The CIP Report June 2011
June 2011The CIP ReportDeveloping Countries (Cont. from 11)cyber attacks. In the followingsection, we will discuss the potentialfor cyber attacks on developingcountries.Developing Nations and CyberAttacksCyber attacks can have devastatingeffects on governments, companies,and individuals worldwide. Nobodyis immune to the effects of cyberattacks. Cyber attacks present acompletely different threat thantheir traditional counterpart, wherethe ability to wage war was in thedomain of governments. Cyberattacks can be initiated by anyindividual with the necessary skills.With reference to the previoussection, it is not difficult to predict apossible outcome of interconnectinga vast number of users in a relativelyshort period of time. Developingcountries are now experiencing theimpact of cyber attacks, with anincreasing number of attackstargeting users in these countries.Protection structures in developednations have evolved over the past20 years. With the initialdevelopment of the ComputerEmergency Response Teams(CERTs) in the 1980s, thesestructures have grown and maturedalongside the development of theInternet.7 However, this is not truein developing nations. With only alimited ability to connect to theInternet, and therefore to connectinternal systems, developingcountries had little need to developsuch structures. Given the limitednumber of cyber attacks theyexperienced, developing countriesmight have considered themselves“immune” to cyber attacks.However, they now find themselvesin a position to address thisconcern. The unique requirementsin developing countries requireunique solutions. In the followingsection, we will reflect on why analternative approach is required.is known by various names. Thebasic concept is that of acoordinating structure responsiblefor overseeing CIIP within acountry. Generally, these structuresare “top-down” with a focus ongovernments, and large industry asthe primary constituent.Depending on the implementation,there will be various other bodiesthat assist CSIRT in achieving itscore service.A Different Approach to CIIP inDeveloping CountriesWith such a varied environment, atraditional CSIRT structure wouldnot effectively provide CIIP for allstakeholders. That is not to saythat there is no place for a CSIRTstructure in a developing country,only that any protection structureshould be supplemented so that itcan holistically address thechallenges that are faced.Due to the unique challenges thatare present in developing nations,especially in Africa, there must be adifferent approach to CIIP. Thereare many existing models with avariety of different benefits;however, these models are tailoredfor the environment in which theyare deployed. As such, these modelsare not directly suited fordeveloping countries.The risk factors discussed abovehighlight this fact: the challengesexperienced in developing countriesare wide-ranging and unique.Solutions have to be developed withthis in mind. In the followingsection, we will discuss a potentialsolution to address the needs ofdeveloping countries.Community-Oriented CIIPTraditional methods of CIIP oftentake the form of a ComputerSecurity Incident Response Team(CSIRT)-like structure, although itAny society is made up of a numberof related communities, be they acommunity of individuals, smallbusinesses, or large industries. Thesecommunities will have their own setof requirements when conductingbusiness, and as a consequence,they will have a set of requirementsfor computer security. This idea ofrelated communities can be used toform the bases for a CIIP model.This model has a direct focus on arelated community of members,rather than a high-level overview.This idea of communityinvolvement has been exploredbefore;8 however, within thecontext of a developing country, it(Continued on Page 29)G. Killcrece, Steps for Creating National CSIRTs, CERT Coordination Center, (August 2004). http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/NationalCSIRTs. pdf.8J. Harrison and K. Towsend, “An Update on WARPs.” ENISA Quarterly Review, 4(4):13–14, (December 2008). http://www.warp.gov.uk/downloads/enisa quarterly 12 08.712
