Rechtsgeschichte Legal History

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RgRechtsgeschichteZeitschri des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische RechtsgeschichteJournal of the Max Planck Institute for European Legal HistoryRechtsgeschichteLegal .de/rg24Zitiervorschlag: Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History Rg 24 (2016)Rg24 2016257 – 265http://dx.doi.org/10.12946/rg24/257-265Claudia StortiAscertainment of Customs and Personal Laws inMedieval Italy from the Lombard Kingdom to theCommunesDieser Beitrag steht unter einerCreative Commons cc-by-nc-nd 3.0

AbstractThe medieval systems of law in Italy and Europehave been proposed as a sort of virtual laboratoryto deal with the issue of ensuring that the principleof equality in the rule of law be compatible withthe recognition of indigenous peoples’ customs.The legal framework of the medieval communes sought to strike a balance between thegeneral interest in having legal certainty and uniformity with the citizens’ interest in ruling theirfamily life and economic assets according to theircultural and social values.Up until the 14th century, in Lombardy anindividual’s legal status, family and inheritancecontinued to be ruled according to the customsof the individual’s natio, be they Lombard or Roman.The ascertainment of customs is an arduoustask, as oral customs are fluid and vary from placeto place and from family to family. For this reason,in the Middle Ages ascertainment was always entrusted to judges and legal experts (sapientes).Until a few decades ago, recognising and enforcing customs was mostly unthinkable due tolegal positivism and the principle of equality. Now,however, the limits of the principle of legal equality are well known: »Legal positivism was not ableto abolish status« (G. Alpa).The recognition of »legal Indigenous status«provides continuity between the past (the MiddleAges) and present (Indigenous Peoples Basic Law).Just as in the past, when living according to a givennatio’s laws and customs did not mean self-government, so today the enforcement of an indigenouspeoples’ basic law should not undermine the sovereignty of the State.

Fokus focusClaudia StortiAscertainment of Customs and Personal Laws inMedieval Italy from the Lombard Kingdom to theCommunes1Recognising customs without granting selfgovernment from past to presentOne of the goals of this Focus is to consider howto pave the way for effective application of indigenous customs in courts. In fact, in endeavouring to respect human rights, the Republic of Chinais actively dealing with the very complex problemof recognising the cultural and customary legaltraditions of indigenous peoples in compliancewith the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1According to articles 1, 23 and 30 of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law of 5 February 2005, thelegal customs of indigenous and / or tribal peoplesare to be recognised and respected in »judicial andadministration remedial procedures, mediation,arbitration and the like«, with respect to traditionaland customary rules related to the social, economicand political institutions in their territories, as wellas within the Traditional Territories and ReservedLand. 2The Republic of China is not willing to allowindigenous peoples any form of self-government. 3However, this approach represents a reversal of thetrend that swept across Europe from the beginningof the 19th century, which led to both the central-1 United Nations, International covenant on civil and political rights,art. 40.2 Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (2005):Art. 1 »This Law is hereby promulgated for the expressed purposes ofrecognizing, protecting, and promoting the fundamental rights ofIndigenous People, enhance and secure shared prosperity of the Indigenous communities, so as to ensureIndigenous Peoples’ continued survival based on sustainable socio-economic development and in the spiritof inter-people cooperation«. Art. 23»The Government shall recognize andrespect Indigenous Peoples’ rightsto choose their way of life, customs,isation and the codification of a unique State law inthe name of equality, an equality that was actuallyfictitious, as it was not supported by an effective,de facto equality, with severe outcomes for theworking class as well as for the indigenous peoplessubject to European colonial powers throughoutthe world. 4The medieval Italian and European systems ofthe law have been very correctly proposed as a sortof virtual laboratory in which one can observe theexact opposite of the 19th century European model. In Middle Ages, citizenship and subjection to akingdom did not prevent individuals from claiming to rule their legal affairs according to thecustoms or laws of their natio. Such circumstanceswere the outcome of a long series of historicalevents that began in the early Middle Ages.Historical research shows just how controversialthe meaning of the term natio is. What historiansknow is that the original ethnic characteristics andidentity of barbarian peoples (gentes) that invadedthe Roman Empire progressively faded or at leastunderwent continuous change due to the assimilation process among barbarian peoples (gentes)and Romans. Thorough studies have been carriedout on the »ethnogenesis of the barbarian withinthe Empire«, 5 as well as the subsequent establish-clothing, modes of social and economicinstitutions, methods of resource utilization and types of land ownership andmanagement, based on their Indigenous knowledge systems and practices(IKSPs)«. Art. 30 »The Governmentshall give due respect to tribal languages, Indigenous customs and practices, cultural diversity, cultural integrity, and the integrity of the values,practices and institutions of Indigenous Peoples in the process of dealingwith Indigenous affairs, making lawsor implementing judicial and administration remedial procedures,notarization, mediation, arbitrationand the like, for the purpose of protecting the lawful rights of Indige-nous Peoples. In the event that anIndigenous Person does not understand the Chinese language, an interpreter who speaks the tribal languageshall be put in place. IndigenousPeoples’ courts and / or tribunals maybe established for the purpose ofprotecting Indigenous Peoples’ rightsand equitable access to Justice / thejudicial system / the judiciary system«.(The italics are mine).3 Implementation of the InternationalCovenant (2012) 2.4 Nuzzo (2009); Nuzzo (2012).5 Geary (2003) 99–150; Phol (1998),(2000) 17–69.Claudia Storti257

