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R ESEARCH PAPERResearch Division – NATO Defense College, Rome – No. 145 – March 2018New Armies for a New EraDecrypting post-2011 Arab Military Reform TrendsEleonora Ardemagni and Umberto Profazio1The Research Division (RD) of the NATO Defense College provides NATO’s senior leaders withsound and timely analyses and recommendationson current issues of particular concern for the Alliance. Papers produced by the Research Divisionconvey NATO’s positions to the wider audienceof the international strategic community and contribute to strengthening the Transatlantic Link.The RD’s civil and military researchers come froma variety of disciplines and interests covering abroad spectrum of security-related issues. Theyconduct research on topics which are of interest tothe political and military decision-making bodiesof the Alliance and its member states.The opinions expressed are those of the authorsand do not necessarily reflect the opinions of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization or the NATODefense College.Printed copies of this paper can be obtained bycontacting Mary Di Martino atm.dimartino@ndc.nato.intResearch PaperISSN 2076 – 0949(Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Print)ISSN 2076 – 0957(Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Online)Research DivisionJeffrey A. Larsen, PhD, Division HeadNATO Defense CollegeVia Giorgio Pelosi, 100143 Rome – Italywebsite: www.ndc.nato.intFollow us on Twitter and Facebookat https://twitter.com/NDC Researchat https://facebook.com/NDC ResearchPrinted and bound byDeBooks ItaliaV.le G. Mazzini 41, 00195 Rome, Italywww.debooks.usPortions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standardsource credit line is included. The Research Division would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints.Please direct all enquiries to:m.dimartino@ndc.nato.intThe NATO Defense Collegeapplies the Creative ” (CC BY-NC-ND)The reaction of the Arab armies to the 2011 uprisings is a subjectthat has been frequently examined, but the evolution and reform ofArab armies is a neglected topic.2 In times of global interdependence,the Atlantic Alliance must be ready to understand and interact witha changing Middle East, since NATO Arab partners’ security is moreand more NATO’s security, in terms of shared objectives, commonthreats and cooperative security. Arab armies have entered a newera: traditional obstacles to military reform, mostly due to theirpoliticization, persist; other variables emerge from the interaction ofdomestic, foreign and transnational threats.Drawing upon multidisciplinary literature and day-by-day analysis, thispaper examines the debate on the state of the Arab armies, decryptingtrends in military reforms with a specific focus on two different, butprominent case studies: Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).Both of these countries implemented military reform starting fromdifferent contexts and ambitions. Our aim is to shift the focus on howArab security forces, in particular Arab armies, have been changing,1Eleonora Ardemagni is Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean Analyst, NDCF, Associate Research Fellowat the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). Umberto Profazio is Maghreb Analyst,NDCF, ACD Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This is a revised versionof a previous working paper, published by the NATO Defense College Foundation with the title “NewArmies for a New Era. Decrypting post-2011 Arab Military Reforms: Trends from Tunisia and the UnitedArab Emirates.” The views expressed belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions ofthe NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.2Two remarkable exceptions, both prior to the uprisings, are Oren Barak-David Assaf, “The Arab Security Sector: A New Research Agenda for a Neglected Topic,” Armed Forces & Society 36 (5), pp. 804824, 2010; and Yezid Sayigh, “Security Sector Reform in the Arab Region: Challenges to Developing anIndigenous Agenda,” Arab Reform Initiative, Thematic Paper, 1 December 2007.1

