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DEFENSE PROJECTHow the US CanAssist NATO andits EuropeanAlliance Membersin Addressing theChina SecurityChallengeJames E. Long, United States Air ForcePA P E RJUNE 2022

Defense ProjectBelfer Center for Science and International AffairsHarvard Kennedy School79 JFK StreetCambridge, MA tatements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the author(s) and do not implyendorsement by Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science andInternational Affairs.The designations employed and the presentation of the material on the maps in this report do not implythe expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city orarea or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

DEFENSE PROJECTHow the US CanAssist NATO andits EuropeanAlliance Membersin Addressing theChina SecurityChallengeJames E. Long, United States Air ForcePA P E RJUNE 2022

DisclaimerThe views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authorand do not reflect the official policy or position of Harvard University, theKennedy School of Government, the US government or the Departmentof Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, IntellectualProperty-Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1September 1998, the content of this paper is not copyrighted but is the property ofthe United States government.About The AuthorJames E. Long is a Colonel in the United States Air Force and is a NationalSecurity Fellow with the Defense Project at the Belfer Center for Science andInternational Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.About the Defense ProjectThe Defense Project seeks to increase the Belfer Center’s visibility and capacity toadvance policy relevant knowledge in defense and international security areas andhelp prepare future leaders for service in those fields. Through a robust speakerseries of visiting senior military officers and DoD civilian leaders, this initiativelinks defense professionals with Belfer researchers, faculty, and Kennedy Schoolstudents, to facilitate better policymaking in the field and enrich the education offellows and students about security issues.Within the Defense Project, the National Security Fellowship is a 10-monthresearch fellowship for U.S. military officers at the Lt Col/Colonel rank and theircivilian counterparts who show promise of rising to the most challenging leadership positions within their organizations. This approved senior service collegefellowship provides officers and officials with the tools to make the transition fromoperational to strategic expertise.iiHow the Us Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

AcknowledgmentsI would like to thank the following individuals who either provided guidance orinput for this paper. None of them are responsible for the final product, and anyerrors or misjudgments are the responsibility of the author. Mr. David Cattler, Assistant Secretary General for Intelligenceand Security, NATO Gen (Ret) Joseph Dunford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Fewsmith, Professor of International Relations and PoliticalScience and Director of the Boston University Center for the Studyof Asia, Boston University Alastair Iain Johnston, The Governor James Albert Noe and Linda NoeLaine Professor of China in World Affairs, Harvard University Seth A. Johnston, adjunct assistant professor in the Walsh School ofForeign Service at Georgetown University Philippe Le Corre, Research Fellow with the Mossavar-Rahmani Center forBusiness and Government and the Ash Center for Democratic Governanceand Innovation at the Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University Dr. Maria Robson, Project Coordinator for the Intelligence Project,Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University Anthony Saich, Director of the Ash Center for DemocraticGovernance and Innovation and Daewoo Professor ofInternational Affairs, Harvard University Gen (Ret) Curtis Scaparrotti, former Supreme Allied CommanderEurope, NATO Andrew Schad, Office of Special Investigations, Department of theAir Force Dr. Jude Sunderbruch, Executive Director of Office of SpecialInvestigations, Department of the Air ForceBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy Schooliii

Table of ContentsExecutive Summary. 1Introduction.3Section I: Security Concerns Posed by China.5Section II: Opposition to NATO’s Fundamental Values. 15Section III: Helping NATO and its Alliance Members Address the ChinaSecurity Challenge. 18Conclusion.34Bibliography.35Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy Schoolv

In this June 24, 2020 file photo, soldiers from China’s People’sLiberation Army march toward Red Square during the VictoryDay military parade marking the 75th anniversary of the Nazidefeat in Red Square in Moscow, Russia. Chinese and Russianforces will take part in joint military exercises in southern Russialater in September. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, File).viHow the Us Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