Rg24 2016ment of the Kingdoms of Burgunds, Visigoths,Francs and Lombards in the territory of the RomanEmpire between the 5th and 7th centuries.In any case, the political nature of the kingdom’s establishment did not eliminate the ethnicconsciousness of the predominant people makingup the kingdom, as was the case with the Lombards in Italy; 6 it was only a ‘new’ identity, so tospeak. 7As described below, medieval Lombard recordsshow how claiming the application of the laws ofthe natio (Lombard or Roman) was an attempt byindividuals to apply a specific set of rules to theirlegal affairs.From this point of view, it could be argued that,in medieval law, a twofold status (or legal personality) coexisted within each person: that of one’snatio (e.g. Roman or Lombard), and that of a citizen or subject to the king. There was even a threefold status in some cases: a ‘national’ status (e.g.Roman or Lombard), the status of being a citizenand the status of being a subject to the king.In early medieval Europe, multiple sets of ruleson the status of subjects in the same legal systemcould apply simultaneously when custom was asource of law and the principle of equality was stillunsettled, which was made easier by the fact thatthe modern concepts of State law did not yet exist.The status of the individual, without distinctionbetween legal capacity and capacity to act, wasdetermined by the bundle of customs or laws thatruled his or her life according to the people, gens ornatio to which he or she belonged. Determiningthe law applicable to a specific case was a matter ofthe »internal« rules on conflict of laws, and theserules, which were developed by jurists and appliedin courts, were often common to several jurisdictions.6 For bibliographical references, see also: Padoa-Schioppa (2011) 71–72.During their occupation of Italy, theLombards were helped by Saxons,Gepids, Bulgarians, Sarmatians, Pannonians, Swabians and Noricons. As aconsequence of their military support, these people were then allowed,under the king’s protection, to settlewherever they wanted within theconquered Italian territory, but at thetime of Rothari’s edict in 643 whichwas drawn up according to the styleof his gens – secundum ritum gentis258While living according to the law of one’s originwas consubstantial with one’s status, I maintainthat the recognition and enforcement of personallaws did not lessen the authority of State law, nordid it create forms of autonomy that might weakenthe sovereignty of States.On the contrary, by respecting pluralism inspecific categories of cases that did not affect publicorder / policy, the State was able to enhance integration and consensus. Indeed, there seemed to bea belief that such integration would translate intoobedience and respect for fundamental traditionallegal values, such as those concerning personallegal capacity, marriage, family, property, ownership, contract and inheritance law. It simply depended, then as now, on the minorities’ propensityto seek contact and interaction, or in contrast, toisolate themselves or advocate separatism.Legal pluralism was the main characteristic ofthe legal order.In the eyes of a European legal historian, whenconsidering medieval legal categories, the only wayto deal with such matters as the granting offundamental rights to indigenous peoples withoutgranting them self-governance is to appeal to thetheory of statutes and the distinction betweenpersonal and real statutes. The former are rulesapplicable to individuals in accordance with theirpeople and / or their familial traditions, while thelatter are rules applicable to land. 8Though it may seem paradoxical, there is indeeda specific term in the above-mentioned »BasicLaw« that suggests and allows for a closer connection to be established between Taiwanese law in the21st century and European law in the Middle Ages,or at least provides the possibility of a commonground of reasoning. That term is »status«, in reference to both individuals and land. 9nostrae, these peoples, with the exception of the Saxons, accepted theLombard rules (Jarnut (2003),416–427): »The rex gentis Langobardorum was, therefore, acclaimed byhis gens as their ruler and leader, andin this position was of rank fullyequal to that of the other reges,whether they ruled over the Herules,the Gepids, the Goths or the Franks.As rex Langobardorum he was thecentral focal point of his gens and theembodiment of his tribal consciousness«.Ascertainment of Customs and Personal Laws in Medieval Italy7 Geary (2003) 71–78.8 See bibliographical references aboutthe theory of statutes in StortiStorchi (1989) 1–66.9 Indigenous Peoples Basic Law art. 2:»The term ›Indigenous Persons‹means nationals who are registeredeither as Mountain Region Indigenous Peoples or as Plain Region Indigenous Peoples, and thereby obtainlegal Indigenous status, being evidenced by the household registrationrecords of aforesaid Indigenous Persons.« (The italics are mine.)