Research PaperNo. 145 – March 2018coping with emerging dynamics and actors. Beyondthe theoretical debate on “democratization” and“authoritarian resilience,” the concept of militaryreform is here the lens of investigation to framecurrent empirical trends in Arab armies. First ofall, the paper highlights the post-uprisings contextand the most important variables of change forthe military. Then it isolates traditional and newobstacles to military reform in Arab states, providinginsights from the cases of Tunisia and the UnitedArab Emirates. The last section synthesizes themain analytical findings, introducing the concept of“patchwork security.”as well as the first factor of change. If the managementof security becomes a “regional matter,” regionalpowers will enhance efforts to impose their ownsecurity agenda on neighboring territories, therebyfueling counter-alignments, arms races and intraregional conflict. As a result of these developments,the military regains center stage. Regionalization ofsecurity has a deep impact on Arab armies, modifyingrequested tasks and expertise: but since it is theopposite of multilateralism, it increasingly servessecurity apparatus’ national goals. What occurredamong the Arab Gulf states is a perfect example ofthis kind of regionalization, which also masks risingnationalism in the Gulf region.In March 2011, the intervention in Bahrain bySaudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates policeanticipated this trend, which was then openly unveiledby the 2015 Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen.In 2017, the Saudis and the Emiratis also opened thediplomatic crisis against Qatar. The Middle Easternorder is in fragments, shaken by the collapse of states,civil wars and unsustainable social pacts. The Arabuprisings emphasized the crisis of the Arab state,3 thesecond factor of change. Sovereignty is constantlyeroded, as state legitimacy is not only challengedby sub-/transnational actors but also weakened bystates’ persistent ineffectiveness. This contributes toa reduction in armies’ available financial and humanresources, while contesting agencies undermine theircoherence and esprit de corps. The fragmentation ofthe social fabric affects many countries and allowsfor the resurgence of tribalism, as in Iraq and Libya.The Middle East’s disorder and the widening ofthe nation-state crisis have bolstered new powerArmies’ New Context. Post-2011 variablesof changeThe current international system is characterizedby multiple centers of power: besides the UnitedStates, Russia and China, different regional powersare becoming more actively engaged, leaving roomfor ad hoc cooperation as well as for indirect, proxyconfrontation in many regions, including the MiddleEast. Barack Obama’s “lead from behind” postureand then Donald Trump’s “America first” rhetorichave geopolitically isolated the United States, endingglobal governance aspirations. As a matter of fact,security vacuums have been quickly filled by otherstate/non-state actors, willing to set their ownparameters of security: this is why global securityremains a positive-sum game, but is even moredifficult to translate into policies than before. In thisframework, regionalization of security is, at the sametime, the product of a reshaped international system,3Yezid Sayigh, “Militaries, Civilians and the Crisis of the Arab State,” The Washington Post, The Monkey Cage Blog, 8 December 2014 -the-arab-state/?utm term .fb04e0c39fd02

No. 145 – March 2018Research Paperrelations and inter-state realignments, strengtheningthe competition for regional power and hegemony.The “Cold war” between Saudi Arabia and Iran,4 aswell as the intra-Sunni rivalry between Saudi ArabiaUnited Arab Emirates and Qatar have reshapedregional dynamics and given external actors (Russiain particular) room for maneuver, altering thebalance of power in conflict-torn countries (Syria).The crisis of the Arab state model fosters polarizationand sectarianism, also exacerbated by intra-regionalstruggles: it represents the third factor of change.Since material and immaterial national boundariesweaken, identity politics prevails and systemicallybecomes a tool of power politics: this paves theway for transnational threats, which are the fourthfactor of change. Subnational, often regional-basedloyalties, such as kinship and tribal lineages, acquire aprominent role, putting the proliferation of informalactors and alternative security providers into starkrelief. Patron-client relations, also on a transnationalbasis, are able to spin regional events, consolidatingasymmetric interdependence among states/non-stateactors.armies, whether or not they are engaged in militaryreform. The growth of transnational threats suchas jihadism also offers the opportunity for militaryreform in the Arab world, since Arab governmentsare faced with the problem of preventing and copingwith these phenomena. The case of Tunisia providesan example of these dynamics. For Saudi Arabia andthe United Arab Emirates, the regionalization ofsecurity is also a driver of military reform: Riyadh andAbu Dhabi increasingly perceive themselves as actorswith military responsibilities (security providers)and regional ambitions (power projection). Such ageopolitical role requires a reshaped military.Defying Arab Armies’ Role. Traditionaland New Obstacles to Military ReformAccording to standard definitions of Security SectorReform5 (SSR), there are two core dimensions tosuch processes: effectiveness and efficiency; democratization and civilian control.Moreover, political marginalization has affecteddisenfranchised populations, in particular ethnicand religious minorities already excluded by states’social pacts, leading to increased instability. Tribaland ethnic affiliations question both the usefulnessof the colonial borders and the creation of new stateentities (Kurdistan). In this vacuum, jihadism hasproliferated, taking advantage of state fragmentationand making border areas in the Middle Eastand North Africa ungovernable. As a result, thisredesigned context poses new challenges to the Arab4However, these very requirements are known to bethe limitations of Arab armies, in republics as well asin monarchies: civil-military relations in the MiddleEast are characterized by undefined boundaries, andit is also more appropriate to talk about civil-securityrelations, given the variety of security providers.Following these coordinates, it is possible to isolatetraditional and new obstacles to military reformin Arab Armies, shedding light on what impedesarmies’ effective adaptation to post-2011 challenges.Gregory F. Gause III, “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War,” The Brookings Institution, Brookings Doha Center, Analysis paper, n. 11, July 2014.Timothy Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation,” in Timothy Edmunds-Wilhem N. Germann (eds.), Towards SSR in Post-Cold WarEurope: a Framework for Assessment, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003.53

