Blinding The Enemy: CCP Interference In Taiwan’s Democracy
Blinding the Enemy:CCP Interference in Taiwan’s DemocracyGary Schmitt and Michael MazzaOctober 2019
Global Taiwan InstituteAbout the Global Taiwan InstituteGTI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit policy incubator dedicated to insightful, cutting-edge, and inclusiveresearch on policy issues regarding Taiwan and the world. Our mission is to enhance the relationship betweenTaiwan and other countries, especially the United States, through policy research and programs that promotebetter public understanding about Taiwan and its people.www.globaltaiwan.orgAbout the AuthorsGary J. Schmitt is a resident scholar in strategic studies & American institutions at the American Enterprise Institute(AEI).He has held senior staff positions in the US Senate & the White House. He is the author, coauthor, editor, andcoeditor of many books, with the latest being Rise of the Revisionists: Russia, China, and Iran (AEI Press, 2018). Dr.Schmitt has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in politics from the University of Dallas.Michael Mazza is a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and a regular contributor to GTI'sGlobal Taiwan Brief. Mazza is also a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he analyzesUS defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese military modernization, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, KoreanPeninsula security, and US policy in Southeast Asia. Mazza has contributed to numerous AEI studies on Americangrand strategy in Asia, US defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific, US-Taiwan relations, and Taiwanese defense strategy,and his published work includes pieces in The Wall Street Journal Asia, the Los Angeles Times, and Foreign Affairs.Cover: "Taiwan flag" by 365 is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, photo for public use through creative commons, 172
Board of DirectorsWen-yen Chen(Chairperson)Chieh-Ting Yeh(Vice Chairperson)Jennifer Hu(Vice Chairperson)John HuangKeelung HongAki HsuStephanie HuHertz HuangHoward HuangPatrick HuangVictor HuangAnthony KangHong-tien LaiJennifer LeeKF LinHeather LinCharles PanMinly SungSunshene TsouArthur TuKevin LinFred WangKristie WangSarah WeiLily WangElise WhangAdvisory CouncilWen-yen ChenPeter ChowDavid TsaiJames WangAdvisory BoardGordon ChangColumnist for The Daily Beast, author of The Coming Collapse of ChinaRalph CossaPacific Forum CSISJune Teufel DreyerProfessor,University of MiamiDafydd FellDirector, Centre of Taiwan Studies, School ofOriental and African StudiesRichard FisherSenior Fellow, International Assessment andStrategy CenterToshi YoshiharaSenior Fellow,Center for Strategic and Budgetary AssessmentsWallace GregsonRetired Lieutenance General, USMCThomas HughesConsultant, Hughes And CompanyShirley KanMark StokesExecutive Director,Project 2049 InstituteJohn TkacikRetired Specialist, Congressional Research Service(CRS)Senior Fellow and Director,International Assessment and Strategy CenterMatt SalmonMasahiro WakabayashiFang-long ShihArthur WaldronVice President for Government Affairs, ArizonaState University; Former Member of Congressfrom ArizonaCo-director, Taiwan Research Programme, LondonSchool of Economics and Political ScienceWilliam StantonFormer AIT Director (2009-12)Michael ReillyFormer British Representative to TaiwanRobert WangSenior Advisor, CovingtonProfessor,Waseda University in JapanProfessor,University of PennsylvaniaGerrit van der WeesFormer Editor and Publisher,Taiwan CommuniquéStephen M. YoungRetired U.S. AmbassadorJoseph BoscoFormer China Country Desk Officer in the Officeof the Secretary of Defense
Global Taiwan InstituteTable of ContentsIntroduction.5Blinding the Enemy: CCP Interference in Taiwan’s DemocracyNew and Traditional Media.74Old School Influence: Locals, Gangs, and Money.12Tackling the Challenge.15Conclusion.20October 2019
Global Taiwan InstituteIntroductionThe People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) interferenceThe issue of PRC interference in Taiwan’s democracycame to a head in the November 2018 elections for localmayors, county magistrates, and township councils. Although the exact extent of the interference is difficult toquantify, that it existed is not difficult to see. And whilethe margins of electoral victories for the Kuomintang(KMT) suggest that the interference was unlikely tohave been decisive in many or most instances, the PRC’sefforts almost certainly boosted KMT candidates2 andeased their paths to victory.3 Understanding the leveland character of this interference is important if for noother reason than that future elections—such as theupcoming national election for president and the legislative