Theater Airlift Lessons From Kosovo - Air University
Theater Airlift Lessons from KosovobyLt Col Rowayne A. Schatz, USAFThis basic doctrine presents the guiding principles of our Service andour view of the opportunities of the future As airmen, we mustunderstand these ideas, we must cultivate them and, importantly, wemust debate and refine these ideas for the future.1General Michael E. RyanChief of Staff, USAFOperation Allied Force, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation tocompel Serbia to cease hostilities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and allow a peacekeepingpresence on the ground, was the first major war in history fought exclusively with air power.NATO air forces flew over 38,000 sorties from 24 March through 9 June 1999 to allow NATO toachieve its political objectives in Kosovo.2 Although you may not have heard or read much aboutthem, air mobility forces were key to the success of the air war over Serbia. The air mobilityteam moved enough airmen and equipment to increase the number of air expeditionary wings inEurope from three to ten, provided aid directly to thousands of Kosovar refugees, and deployed alarge US Army contingent to Albania—all at the same time. In the words of Colonel Scott Gray,the USAFE Assistant Director of Operations during Operation Allied Force, "This was aphenomenal success, enabling the forces which forced Milosevic to back down while sustainingthe refugees he created until they were able to go home.3According to AFDD1, "Air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge gainedprimarily from the study and analysis of experience, which may include actual combat orcontingency operations as well as equipment tests or exercises."4 I am a firm believer thatdoctrine is key to warfighting. I also believe that airmen have a responsibility to record whatworked well and what did not work so well in past conflicts to improve our capabilities in thefuture. My purpose in this article is to record theater airlift lessons I learned as a C-130 squadroncommander during Operation Allied Force. After a brief summary of theater airlift support toOperation Allied Force, I will review humanitarian airdrop, total force, logistics, and commandand control issues to point out areas for potential improvement. Then I will address severalthings theater airlifters did well that we need to record for future operations. Some of theselessons learned are general and apply to all expeditionary aerospace operations in general, whileothers are very narrowly focused on theater airlift. I do not claim to have all of the answers to theissues raised, but if this work does nothing more than stimulate debate over airlift doctrine then Ihave met my goal.I have attempted to "stay in my lane" and focus primarily on observations I made whilecommanding the 50th Airlift Squadron (50 AS) while deployed from Little Rock Air Force Base,Arkansas, to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, from 20 May through 21 July 1999. The 50 AS
became the 38th Air Expeditionary Squadron, also known as "Delta Squadron," assigned to the86th Airlift Wing (86 AW) at Ramstein, which was renamed the 86th Air Expeditionary Wing forOperation Allied Force. Over the course of the deployment, 10 C-130 aircraft and 284 men andwomen from the 50 AS supported Operation Allied Force, NATO combat operations in Kosovo,and Operation JOINT FORGE, the sustainment of NATO peacekeeping forces in BosniaHerzegovina. At the same time, the 50 AS flew missions in support of Joint Task ForceSHINING HOPE, humanitarian assistance to Kosovo refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Afterthe cease-fire, the airlift effort immediately turned to Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, thedeployment and sustainment of NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo.My analysis centers on intratheater airlift and does not cover all issues under review by AirMobility Command (AMC) or U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE).5 Lieutenant GeneralWilliam J. Begert wrote an excellent Aerospace Power Journal article in the Winter 1999 issueentitled "Kosovo and Theater Air Mobility" that provides an overview of theater airlift andtanker accomplishments and issues from an operational level of war perspective. The more"tactical" issues addressed in this article should complement General Begert’s article nicely.Airlift Support to Operation Allied ForceMake no mistake that this operation was really a victory. It was avictory for NATO; it was a victory for the United States of Americaand its leadership; it was a victory for air power; and it was a victoryfor the mobility air forces and global mobility concepts.6General Charles T. "Tony" Robertson, Jr.Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command (CINCTRANS)As the USAF moves toward becoming a more expeditionary force, based predominately in theContinental United States, it will obviously need to rely more on the "Reach" core competenciesin "Global Reach, Global Power" to project aerospace power around the world. Air mobilitycombines airlift, air refueling, and air mobility support assets, processes, and procedures to builda system of systems. General Michael Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff, stressed the importance of airmobility when he said, "Whatever it is, relieving friends or repelling foes, U.S. airpower relieson the dedication, sacrifice and professionalism of the members of our great Air Mobility Team.Air Mobility Command is our leading edge, it’s what takes us to the fight."7 Air mobility forcesplayed a vital role in supporting and sustaining Operation Allied Force combat operations.According to a December 1999 article in Air Force Magazine entitled "Airlift Reality Check" byJohn A. Tirpak, "In Operation Allied Force, Air Mobility Command did a masterful job,delivering everything U.S. and NATO officials asked, and more. USAF’s airlift and aerial tankerfleets logged 7,600 sorties during the deployment and redeployment of NATO’s forces,transporting 32,000 passengers and 52,645 tons of equipment."8 Airlift maintainers andlogisticians performed superbly and kept the aircraft ready to fly. For example, C-130s and C17s had departure reliability ratings near 97% for the operation, as compared to around 95% forpeacetime.9 Tanker Airlift Control Elements, or TALCEs, did an excellent job controlling airliftflows, loading/unloading, and servicing aircraft throughout the theater, from the internationalairport at Budapest, Hungary, to the bare bases at Balikesir and Bandirma in Turkey. The
combined AMC-USAFE effort at Tirana was at the cutting edge of the Expeditionary Air Force.A USAFE briefing entitled "The Balkans: A Mobility Perspective," aptly concluded, "Withoutthese combined efforts, USAF assets could not have gotten into place or been sustained. Inaddition, humanitarian relief efforts would have remained chaotic and slow, and many morerefugees would have gone hungry, lived without shelter, or died for lack of proper medicalcare."10The venerable C-130 and the versatile C-17 were the two aircraft that primarily performedintratheater airlift during Kosovo operations. The 86 AW, a USAFE wing under Third Air Force,normally has one squadron of 16 C-130 aircraft in the 37th Airlift Squadron (37 AS)permanently assigned to Ramstein Air Base. Since 1995 when the U.S. became more heavilyinvolved militarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina, AMC has deployed eight or more C-130scontinuously to Ramstein. This unit was known as "Delta Squadron" or the 38th AirExpeditionary Squadron, which "CHOPS" (changes operational control) to USAFE andaugments in-theater airlift assets. To better support Joint Task Force SHINING HOPEhumanitarian relief operations, AMC deployed eight additional Air Reserve Component (ARC)C-130s from various Air Force Reserve (AFR) and Air National Guard (ANG) units that also"CHOPPED" to USAFE to increase intratheater airlift capability. This unit was known as "DeltaII." The USEUCOM Joint Movement Center validated all intratheater airlift mission requests,which were then centrally planned and scheduled by the USAFE Air Mobility OperationsControl Center (AMOCC) and executed through the 86th Operations Group Current OperationsDivision at Ramstein.CINCTRANS gave tactical control (TACON) of 12 C-17s and 24 aircrews to USAFE for severalweeks to complete the movement of Task Force Hawk, a U.S. Army unit with 24 ApacheHelicopters, 36 M1 Abrams Tanks, 58 M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 7,745 troops, and 22,000short tons of equipment.11 AMC also provided a Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) tocoordinate theater airlift requirements with AMC and U.S. Transportation Command andintegrate the inter/intratheater airlift effort, as well as personnel to augment the USAFE AMOCCstaff. The Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC), a combined organization set up tocontrol the NATO airlift flow into Bosnia-Herzegovina, coordinated airlift missions with combatmissions planned and executed at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza,Italy.12 The AMOCC, with assistance from the RAMCC, primarily planned and executed theintratheater airlift piece of the air war, while the CAOC ran the shooting war. Figure 1 illustratesthe command relationships of all USAF forces for Operation Allied Force.