June 2011The CIP ReportRECIPE – Good Practices for CIP Policy-Makersby Eric Luiijf, Marieke Klaver, and Albert Nieuwenhuijs,Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNOAll European Union MemberStates are obliged by EuropeanCouncil Directive 2008/114/ECto identify and designateEuropean critical infrastructure(ECI) and to assess the need toimprove their protection. Thisobligation stimulated MemberStates to also look at theirnational critical infrastructures.However, it was discovered thatthere is a limited exchange ofexperience and knowledgebetween nations about how todevelop CIP policies and how tosuccessfully implement them.Therefore, nations sometimesreinvent the CIP “wheel” or findthemselves trapped in the samepitfalls explored and experienced byother nations.A project named “RecommendedElements for Critical InfrastructureProtection for Policy-Makers inEurope” (RECIPE) was establishedto remedy the lack of informationexchange among different nations.The policy approaches towards CIPin a number of nations werecollected and analyzed. The GoodPractices document for CIP policymakers is currently in its finalreview phase. This article presents ashort description of the approach.An outline of the final documentwill be published in June 2011.A TNO-led consortium consistingof the Netherlands Ministry ofSecurity and Justice, the SlovakianMinistry of Transport, Constructionand Regional Development, theAustrian Institute for InternationalAffairs (OIIP), and the EstonianMinistry of the Interior undertookthe European Commissionsponsored RECIPE project. Allconsortium partners were involvedin one way or another in earlierdevelopment and/or application ofnational CIP policy. At the sametime, the project team built onbilateral and multinational networksof CIP policy contacts in Europeand abroad. Rather thanimmediately approaching thesecontacts, the team first undertook amajor desk research effort. Thiseffort concluded that CIP policymakers face six key challenge areas:identification of criticalinfrastructure; critical infrastructuredependencies; public-privatepartnerships; information sharing;risk management; and crisis13management. From the inceptionof the RECIPE project, it was clearthat specific CIP good practices inpolicy will not fit all nations. Anation will have to compose its ownset of CIP policies, tailored to itsspecific needs and possibilities.Differences in CIP maturity,historic and legal backgrounds, andmany other reasons require selectivepicking and adaption of goodpractices. As such, the RECIPEmanual is more of a cookbook withvarious recipes under each of the sixthemes. Based on the desk research,for each of the six themes the teamselected an initial set of promisingCIP good practices stemming fromvarious nations in Europe, Australia,Canada, Singapore, and the UnitedStates. The team realized that theadded value of RECIPE is not justthe collection of good practices, butin the understanding of lesssuccessful or even failed CIP policyinitiatives and projects. These too(Continued on Page 14)
June 2011The CIP ReportGood Practices (Cont. from 13)provide valuable experiences,especially when they indicatefundamental problems. As nationsare not proud of their unsuccessfulinitiatives, the lessons identified arenot found in the public.Nevertheless, the RECIPE teammembers assembled a set ofunsuccessful initiatives to study.Team members contacted CIPpolicy-makers in selected nations toacquire deeper insight into the mainreasons for (lack of ) success of acertain approach. Strictconfidentiality was promised to theinterviewed policy-makers to enablefrank and open answers. The teamwas blessed by the professionalattitude of the interviewed nationalCIP policy-makers willing to shareeven their negative experiences. Thisinformation helped the teamcompose an introductory text oneach theme highlighting theessential conditions for a successfulimplementation of good practices.Last, but certainly not least, theteam analyzed the challenges forCIP policy-makers related to CIPpolicy transplantation. A CIP goodpractice may look great at firstglance, but they may not fit forimplementation in a specific nation.The team identified four crosscutting dimensions that are ofessence in determining whether aspecific good practice can beadapted to a nation: (1) the level ofinvolvement of private parties inCIP; (2) the level in which the cooperation structure is mandated bylaw or is on voluntary basis; (3) thematurity in the nation of CIP policyapproaches and implementations;and (4) an indication of the amountof resources required for successfulimplementation.Each of the 22 identified goodpractices is tagged with an indicatorfor each of the