assembly in January 2020—may be closer and,in such elections, Chinese Communist Party (CCP)influence operations could well make a real difference.For Americans, understanding what happened in Taiwan is undoubtedly informed by our own recent expe1Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8, 22 U.S.C. 3301), Sec. 2, iwan-relations-act/.2A particularly striking KMT win was populist Han Kuo-yu’s electionas mayor of the city of Kaohsiung—traditionally a DPP stronghold. Han’s victorywas, in part, the product of a massive rallying of supporters through social media.According to a report by investigative journalist Paul Huang, the largest Facebookgroup supporting his campaign (and which was used to distribute information toother social media) was likely “created, managed, and nurtured by what looks verymuch like a professional cyber group from China.” “Chinese Cyber-OperativesBoosted Taiwan’s Insurgent Candidate,” Foreign Policy, June 26, 2019, he Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won 13 city and county elections in 2014 but only 6 in 2018. The KMT won 15 city and county elections lastyear, after having only won 6 in 2014, including winning the mayoralty race in along-standing DPP stronghold Kaohsiung City.In contrast, Taiwan is a country of 23 million facing aChinese behemoth with massive financial and cyberrelated resources. The scale of what Beijing can “throw”at a much smaller Taiwan makes Chinese efforts potentially far more impactful. Not surprisingly, in the University of Gothenburg’s annual analysis of democracyaround the globe, two small states (Latvia and Taiwan),facing neighbors that are both much larger and determined to “return” the smaller states to their sphere,have the “absolute worst scores” for the level of foreigngovernment dissemination of false information. Taiwanis the only country to score under 0.5—a score of 0 corresponds to “Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.”4In the past, the most visible form of Chinese interference in Taiwan’s electoral processes took the form ofmilitary intimidation. Most famously, the People’sLiberation Army (PLA) fired missiles into waters surrounding Taiwan in 1996 ahead of the island’s first direct, open presidential election in an ill-fated effort todissuade voters from casting ballots for Lee Teng-hui.More recently, Beijing’s use of the PLA to sway elections is subtler. Indeed, after increasing the frequencyof long-haul PLA Air Force patrols through the Miyako Strait, many of which encircled Taiwan, between2015 and 2018, there was a seven-month pause insuch operations from June to December 2018. FlightsBlinding the Enemy: CCP Interference in Taiwan’s Democracyin Taiwan’s democracy—efforts to influence politics inTaiwan through both overt and covert, both legal andillicit means—is a matter of importance not only forTaiwan but for the United States as well. As the TaiwanRelations Act (1979) states unequivocally, “It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the WesternPacific area and of gave concern to the United States.”1rience with foreign interference in elections. But thereare important differences to be kept in mind and whichmake the case of China and Taiwan unique. First, Chinahas the advantage of being ethnically and linguisticallyfar more in sync with Taiwan than Russia could ever bewith the United States. Second, the United States is acountry of 330 million. As sophisticated as the Russianoperation might have been, Moscow’s capacity to movethe electoral meter in the United States was always going to be marginal, even if important in key instances.4V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, “Democracy Facing GlobalChallenges: V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019,” p.34. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer v-demdemocracy report 2019.pdf.October 20195
Blinding the Enemy: CCP Interference in Taiwan’s DemocracyGlobal Taiwan Institute6resumed in 2019.5 It appears Beijing was intent on softening its threatening posture towards Taipei in the run-up to the November elections in order to deny the DemocraticProgressive Party (DPP)—the party most intent onmaintaining the island’s de facto independence—anissue on which to campaign against KMT candidateswho were calling for closer relations with the PRC.Although the PLA remains a tool in the CCP’splaybook6—the military is, after all, the armedwing of the political party—other tools for election interference in Taiwan are more insidious and less understood here in the United States.5Jia Jiawen, “After 9-in-1 Elections, PLA Encirclement Flight aroundTaiwan ‘Go quiet’” United Daily News, January 28, 2019, https://udn.com/news/story/7331/3618234. English translation of the headline from the Chinese.6Although the PLA appeared to “take a break” operationally in therun-up to the November 2018 elections, at other times, in an effort to reinforce theimpression of Taiwan’s weakness, it has used social media accounts to publicizePLA deployments of aircraft and naval vessels in the island’s surrounding air andseas. Taiwan news channels have then used, without it appears verifying whetheraccurate or not, these same videos and pictures in their coverage. Reuters Institutefor the Study of Journalism, “Digital News Report 2018,” p.138. ads/2018/06/digital-news-report-2018.pdf.October 2019
