, theNorth Vietnamese hadtheir own “crisis of1957,” which was onlyresolvedinlateDecember when Ho ChiMinh, Le Duan, and VoNguyen Giap appearedtogether in public, andTruong Chinh fadedfrom view.ThestrategicissuehadbeensettledHo Chi Minh, 1946—Wikipedia18in favor of Moscow.The decision, as became clear in retrospect, was to begin theconflict as a low-level insurgency, and then gradually escalate itinto full-blown war. In what would be a continuing and growingdilemma, the Vietnamese realized that a Sino-Soviet split wouldseverely hamper their own plans for revolutionary unification ofVietnam and made every effort to heal the growing breach19between Moscow and Beijing.Ho Chi Minh played a crucial role in this effort. Oftendepicted as neutral between Moscow and Beijing, Ho was18“Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam,” Pentagon Papers, Part IV. A. 5.,Tab 3, II, 50-52.See Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and theSecond Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (North Carolina: McFarland, 1997) for adetailed analysis of this effort.19

34 R I C H A R D C . T H O R N T O Nanything but. A Comintern agent and loyal Stalinist since the1920s, Ho was in full agreement on the long-term strategicobjective of a Big Vietnam, which called for not only theunification of Vietnam, but also the incorporation of Laos andCambodia into Hanoi’s sphere.Ho’s great challenge was to convince Mao that thisobjective was worthy of Chinese support. While Mao agreed tothe Big Vietnam str

United States affected both powers differently as the Soviet Union sought to contain China while promoting a change in its policy and leadership and the United States played down what was a growing antagonism with France. Both developments would have a major impact on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

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NGOs working on the ground, who agreed to be interviewed for this report. Illustrations by Jocie Juritz/IRC. Acknowledgements . The Cruelty of Containment: The Mental Health Toll of the EU’s ‘Hotspot’ Approach on the Greek Islands The Cruelty of Containment: The Mental Health Toll of the EU’s ‘Hotspot’ Approach on the Greek Islands .

reengineered Poly-Flo PP and HDPE co-extruded double containment pipe. System shall meet the pressure and materials requirements of the specifications. Poly-Flo co-extruded pipe has a carrier pipe rating of SDR11 rated for 150psi at 68 F, and containment pipe rating of SDR17 rated for

LIFE-SAFETY FIRE CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 07210/THC BuyLine 2999 Fire Containment Curtain Wall Systems . Since the floor assembly is typically a fire-rated system, a possible route for fire spread is through and up . or DUROCK Brand Exterior Cement

ASME 9/EN ISO 15614–1 standards and can undergo dye penetration testing to ASME standards, if required. Furthermore, the flange welds may be x-rayed to most recognized international standards. Weight Electrical Standard Containment Optional Outer Containment Optional Second Containment Case pressure Limited by the Case failure

complete drainage of both the primary and secondary containment piping. Interstitial supporting devices shall be made from Polypropylene Centra-Guide supports and shall be provided within the secondary containment pipe, and shall be designed to allow continuous drainage in the annular space to the drain points. Drain fittings