Planning For Action: Campaign Concepts And Tools - DTIC

Chapter Eleven: Lines of Effort (continued) 11-12. Operational Approach Example (LOEs) . 164 11-13 GEN Franks’ Commander’s Concept . 167 11-14. Lines of Effort – Northern Iraq Stability Operations. 169 11-15. Operational Objectives – Northern Iraq . 170 11-16. Northern Iraq LOEs and Opnl Objectives Crosswalk . 171 11-17. Northern Iraq Crosswalk Schematic . 172 11-18. ISAF Campaign Plan Schematic . 173 Chapter Twelve: Critical Factor Analysis (CC-CR-CV) 12-1. Operational Design Quote . 179 12-2. The CG-CC-CR-CV Process – Dr. Strange . 180 12-3. Critical Factors – Joint . 181 12-4. Centers of Gravity – Modified Definition . 182 12-5. Critical Capabilities (Verb!) . 183 12-6. Critical Requirements (Noun!) . 184 12-7. Critical Weaknesses (Noun!). 186 12-8. Critical Vulnerabilities (Noun!) . 187 12-9. Enemy Critical Factor Analysis – COG and CC. 188 12-10. Enemy Critical Factor Analysis – CR . 189 12-11. Enemy Critical Factor Analysis – CW . 190 12-12. Enemy Critical Factor Analysis – CV . 191 12-13. Enemy Critical Factor Analysis – CR/CV Crosswalk . 192 12-14. Friendly Critical Factor Analysis – COG and CC. 193 12-15. Friendly Critical Factor Analysis – CR . 194 12-16. Friendly Critical Factor Analysis – CW . 195 12-17. Friendly Critical Factor Analysis – CV. 196 12-18 Friendly Critical Factor Analysis – CR/CV Crosswalk . 197 12-19. Friendly CFA – CR/CV Crosswalk (Continued). 197 12-20. COG-CC-CR-CV Link Diagram . 198 12-21. COG-CC-CR-CV Link Diagram version 2. 199 12-22. COG-CC-CR-CV and Ends, Ways, and Means . 200 xi

Chapter Thirteen: Target Value Analysis 13-1. Target Value Analysis . 203 13-2. Target Value Analysis Schematic . 204 13-3. Critical Factor Analysis Schematic . 206 13-4. Relationship between CFA and TVA . 206 13-5. Warden’s Rings . 207 13-6. System Attributes . 208 13-7. Comparison of System Approaches . 209 Chapter Fourteen: Wargaming 14-1. How to Think . 211 14-2. Wargaming Description – Joint . 212 14-3. Wargaming Description – Army. 213 14-4. Wargaming Purpose – Joint . 214 14-5. COA Analysis Input and Outputs – Joint . 215 14-6. Sample Wargaming Steps – Joint . 216 14-7. Wargaming Purpose – Army . 217 14-8. COA Analysis Input and Outputs – Army . 217 14-9. Wargaming Preparation – Joint . 218 14-10. Wargaming Preparation – Army . 219 14-11. Modified Wargaming Steps – Combined. 220 14-12. Applying Evaluation Criteria . 223 14-13. Evaluation Criteria – Perseverance. 224 14-14. War Game “Turn” Process . 230 14-15. Modified Wargaming Steps – Review. 233 Chapter Fifteen: Assessment: MOE and MOP 15-1. Assessment Levels and Measures – Joint . 236 15-2. Assessment Measures and Indicators – Army . 237 15-3. MOE / MOP Concept Crosswalk . 240 15-4. Northern Iraq Line of Effort – Rule of Law . 241 15-5. Northern Iraq MOP – MOE Example . 241 15-6. Northern Iraq Key Task MOP – MOE Example . 242 15-7. Katrina MOP- MOE Example . 243 xii

Appendix B: Examples B-1. Friendly Operational Center of Gravity Analysis . 266 B-2. Enemy Operational Center of Gravity Analysis . 268 B-3. Friendly Operational Lines of Effort . 270 B-4. Enemy Operational Lines of Effort . 272 B-5. Endstate – MOE / MOP Crosswalk . 274 B-6. Evaluation Criteria – Legitimacy . 276 B-7. Course of Action Comparison – Enemy MDCOA . 278 xiii

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Introduction The purpose for this book is straightforward: to provide an overview of planning principles and the tools used by planners to design campaign plans. Since 9/11, the US military has been involved in numerous actions, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. The approach to campaign planning has changed and evolved over this time, spawning a number of new concepts and approaches to planning; this book is intended to provide some assistance in understanding and applying those concepts and approaches. A campaign is defined as “a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.”1 That’s a fairly broad definition for a campaign – but campaigns are normally joint operations (which means it is conducted by more than one service of the US military) and relates directly to strategic level or national objectives. Put another way, campaigns are fought because the US President has decided that our national level objectives necessitate the commitment of US military forces. Today, campaigns also require the integration of both military and non-military national level instruments of power to achieve “unity of action.” Our campaigns today require both civilian and military resources to fully accomplish national level objectives. Those objectives are aimed towards changing the conditions “at a given time and space” to conditions that are desirable for the United States. We conducted (and are still conducting) campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan (and elsewhere) because the US President decided that the conditions in those areas required the commitment of US forces to change those conditions. This required the commitment of not only US forces, but also the commitment of civilian resources and lots of money. Tying this all together in a coherent 1