Executive SummaryThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies havea long history with China that has fluctuated between competitor,adversary, and ally. However, in response to US urging and USnational security strategy, NATO and its allies have now recognizedChina’s economic growth, global influence, and rejection ofinternational norms as a concern that needs to be addressed bothas a competitor and potential adversary. In an enormous shift in itsposition, NATO leadership began to make serious statements aboutChina in 2020. As such, NATO issued a communique in June 2021expressing concern that China’s ambitions and assertiveness present asystemic challenge to the rules-based international order.1 Moreover,according to the NATO 2030 Reflection Group2, China is expectedto challenge NATO’s collective resilience within a decade and itsextensive military modernization efforts across all domains that willpresent major risks and potential threats to NATO and its members.3In particular, China leverages all of its instruments of power—economic, military, informational, technological, and diplomatic—toadvance its strategic objectives and specifically to be the world’s leaderin artificial intelligence (AI) and the global technological superpower.Most concerning is China’s current alliance with Russia that threatensto disrupt the rules-based international order and to subvert NATO’sfundamental values of individual liberty, democracy, human rightsand the rule of law. NATO and its European allies are beginning torecognize that US defense of Europe will change due to China, andEurope must adjust accordingly.41 ATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government ParticipatingNin the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021.”2 As a result of the NATO Meeting of Heads of State and Government in London in December2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was asked to assess ways to strengthen thepolitical dimension of the NATO Alliance. Subsequently, in April 2020, Stoltenberg appointedan independent Reflection Group co-chaired by Thomas de Maizière and A. Wess Mitchell andconsisting of John Bew, Greta Bossenmaier, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Marta Dassù, Anna Fotyga,Tacan Ildem, Hubert Védrine, and Herna Verhagen who produced NATO 2030: United for a NewEra report.3 NATO, “Reflection Group Final Report: NATO 2030 United for a New Era.”4 Dempsey, “Judy Asks.”Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School1

As such, the US needs to assist NATO and its European allies in several areas toaddress a rising China:1. Rebuild credibility with allies and work with them to define what it meansto be a full-fledged NATO partner;2. Better explain US concerns with China and share the underlyinginformation with NATO and its alliance members;3. Work with NATO leadership to extend NATO’s militarytechnologies & capabilities, training, and political influenceto Indo-Pacific partners;4. Help NATO create research and development (R&D) centers and defenseinnovation hubs to harness emerging technologies being developed by allies;5. Help NATO create a center of excellence (COE) for democratic resilienceto focus on challenges to democracy within and external to the alliance;6. Assist NATO and Europe with developing a counter to China’s Belt andRoad (BRI) Initiative;7. Help create a COE for supply chain and logistics;8. Promote a NATO-European Defense Force to free up US commitments;9. Promote closer collaboration between EU, NATO, and the U.S; and10. Foster managed strategic competition with China.This report offers these possible actions as NATO and its allies continue todevelop their Strategic Concept.2How the Us Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

IntroductionChina’s meoteoric rise and the associated US-China great power rivalry hasbecome one of the most concerning geopolitical issues to date. No longer is Chinaa regional power, and its global influence and economic clout are undeniable.According to the CIA World Factbook, China has the largest Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) in the world when measured using Purchasing Power Parity. Asof 2021, at 23.01 trillion, China outpaces the US at 19.85 trillion GDP.5 As aneconomic powerhouse, China has effectively used all instruments of power—economic, military, diplomatic, technological and informational—to advance itsstrategic goals. Unfortunately, the ways and means in which China is obtainingits strategic goals have frequently run counter to democratic ideals, caused a riftwith its Indo-Pacific neighbors, the US and several European countries, and havechallenged the rules-based international order. While NATO and its allies arebeginning to understand the implications of a rising China, there is a pressingneed right now for NATO and its allies to address China concerns; this starts withidentifiying actions the alliance can take in the 2030 Strategic Concept.6In June 2021, NATO issued “NATO 2030,” which is NATO’s agenda for remaining“ready, strong, and united” for the future. During the June 2021 NATO Summit,alliance leaders agreed on the agenda to address extensive global competition,terrorism, cyberattacks, disruptive technologies, climate change, and Russiaand China’s challenge to the rules-based international order. NATO 2030 notedChina’s attempt to be the global leader in AI in the next ten years and called forstrengthening partnerships to protect against China and Russia’s efforts to disruptthe international rules-based order. Importantly, it called upon NATO to developa new [2030] Strategic Concept to provide a clear direction for NATO to addressincreased global competition and security threats, including a shift in the balanceof power involving China.7At the summit, US President Joe Biden reemphasized the critical importance of theNATO alliance as a “sacred obligation” to US national security and urged NATOleaders to address China’s authoritarianism and growing military strength.8 After5 CIA, “CIA World Factbook: China”; CIA, “CIA World Factbook: United States.”6 Dempsey, “Judy Asks.”7 NATO, “NATO 2030 Factsheet.”8 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg During Greeting.”Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School3

