T R HURST V FLORIDA 136 S. C 616 (2016) TO DEATH
THE RETROACTIVITY OF HURST V. FLORIDA,136 S. CT. 616 (2016) TO DEATH-SENTENCEDPRISONERS ON COLLATERAL REVIEWAngela J. Rollins* & Billy H. Nolas**I. INTRODUCTIONIn Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Courtestablished that any finding that increases a defendant’s potential maximumsentence is an element of the offense that must be presented to the jury andproved beyond a reasonable doubt.1 Applying that concept in Hurst v.Florida, the Supreme Court found Florida’s death-sentencing scheme,which required a judge rather than a jury to make the ultimate factualfindings to impose a death sentence, unconstitutional.2 The Court held that“[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each factnecessary to impose a sentence of death.” 3Hurst left no indication as to whether its holding applies retroactivelyto death-sentenced individuals seeking post-conviction relief. In federalhabeas review and some states’ post-conviction review processes, thisinquiry centers on applying the federal retroactivity analysis announced inTeague v. Lane.4 In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Supreme Court, applyingTeague, found that Ring v. Arizona,5 often considered Hurst’s predecessorcase, was not retroactive on collateral review.6 Summerlin, however, doesnot settle the matter of Hurst’s retroactivity for a few reasons. First,Hurst’s holding included a proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt issue that wasnot present in Summerlin,7 and the Supreme Court has traditionally given***1.2.3.4.5.6.7.Attorney, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Northern District ofFlorida. Former law clerk to the Honorable Harris Hartz of the United States Court of Appeals forthe Tenth Circuit, the Honorable Staci M. Yandle of the United States District Court for theSouthern District of Illinois, and the Honorable J. Phil Gilbert of the United States District Courtfor the Southern District of Illinois.Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Northern District ofFlorida.See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,609 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.220, 244 (2005); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).Id.See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).See generally Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004).See id. at 351 n.1 (“Because Arizona law already required aggravating factors to be provedbeyond a reasonable doubt, that aspect of Apprendi was not at issue.”) (internal citations omitted).181
182Southern Illinois University Law Journal[Vol. 41retroactive application to pre-Teague proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubtcases.8 Second, state courts, even those that look to Teague for theirretroactivity analyses, are not bound by the federal courts’ decisionsinterpreting Teague and are therefore not bound by the jury-trialretroactivity portion of Summerlin.9 Third, the Court’s application ofTeague to Miller v. Alabama10 in Montgomery v. Louisiana11 indicates thatthe Supreme Court’s reluctance to hold cases retroactive under Teague maybe eroding or that the Court is considering retroactivity under a contextualapproach.This Article argues that Hurst is retroactive under Teague to all deathsentenced prisoners seeking post-conviction relief. Section I examinesHurst’s predecessor cases: Apprendi and Ring. Section II examinesFlorida’s death-sentencing scheme and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisionin Hurst. Section III applies the Teague analysis to Hurst and shows Hurstis retroactive on collateral review under a traditional Teague analysis.Recent Supreme Court precedent, however, indicates that the Court’sreluctance to hold new rules retroactive under Teague is eroding or theCourt is recognizing “constitutional difference” in its analysis.II. BACKGROUNDHurst finds its modern roots, for the most part, in Apprendi. There,the Court held that any fact that increases a sentence above the statutorymaximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.12 ApplyingApprendi, the Supreme Court in Ring determined that Arizona’s deathsentencing statute was unconstitutional because judges—not jurors—madethe ultimate factual findings required to impose a death sentence.13 Areview of Apprendi and Ring follows.8.9.10.11.12.13.See Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432U.S. 233, 242 (1977).Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280–81 (2008).[T]he Teague rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federalhabeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings. It wasintended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions—not tolimit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutionallaw when reviewing its own [s]tate’s convictions.Id.; see also Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Conn. 2015).See generally 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life-without-parole sentences forjuveniles).See generally 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (holding Miller v. Alabama retroactive).530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