fashion in order to ultimately meet US national objectives requires detailed campaign planning. At the campaign level, there is a need to integrate all of these different resources (means) into a coherent plan (ways) in order to meet our national objectives (ends). This requires a comprehensive approach for unified action to planning; no longer can the US military just plan for offensive or defensive operations, but must also integrate civil support and stability operations – frequently taking place simultaneously. The comprehensive approach expands the “whole of government approach” to address how the military must also cooperate and collaborate with a diverse array of actors (including departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities). The focus for the US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been characterized as fighting “comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.” These campaigns had components of counter-terrorism, developing governance, developing host nation security forces, establishing essential services, and supporting economic development. All of these actions are important – and none is sufficient within itself to meet national security objectives. Even though the enthusiasm for COIN has waned, the concepts behind the comprehensive approach are here to stay. No longer will the US military be able to focus solely on pure warfighting (if that ever was true). Conceptually, planning in the military has also made a major adjustment to acknowledge the design methodology. Planning consists of two separate but closely related components: a conceptual component, represented by the cognitive application of design, and a detailed component, which introduces specificity through a formal planning process, such as the military decision making process (MDMP) or the joint operation planning process 2

(JOPP). Design, the conceptual component, is a methodology to help commanders think through handling problems – and to engage the staff, subordinates, and higher level commanders using dialogue and collaboration to achieve a commander’s visualization of a situation. Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex problems and develop approaches to solve them. In a collaborative environment, it is important that all – commanders as well as staff officers – contribute what they know and how they see things without being afraid to speak up. After all, even a commander doesn’t know everything, and relying solely on intuition and experience can hinder effective decision making. A learning organization comprising people with different skills and backgrounds can assist commanders to look at complex problems from different perspectives – thereby assisting the commander in his mission of leading that organization. Design conceptually follows the Army’s Mission Command concepts of understanding, visualizing, and describing. If you understand those concepts from mission command, design will make a lot more sense to you. If you do understand those concepts, design will help you take a complex problem and let you see it for what it is so you can adjust to make things better. Department of Defense joint doctrine (as well as Army doctrine) includes the concept of Operational Design – “the conception and construction of the intellectual framework that underpins joint operation plans and their subsequent execution.2” Design, as described in this book, is a similar conceptual methodology – although not limited solely to the operational level of war. Joint doctrine states, “Operational design extends operational art’s vision with a creative process that helps commanders and planners answer the ends–ways–means–risk questions.”3 Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity 3

of the commander with the analytical and logical process of design.” Today, complex problems exist at all levels of war – and commanders at all levels have to synthesize intuition and “informed vision and creativity” with cognitive analytical approaches. Design provides the very tools needed to develop conceptual approaches to these complex problems; formal planning systems such as MDMP and JOPP provide a complementary and iterative methodology to provide specificity to planning. This book also contains a number of different tools and processes that are used to develop campaign plans. These include discussions on center of gravity, lines of effort, course of action development, targeting processes, wargaming, and assessment. These tools are designed to be used as “starting points” for planners. To relate these tools to an analogy, an artist with a brush full of paint needs certain techniques to start to communicate his vision on the canvas; there has to be some method to start the painting that gets the creative juices flowing. Campaign planning is an art, but some of the science of tactics, techniques, and practices (TTP) can help the process get started and provide coherence throughout the planning process. It is my hope that the tools described throughout this monograph provide this starting point and are of use for campaign planners. Finally, the concepts and tools have a broader usage than campaign planning. Those conducting deliberate planning for a variety of environments may find the concepts and tools useful for adding coherence to addressing complex problems. 4

Notes 1. JP 5-0, page II-21. 2. JP 3-0, page xiii. 3. JP 3-0, page II-4. 5

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Part I: Planning for Action Concepts The first eight chapters of this book are designed to provide the foundational concepts for planning – getting a firm grasp on some of the underlying principles that apply for campaign planning. Chapter one starts with the basics – looking at “how to think” in terms of problem solving – the process of identifying a problem, developing a solution to the problem, and then testing to see if the solution actually answers the problem at hand. From that foundation, in chapter two we move to the concept of ends, ways, and means as a framework for linking purpose, methods, and resources for the solution or approach to the problem. Having a firm grip on the end state – what the conditions are expected to be as a result of an operation or campaign – is an essential step in planning and one that frequently gets little attention. The next three chapters draw heavily on two concepts from Army and joint doctrine – mission command and design. Chapters three, four, and five are based on the commander’s tasks in mission command to understand, visuali

Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools is designed to be used as a handbook for developing campaign plans at the US Army Command and General Staff College. This book provides working definitions of campaign concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for campaign planners. In