Fokus focusThe term status shifts legal reasoning from thecategory of rights to that of the intrinsic nature of aperson or thing. In this sense, as far as individualsare concerned, their customary way of acting isconsubstantial with their personal status, in addition to indicating some specific legal elements oftheir capacity.In light of these preliminary considerations, Iwill pursue two distinct lines of reasoning, as theyrefer to two different sets of categories or questionsfrom a juridical point of view. The first line ofreasoning concerns defining the validity of law, aswell as the distinction between the laws of thenation (gens – natio) to which a person belongs bybirth (family, tribe, people) and the laws that applywithin the territory where the person resides. Theother line of reasoning relates to the technicalproblem of identifying customary law and to theprocess of writing down customs. From this pointof view, judges have played a fundamental rolebecause the recognition of customary laws couldincrease the number of claims and result in thejuridification of social and legal issues. 10 Thisphenomenon might have informed art. 30 of theIndigenous Peoples Basic Law, which states thatthe due respect of indigenous customs and practices requires »implementing judicial and administration remedial procedures, notarization, mediation, arbitration and the like« and subsequentlysetting up specialised chambers and sections in thejustice system to handle cases involving an indigenous party. 11The judiciary might have a fundamental role incarrying out this task. Settling controversies basedon customs and traditions requires that judgesascertain the content and proper understandingof indigenous peoples’ customary rules as theyemerge from particular cases. Needless to say,however expert and legally experienced judgesmay be, they might have great difficulty in recognising the religious and ethical values underlyingethnic customs.10 Decherf (2001) 5.11 See fn. 1 above.12 Marculfi Formularum liber I, 8 Cartade ducatu, patriciato et comitatu,MGH, Legum s. V, 48.13 See, for example: Chartularium, in:M.G.H. Leges IV, 600: Qualiter chartaostendatur: »Domne comes, propter hocostendit Petrus hanc cartam venditionisGoing back to the 6th century, a famous textheld that the conscience and expertise of the judgewere the rectum tramite to reconcile and bringtogether general law with personal law: »omnispopulus ibi commanentes, tam Franci, Romani, Burgundionis vel reliquas nationis sub tuo regimine etgubernatione degant et moderentur, et eos, recto tramite, secundum lege et consuetudine eorum regas«. 12In other words, all peoples residing in the State,Franks, Romans, Burgundians as well as every natiosubjected to your government, live in peace. Youhave to rule them by means of justice – which Isuspect was a way of saying by means of equity –while keeping the balance between the general lawand their customs.2Pluralism in the medieval communes andkingdomsQuale lege vivis? What is your law? 13In the early medieval period this was the firstquestion that defendants had to answer when theywere sued in courts.Much legislation shows that respect for ethniclaw is the basic, original feature of the Germanlegal conception, 14 a conception that some earlymedieval kingdoms inherited. In actuality, the Romans also recognised the right of some peopleswho were annexed by the empire (foederati 15) tolive according to their own law.Obviously, ethnic and customary law concernednot only private relationships; public law and thebody of principles underpinning the differentforms of government were profoundly influencedas well.Historians have thoroughly studied this way ofrecognising and enforcing personal law in the earlyMiddle Ages. Still, studying the Lombard Kingdom can help to explain some features of subsequent judicial practice in the communal cities andkingdoms, first the Normans and later the King-[.] Qua lege vivis? Longobarda. [.]Similiter est in Romana. In Salicha dic:obliga te, et ›warpi te‹ et ›proheredes‹ et›insuper‹.«; Storti (2011) 418–428.14 Cortese (1995) 51–172; PadoaSchioppa (2009) 38–48.15 D. 49,15,7.Claudia Storti259

