Populism And Machiavelli Citizen Militia A Reconsideration .
Populism and Machiavelli’sCitizen Militia – A Reconsiderationof The Prince1William WittelsDuke UniversityChapter XIII (“Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and One’s Own Soldiers”) is the most important chapterof The Prince. It outlines Machiavelli’s proposal for the best concrete response to the centralproblem of political violence: the citizen-militia. The citizen militia has the dual desiderata ofconstraining the prince to respect the norm of non-oppression and of creating a mechanism ofviolence that is sufficiently capable in projecting force, sufficiently responsive to the publicgood, and sufficiently limited in its exercise of violence. As a result, it fundamentally changesthe way that other important chapters, such as VI, IX, XV-XXIII XXVI must be read. Bypaying careful attention to the role of the citizen militia in The Prince, it becomes clear that thetext was not intended as a trap for its reader, but rather that it is seriously meant to induce selfinterested politicians to pursue the common good and stabilize the state.This article interprets The Prince in an unprecedented fashion. It takes chapterXIII (“Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and One’s Own Soldiers”) as the most importantchapter for understanding The Prince. One of The Prince’s most important lessons ishow politicians can best respond to the central problem of political violence andchapter XIII is critical for understanding that lesson. The central problem ofpolitical violence lies in creating mechanisms for the use of violence that canultimately minimize aggregate levels of violence. This problem is the centralproblem of political violence because mechanisms of violence like armies, policeforces, and spy agencies – when poorly constructed – make every other problem ofviolence more difficult to treat. Moreover, they can easily become tools ofoppression. Thus, creating sufficiently capable, responsive, and limited mechanisms ofviolence is the most important task in treating the central problem of politicalviolence. Chapter XIII offers a concrete proposal for responding to that problem in thecontext of Machiavelli’s day and the general principles for responding to it in othercontexts. Moreover, other chapters of tremendous importance to Machiavelli’srecommended response to the central problem of political violence (VI, XI, XV,XXVI, to name a few) can only be understood in light of chapter XIII. IfMachiavelli’s insight into politics – as presented in The Prince – is to have any utilityPrepared for delivery at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation, August 29- ‐‑September 1, 2013. Please cite with permission from the author.11
to politicians in autocracies and democracies alike, it must be understood withreference to chapter XIII.One of Machiavelli’s core observations is that the best way to address theproblem of political violence is through a partnership between properly motivatedpolitical elites and the people at large. The citizen-militia described in chapter XIIIis an embodiment of that partnership As a result, Machiavelli discourages hisreader from pursuing a pure autocracy.2 In fact, every regime worth emulatingmust be somewhat populist in both structure and orientation (i.e. some publicfunctions must be carried out by and for the people).3 In the case of Machiavelli’sprincipalities (autocracies to us), we see this partnership most clearly in the citizenmilitia. For Machiavelli, it is only through an alliance with the people that theprince can solve the central problem of political violence. The citizen militia hastwo important desiderata as far as the structure of a mechanism of violence isconcerned.1. The use of violence should always have non-oppression as its goal.Mechanisms of violence must be similarly structured. Broad citizenparticipation guarantees non-oppression because citizens have nonoppression as their dominant desire.4In fact, though decisive, it is the only moment of elite- ‐‑popular partnership in The Prince.Elite- ‐‑popular partnerships expand to certain legislative and judicial functions indemocracies. An examination of these issues in The Discourses would fall within the scope ofa much larger project.3 Niccolò Machiavelli writes of principalities rather than autocracies and tyrannies. (As wellas terms like ‘dictatorship’, ‘totalitarian regime’, ‘despotism’, ‘authoritarianism’, and so on.)This shift in language (at least in the case of ‘tyranny’ and 'ʹautocracy’) illustrates animportant dimension Machiavelli’s theory of regime- ‐‑type and the role of violence playedtherein. The concepts of autocracies and tyrannies are distinctive for including a gulf in defacto power between the ruler and the ruled. The concept of a principality includes, at most,a de jure differentiation between ruler and subject. The Machiavellian principality maintainsthat de jure differentiation but attempts to coordinate the power of the prince and the powerof the people in the exercise of violence. Nevertheless, I shall use these terms somewhatinterchangeably, referring to princes and principalities when discussing Machiavelli’slanguage, and referring to autocracies when discussing contemporary views of suchregimes.4 I take Machiavelli’s use of oppression to be something like its Latin etymological root of “apressing down.” This use is consistent with active variation of domination as defined byFrank Lovett in A General Theory of Domination and Justice: “Domination should beunderstood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they aredependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrarypower over them.” Machiavelli’s use of “oppression” refers to moments where this arbitrarypower is actually used. Lovett’s understanding of domination includes a passiverelationship. Lovett, Frank. 