2017]Retroactivity to Death-Sentenced Prisoners183A. Apprendi v. New JerseyBefore Apprendi, jurisdictions were free to define which facts thatincreased a sentence were elements of the offense and which facts thatincreased a sentence were sentencing factors.14 Only elements of a crimewere required to be pleaded in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond areasonable doubt.15Sentencing factors, however, could increase adefendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum without the jury findingthose facts beyond a reasonable doubt.16 That was the case in Apprendi.In Apprendi, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possessionof a firearm, each count carrying a statutory punishment of five to tenyears’ imprisonment.17 At sentencing, the court found by a preponderanceof the evidence “that the crime was motivated by a racial bias” andsentenced the defendant to twelve years’ imprisonment—two years abovethe statutory maximum.18The defendant argued that his sentence violated the Due ProcessClause of the U.S. Constitution because the finding that increased hissentence above the statutory maximum was not proved to a jury beyond areasonable doubt.19 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the FifthAmendment due-process right and the Sixth Amendment jury-trial rightrequire that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact thatincreases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximummust be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”20 AsJustice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury“has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts which mustexist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishmentmust be found by the jury.”2114.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.See Luis E. Chiesa, When an Offense is Not an Offense: Rethinking the Supreme Court’sReasonable Doubt Jurisprudence, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 647, 666 (2011).Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (stating that an indictment must charge allelements of the offense); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (“[T]he Due ProcessClause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included inthe definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged . . . .”).Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492 (noting that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), held that“the legislature can authorize a judge to find a traditional sentencing factor on the basis of apreponderance of the evidence . . .”).See id. at 466.Id. at 471.See id.Id. at 490.See id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184Southern Illinois University Law Journal[Vol. 41B. Ring v. Arizona and the Former Arizona Death-Sentencing SchemeApprendi resulted in numerous sentencing changes, includingrequirements that facts that increase mandatory-minimum sentences22 andfacts that increase fines23 be submitted to a jury. In Ring, the SupremeCourt applied Apprendi’s holding to findings of fact that increased thedefendant’s sentence from life imprisonment to death.24 In doing so, itfound Arizona’s capital-sentencing scheme unconstitutional.25 The Courtstated: “Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, weconclude, are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which thelegislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”26 Asummary of Ring follows.An Arizona jury found Timothy Ring guilty of felony murder.27 TheArizona death-penalty statute provided that the statutory maximumsentence for felony murder was life imprisonment, “unless further findingswere made.”28 In particular, Arizona’s first-degree murder statute provided:“First degree murder . . . is punishable by death or life imprisonment asprovided by § 13-703.”29 Before imposing a death sentence, section 13-703required the judge to “conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determinethe existence or nonexistence of [certain enumerated] circumstances . . . forthe purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed.”30 The statutefurther provided: “The hearing shall be conducted before the court alone.The court alone shall make all factual determinations required by thissection or the constitution of the United States or this state.”31 After thesentencing hearing, the statute directed the judge to find aggravating andmitigating circumstances.32 A defendant could only be sentenced to deathif the judge found at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an “element” that must besubmitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimumsentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increasesthe mandatory minimum is an “element” that must be submitted to the jury.Id.S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2349 (2012) (extending Apprendi to criminalfines).Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).Id. at 609.Id. at 589.See id. at 591–92.Id. at 592.Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(C) (2001)).Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (2001)).Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (2001)).Id.