Rg24 2016doms of Sicily and France. Indeed, between the12th and 15th centuries, jurists and judges continued to recognise personal law despite the strongincrease in integration between individuals andfamilies of Roman and Lombard law. As timepassed, the differences between the two peoples,Lombard and Roman, faded and general customsbecame ever more widespread. 16As the preambles of the Lombard kings’ lawsdemonstrate, the certainty of customary rules wasan essential instrument to maintain and protectsocial order. This was even more important in theperipheral or remote, mountainous areas of thekingdom, where public officials and judges werefew, or less skilled, less learned or less authoritative.In such areas, public outrage, rebellions and uprisings broke out more readily. As provided by Liutp.42 and Ratc. 10, the king was sometimes inclinedto justify protests, and not to punish them, on thegrounds that officials and / or judges and courtswere responsible for denials and / or miscarriagesof justice, or for the infringement of customaryrules. Indeed, orders or judgments issued by publicofficials that were deemed contrary to some customs or unsuitable for the common understandingand experience of local society were the increasingly frequent pretext of such revolts. It was notinfrequent that the king’s curia launched an inquiry in response to this kind of disorder, or on thespecific request of officials, judges or dukes. Theend of the inquiry might consist in recognising theproper content of a specific custom that waswritten down in a king’s rule (edictum). 17Disputes and inquiries could also arise withregard to lands and estates. Distinguishing theking’s demesne from freehold property and fromthe collective ownership of a community was not16 Pohl-Resl (1998) 205–219; Geary(2003) 120–127 and with regard tothe famous Liutprand’s edictum describis: Padoa-Schioppa (2009) 49;Cortese (1995) 230–236.17 Storti (2015) 461–462 with reference to Liutp. 42, a. 723, and Ratc. 10.Padoa-Schioppa (1966) 158–161.18 Storti (2015) 462–472.19 Storti (2011) 425–426 with reference to Capitulare missorum, 792(Capitulare regum Francorum, t. I,Kar. M. 25). See also: Carolus Magnus, 143 Leges Lanogobarodum, II,56: Qualiter diversarum legum homines260always easy. On the contrary, the process of definitively establishing who had rights (the king, aprivate individual, a community) to work a pieceof land and exploit its resources was a problem ofpublic order, even leaving aside that the wealth ofthe State consisted in land and land revenue. Thejudges ascertained rights over the land by crossexamination. 18The Carolingian Empire did not do away withthe laws of the conquered kingdoms. In particular,the edicta of the Lombard Kingdom were notabolished, but only modified in some cases. Between 783 and 802, the provisions of Charles theGreat’s capitularia stipulated that his officials (missiet comites) were to conduct inquiries to ascertainthe laws of the peoples living in his new territories.Each individual was to be asked what the bindingrules of his or her people were »per singulos inquirant quale habeant legem ex natione«. 19 Charles theBold adopted the same policy with the peoplesliving in the Kingdom of the West Franks. 20I have examined the ancient Lombard andCarolingian Empires to point out how, despiteextraordinary political, cultural, economic andsocial changes, the ancient system of legal thinkingabout national laws still exercised a very stronginfluence over learned lawyers, judges and indeedover the entire European legal system until the lateMiddle Ages.However, there was a shift in the meaning of theexpression »national law«. It originally indicatedthe law of a people, but as time passed, it came tomean personal law; that is, the law according towhich a person lived because of his or her origins.As is evident in documents and judicial formulae(formal statements), individuals formally assertedtheir legal personality by declaring to live as Lom-res suas diffinire debent. 1: Sicut consuetudo nostroest ut Longobardus autRomanus (si evenerit quod causam interse habeant) observamus ut Romani successiones iuxta illorum legem habeant;similiter et omnes scriptiones secundumlegem suam faciant; et quando iurant,iuxta legem suam iurent; et quandocomponuntur iuxta legem ipsius cuiusmalum fecerint, componantur; et Longobardos illos conve

Legal pluralism was the main characteristic of the legal order. In the eyes of a European legal historian, when considering medieval legal categories, the only way to deal with such matters as the granting of fundamental rights to indigenous peoples

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