Figure 1: Expeditionary Air Forces13Intratheater airlift played a major role in several phases of the operations in Kosovo. The USAFEand AMC team of C-130s flew 78 missions in late February and mid April 1999, transporting734 passengers and 630 tons of cargo to deploy USAFE fighter units from England and Germanyforward to Italy. C-17s flew 468 missions and C-130s flew 269 missions from 8 April through 27June 1999 to deploy Task Force Hawk from Ramstein to Tirana, Albania. Concurrent with theTask Force Hawk move, C-130s flew 117 missions in support of humanitarian relief efforts inAlbania and Macedonia under Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE, transporting 892 passengersand 2,637 tons of relief equipment. To sustain the air campaign, intratheater C-130s flew 324missions to bases throughout Europe that airlifted 3,611 passengers and 2,534 tons of munitions,spare parts, and other cargo. At the peak of the air war, C-130s were flying 69 regularlyscheduled channel missions per week throughout the theater. When combat operations overKosovo came to an end, intratheater airlift forces turned toward the tasks of redeploying AlliedForce units, deploying the peacekeeping force into Kosovo via Macedonia and Albania, andsustaining NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo. C-130s flew 357 missions that redeployed 1,582troops and 203 tons of equipment, while C-17s flew 42 missions that redeployed 617 troops and1,998 tons of equipment.14The airlift effort in Operation Allied Force was a major success. However, there were situationswhere theater airlift forces had to struggle through difficult challenges. They often ended upgetting things done the hard way. This article now turns to its primary task, an analysis of theaterairlift lessons learned during the air campaign in Kosovo, beginning with a discussion on issuesraised during humanitarian airdrop planning. These issues included preparing troops foroperations other than war, integrating a large airborne force package into an air tasking order(ATO), archiving procedures for airdropping humanitarian relief supplies and other special
missions, analyzing current airlift and airborne tactics, and addressing the need for large aircraftself-protection measures.We Train like We Fight—Some TimeOperation Allied Force was extremely successful because ourexpeditionary commanders and their people performed magnificently.As is every great endeavor, we also learned there are things we can dobetter. It is important that we now take the time to remember andcodify those lessons, make them part of our expeditionary culture, anduse them to ensure success in the next conflict.15Major General Roger A BradyUSAFE Director of Plans and Programs during Allied ForceOn or about 3 June 1999, USAFE tasked the 86 AW at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, to beprepared to conduct humanitarian airdrops over Kosovo.16 The purpose of the airdrops, ascommunicated by various USAFE staff officers during mission concept development, was tosend a political statement to the world that combat operations had ceased in Kosovo and NATOhad entered a new stage of peace operations. Aircrews tasked to plan the airdrops immediatelycoined the nickname "Operation Provide Closure" due to the emphasis on using media crews tobroadcast a political message sent through military means. Intelligence and operations staffs atthe U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and USAFE had located potential drop zones nearlarge concentrations of Kosovar-Albanian refugees inside Kosovo. The 86 AW developed a planto airdrop up to approximately 330 tons of humanitarian daily rations, or HDRs, which are ameal package similar in weight and size to a U.S. military meal ready to eat (MRE), each dayover Kosovo using C-130s and aircrews from the wing. The wing also went to work to beprepared to undertake this huge humanitarian effort if ordered to execute.Men and women from the 86 AW and the Army’s local quartermaster unit worked nonstop overa two-day period to be ready to execute limited airdrops within 24-hours of initial tasking byUSAFE, and large-scale airdrops within 72-hours. The wing gathered Army rigging experts andkey people in the wing who had done similar airdrops over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994-95during Operation PROVIDE PROMISE. These experts put their heads together and developedground handling, rigging, loading, and flight procedures that were promulgated to all key playerson Ramstein who would have to execute this mission. Aircrews were identified and placed onalert status, and aircraft with proper self-protection