2017]Retroactivity to Death-Sentenced Prisoners185reasonable doubt33 and that “there [were] no mitigating circumstancessufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”34Although there was no testimony at trial indicating Ring was a majorparticipant in the murder,35 a co-defendant testified at the sentencing thatRing was a leader in the crime and fired the shot that killed the victim.36Based on that testimony, the judge found that Ring murdered the victim andwas a major participant in the robbery.37 The judge then considered theaggravating and mitigating circumstances.38The judge found twoaggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) “Ring committedthe offense in expectation of receiving something of ‘pecuniary value,’”and (2) Ring committed the offense “in an especially heinous, cruel ordepraved manner.”39 The judge found only one non-statutory mitigatingcircumstance: “Ring’s ‘minimal’ criminal record.”40 That mitigatingcircumstance did not “call for leniency,” and the judge sentenced Ring todeath.41Citing Apprendi, Ring contended that Arizona’s death-penalty statutewas unconstitutional because it required the judge, not the jury, to find thefacts necessary to impose a death sentence.42 The Supreme Court agreedthat Arizona’s death-penalty scheme violated the Sixth Amendment right toa jury trial.43 The Court noted that the maximum punishment Ring couldhave received, absent the judge’s finding of at least one aggravatingcircumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, was life imprisonment.44 Underthe reasoning of Apprendi, however, a jury must find any fact that increasesthe sentence to which a defendant is exposed.45 Moreover, “[b]ecauseArizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functionalequivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendmentrequires that they be found by a 6.Id. at 597 (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001)).Id. at 593 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (2001)).See id. at 592; Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157–58 (1987). The Eighth Amendment permitsexecution of a felony-murder defendant only when a defendant killed, attempted to kill, or was amajor participant in the felony that demonstrated “reckless indifference to human life.” Id.See Ring, 536 U.S. at 593.See id. at 594.See id.Id. at 594–95 (internal quotation marks omitted).Id. at 595.Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).Id.Id. at 609.See id. at 597.Id. at 603.Id. at 609 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
186Southern Illinois University Law Journal[Vol. 41III. HURST V. FLORIDA AND FLORIDA’S DEATH-SENTENCINGSCHEMESixteen years after Apprendi and fourteen years after Ring, theSupreme Court found Florida’s death-penalty scheme unconstitutionalbecause a judge, rather than the jury, made the factual findings thatsubjected a defendant to a death sentence.47 The facts of Hurst follow.On May 2, 1998, Cynthia Harrison was murdered at the Popeye’srestaurant where she was employed.48 She was discovered in the freezerwith her hands bound behind her back and tape over her mouth, and she hadincurred “at least sixty slash and stab wounds to her face, neck, back, torso,and arms.”49 Timothy Lee Hurst, a co-worker, was convicted of the murderin a Florida state court, and the judge sentenced him to death.50 On directappeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and deathsentence.51 In state post-conviction proceedings, the Florida Supreme Courtgranted penalty-phase relief, finding that Hurst’s counsel was ineffectivefor failing to properly investigate and present mitigation evidence of hisintellectual disability.52 At resentencing, the jury recommended death by aseven-to-five vote,53 and the judge once again imposed a death sentence.54Under Florida law, life imprisonment was the maximum sentence acapital felon could receive based on a conviction alone.55 “A person whohas been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death” onlyafter an additional sentencing proceeding “results in findings by the courtthat such person shall be punished by death.”56 Florida statutes outlinedthis proceeding. First, an evidentiary hearing was held before the jury. 57Thereafter, the jury recommended a life or death sentence to the courtwithout providing a factual basis for the recommendation.58 The court thendetermined and weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors.59Notwithstanding the jury’s recommendation, the judge ultimately made the47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).See Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 984–85 (Fla. 2009).Id.See id. at 984.Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 2002).Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1008.“Of the thirty-one states that still had the death penalty at the time of Hurst v. Florida, twentyeight states required a unanimous vote of twelve jurors with respect to the final verdict orrecommendation, making Florida, Alabama, and Delaware glaring outliers.” Hurst v. State, 202So. 3d 40, 72 (Fla. 2016).Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 440 (Fla. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (2010).Id.§ 921.141(1) (2010).§ 921.141(2).§ 921.141(3).
2017]Retroactivity to Death-Sentenced Prisoners187decision to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or death.60 Under thisscheme, “the judge must give the jury recommendation great weight,” but“the sentencing order must reflect the trial judge’s independent judgmentabout the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors.”61Relying on Ring, Hurst argued on appeal to the Florida Supreme Courtthat his death sentence was unconstitutional “because the advisory jury inthe penalty phase was not required to find specific facts as to theaggravating factors, and . . . the jury was not required to make a unanimousrecommendation as to the sentence.”62 The Florida Supreme Court rejectedHurst’s claim, noting that Florida “precedent has repeatedly held that Ringdoes not require the jury to make specific findings of the aggravators or tomake a unanimous jury recommendation as to sentence.”63 Relying on theSupreme Court’s pre-Ring decision, Hildwin v. Florida,64 where the Courtfound Florida’s capital-sentencing scheme constitutional, the FloridaSupreme Court declared: “the Sixth Amendment does not require that thespecific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death bemade by the jury.”65The Supreme Court reversed, holding Florida’s capital-sentencingscheme unconstitutional.66 “The Sixth Amendment,” the Court explained,“requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose asentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”67 TheCourt remanded the case to the state court to determine whether the errorwas harmless.68On remand, the Florida Supreme Court determined that under theUnited States and Florida Constitution, the right to a jury trial required thatthe jury make all factual findings unanimously.69 The court expanded onthe Supreme Court’s holding, resting its decision on the EighthAmendment, as well as the Sixth Amendment:[T]he foundational precept of the Eighth Amendment calls for unanimityin any death recommendation that results in a sentence of death. Thatfoundational precept is the principle that death is different. This means60.61.62.63.64.65.66.67.68.69.Id.Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 620 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 445 (Fla. 2014).Id. at 445–46 (citing Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d143 (Fla. 2002) (both holding that Ring does not apply to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme)).See generally 490 U.S. 638 (1989).Hurst, 147 So. 3d at 446 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640–41 (1989)).Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619.Id.Id. at 624.Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 53–54 (Fla. 2016) (finding an unanimity requirement for every factnecessary to impose a sentence of death compelled by the jury-trial right and the EighthAmendment evolving standards of decency).