first three elements.When a nation is not yet used tointense interactions between publicand private parties, good practicesthat indicate little need for publicprivate partnership structures willprobably be more suited to them.When a nation generally requires astatutory decree to pass Parliamentbefore a CIP-related activity may beinitiated by a government agency,good practices which are tagged“mandated” are probably bettersuited. Also, when just starting todevelop CIP policies, the CIPpolicy-maker may want to look forCIP good practices tagged with alow required level of CIP maturity.As previously mentioned, the goodpractices are organised along six keythemes.The first theme, “identification ofcritical infrastructure,” discusses thebenefits and drawbacks of top downand bottom up approaches toidentify critical infrastructure.Following the European CouncilDirective approach, the manualexplains four basic steps to identifycritical infrastructure. The manualincludes four different good practiceapproaches to identify criticalinfrastructure, each with their prosand cons. These practices include:(1) operator-based; (2) serviceoriented; (3) asset or hybrid-based;and (4) bottom-up cross-borderapproaches. In the first case, thegovernment designates companies asa critical infrastructure operator,requiring them to perform a riskassessment and to develop security14plans. The service-oriented approach starts from identifying anddesignating services which arecritical to the society. The asset orhybrid-based approach is based ondesignated critical assets in whichcriticality is regularly evaluated by arisk assessment process. For thebottom-up, cross-border approach,the U.S.-Canadian cross-bordercritical infrastructure identificationand designation approach was takenas good practice.The second theme, “criticalinfrastructure dependencies,” firstexplains why there is a need forcritical infrastructure dependencyanalysis. The concept ofdependencies is explained, alongwith some important notionsstemming from various theoreticalmodels such as critical infrastructuredisruption and recoverycharacteristics. Attention is drawnto different modes of criticalinfrastructure operation, as the setof critical dependencies maybecome completely different whenthe critical infrastructure mode ofoperation shifts away from normal.For example, a critical infrastructureis not dependent on diesel fuel andfuel transport until the electricpower is disrupted and one startsthe backup generator. Variousmethods to map criticalinfrastructure dependencies arediscussed.Three good practices wereidentified for this theme: (1)identifying critical infrastructuredependencies using intersectoralworkshops; (2) performing aqualitative analysis; and (3)(Continued on Page 30)
June 2011The CIP ReportImpacts of the March 11, 2011 Tohoku Tsunami on Defensive Elements ofJapan’s Critical Infrastructureby Gary Chock, Structural Engineer, ASCE Tohoku Tsunami Reconnaissance Team Leader, andChair, ASCE 7 Standard - Tsunami Loads and Effects SubcommitteeJapan has a long history ofexperiencing great earthquakes andtsunamis. In fact, as evidenced inTable 1, it is the country with thehighest frequency of tsunami attacksin the world. Beginning after the1933 Showa Sanriku Tsunami andaccelerating after the 1960 Chileand 1993 Hokkaido-Nansei-OkiTsunamis, many tsunami-resistantcountermeasures were explicitlyimplemented in Japan, includingbreakwaters, seawalls, tsunamiresistant development plans, andevacuation procedures. Tsunamiprotective structures along theSanriku coast (the three prefecturesof Miyagi, Iwate, and Aomori)constituted critical infrastructurethat were vital to the protection oflife, property, and economic assetsof these coastal communities.However, the March 11, 2011 2:26pm moment magnitude (Mw) 9.0local earthquake and tsunami wasunprecedented in tsunami heightand spatial extent along the coast ofthe main island of Honshu. In thisarticle, we discuss the impacts ofthe tsunami on these elements oftsunami countermeasures for riskreduction are discussed.ASCE Structural EngineeringInstitute (SEI) and Coasts OceansPorts and Rivers Institute (COPRI)deployed three teams to examinetsunami damage, including criticalinfrastructure. The author was theleader of the ASCE TohokuTsunami Reconnaissance Team thattraveled with several Japaneseresearch collaborators during April16 to May 1, focusing on structuresand overall tsunami