Strategy Research Project

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Strategy Research ProjectHAMAS – HOW HAS ATERRORIST ORGANIZATIONBECOME A POLITICALPOWER?BYCOLONEL BEN-ZION (BENNY) MEHRIsraeli Defense ForcesDISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:Approved for Public Release.Distribution is Unlimited.USAWC CLASS OF 2008This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree.The views expressed in this student academic researchpaper are those of the author and do not reflect theofficial policy or position of the Department of theArmy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188Report Documentation PagePublic reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.1. REPORT DATE2. REPORT TYPE3. DATES COVERED15 MAR 2008Strategy Research Project00-00-2007 to 00-00-20084. TITLE AND SUBTITLE5a. CONTRACT NUMBERHamas- How Has a Terrorist Organization Become a Political Power?5b. GRANT NUMBER5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER6. AUTHOR(S)5d. PROJECT NUMBERBen-Zion Mehr5e. TASK NUMBER5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)U.S. Army War College ,122 Forbes Ave.,Carlisle,PA,17013-52209. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORTNUMBER(S)12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for public release; distribution unlimited13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES14. ABSTRACTSee attached15. SUBJECT TERMS16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:a. REPORTb. ABSTRACTc. THIS PAGEunclassifiedunclassifiedunclassified17. LIMITATION OFABSTRACT18. NUMBEROF PAGESSame asReport (SAR)3619a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSONStandard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECTHAMAS – HOW HAS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION BECOME A POLITICALPOWER?byColonel Ben-Zion (Benny) MehrIsraeli Defense ForcesColonel Paul JusselProject AdviserThis SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of StrategicStudies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission onHigher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on HigherEducation is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary ofEducation and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the authorand do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.U.S. Army War CollegeCARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACTAUTHOR:Colonel. Ben-Zion (Benny) MehrTITLE:Hamas – How Has a Terrorist Organization Become a PoliticalPower?FORMAT:Strategy Research ProjectDATE:13 March 2008KEY TERMS:Terrorism, Islam, Israeli – Palestinian ConflictWORD COUNT: 8,256PAGES: 36CLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedIn the beginning of 2006 the first democratic elections in the Palestinian authorityended with a surprising victory by a landslide of Hamas – a recognized terroristorganization.How did Hamas gain so much power to become the ruling party by democraticelections? Does that mean that the majority of the Palestinian population support terror?Hamas is similar to other fundamentalist Islamic organizations, mainly by its socialnetwork and its aspiration to establish a religious Islamic state. Understanding thesource of power and identifying the center of gravity of the Hamas is crucial tounderstand how Hamas come to power. It’s also important for an effective war on terror.Furthermore, this understanding is essential as part of the efforts to settle thePalestinian-Israeli conflict.Since any action against Hamas taken by Israel and/or the USA is interpreted andmarketed as an attack against Islam, an efficient way to cope with an Islamistfundamentalist organization must involve an active part played by the moderate Arabcountries.

HAMAS – HOW HAS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION BECOME A POLITICALPOWERFollow The Money .—AnonymousIn January 2006 the first democratic elections for the Palestinian National Authoritywere held. Many hopes rested upon these elections, not only being the first in history,but also held shortly after the death of Yasser Arafat. Those hopes vanished withHamas landslide victory, a victory that surprised the Fatach leaders, Israel, theAmerican administration, and even the Hamas leaders themselves. 1 The electionresulted in a clear majority of 76 seats of the 132-member Parliament.How did an organization that had been recognized as a terrorist organization byIsrael, the United States 2 , Canada, and some European countries, win democraticelections in a Palestinian society that had not defined itself as particularly religious? 3 Asa religious Muslim organization, Hamas has characteristics similar to those of otherFundamentalist groups, mainly the use of the Koran and the call for Jihad as centraltools in the organization's way to achieve its goals. Are the election results a part of theglobal rise of Islamic fundamentalism over the last few years, or is it a uniquephenomenon of the Palestinian society?The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) that was established after the 1993 Osloagreements is in a continuous process of building the Palestinian state. This processreceived validation at the 2007 Annapolis 4 convention with the declaration by the PrimeMinister of Israel that the Palestinian people have a right to their own state side-by-sidewith Israel 5 . However, peace agreements may be reached and signed by leaders, butthey are executed, fostered, and kept by peoples. It is therefore important to have an