2010. A general Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press. Page 2.22
2. Any mechanism of violence must be sufficiently capable of exercising force,limited to the necessary exercise of force, and responsive to citizen desiresin the exercise of that force. Citizen participation in the citizen militia isnecessary for the satisfaction of all three demands.A prince that tries to solve the essential problem of political violence by onlyworking with other elites will, in Machiavelli’s terms, “come to ruin” by dependingon unreliable and dangerous political rivals.5 An armed people will not ruin theprince or the principality, but will secure it from external threats. Moreover, the‘onestà’ (‘honesty’ or ‘decency’) of the people solve the problem of the destabilizingambitions of the elite, thus making them an attractive partner for the prince infounding or maintaining the state as well as a morally superior foundation forprincely power.6The citizen-militia is the answer to the question of how the people partner withthe prince to address the central problem of political violence. Two other keyelements of Machiavelli’s thought (the role of founders as liberators and the diversehumors thesis) also point to the importance of cooperation between the prince andthe people. They are the what and the why of treating the central problem ofpolitical violence. The diverse humors thesis indicates why the central problem ofpolitical violence is so intractable. The will to oppress, which Machiavelli takes tobe unquenchable in most elites, makes political violence a chronic but treatableproblem. The onestà of the people, on the other hand, reflects the people’s moralsuperiority. That is why treatment of the problem of political violence is geared intheir favor. In turn, Machiavelli’s praise of founders who liberate their peoplesindicates the what that he has in mind in treating the problem of political violence:freedom from oppression by political elites and the creation of lasting socialinstitutions. The surest means to that freedom in principalities and the bestdefender of national sovereignty – a requisite for healthy institutions – is the citizenmilitia.75 Machiavelli, Niccolò, and Harvey Claflin Mansfield. 1985. The Prince. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. Page 61.6 Likewise, a proper understanding of the limit of Machiavelli’s populism in the use ofpolitical violence is essential to understanding his theory of regime type, but that is beyondthe scope of this article.7 Chapters XV- ‐‑XIX, where Machiavelli develops his radical political ethics, can also beunderstood as the how of the treatment of the central problem of political violence. Thesechapters, however, cannot be properly understood without reference to chapter XIII. Notonly do they offer competing answers to the question of what Machiavelli means by “one’sown arms” (i.e. a citizen militia vs. moral flexibility) they interact such that chapter XIIIcontours chapters XV- ‐‑XIX. A prince behaves differently in the presence of a citizen- ‐‑militiathan he does in the presence of other mechanisms of violence.3
If one takes only a single conclusion away from this article, it should be that ThePrince that the text’s most important chapter is chapter XIII. If one stakes a secondconclusion away from this article, it should be that The Prince has a populist streak,which is embodied in the proposal for the citizen militia. According toMachiavelli’s universe of regime-types, different regimes have different strengthsand weaknesses in solving the essential problem of political violence. Principalitiesaddress their chief weakness through the populist move of relying on the citizenmilitia as the chief institution of violence.The central importance of the citizen-militia remains unrecognized indominant interpretations of The Prince. Three broad classes of interpretations of ThePrince bear mention here. The first, and most influential in the popular imagination,are those that, like Innocent Gentillet’s, regard the Florentine as an advocate ofamoral power politics.8 These interpretations, such as those of Herbert Butterfieldand Leo Straus for example, tend to ignore the constraining effects of the citizenmilitia on the activities of the prince. Butterfield writes of Machiavelli that he“Taught a man how to usurp a government, how to perpetuate andincrease his power, the methods he