188Southern Illinois University Law Journal[Vol. 41that the penalty may not be arbitrarily imposed, but must be reserved onlyfor defendants convicted of the most aggravated and least mitigated ofmurders.70The Florida Supreme Court also found that the Hurst error was subjectto harmless-error review and concluded that the error in Hurst’s case wasnot harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.71 The court explained that theburden is on the state, “as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond areasonable doubt that the jury’s failure to unanimously find all the factsnecessary for the imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to [thedefendant]’s death sentence.”72Since the Supreme Court decided Hurst, Delaware and Alabama haveconsidered its applicability to their death-sentencing schemes. In Rauf v.State, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Delaware’s death-sentencingscheme was unconstitutional under Hurst.73 Like Florida, Delaware’sdeath-penalty statute provided that a jury make a sentencingrecommendation of death or life imprisonment to the judge.74 The judge,however, was not bound by the jury’s recommendation.75 Also, likeFlorida, the Delaware jury was not required to find an aggravatingcircumstance unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt or that theaggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.76 The70.71.72.73.74.75.76.Id. at 59–60.Id. at 67–68.Id.145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016).11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (2013).If a jury has been impaneled and if the existence of at least 1 statutory aggravatingcircumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section has been found beyond areasonable doubt by the jury, the Court, after considering the findings andrecommendations of the jury and without hearing or reviewing any additionalevidence, shall impose a sentence of death if the Court finds by a preponderance of theevidence . . . that the aggravating circumstances found by the Court to exist outweighthe mitigating circumstances found by the Court to exist.Id.Id.The jury’s recommendation concerning whether the aggravating circumstances foundto exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist shall be given suchconsideration as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particularcircumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character andpropensities of the offender as found to exist by the Court.The jury’srecommendation shall not be binding upon the Court.Id.§ 4209(c)(3)(b)(2).The jury shall report to the Court by the number of the affirmative and negative votesits recommendation on the question as to whether, by a preponderance of the evidence,after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bear upon theparticular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character
2017]Retroactivity to Death-Sentenced Prisoners189Delaware Supreme Court found the death-sentencing provisions violatedthe Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.77The Alabama Supreme Court, on the other hand, found in In reBohannon that Hurst did not render Alabama’s death-sentencing schemeunconstitutional.78 The court reasoned: “Because in Alabama a jury, not ajudge, makes the finding of the existence of an aggravating circumstancethat makes a capital defendant eligible for a sentence of death, Alabama’scapital-sentencing scheme is not unconstitutional on this basis.”79 Contraryto the Florida and Delaware Supreme Courts, the Alabama Supreme Courtinterpreted Ring and Hurst as requiring “only that the jury find the existenceof the aggravating factor that makes a defendant death-eligible.”80 Thecourt did not require the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigatingfactors.81The Alabama Supreme Court, therefore, concluded thatAlabama’s requirement that the judge, not the jury, make “an independentdetermination that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweighthe mitigating circumstance or circumstances found to exist” was consistentwith Hurst.82 Finally, the fact that Alabama capital juries are instructed thattheir sentences are merely advisory, the court reasoned, is consistent withHurst, because “the finding required by Hurst to be made by the jury, i.e.,the existence of the aggravating factor that makes a defendant deatheligible, is indeed made by the jury, not the judge, in Alabama.”83IV. HURST RETROACTIVITY ANALYSISThe Supreme Court left it to the lower courts to determine whetherHurst is retroactive and to what extent it is retroactive. This Sectionconsiders Hurst’s retroactivity and concludes that Hurst is retroactive onpost-conviction review to all defendants.A. Retroactivity OverviewEither a state or federal court may declare Hurst retroactive oncollateral review. On federal-habeas review, federal courts employ theretroactivity test set forth in Teague to determine Hurst’s retroactivity.and propensities of the offender, the aggravating circumstances found to existoutweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist.77.78.79.8081.82.83.Id.Rauf, 145 A.3d at 430.Bohannon v. State, No. 1150640, 2016 WL 5817692, at *5 (Ala. 2016).Id. at *6.Id. at *5 (emphasis added).Id.Id. at *6.Id. at *7.