Global Taiwan InstituteNew and Traditional MediaThe PRC’s use of information warfare against TaiwanAccording to a recent study, nearly 60percent of Taiwaneselook to social mediafor news.11 Taiwan investigators have foundthat fake news storieshave originated in bothTaiwan and overseas,that they are initiallyYet, misinformation and disinspread via new mediaformation8 have become a more significant problem (e.g., Facebook, Line, PTT message boards), and thatin Taiwan in recent years, with their effective impact they are then magnified by traditional mass media.fueled by both a politically polarized society and thepervasive use of social media by Taiwanese citizens.9 Chinese disinformation efforts took on particular poiDistressingly, a sizeable portion of Taiwan’s profes- gnancy following an incident in September 2018. Afsional journalist community, via traditional media, ter a powerful typhoon hit Japan and knocked out ahas played a role in amplifying “fake news” rather than bridge to Osaka’s Kansai International Airport, a reportproviding the rigorous reporting sensational stories on Taiwan’s Professional Technology Temple (PTT)require. Put simply, Taiwan’s media environment— online bulletin board indicated that China’s consulatecomprising both new and traditional outlets—has be- had evacuated Chinese nationals from the airport. Thecome a fertile milieu for PRC influence operations. report went on to say that if Taiwan citizens identified“Taiwan’s media environ-ment—comprising both newand traditional outlets—hasbecome a fertile milieu forPRC influence operations.One such fabricated story that circulated widely7Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume 2 (Elmsford, NY: ForeignLanguages Press, 1975), 166.8“Misinformation” is false information that is spread, unintentionally ornot; “disinformation” is false information deliberatively spread.9Nearly 90% of Taiwan’s population is active on social media, withthe two most popular social media platforms being Facebook and YouTube.LINE is the most utilized communication app, which also allows the exchangeof texts, videos and images. Simon Kemp, “Digital 2019: Global Digital Yearbook, Datareportal, January 31, 2019 l-digital-yearbook?utm source Reports&utm medium PDF&utmcampaign Digital 2019&utm content Global Overview Promo Slide and“Digital 2018 Taiwan (January 2018),” SlideShare, 18-taiwan-january-2018.themselves as Chinese, they too could be evacuated fromthe airport. Taiwan’s foreign ministry representative inOsaka, a 61-year old diplomat named Su Chii-cheng,came under a mountain of criticism for failing to aidTaiwan citizens and, subsequently, took his own life.1210“After Sanctions, Made-in-China Fake News Engulfs Taiwan as TiesTurn Sour,” Business Standard, November 27, 2018, lfstaiwan-as-ties-turn-sour-118112700194 1.html.11Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, “Digital News Report2019,” p.145, efault/files/2019-06/DNR 2019 FINAL 0.pdf.12“Taiwan Representative in Japan’s Osaka Commits Suicide,” Reuters,October 2019Blinding the Enemy: CCP Interference in Taiwan’s Democracyis, of course, not new. Radio stations, massive loudspeakers designed to reach across the waters of the Strait, andeven artillery salvos of propaganda pamphlets, were allused by the PRC in the immediate wake of the Nationalist forces’ retreat onto Taiwan and surrounding islands.From Beijing’s perspective, the “loss” of Taiwan in 1949to Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT was, and remains, a bitterpill despite Mao’s victory in the Chinese Civil War. Nevertheless, Mao’s adage that “toachieve victory” one “must asfar as possible make the enemyblind and deaf by sealing his eyesand ears and creating confusion in their minds”7 was morea policy hope than an effectivereality when it came to Taiwanin the decades following the war.within Taiwan—and was well along before the government showed it to be false—was associated with apicture of a massed dumping of pineapples in the waters of a dam. The caption tied to the picture assertedthat China was no longer buying fruit from Taiwan’sfarmers because of Tsai’s stance on cross-Strait relations. “The farmers,” it concluded,” work hard fornothing.” Only later was it made clear that the picture was of pineapples dumped in a Chinese dam.107