impacts. At thetime of this article, the ASCETsunami Team is working towards aJuly 1, 2011 report release.Therefore, these comments hereinare preliminary. The COPRI teamsfor detailed assessments of coastalstructures, ports, and harbors havejust recently returned and will beissuing their reports at a later date.It should be noted that theseobservations were made for acountry with significant tsunamiprotective structures and mitigationmeasures in place. The lessons to belearned may have even greaterimportance for the United States,where the vulnerability of ourcritical infrastructure along the westcoast is just beginning to berecognized outside of the scientificcommunity. The ASCE TsunamiTeam was able to observe examplesof structural countermeasures alongthe most severely affected coastalregion (see Table 2 on page 16).It appears that tsunami heightdesign criteria in Japan has evolvedover the years; recently, by utilizingTable 1: List of Major Historical Damaging Tsunamis Affecting Japan15(Continued on Page 16)
June 2011The CIP ReportJapanese Infrastructure (Cont. from 15)Table 2: Structural Countermeasures along the most severely affected coastal regioneither the largest past tsunamifrom which credible evidence onrunup could be obtained, ormodeled inundation depths forthe possible tsunamis caused bythe largest earthquake that canbe assumed to occur. The Mw9.0 Tohoku Earthquake, alsoknown (in Japan) as the GreatEast Japan Earthquake, farexceeded the maximum credibleearthquake that was anticipated.This may have lessons for theUnited States on the question ofwhether tsunami design criteriashould have a “deterministicovertopped by a significant marginthese structures still appeared tomaximum limit” based on judgment (sometimes up to twice their height) provide a pronounced mitigatingof the capacity of the seismic source, which subsequently created aeffect on tsunami damage, providedas is presently donebreaching failure. There have beenthey did not undergo a structuralfor earthquake design on the westundermining failures due to massivefailure. The tsunami defensive wallcoast, or whether the tsunamiscour of the onshore toe of the seafor the town of Fudai was quitedesign level should be entirelywall due to overtopping. In othersuccessful in mitigating the effectsprobabilistically based. (For morecases, some concrete gravity seawallsof an 18.5 meter tsunami waterinformation on the impact of thewere overturned by the return flowdepth. Even though the gated wallTohoku earthquake and tsunami onfollowing inundation, rather thanwas overtopped by about threeU.S. nuclear facilities, see page 25.by the incoming tsunami. Seawallsmeters, the extent of damage on theThe reasoning to use a probabilisticwere equipped with heavy steel gates lee of the wall to the town wasapproach for tsunamis for riskand the majority of these gates seemminimal. Another case ofmanagement is that the consequencesto have resisted the incoming flowdemonstrable effectiveness was seenof tsunami height underestimation arebut not necessarily the outwardin the city of Miyako. In this city,quite severe.return flow. The tsunami heightwe examined areas of the townwas greatly affected by the coastaloutside of the seawall and theIrrespective of population, thebathymetry and local topography,portions within. The difference wasmajority of coastal communitiesand in all cases so far exceeded theremarkable, with the unprotectedalong most of the areas north ofdesign height of tsunami defensivearea essentially more than 90Sendai had seawalls designed forwalls and gates. The resultingpercent destroyed and the portiontsunami mitigation. These seawallsdamage was near completebehind the seawall having damagewould have had a considerabledestruction to most low-risethat was mostly localized. This wasrange of construction date vintages.buildings in low-lying communities. in spite of the fact that variousThe tsunami protection wallsHowever, there could have beensections of the protective wall weremainly consisted of either eartheven greater spatial extent ofovertopped by about two meters.filled dikes protected by concretedamage had there been no seawallslabs on both the offshore andprotection at all.Most offshore breakwaters failed inonshore slopes, or of massive gravitythe tsunami, as evidenced by eitherseawalls constructed of monolithicNotable exceptions to this wereremote sensing or on-siteunreinforced concrete. However,seawalls experiencing only awith few exceptions, seawalls weremoderate amount of overtopping;(Continued on Page 17)16
