Wired For War? - Brookings Institution

FEATURES Robots and Military DoctrineADM Mullen observes robot used to detectand destroy roadside bombs during visit toexercise Mojave Viper106     JFQ/ issue 52, 1st quarter 2009competitor” that followed the mode of fighting an asymmetric war with submarines,cruise missiles, and antiship ballistic missiles(that is, China), Navy planners hit upon anovel solution. Because unmanned planestake up less deck space and have far greaterendurance and range than manned planes,they reversed the ratio, offloading all but12 of the manned planes and loading on 84unmanned planes. Their “spot on, almostvisionary” idea reportedly tripled the strikepower of the carrier and gave it a reach that astandard mix of F–35s and F–18s would lack.11As UAVs shrink in size, even more dronescould fly off such flattops. In 2005, one ofthe largest aircraft carriers in the world, theUSS Nimitz, tested Wasp Micro Air Vehicles,drones that are only 13 inches long.12The same developments with mothership concepts are starting to take place underthe sea. In 2007, a Navy attack sub shot asmall robotic sub out of its torpedo tubes,which then carried out a mission. The roboticmini-sub drove back to the mother submarine. A robotic arm then extended out of thetube and pulled the baby sub back inside,prototype ship in the series is only about onefourth the size of the previous equivalent ship’screw. But less important than the automationof the ship itself is the concept of change it represents. Besides the crew on board, there is alsoa crew on shore, sitting at computer cubiclesand providing support from thousands of milesaway.10 The LCS has a modular plug-and-playcapacity, allowing various unmanned systemsand the control stations to be swapped in andout, depending on the mission.If the ship is clearing sea lanes of mines,it might pack onboard a set of mine-huntingrobotic mini-subs. If the ship is patrolling aharbor, it might carry mini-motorboats thatwould scatter about, inspecting any suspiciousships. Or, if it needs to patrol a wider area, itmight carry a few UAVs. Each of these dronesis controlled by crew sitting at control modulestations, who themselves only join the shipfor the time needed. The manned ship reallyis a sort of moving mothership, hosting andcontrolling an agile network of unmannedsystems that multiply its reach and power.The mothership concept is not justplanned for new, specially built ships like theLCS. Older ships all the way up to aircraftcarriers might be converted to this mode.Already serving as a sort of mothership formanned planes, the aircraft carrier wouldadd up to 12 unmanned planes to each carrierunder the Navy’s current plan. This numbershould grow if we are interested in actualcombat effectiveness. In a 2006 wargame,which simulated a battle with a “near-peerthe Navy’s current plan foraircraft carriers entails addingup to 12 unmanned planes toeach carrierU.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley)capabilities, and more accurate, GPS [globalpositioning system]-enhanced targeting.”8The dangers are even greater in thebrown water close to shore. Here, small, fastmotor boats, like those that attacked the USSCole, can hide among regular traffic and dartin and out. Relatively cheap diesel-poweredsubmarines can silently hide among watercurrents and thermal layers. More than 300varieties of undersea mines are available onthe world market today, ranging from thosethat detonate by simple contact to a newgeneration of smart mines, stealthy roboticsystems equipped with tiny motors thatallow them to shift positions, so as to create amoving minefield.As evidenced by the intense work withrobotics at the Office of Naval Research,the Navy is increasingly turning towardunmanned systems to face this dangerousenvironment. Describing the “great promise”that unmanned systems hold for navalwarfare, one report told how “we are justbeginning to understand how to use and buildthese vehicles. The concepts of operationsare in their infancy, as is the technology. TheNavy must think about how to exploit theunmanned concepts and integrate them intothe manned operations.”9One of the early ideas for trying to takethese technologies out to sea comes in theform of the Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS)concept. Much smaller and faster than thewarships used now, the ships are to be incredibly automated. For example, the crew on thewhereupon the crew downloaded its data andfueled it back up for another launch. It allsounds simple enough, but the test of a roboticunderwater launch-and-recovery systemrepresented “a critical next step for the U.S.Navy and opens the door for a whole new setof advanced submarine missions,” accordingto one report.13The challenge the Navy is facing inundersea warfare is that potential rivals suchas China, Iran, and North Korea have dieselsubs that remain absolutely quiet. When thesesubs hide in littoral waters close to shore,many advantages held by America’s nuclearsubs disappear.Unmanned systems, particularly thosesnuck in by a fellow submarine, “turn theasymmetry around by doing [with unmannedcraft] what no human would do.” For example,sonar waves are the traditional way to find foesunder the sea. But these active sensors are akinto using a flashlight in the dark. They help usfind what we are looking for, but they also leteveryone nearby know exactly where we are.ndupres s . ndu. edu