Research PaperNo. 145 – March 2018Traditional Obstacles to Military ReformLibya and also in Iran), parallel military structureswith ideological conformity openly counterbalancethe armies.9 Academia has often analyzed Arabarmies through the dichotomy “institutionalizationvs patrimonialism,” although reality is often morenuanced than constructed categories.10 For instance,the armies of Morocco, Jordan and the Arab Gulfstates can be all considered “neo-patrimonialarmies,”11 even though their degree of effectivenessand professionalization varies widely: the Jordanianarmy has proved more efficient at managing bordersecurity (Jordanian-Syrian/Jordanian-Iraqi borders)than the Saudi army (Saudi-Yemeni border). Themilitary security structure impacts on the armedforces’ decision-making: they can be relativelywell institutionalized or highly penetrated by nonmilitary actors, apply universal conscription orvoluntary recruitment, be focused on militaryaffairs or have economic interests, and significantlycontribute to the country political leadership ornot.12 As a matter of fact, states have attempted tobuild modern armies by mixing professionals (in theupper echelons) and cronies (in the lower ranks),conscripts and mercenaries, foreigners and locals,in order to maximize loyalty and short-term results,while diminishing political risks in the long-term.Since national security often overlaps with regimesecurity, the armies’ first objective is often regimeprotection rather than state protection. This is evenmore evident due to the decline of conventionalPolitical-military relations6 shape the trajectory ofthe Arab states: a balanced relationship betweenpolitical power and the military is vital not onlyfor the survival of the regimes, but also for theirresilience vis-à-vis multilayered challenges. Thepoliticization of the military field and the economicrole of the militaries are the main, traditionalobstacles to military reform. Although every statepresents peculiar features, these are fundamentalmacro-variables affecting the Arab military domain:they also encompass relevant sub-dimensions (statevs regime allegiance, lack of civilian oversight,welfare function), which contribute to frame theoverall picture of Arab armies’ resistance to reform.Politicization, Factionalism and Economic Interests.According to classical definitions, professionalism is acombination of expertise, clientship (to the society orto the state), corporateness (group consciousness) andideology (the military mindset).7 Professionalism hastraditionally been the weak point of the Arab armies.Interestingly, gradual military professionalizationin the Middle East has not been followed by themilitary’s depoliticization, since it has offered themilitary further opportunities to intervene in thepolitical process.8 Subgroups and microidentities,as in the cases of paramilitary forces or tribal/sectarian clans, often prevail in the construction ofa military mindset; in “dual militaries” (as in Iraq,6Risa A. Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper No.324, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.7Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977.8Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly, 115, 1, Spring 2000.9Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization.”Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics, vol. 36, no. 2, 2004, pp.139–157.1011Jean-François Daguzan, “Armées et société dans le monde arabe: entre révolte et conservatisme », Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, note n 05/13, février 2013.Fred H. Lawson, “Armed Forces, Internal Security Services, and Popular Contention in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant andFred H. Lawson (eds), Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, pp. 54-70.124