President Biden’s statements, NATO issued a communique noting, “China’s statedambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-basedinternational order and to areas relevant to alliance security.”9 This statementwas further bolstered by NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, whoaddressed the future of NATO during a presentation at the University of ChicagoBooth School of Business. Geoană highlighted the need for NATO to adapt andbe innovative as it formulates its 2030 Strategic Concept to include addressing thethreat of authoritarian regimes like China and Russia. Importantly, he emphasizedthe importance of NATO as the longest running and strongest alliance in historyand its critical need to protect democracy, freedom, justice, rule of law, and humanrights across the globe, not just the transatlantic region. Geoană emphasizedthat Secretary General Stoltenberg would present an upgraded Strategic Conceptduring the Madrid NATO Summit in June 2022, noting that China was nevermentioned in the previous 2010 Strategic Concept.10Based upon NATO’s new focus and the pending release of the NATO 2030Strategic Concept, this paper will specifically examine the security challengesthat China poses to NATO and its alliance members. It will also highlight China’sopposition to democratic principles and its efforts to disrupt the rules-basedinternational order. Finally, the paper will identify possible actions the US can taketo help NATO and its alliance members address the China challenge to preserveNATO’s fundamental values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights andthe rule of law.49 NATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting ofthe North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021.”10 NATO, “Deputy Secretary General Discusses the NATO Summit and the Future of Alliance.”How the Us Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

SECTION ISecurity Concerns Posed by ChinaDuring his April 2021 testimony before the House Permanent Select Committeefor Intelligence, William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,stressed that China is the most important geopolitical threat the US has faced inthe 21st century. Burns explained the threat was military, ideological, values-based,economic, competition, and technological.11 Most notably, Burns cited China asthe single greatest technological threat to the US.12 As such, China poses seriousconcerns to the US, NATO, and its associated alliance members.13Building a Global Military PowerAccording to Graham Allision, China President Xi Jinping has a plan for “MakingChina Great Again.”14 This starts with restoring China as the preeminent powerin Asia, whether it involves securing its borders and proximate seas or reclaimingfull control over historically Chinese territories. China wants to command therespect of other great powers in global forums based upon the precept that Chinais the center of universe.15 To achieve this plan, China needs to build a globallydominant military that can project power anywhere in the world. According tothe NATO 2030 Reflection Group, China would challenge NATO’s collectiveresilience within a decade and would eventually project military power in theEuro-Atlantic region. The Reflection Group further noted China’s large-scalemilitary modernization efforts—across all domains as well its military-civilfusion strategy—would present major risks and potential threats to NATO and itsmembers.16Under Xi Jinping, China continues to aggressively reform and build China’smiliary at an unpresented level. As explained by Allison, Xi Jinping’s emphasison reform is needed to ensure complete loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party11 Burns, “China Poses Biggest Geopolitical Test For US In 21st Century.”12 BBC News, “Chinese Man Convicted for Stealing Aviation Trade Secrets.”13 David Cattler, Interview of Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, NATO.14 Allison, Destined for War - Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, 109.15 Allison, 109.16 NATO, “Reflection Group Final Report: NATO 2030 United for a New Era.”Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School5