190Southern Illinois University Law Journal[Vol. 41Although some state courts also use the Teague test, they are not bound toemploy that test. For instance, the Florida Supreme Court recentlyreaffirmed Witt v. State,84 the case establishing Florida’s retroactivity test.85Under Witt, Florida courts give retroactive application to decisions that arefavorable to criminal defendants provided that the decisions (1) emanatefrom the U.S. Supreme Court, (2) are constitutional in nature, and (3)constitute “a development of fundamental significance.”86 Delaware andAlabama, on the other hand, apply Teague.87 Even those states that employthe Teague test may interpret Teague more broadly than the federalcourts.88 Although state courts may give broader relief than a federalTeague analysis would provide, they are not free to deny retroactiveapplication of a substantive rule.89The Delaware Supreme Court applied Hurst retroactively to all deathsentenced prisoners under its Teague-like retroactivity test andautomatically imposed life sentences.90 The Florida Supreme Court, on theother hand, afforded retroactivity of Hurst under its Witt retroactivityanalysis to defendants whose sentences were final after Ring, subject toharmless-error analysis and resentencing.91 It also suggested it wouldafford retroactivity to pre-Ring defendants under a fundamental-fairnesstest.92 The Florida Supreme Court, however, has not considered federalretroactivity under Teague. This Article focuses on the federal Teagueretroactivity test.84.85.86.87.88.89.90.91.92.387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).See Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 960 (Fla. 2015) (holding that Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.2455 (2012), is retroactive).Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931.See Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Conn. 2015) (finding Miller a watershedrule of criminal procedure that is retroactive under Teague); Ex parte Williams, 183 So. 3d 220,224-31 (Ala. 2015) (finding Miller not retroactive under Teague), abrogated by Montgomery v.Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).See Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1038 (“[A]lthough this court concluded that we will apply the Teagueframework, we did so with the caveat that, while federal decisions applying Teague may beinstructive, this court will not be bound by those decisions in any particular case, but will conductan independent analysis and application of Teague.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729.Powell v. Delaware, No. 310,2016, 2016 WL 7243546, at *5 (Del. Dec. 15, 2016).Mosley v. State, No. SC14-436, 2016 WL 7406506, at *25 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016). Defendantswhose sentences became final after Ring “fall[] within the category of defendants who shouldreceive the benefit of Hurst.” Id. Partial retroactivity is a novel approach, and it may violateequal protection. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367–68 (1886) (Equal protectionrequires “that, in the administration of criminal justice, no different or higher punishment shouldbe imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses.”). Indeed, death sentenceswill be enforced, not by the date on which the defendant committed the crime, but on the arbitrarydate on which the sentence became final. See Mosley, 2016 WL 7406506, at *25.See Mosley, 2016 WL 7406506, at *19. A pre-Ring defendant is entitled to retroactive applicationof Hurst if he raised a Sixth Amendment claim “at his first opportunity and was then rejected atevery turn.” Id.