No. 145 – March 2018Research Paperinter-state wars: security and intelligence services risein prominence, strengthening the Deep State. Forinstance, the military coup in Egypt on July 2013highlighted the army’s regime protection choice,thus favoring a return to authoritarian rule. The caseof the Egyptian army can be explained by taking intoaccount the lower degree of institutionalization andthe stronger relationship with the regime if compared,for instance, to the Tunisian army.13 Bahrain is a moredebated case: scholars commonly define the Bahrainiarmy as cohesive and professional, with allegiance tothe regime rather than to the state,14 while othersunderline that is the institutional design (andfragmentation) of security forces that bolsters militarycohesion with respect to the non-material Sunniidentity bond.15 Certain armies are not cohesive, butattached to a specific regime, as in Libya and Yemen,thus fostering the crumbling of the monopolyof violence and then armed confrontation.16 Thelack of civilian oversight and accountability in themilitary paves the way for personalist centralization.“Tribally dependent monarchies”17 like Morocco,Qatar and Oman do not have defense committees;in Jordan, the budget of the army is passed throughparliament, even though committees and legislatorsare not allowed to examine expenditures. Amongthe Arab Gulf states, only Kuwait’s parliament hasformal oversight rights on the security sector, givenits constitutional tradition. But political devicesand filters disempower an effective civilian controlon the Army. Notwithstanding formal checks andbalances, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki succeeded to build his personal militarynetwork, bypassing institutional bodies throughregional command centers, so enhancing the dualmilitary scheme. In Algeria, one of the clearestexamples of mukhabarat (intelligence) states,18President Abdelaziz Bouteflika managed to completethe overhaul of the security services in 2016, after along power struggle with the powerful Départementdu reinsegnement et de la sécurité (DRS), placing thenew Direction des services de sécurité (DSS) underhis authority.19 In Saudi Arabia, the new Presidencyof State Security will control several security bodies(such as the rapid intervention forces) formerlyunder the Interior ministry authority, thus furthercentralizing power on king Salman and his son, thecrown prince Mohammed bin Salman. The role of themilitaries in national economies is another obstacleto defense accountability and civilian oversight,as occurs in Algeria, Syria, Yemen and most of allEgypt, where the army has extensively diversified itsactivities, since the seventies, also beyond defenseindustry (infrastructure, agriculture, tourism andservices). In these states, the military is the pillarof the regime, since it laid the foundations of themodern state. In many Arab states, the army, as wellas the public sector, also has a welfare function: italleviates poverty and social unbalances, providingsalaried employments, especially in less developedareas. However, overstaffed armies, or the wasteand misappropriation of defense funds, contribute13Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance,” DCAF-Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, SSR Paper 2, 2011.14Florence Gaub, “The Libyan Armed Forces Between Coup-Proofing and Repression,” Journal for Strategic Studies 36, 2, pp. 221-44.15Dorothy Ohl, “Bahrain ˊCohesiveˋ Military and Regime Stability amid Unrest,” in Armies and Insurgencies, pp. 145-67.16Florence Gaub, “Arab Armies: Agents of Change? Before and After 2011,” Chaillot Papers 131, EUISS, March 2014.17Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization.”18Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization.”Umberto Profazio, “The overhaul of the security services and the power struggle in Algeria,” NATO Defense College Foundation, Maghreb Strategic Trends, November2015.195

Research PaperNo. 145 – March 2018and equipped than the armies. This has alsoresulted in fewer funds for the armies, increasingthe risk of a lack of coordination between differentsecurity forces: for instance, Morocco’s gendarmeriereportedly absorbs 22% of the military budget,while the army only receives 17%. Nowadays, themilitary’s original raison d’être is overshadowed by thedecline of inter-state wars and the rise of domesticchallenges: it is no chance that the army and thepolice have increasingly overlapping functions. Theimportance of gendarmerie-type forces sheds lighton the convergence between internal and externaldimensions of security, synthesized by transnationalthreats; at the same time, the growth of the securitysector fos

North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the NATO Defense College. Printed copies of this paper can be obtained by contacting Mary Di Martino at m.dimartino@ndc.nato.int Research Paper ISSN 2076 – 0949 (Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Print) ISSN 2076 – 0957 (Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Online) Research Division

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