(CCP) and himself.17 Notably though, Xi Jinping wants the ability to fight and winwars, which is essential for its status as a great power and its need to overcome acentury of humiliation by imperialist powers. Accordingly, China’s modernizationefforts focus on integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance across allwarfighting domains; and, similar to the US, incorporating theater (geographic)commands and implementing joint doctrine.18Beyond reform of the military, China is fielding advanced military technologiesthat further project power while providing superior defense to its territory.China’s military expenditures are more than that of all Indo-Pacific countriescombined.19 Xi Jinping has significantly bolstered the People Liberation Army’s(PLA) naval, air, and missile forces to control the seas. This includes anti-shipmissiles, hypersonic missiles, smart mines, submarines, and antisatellite weaponsthat effectively give China anti-access/area denial capability along its coasts andterritories, including the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. All of this wouldmake it very difficult for the US or NATO countries to intervene in cross borderdisputes or protect global sea lanes and commerce.20 Allison noted that China’sdeclared defense spending is currently about one half the US spending and is oncourse to be equal.21In addition, China is building military bases overseas and in areas that wouldgive it a geostrategic advantage. Through China’s BRI, China has been rapidlyacquiring global ports that could be used for military operations.22 For example,China established its first-ever overseas military base at the port of Djibouti,Africa, which is located at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. There isgrowing concern that China’s militarization of the Djibouti port is a bellwether forChina’s intent in other strategic locations, such as Tanzania, United Arab Emirates,Pakistan, Burma, or Israel. China’s recent acquisition of Israel’s Haifa Port could17 Allison, Destined for War - Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, 128–30.18 Allison, 128–30.19 Campbell and Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order.”20 Allison, Destined for War - Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, 131–32; Campbell and Doshi, “HowAmerica Can Shore Up Asian Order.”21 Allison and Glick-Unterman, “The Great Military Rivalry.” This evaluation uses the Central Intelligence Agency andInternational Monetary Fund metric for comparing national economies.22 G en (Ret) Curtis Scaparrotti, Interview of Gen (Ret) Curtis Scaparrotti, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe,NATO (2016 - 2019).6How the Us Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

easily provide an intelligence collection platform to monitor the US Navy’s SixthFleet.23In addition to seaports, China is building artificial islands in the South China Seawhere it has 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and seven in the Spratlys equatingto 3,200 acres of new land.24 Not only is China aggressively building and fortifyingthese islands, China’s claims to these areas have been called into question by thePermanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.25 Gregory B. Poling, Directorof the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and a fellow with the SoutheastAsia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes theseislands are used to coerce China’s Southeast Asian neighbors, like Vietnam andPhilippines, but also serve as a strategic buffer against the US and its allies. Forexample, China has deployed advanced jet fighters, anti-cruise ship missiles,surface-to-air missiles, radar and signals intelligence, and constructed hardenedfacilities and ammunition depots on these islands; thus, illustrating they are usedfor military purpose.26 The military buildup on these artificial islands occurreddespite China’s claim that they would not militarize these islands.27Cyberattacks and IntellectualProperty (IP) ThreatsNATO’s 2030 Reflection Group noted that several NATO countries attributedlarge-scale IP theft by Chinese actors and disinformation campaigns originatingfrom China.28 China’s global acquisition efforts include exploitation of academicinstitutions and talent programs, cyber hacking and theft, and investmentin US companies to obtain critical technology.29 According to John Demers,Director of the Department of Justice (DOJ) National Security Division, Chinais the primary actor responsible for the theft of US IP. Demers noted that over80% of DOJ’s economic espionage cases are tied to China. He explained that23 Xie, “China’s Global Network of Shipping Ports Reveal Beijing’s Strategy.”24 AMTI, “China Tracker.”25 I n 2016, in a case brought by the Philippines, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that most ofChina’s claims to areas within the South China Sea had no legal basis. The Chinese government subsequently rejectedthe ruling and continued to build civil and military infrastructure.26 Poling, “The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong.”27 Gen (Ret) Curtis Scaparrotti, Interview of Gen (Ret) Curtis Scaparrotti, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe,NATO (2016 - 2019).28 NATO, “Reflection Group Final Report: NATO 2030 United for a New Era.”29 Blumenthal and Zhang, “China Is Stealing Our Technology and Intellectual Property. Congress Must Stop It.”Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School7