June 2011The CIP ReportJapanese Infrastructure (Cont. from 16)observation of breakwaters (andtheir disappearance). The tsunamimitigation forests appeared to beineffectual on their own, sincetrunks were snapped off oruprooted, and merely provided largewooden debris missiles broughtinland by the tsunami.Every community has tsunami roadsigns indicating when you enterand leave the potential tsunamiinundation area. These signs appearto have been conservatively locatedsuch that the destructive part ofthe tsunami occurred within thezone, even when most seawallsand breakwaters were severelyovertopped or destroyed. Therefore,it seems tsunami evacuation andawareness policy implementationfor public safety did not assume thattsunami effects would always beprevented by these seawalls.Warnings for the occurrence of themost severe category of tsunamiwere being issued beginningapproximately three minutes afterthe Tohoku Earthquake.Communities utilized verticalevacuation buildings as well aslocally higher ground sites asevacuation centers as a part of theirlocal disaster management plan. Inthe northern Sanriku coastal areas,there were communities where thetallest buildings were not higherthan four or five stories. There wereseveral cases where up to four-storybuildings were overtopped by thetsunami, including some tsunamievacuation buildings, a hospital,and local emergency managementcenters, resulting in loss of lifeamongst those who expected to besafe in those buildings. Newsreports indicate that over a hundredevacuation buildings or evacuationsites were inundated. Someemergency evacuation centers, suchas in Minamisanriku and Onagawa,were seismically robust low-risestructures (for example, a firestation) that were manned by thoseissuing the tsunami warnings andbroadcasting real-time accounts ofthe tsunami to the towns, andperished while fulfilling thatmission. In these cases, the buildingstructures survived but most of theiroccupants did not. In one case inRikuzentakata, such real-timereporting resulted in abandonmentof a tsunami evacuation center tomove to even higher ground beforethe four-story building wasinundated, thereby saving severaldozens of prima
before a CIP-related activity may be initiated by a government agency, good practices which are tagged “mandated” are probably better suited. Also, when just starting to develop CIP policies, the CIP. policy-maker may want to look for CIP good practices tagged with a . low required
CIP -003 -5, CIP -004 -5, CIP -005 -5, CIP -006 -5, CIP -007 -5, CIP -008 -5, CIP -009 -5, CIP -010 -1, . controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the Version 5 CIP Cybe r Security Standards . Most requirement s open with , Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented .
May 02, 2018 · D. Program Evaluation ͟The organization has provided a description of the framework for how each program will be evaluated. The framework should include all the elements below: ͟The evaluation methods are cost-effective for the organization ͟Quantitative and qualitative data is being collected (at Basics tier, data collection must have begun)
Silat is a combative art of self-defense and survival rooted from Matay archipelago. It was traced at thé early of Langkasuka Kingdom (2nd century CE) till thé reign of Melaka (Malaysia) Sultanate era (13th century). Silat has now evolved to become part of social culture and tradition with thé appearance of a fine physical and spiritual .
On an exceptional basis, Member States may request UNESCO to provide thé candidates with access to thé platform so they can complète thé form by themselves. Thèse requests must be addressed to esd rize unesco. or by 15 A ril 2021 UNESCO will provide thé nomineewith accessto thé platform via their émail address.
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CIP-005-5 . 4/1/2016: CIP-006-5. 4/1/2016: CIP-007-5. 4/1/2016: CIP-008-5. 4/1/2016: CIP-009-5. 4/1/2016: CIP-010-1. 4/1/2016: CIP-011-1. 4/1/2016: Talk with Texas RE & NRWG February 18, 2016. 3 CIP
(CIP 005 and CIP 006) g, g ( ) Replacement of 500 signs and 3,000 chain markers (CIP 020) Rehabilitation of 5,000 feet of track pads/shock absorbers (CIP 021) Rehabilitation of 5 miles of third rail (CIP 023) Rehabilitation of 10 miles of running rail (CIP 024)Rehabilitati