understanding of Palestinian society, and especially the reasons for the rise of Hamas.It is crucial as part of the attempt to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is even moreso in the present time of enhanced efforts and increased international involvement afterthe Annapolis convention. Such understanding can help choose the appropriate courseof action toward finding a long term and lasting solution to the conflict. Furthermore, inthe era of Global War On Terror (GWOT), understanding the power base of a terroristorganization is of great importance beyond the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The fact thatIsrael and the Western countries were so surprised by the rise of Hamas points to a gapin the understanding of the Hamas base of power, a gap that must be reduced oreliminated in the future as part of the international effort to fight terror effectively.This paper’s thesis is that social reasons were the main factors affecting votingpatterns of the Palestinian public. The result of the elections is, therefore, a civil protestand does not mean that the Palestinian public as a whole supports the way of terror orseeks to withdraw recognition of the state of Israel. That means that the power base ofHamas is not ideology, but the social economic situation in the PNA. Thisunderstanding, which I will elaborate, is fundamental, and in this case, contradictsPresident Bush's definition that every terrorist organization’s center of gravity is itsideology. Beyond the regional meaning of solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,examining this issue can bring some insights to the role of the moderate Arab countriesin coping with fundamentalist Islamic organizations, like Hamas.The DawaThe appearance of the Palestinian Islamic organizations is part of the widerphenomenon of Islamic revival in the Middle East during the 1970's and 1980's. The2

revitalization of Islamism 6 was a reflection of the failure of the Arab world to modernizeand to meet the current age. In addition, it was a defensive battle against Westernmodernity and the decay of traditional values. The disappointment created by the failureof the authoritarian Arab regimes to provide solutions to the aggregation of social andeconomic hardships, with the escalating processes of urbanization and education, haspushed the masses towards religion and the Islamic movements. The Islamicmovements knew how to give the alienated masses in the cities a sense of identity anda feeling of belonging to a framework for life with a destiny and purpose. The MiddleEast war in 1967 was a turning point in the process of Islamic revival. It symbolized thedownfall of the Arab regimes that lost territories to Israel, which was perceived as aWestern bridgehead aiming to crumble Islam. This war and the subsequent Israelioccupation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank provided the political andsocioeconomic background for the appearance of the Palestinian Islamic movements. 7Hamas, the Arabic word for zeal, is the acronym of al-Harakat al-Muqawwama alIslamiyya—the Islamic Resistance Movement. The group was established by thePalestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) at the outset of the first Palestinianuprising (intifada) in late 1987. It provided a vehicle for the MB’s participation in theviolent confrontation against Israel without exposing the MB and its wide network ofsocial welfare and religious institutions to Israeli retaliation. 8 Hamas combinesPalestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Its founding charter commits thegroup to the destruction of Israel, the replacement of the PNA with an Islamist statebased on rules of Islam and to raise "the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine" 9(including Israeli sovereign territory).3

Hamas also seeks to counter what it perceives as the secularization andWesternization of Arab society and to become internationally recognized as the solerepresentative of the Palestinian people, a distinction held by the PLO (PalestinianLiberation Organization) since 1974. Hamas’ slogan, as declared in Article 8 of theircharter, reflects the centrality of violent Jihad 10 to their strategies: “Allah is its target, theProphet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sakeof Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.” 11The MB movement has been active in the Gaza strip and the West Bank since the1970's. Led by Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yassin, it focused on building social and culturalinstitutions and on educational activities to "prepare the hearts" and reshape MuslimPalestinian society – one of the basic principals of MB doctrine. These activities are theessence of the Dawa – the Hamas’ social network of welfare institutions. Yassinbelieved that as long as he focused on the cultural and social issues, he could enjoyrelative freedom of action from the Israeli regime and would not invoke any politicalresistance from within Palestinian society. Indeed, in 1978 the Israeli militarygovernment acknowledged his social activity. That acknowledgment facilitated thespreading of Dawa cells through Gaza. These cells focused on enlarging the circle ofsupport for the movement, using the growing frustration of the population, especially theyoung population, with the harsh social and economic reality in the Gaza Strip, asopposed to the modernity and prosperity of the neighboring Israeli society. Dawainstitutions, which included schools, kindergartens, clinics, educational centers, Koranlessons, mosques, and help to the needy in various other fields, were established withdonation money. The donations were raised mainly from the Persian Gulf states. This4

financial support was motivated by different reasons: supporting the idea of a Muslimsociety; explicit support of terrorist activities against Israel by Iran; and the wish toprovide humanitarian aid to the Palestinians by different Muslim organizations from thePersian Gulf states, the USA and Europe. 12 This was a central element in financing thePalestinian MB activities, which would later become Hamas. 13 Over the years, thesocial activities of Hamas through the Dawa institutions have created a situation inwhich many poor families depend on the institutions for their existence and support.Thus a poor Palestinian family in the West Bank or Gaza might send a child to a Hamasschool on a Hamas bus, use a low-cost Hamas medical clinic, play soccer at a Hamassports club and perhaps rely on a ration of Hamas rice. 14The financing of the Dawa institutions is based on the centrality of charity in Islam,and, therefore, many Muslim institutions raise money for the organization. Raisingmoney is in fact calling for "economic Jihad," (al-Jihad bil-mal) a phrase that featuresprominently in their fundraising techniques. The concept is simple in practice. Radicalleaders claim their followers have a religious duty to engage in Jihad – either byphysically fighting Islam’s enemies or by supporting those who do. Proponents of thislogic ground their position in a Koranic verse in Surah 9 (al-Tawbah) Verse 41: “Fightwith your possessions and your souls in the way of Allah.” For the purpose ofexpediency, “possessions” typically translates as “money.” 15 According to estimatescontained in the U. S. FBI testimony to Congress, the organization raised about 30million in 2003. Israeli intelligence estimates that each year the organization raisesabout 50 million. Most of the money that is raised is delivered to Dawa institutions andonly a small portion of the money, which mainly comes from Iran with the support of the5