Blinding the Enemy: CCP Interference in Taiwan’s DemocracyGlobal Taiwan Institute8It only became clear following the Taiwanese official’s death that the original PTT post,which was shared widely on the messageboard and repeated by mass media outlets, wasuntrue. PRC officials were no more able than their Taiwan counterparts to evacuate stranded travelers fromthe airport. As CCP Watch’s Jessica Drun reported,official Chinese media played “into the narrative that[China] aided Taiwanese in Osaka” and made a pointof criticizing the Tsai administration “for mismanaging the situation and being unable to support its citizens abroad.”13 In the end, the original story was tracedback to a Chinese microblogging site (Weibo) and“content farm” and posted on mainland media sites,where it was then picked up by PTT messaging.14 Onesurvey study reportedly indicated that less than halfthose familiar with the story understood it to be false.15The Kansai airport PTT post was, unfortunately, not unique in its falsehood. Per Drun:Numerous other examples abound—all witha common thread of criticizing the DPP. Thisis seen in the spread of disinformation on social media during the very public and contentious debate on pensions reform, which sawuntrue claims that the DPP government wouldenforce unnecessarily strict restrictions onpensioners. Another example includes widelyshared posts that falsely accused Tsai of beingSeptember 15, 2008. -idUSKCN1LV067.13Jessica Drun, “Taiwan’s Social Media Landscape: Ripe for ElectionInterference?” (Center for Advanced China Research) November 13, 2018, rference14Reporters without Borders, “China’s Pursuit of a New World MediaOrder,” March 22, 2019, p.17, https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/en rapport chineweb final.pdf. See also, Puma Shen’s presentation on Chinese sharp power at“Cross-Strait Relations: Present Challenges and Future Developments,” HeritageFoundation, July 2, 2019, s.15Cited in South China Morning Post, “Taiwan Set for Pro-MainlandFake News Deluge before its Presidential Election,” June 27, 2019, -elections. As the former legal counsel to PTT has noted, “As farback as 2015, a cavalcade of Chinese ’50 cent’ accounts were active on PTT. Fromtheir IP addresses, one could see they were all entering through dummy accounts.”Quoted in “Taiwan’s Online ‘Opinion War Arrived,” Rebecca Lin & Felice Wu,Commonwealth Magazine, April 27, 2019, d 2375. The article also provides a useful overview of how the internethas affected political campaigning in Taiwan.unsympathetic and disengaged from Tainanflood victims by remaining on an armored military vehicle and refusing to set foot in subsiding flood waters. All in all, these schemes out ofChina align with the broader approach Beijinghas adopted towards Taiwan since Tsai cameto power to discredit her administration andto portray the DPP as ill-equipped to govern.16Some scholars in Taiwan have suggested that China’sdisinformation campaign not surprisingly intensifiedin early 2018 as election campaigning got underway,pointing to a return of the “ghost island” meme. Ozyreporter Leslie Nguyen-Okwu describes “ghost island”as “shorthand for the global isolation, lack of opportunity, economic stagnation, government corruptionand overall sense of despair that seem to be hauntingTaiwan as of late.”17 The term apparently emerged fromwithin Taiwan, but it undoubtedly embodies a narrative that the CCP would like to promote. Indeed, J.Michael Cole describes “ghost island” as a “recurringtheme” in China’s information warfare efforts.18 Writing in July 2018, Nguyen-Okwu reported that in thefirst six months of the year, a Google search indicatedthat the phrase had spiked in use by 86 percent overthe previous year and that there were more than 400PTT posts on “ghost island” over the same period.19PTT has been a major tool of Chinese disinformation efforts. According to discussions we had in Taipei, PTT reaches between one and two million middle-class residents in Taiwan. Prior to the election, alarge number of PTT accounts were bought and soldon Shopee, an online auction site active in Taiwanand Southeast Asia. (Drun reports PTT accounts havealso appeared on Taobao, a PRC auction site). Influential accounts are sold for as m
he People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) interference in Taiwan’s democracy—efforts to influence politics in Taiwan through both overt and covert, both legal and illicit means—is a matter of importance not only for Taiwan but for the United States as well. As the Taiwan Rel
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