China steals IP, recreates the product, then displaces the US company in theglobal market. Demers advised that the PLA had historically engaged in cyberoperations to steal the IP, but more recently China has employed the Ministryof State Security to conduct classic insider espionage. As an example, Demershighlighted the “Thousand Talents” program as a Chinese instrument for illegallyobtaining IP.30 The program targets academics and scientists who can providesensitive IP to China under the ruse that the program is an open effort to sharecollaborative research.31 According to the US National Intelligence Council, theThousand Talents Program is providing China with “the legal and illicit transferof US technology, intellectual property and know-how to China.” As a result ofthe program, in 2017, China created 73 companies in China and recruited 11,000overseas high-level talent to China.32It is estimated that China’s efforts to steal IP cost the US between 225 and 600billion per year.33 For example, in 2014 and 2015, China penetrated the USGovernment’s Office of Personnel Management and stole the personnel files ofover 4 million current or former federal employees. Of note, this cyber operationobtained the background investigations of federal employees who held top secretclearances.34 In another example, a Chinese intelligence officer was convictedby a US court of five counts of economic espionage. The intelligence officer, whoworked for China’s Ministry of State Security, was arrested in Belgium in 2018and was subsequently extradited to the US. The intelligence officer had targetedemployees of US companies since 2013 with the aim of stealing US technology tohelp China’s economy and military.35Developing Advanced Technologiesto be the Global Leader in Space,Cyberspace, Communications and AIThe NATO 2030 Reflection Group suggested China posed grave risks in criticalsectors such as telecommunications, space, cyberspace, and new technologies. In30 National Law Review, “The Department of Justice’s National Security Division Chief Addresses China’s Campaign toSteal U.S. Intellectual Property.”31 Burgess, “China’s Thousand Talents Program Harvests U.S. Technology and a Guilty Verdict.”32 Burgess.33 Blumenthal and Zhang, “China Is Stealing Our Technology and Intellectual Property. Congress Must Stop It.”34 Gordon and Rosenbach, “America’s Cyber-Reckoning Foreign Affairs.”35 BBC News, “Chinese Man Convicted for Stealing Aviation Trade Secrets.”8How the Us Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

particular, the Reflection Group emphasized China intends to become a worldleader in AI by 2030 and the world’s leading global technological superpower by2049.36 For example, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET)reported the PLA likely spent over 1.6 billion per year on AI-related technologies,believing its AI efforts would provide an asymmetric advantage over the US. CSETfurther highlighted that China’s military-civil fusion strategy gave China a majoradvantage in obtaining advanced AI technology from its commercial sector.37 Inaddition, Pierre Delsaux, Deputy Director General at the European Commission,specifically highlighted that China is rapidly moving to dominate the spacedomain and advised during a 2021 defense forum that, “It’s something that weneed to take into account because again dominating space will mean dominatingthe world.”38This statement was further bolstered by the 2020 US Defense SpaceStrategy that noted China views space as a warfighting domain critical to modernwarfare where counterspace technologies can be used to thwart US and its alliesin an effort to win wars.39 As such, China is pursuing advanced technologiesand counterspace weapon capabilities, such as jammers, lasers, kinetic-kill oranti-satellite (ASAT) systems, and cyber-attack capabilities that could threaten USand its allies’ space assets.40Leveraging Chinese Companies as Proxiesfor Military and Intelligence OperationsAs an authoritarian state, China has a blurry public-private sector divide. Evenif a Chinese company is not owned by the state, China’s government wields anenormous influence on their operations and may use the company to achieve stategoals.The best example is Huawei Technologies. Huawei’s rise illustrates Chinesenational policy of achieving technological superiority when Huawei became thelargest global telecommunication equipment manufacturer. Although Huaweihad primarily been a telecommunications infrastructure manufacturer, it becamea major producer of smartphones wherein it was the only company that could36 NATO, “Reflection Group Final Report: NATO 2030 United for a New Era.”37 Fedasiuk, Melot, and Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning.”38 U ppal, “China to Become Global Space Power by Advancing Its ‘Space Silk Road’ Strategy to Back Its Belt and RoadPlan.”39 Department of Defense, “2020 Defense Space Strategy Summary.”40 CRS, “Space as a Warfighting Domain: Issues for Congress.”Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School9