2017]Retroactivity to Death-Sentenced Prisoners1911. Teague v. Lane OverviewJustice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague held, subject to twoexceptions, that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not beapplicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules areannounced.”93 Even if the new rule fits into one of the two Teagueexceptions, it “is not made retroactive to cases on collateral review unlessthe Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive” either expressly or through alogical conclusion drawn from multiple cases.94Under the first Teague exception, courts must give retroactive effectto new substantive rules of constitutional law.95 Substantive rules place“certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power ofthe criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”96 New substantive rules“apply retroactively because they necessarily carry a significant risk that adefendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal orfaces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”97 For example,in Welch v. United States98 the Supreme Court held Johnson v. UnitedStates,99 which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed CareerCriminal Act as unconstitutionally vague, retroactive because it announceda substantive rule.100 The Court stated: “Johnson affected the reach of theunderlying statute rather than the judicial procedures by which the statute isapplied.”101Under the second Teague exception, courts must give retroactiveeffect to “watershed rules of criminal procedure” that implicate “thefundamental fairness of the trial.”102 These rules “raise the possibility thatsomeone convicted with the use of the invalidated procedure might havebeen acquitted otherwise.”103 “That a new procedural rule is fundamental insome abstract sense is not enough; the rules must be one without which thelikelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”104 SinceTeague’s inception, the Supreme Court has yet to find a watershed rule of93.94.95.96.97.98.99.100.101.102.103.104.Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001).Teague, 489 U.S. at 311; but see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016) (“Teaguedescribes new substantive rules as an exception to the bar on retroactive application of proceduralrules, this Court has recognized that substantive rules are more accurately characterized as notsubject to the bar.”) (internal ellipsis and quotation marks omitted).Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265.Id.Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004).Id. (internal quotati
181 THE RETROACTIVITY OF HURST V.FLORIDA, 136 S. CT. 616 (2016) TO DEATH-SENTENCED PRISONERS ON COLLATERAL REVIEW Angela J. Rollins* & Billy H. Nolas** I. INTRODUCTION In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Court established that any finding that increases a defendant’s potential maximum sentence is
Hurst Cycle Trader. Valid Trend Line System Envelope Indicator Hurst Signal The Hurst Method A NEW Seminar by Ed Downs Introduction to Hurst · Why the Hurst Method is Popular · Cycles in the Stock Market Trading the Hurst Method · The Perfect Hurst Setup · The Edge Band Signal · Price Projections
MotiveWave Hurst Cycles Guide Version 1.0 2019 MotiveWave Software Page 7 of 18 Hurst Nominal Model This is the cyclic model as defined by JM Hurst in the 1970s after years of computational analysis using
The “JM Hurst Cyclitec Cycles Course” which Hurst published in the 1970s, presents the full body of his work. It is this cycles course that contains the true value of his work. That course is over 1000 pages long, and can be a daunting prospect for someone wanting to learn how to profit from Hurst Cycles.
John Ehlers Hurst Coefficient Named after H.E. Hurst, not J.M. Hurst - Studied how high to make the Aswan dam on the Nile - Found the range did not widen as as in a coin toss - Rather: Hurst Coefficient is more estimated than computed - Rescaled range method Log of R/S versus Log of lag - Aggregated Variance Method
Hurst System that fi res signals when Major and Minor Cycles converge in the chart. Hurst Cycle Trader is a great tool to help you fi nd prime entry points in the stock market, especially when used according to the method that Hurst taught in his book. In this seminar, Ed Downs takes you though the essence of the Hurst Method;
2016 CATALOG Back in 1958, when innovator George Hurst founded the company that bears his legendary name, he and his team were . 62 Misc. & Service Parts 04 MANUAL SHIFTERS 20 AUTOMATIC SHIFTERS 44 SHIFTER ACCESSORIES 64 Transmission ID Chart 66 Hurst Gear 50 . 4 Have you always wanted to buy a Hurst-built performance car, but just couldn't .
War Neuroses and Arthur Hurst: A Pioneering Medical Film about the Treatment of Psychiatric Battle Casualties EDGAR JONES King’s College London, Institute of Psychiatry, Weston Education Centre, 10 Cutcombe Road, London SE59RJ, UK. Email: edgar.jones@iop.kcl.ac.uk ABSTRACT. From 1917 to 1918, Major Arthur Hurst filmed shell-shocked
Hurst shifters are the shifter of choice for the ultimate transmission control for various 3, 4, 5 and 6-speed manual transmissions. Each application is carefully designed to shorten the throw appropriately and engineered to last. Each Hurst shifter is built with race-track inspired design and reliability. With years of racing