Iranian government, is directly delivered to the military wing of the organization forfinancing terror activities. In reality, funding the Dawa institutions is a way to laundermoney for terror activities. 16The prolonged social activities of the organization created the situation thatappeared at the election. It was the second generation that had been raised andeducated in Hamas institutions, and met with these institutions daily, which electedHamas to power. Some argue that the social activity of Hamas, through the Dawaorganizations, is meant to ease the situation of the Palestinians and is a humanitarianjustification for the continuation of funding the Hamas. However, seeing Dawa as merelya social organization is a naive perspective that disregards what has been happeningwithin the Dawa institutions themselves. 17 As described by one of the Fatach formerleaders “not the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam raised the warriors, it was the Dawa which raisedthem.” 18 The concept of Dawa is not unique for Hamas and MB, but appears in differentforms or names in other fundamentalist Muslim organizations such as Hezbollah and AlQaeda. In fact it constitutes a social network aimed to replace the local government inthe future. The idea to create a network of institutions that would form the futuregovernment is derived from Mao's theory for people's revolution. 19 Indeed, one of thekey elements of a Maoist insurgency is the construction of shadow political, police, andadministrative organizations that operate concurrently and cooperatively with thedestructive military aspects of the campaign.Hamas falsely presents its three wings – the political wing, the social wing basedon the Dawa, and the military wing called Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades as separatebodies. In fact, the Dawa institutions constitute the main source of funding and recruiting6

for the military wing. They do this through propaganda in educational institutes and inmosques and financial support for the families of suicide bombers and of those whowere killed in activities against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi,one of the founders of Hamas, describes suicide bombers as Istishyhadi, or Shaheed ,which means self-chosen martyrdom . Martyrdom or self-sacrificing is perceived as areligious virtue. Rantisi emphasizes that the leaders of the movement do not force theyoung to go on suicide missions; they only give them religious permission to do so. 20Furthermore, suicide actions are glorified in the educational institutions, the media, andin daily services at mosques. In addition, financial support to the families of suicidebombers is displayed publicly so that potential recruits know that they need not worry fortheir families' livelihood. The three wings have mutual linkage; the political wing is fullyinvolved in both the social and the military activities. Rantisi's description of the "spiritualpermission" for the suicide actions demonstrates the direct connection between theorganization's leadership and the actions of the military wing. The fact that Hamasstopped terrorist activities against Israel in the period right before the elections in thePNA, at the order of the political wing, constitutes further substantial evidence for theability of the political wing to control and direct the actions of the military wing. Thepolitical wing is clearly running the organization and is involved in all its activities.Furthermore, the political wing obeys the Majlis al-Shura, or consultative council,located in Damascus, that outlines the organization's policy. 21Hamas is organized on a system that is designed and operated to achieve itsgoals. According to Hamas' chart, the end state is establishing an Islamic religious statebased on Shariah law over all the land of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capitol. The7

political use of the Koran along with the military wing and the Dawa institutions are themeans. The call for Jihad against Israel, supplying a network of social services, variouskinds of terrorist activities and a developed propaganda are the ways. To counter thissystem, a better understanding of it is required.A New Kind of Terrorist OrganizationHamas defines itself as a national-religious organization, and not as a terroristorganization. So do its followers and supporters within the Palestinian public andoutside of it. Since the course of action for coping with an organization derives from ourdefinition of it, an exact definition of the organization is needed.The IDF dictionary defines terror asThe use of violence (or threat of such use) against individuals (mainlypeaceful and innocent civilians) or against property. Terror is meant toterrify governments and societies and to coerce them into taking actionsthat would achieve the political goals and/or the social, ideological orreligious goals of its operators. 22This definition, similar to that of the United Nations', 23 focuses on actions targetingcivilians. There is no doubt that the acts of hostility committed by this organization areterror activities, particularly the training and employment of suicide bombers which areconsidered by the organization leaders to be a strategic weapon. Its leaders have calledsuicide attacks the "F-16" of the Palestinian people. 24 The extensive interagency actionof Israel's defense elements has resulted in a substantial reduction in the terror activitiesof suicide bombers since 2004. As an alternative, Hamas has enhanced themanufacture of Qassam rockets and increased the amount of launches towards civiliantargets in

understanding of Palestinian society, and especially the reasons for the rise of Hamas. It is crucial as part of the attempt to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is even more so in the present time of enhanced efforts and increased

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