SINGERManned submarines instead usually quietlylisten for their foes, waiting for them to make anoise first. By contrast, unmanned systems canbe sent on missions and blast out their sonar,actively searching for the diesel subs hidingbelow. An enemy might be able to strike back,but it would only reveal its presence and notkill any Sailors.Having its own fleet of tiny subs alsomultiplies the reach of a submarine. Forexample, a mother-submarine able to send outjust a dozen tiny subs can search a grid thesize of the Persian Gulf in a little over a day.A submarine launching a UAV that can fly inand out of the water (like Lockheed Martin’sCormorant design) extends the mothership’sreach farther, even ashore.Such capabilities will lead to new operating concepts. One naval officer talked abouthow the robotic mini-subs would be like theunmanned “whiskers.” He continued, “Theywould act as ‘force multipliers,’ taking care ofprogrammable tasks and freeing up mannedwarships to take on more complex ones. Andthey could be sent on the riskiest missions, tohelp keep Sailors and Marines out of harm’sway.” 14 For example, the robotic subs couldbe sent in to clear minefields from below, lurkaround enemy harbors, or track enemy subsas they leave port.By pushing its robotic whiskers (and“teeth,” as the systems can also be armed)farther away from the body, the mothershipdoes not even have to be a warship itself. Forexample, with foreign nations increasinglyunwilling to host U.S. bases ashore, the Navyis moving to a doctrinal concept of seabasing.These would be large container ships that actlike a floating harbor. But such ships are slow,ungainly, and certainly not stealthy; hence,they are vulnerable to attack. A plan to protectthem is called Sea Sentry.15 The seabase wouldnot only provide a supply station for visitingships and troops ashore, but also host its ownprotective screen of unmanned boats, drones,and mini-subs. Similar plans are being developed for other vulnerable targets at sea, suchas civilian merchant ships, oil tankers, andeven oil rigs.16The concept of the mothership is notlimited to the sea. For example, one firm inOhio has fitted out a propeller-powered C–130cargo plane so it can not only launch UAVs,but also recover them in the air. The dronesfly in and out of the cargo bay in the back,turning the plane into an aircraft carrier thatis actually airborne.17n d u p res s .ndu.eduRethinking War with MotherSuch motherships will entail a significant doctrinal shift in how militaries fight.One report explained that its effect at seawould be as big a transformation as the shiftto aircraft carriers, projecting that it wouldbe the biggest “fork in the road” for the U.S.Navy in the 21st century.18Naval war doctrine, for example, haslong been influenced by the thinking of theAmerican Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan(1840–1914). Mahan did not have a distinguished career at sea (he reputedly would getseasick even on a pond), but in 1890 he wroteThe Influence of Sea Power Upon History,which soon changed the history of war at sea.Navies, Mahan argued, were what shapedwhether a nation became great (an argumentlikely to appeal to any sailor). In turn, thebattles that mattered were the big showdownsof fleets at sea, “cataclysmic clashes of capitalships concentrated in deep blue water.”19Mahan’s prescripts for war quickly becamethe doctrine of the U.S. Navy, guiding TeddyRoosevelt to build a “Great White Fleet” ofbattleships at the turn of the 20th century andshaping the strategy the Navy used to fight thegreat battles in the Pacific in World War II, aswell as how it planned to fight the Soviets if theCold War ever turned hot.The future of war at sea, however, bodesto look less and less like what Mahan envisaged. With the new asymmetric threats andunmanned responses, any future confrontations will not merely take place betweentwo fleets, made up of the biggest ships,concentrated together into one place. Moreover, where ships fight will not simply be theblue waters far from shore; these battles arepredicted to take place closer to shore. Thefleet would comprise not a number of ships“concentrated” together as Mahan wanted,but rather would be made up of many tinyconstellations of smaller, often unmannedsystems, linked back to their host motherships. These ships, in turn, might be muchsmaller than Mahan’s capital ships of the past.ships will not be“concentrated” together asMahan wanted, but ratherbe made up of many tinyconstellations of smaller, oftenunmanned systemsWith Mahan’s vision looking less applicable to modern wars and technology, a newthinker on 21st-century naval war doctrinemay have to come into vogue in planning. Theonly twist is that he was born just 14 yearsafter Mahan.Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854–1922)was a British novelist turned naval historian.Notably, Corbett was a friend and ally ofnaval reformer Admiral John “Jackie” Fisher,who introduced such new developmentsas dreadnaughts, submarines, and aircraftcarriers into the Royal Navy. While he andMahan lived in the same era, Corbett took acompletely different tack toward war at sea.They both saw the sea as a critical chokepointto a nation’s survival, but Corbett thought thatthe idea of concentrating all ships together inthe hope of one big battle was “a kind of shibboleth” that would do more harm than good.The principle of concentration, he declared,was “a truism—no one would dispute it. As acanon of practical strategy, it is untrue.”20In his masterwork on naval war doctrine,modestly titled Some Principles of MaritimeTechnicians observe UH–19XRW Hoverwing during testingU.S. Navy (John Joyce)issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ     107

FEATURES Robots and Military DoctrineStrategy, Corbett opined that the idea ofputting all one’s ships together into one placedid not induce all enemies into one big battle.Only the foe that thought it would win sucha battle would enter it. Any other sensible foewould just avoid the big battle and disperse toattack the other places where the strong fleetwas not (a theory that was borne out later bythe German strategy in World War II). Moreover, the more a fleet concentrated in one place,the harder it would be to keep its locationconcealed. So the only thing Mahan’s big fleetdoctrine accomplishes in an asymmetric war,Corbett felt, is to make the enemy’s job easier.Instead, argued Corbett, the fleet shouldspread out and focus on protecting shippinglanes, blockading supply routes, and generallymenacing the enemy at as many locales aspossible. Concentrations of a few battleshipswere not the way to go. Rather, much like howthe Royal Navy policed the world’s oceansduring the 1700 and 1800s, it was better tohave a large number of tiny constellationsof mixed ships, large and small, each able tooperate independently. In short, it is a doctrine far more apt for motherships.Even more shocking at the time, Corbettemphasized that a navy should think aboutnot just operations in the blue waters in themiddle of the ocean, but also what role it couldplay in supporting operations on land. Offersone biographer, “Well before it was fashionable, [Corbett] stressed the interrelationshipbetween navies and armies.”21 This seems muchmore attuned to the role of the U.S. Navy today,which must figure out not merely how to determajor state conflict and protect shipping lanes,but also how to aid the fight on the land (forinstance, it carried out over half of the 15,000airstrikes during the 2003 invasion of Iraq).Mahan won the first round in the 20thcentury, but Corbett’s doctrine may well cometrue through 21st-century technology.Swarming the FutureThe concept of mothers

singer P.W. Singer is Senior Fellow and Director of the 21 st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. This article is derived from his upcoming book Wired for War: The Robotics .