equipment were equipped with additionalcargo rollers to support the specially rigged boxes of HDRs, which cannot sit unsupported formore than 24-hours without breaking. A large assembly line for rigging boxes was built inside aspecial tent rented for the operation, and key personnel were trained on proper rigging/handlingprocedures. The three C-130 units at Ramstein for Allied Force—the 37 AS, the 50 AS fromDelta Squadron, and the reservists and guardsmen from Delta II—preflighted 12 aircraft andbuilt 24 aircrews to conduct around-the-clock airdrop operations if necessary. In the end, theairdrops never took place because of a potential threat on the ground to Kosovo refugees fromland mines near drop zones and the rapid movement into Kosovo by NATO ground troops thatnegated the need for a humanitarian gesture. (Leaders recognized the airdrop effort, planned tobe of short duration, would not sustain the Kosovo refugees for any extended length of time. For
example, there were only approximately 500,000 HDRs in Europe, approximately one for eachof the estimated 500,000 Indigenous Displaced Persons, or IDPs, as refugees inside Kosovo werecalled.)As the nickname "Operation Provide Closure" for the airdrops indicates, some airmen grumbledabout the explicit use of military means for a political statement, but overall the people atRamstein were excited and ready to contribute. Leaders explained the effort in terms of assistingpeople who needed help, and this message harmonized among the troops and dependents. Forexample, the wing had so many people volunteer to load HDRs into boxes that they had to turnpeople away. USAF people will work hard to make things happen and do ingenious things whenthe mission is clearly explained to them. After participating in the planning and preparation forthis operation, I relearned the lesson that military forces will be used for political ends, andmilitary leaders should be prepared to use airpower, particularly airlift forces, in this manner.USAF leaders must prepare their troops to conduct military operations short of war to furthernational security objectives. These types of operations, such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and disaster relief, are arguably the most likely use of USAF airlift capability in thefuture.The method of how the humanitarian airdrops were planned highlighted potential problems thatneed attention. Because the tasking came directly from USAFE, it appeared to bypass LieutenantGeneral Short, the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC), and his staff in theCAOC. As a commander of the aircrews who would have to fly planned airdrop missions intoKosovo, I never felt comfortable that the plan was fully integrated into the CFACC’s concept ofoperations or planned well enough to properly orchestrate the missions through an air taskingorder (ATO).17 Because the status of Serbian radar guided surface to air missiles and antiaircraftartillery was unclear immediately prior to the cease fire, we wanted airdrop missions enteringKosovo to have a fully integrated support package with electronic warfare, suppression of enemyair defense, and counter-air capabilities. We thought these assets were critical to protect theairlift strike package.The 86 AW planning team (which included C-130 weapons officers and squadron commanders)stressed to wing and USAFE leadership that a force package designed to ensure the survivabilityof large airlift aircraft would have to be thoroughly integrated into the ATO by air campaignplanners at the CAOC. After reviewing the potential threat to airlift aircraft, planners concludedto use delivery tactics similar to those used by strike aircraft over Serbia and Kosovo—nighttimeairdrops from altitudes above 15,000 feet. Despite personally talking to airlift planners in theCAOC, I never saw any planning work that integrated an airdrop package into an ATO inpreparation for execution. Maybe it happened—and I certainly hope it did—but the expertiserequired to build large strike packages with airlift aircraft as "bomb droppers" is lackingthroughout the USAF.This shortfall needs to be addressed at exercises such as Red Flag, because in any potential largescale airborne operation—be it forcible entry to secure an airfield or maneuver and resupply ofground forces—airlift aircraft will have to operate as strike aircraft in a large force package. Thisis particularly true given the lethality of current ground air defense technologies and the potentialcosts of losing up to 70 or more U.S. servicemen with the loss of one airlift aircraft. Today, airlift