produce all elements of a 5G network. With Huawei subsequently dominatingthe 5G market, Europe and other global markets were ready and willing to obtainHuawei 5G services.41 Unfortunately for Europe, Huawei was identified by the USGovernment as a proxy for Chinese intelligence and military operations. AmidstChina’s denials, The Washington Post published an article citing that it came intopossession of more than 100 Huawei PowerPoint presentations and many weremarked “confidential.”42 The Washington Post theorized Huawei had a greaterrole in tracking China’s population including five surveillance activities: voicerecording analysis, detention center monitoring, location tracking of politicalindividuals of interest, police surveillance in the Xinjiang region, and corporatetracking of employees and customers.43 Ultimately, the US Secretary of Defenseprioritized the Huawei concern as a serious threat to European allies that wouldessentially make their communications vulnerable to Chinese intelligencecollection efforts, manipulations, and disruption.44Expanding and Modernizing its Nuclear ArsenalAccording to commercial satellite imagery released in July and September 2021,China was developing 300 hardened underground silos to house IntercontinentalBallistic Missiles (ICBM). The ICBMs are potentially capable of delivering 10independently targetable nuclear warheads; thus, significantly increasing China’sstrategic nuclear arsenal.45 According to US Navy Admiral Charles Richard,Commander of United States Strategic Command, China’s efforts to expand andmodernize its nuclear capability was “breathtaking” and a “strategic breakout.”46Moreover, Admiral Richard stressed the US now faced two nuclear peercompetitors in Russia and China who were routinely conducting joint operationsand training together. Additionally, Admiral Richard emphasized that Chinaand Russia were developing hypersonic cruise missiles that could be capable ofdelivering nuclear warheads across the globe.4741 Kaska, Beckvard, and Minárik, “Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat.”42 Dou, “Documents Link Huawei to China’s Surveillance Programs.”43 Dou.44 Gould, “Esper to Allies.”45 B rumfiel, “A New Tunnel Is Spotted At A Chinese Nuclear Test Site”; Schneider, “China Sees Its Nuclear Arsenal as MoreThan a Deterrent - WSJ.”46 Adm. Charles Richard, “Space and Missile Defense Symposium.”47 Adm. Charles Richard.10How the Us Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

The US and NATO have historically not addressed China’s nuclear capabilities,believing China’s nuclear posture was minimum deterrence. Unfortunately, thisnew modernization effort shows China’s position is more assertive and is in linewith Xi Jinping’s goal of global military dominance.48China’s Belt and Road Initiative and itspurchase of European and Global PortsBRI is a Xi Jinping brain

identifiying actions the alliance can take in the 2030 Strategic Concept.6 In June 2021, NATO issued "NATO 2030," which is NATO's agenda for remaining "ready, strong, and united" for the future. During the June 2021 NATO Summit, alliance leaders agreed on the agenda to address extensive global competition,

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