forces regularly practice large-scale airborne operations, but they seldom participate in exercisesas an integrated package with fighter and electronic combat aircraft. This is a weakness thatcommanders, weapons officers, and exercise planners need to address.Another lesson the humanitarian airdrop planning exercise highlighted was how perishablespecialized tactics, techniques, and procedures can be. Airdrop planners had no formallyapproved and published directives to reference when they began to plan the high altitude airdropsof specially-rigged HDR packages—despite the fact that C-130s had conducted extensivehumanitarian airdrops over Bosnia-Herzegovina during Operation PROVIDE PROMISE onlyfour years earlier. To get the job done, 86 AW leaders found key people who were involved inthe PROVIDE PROMISE airdrops and tasked them to build checklists and teach others the keytasks based on their experience. This mission was no big surprise to the C-130 units at Ramstein,who had anticipated an airdrop tasking ever since the humanitarian crisis began in Kosovo, butthey still had to scramble at the last minute to put together the details of aircrew and riggingprocedures. They lacked formal checklists and manuals, plus they did not regularly train for thismission.AMC needs to establish a repository for manuals and checklists covering these out of theordinary employment missions at the Air Mobility Warfare Center, the Combat Aerial DeliverySchool, and AMC Tactics. This would prevent units from having to recreate checklists andprocedures when they are in the field and tasked to perform one of these "divested" missions nolonger in the regular training program. Low-Altitude
where theater airlift forces had to struggle through difficult challenges. They often ended up getting things done the hard way. This article now turns to its primary task, an analysis of theater airlift lessons learned during the air campaign in Kosovo, beginning with a discussion on issues raised during humanitarian airdrop planning.
CODE NO. 06/L074 CIINAL CODE O TE EBLIC O OSOO CODE NO. 06/L-074 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, Based on Article 65 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Approves: CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO GENERAL PART CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1 Basis and limits of criminal .
Memory Book The Kosovo Memory Book database (KMBD) of the HLC and HLC-Kosovo documents human losses in connection with the war in Kosovo between January 1, 1998, and De-cember 31, 2000.1 The KMB's focus on human losses is geared towards lethal human rights violations in connection with the armed conflict.2 The objective is to document all
William A. Wurts,(1) Sam G. McNeill(2) and Douglas G. Overhults(2) Individual and combined pumping capacities were determined for floating airlift pumps, powered by a centrifugal blower. Individual airlift pumping rates ranged from 66-225 liters of water per mi
Dec 15, 2015 · SR-71. (16) (26) 1966: Air National Guard airlift units started flying about 75 cargo flights a month to Southeast Asia. Additionally, the guard flew about 100-plus flights a month to augment the Military Airlift Command’s global airlift mission. (16) (26) At Tullahoma, Tenn., the Arnold Engineering Devel
Ivna Žic studied Applied Theater Studies, Theater Directing, and Dramatic Writing in Giessen, Hamburg, and Graz. Since 2011 she has been working as a freelance author, lecturer and director at the Maxim Gorki Theater in Berlin, Schauspielhaus Vienna, Lucerne Theater, Theater Neumarkt, Schauspiel Essen, Theater St. Gallen, and at uniT.
Ambler Theater? The Ambler Theater is a non-profit movie theater that shows inde-pendent, art, and foreign films, as well as special events like Saturday Kids Matinees and clas-sic Hollywood films. We also have filmmaker appearanc-es, discussion groups, and lectures. Who is running the Theater? "Ambler Theater, Inc.", is a 501(c)(3)
the agreements reached with Kosovo, the process is likely to be long and drawn out.1 However, the dialogue has now created so much division within Kosovo that many people are worried whether or not it is worth it, concerned that internal divisions within Kosovo are being created as kind of ‘collateral damage’ from the dialogue.
placing the vertically oriented openings in the steel chassis over the mating hooks in the backplate and sliding downward until locking tabs snap over top edge of chassis (reverse of procedure to remove module). 9140053586 May 2016 Philips Lighting North America Corporation 200 Franklin Square Drive Somerset, NJ 08873, USA S Lamps are installed by press fitting into the ceramic lamp base .