must use to take away a people’sliberties, and the manner in which he could exercise severities on thepopulation with the least likelihood of ultimate detriment to himself.”9How this Machiavelli is consistent with the Machiavelli that tells his reader to armthe people whose liberty he would take away, I do not know. Leo Straus, who callsthe “old-fashioned and simple opinion according to which Machiavelli was ateacher of evil” both true and incomplete, dismisses the extended discussion ofmilitary tactics in chapter XXVI as far less important than Machiavelli’s omissionof the evils required of a prince who would liberate Italy from the “barbarians.”10Never does Strauss acknowledge that Machiavelli’s military policies areincompatible with the evils that Strauss thinks Machiavelli recommends to hisreader.Next, we have those interpretations that, in contrast to the first class, try torepublicanize the prince. These interpretations all fail to notice the degree to whichchapter XIII (and chapters VI, IX, and XXVI) blunt the critiques of the first class.Garrett Mattingly, for example, takes The Prince to be a satire on the mirror forGentillet, Innocent, and Simon Patrick. 1969. A discourse upon the meanes of wel governing.London: Da Capo Press.9 Butterfield, Herbert. 1956. The Statecraft of Machiavelli. New York: Macmillan.10 Strauss, Leo. Thoughts on Machiavelli. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978Page 6784
princes literature as a whole.11 Rousseau, Spinoza, and others take Machiavelli tobe warning his readers and arming them with the very means to combat would-betyrants.12 As Rousseau puts it – “he could not help veiling his love of liberty in themidst of his country’s oppression. The choice of his detestable hero, Cæsare Borgia,clearly enough shows his hidden aim.”13 Neither Rousseau, nor Mattingly, squarestheir claims with the populist elements of the text. Mary Dietz argues thatMachiavelli created a package of recommendations that, if followed, would resultin a “trap” for the prince. According to her, The Prince was designed to leaveMachiavelli’s Medici reader hated, undefended, and living with an armedcitizenry.14 There is a degree of truth to this claim, but it would be much moreaccurate to say that the citizen militia is meant to constrain rather than trap theprince. It simultaneously empowers the prince to defend the principality and limitshim from taking overly oppressive action against the people. Even Sheldon Wolin’sstrongly populist reading of Machiavelli seems to see the people as merely passiveactors in The Prince: “The notion which dominated The Prince was that of the mass asmalleable matter ready to respond to the shaping hand of the hero-artist.”15 Tounderstand the people, and their desire not to be oppressed, as “malleable matter”is inconsistent with Wolin’s later appreciation for Machiavelli’s grasping “the factthat popular consent represented a form of social power.”16 Perhaps it is thisambivalence that leads Wolin to almost entirely marginalize the citizen militia inhis discussion of Machiavelli. John McCormick’s recent, excellent articulation ofthe democratic dimension of Machiavelli’s writings sees the popular army onlyemerging as an important factor in Machiavelli’s thinking in The Discourses andtherefore only relevant to his thinking on republics.17 My interpretation sees it as animportant factor in The Prince – and thus one that cuts across Machiavelli’s views ofdifferent regime-types.11 Mattingly, Garrett. 1958. "ʺMachiavelli'ʹs "ʺPrince"ʺ: Political Science or Political Satire?"ʺ TheAmerican Scholar. 27 (4): 482- ‐‑491.12 Spinoza, Baruch, Samuel Shirley, Steven Barbone, and Lee Rice. 2000. Political Treatise.Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Chapter 5, Section 713 Rosseau, Jean- ‐‑Jacques, The Social Contract and Discourses, translated with an introductionby G.D. H. Cole (London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1923)14 For Dietz’s full, compelling argument, see: Dietz, Mary G. 1986. "ʺTrapping The Prince:Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception"ʺ. The American Political Science Review. 80 (3)15 Wolin, Sheldon S. 1960. Politics and Vision; Continuity and Innovation in Western PoliticalThought. Boston: Little, Brown. Page 205.16 Ibid., Page 199.17 McCormick, John P. 2011. Machiavellian Democracy. Cambridge, [England]: CambridgeUniversity Press.5
Even the class of interpretations that sees The Prince as an exploration of statepower and institutions fails to recognize the profound role played by the citizenmilitia. This class of interpretations tends to take the citizen-militia as a passingexample of princely empowerment. J.G.A. Pocock, who argues that the subject ofThe Prince is the innovations required of both founder-legislators and new princes,also marginalizes the role of the people, saying, “Il Principe is not a work of ideology,in the sense that it cannot be identified as expressing the outlook of a group.”18Pocock is right in claiming that no single group’s outlook is exclusively represented,but he then goes on to describe the text as one outlining the tasks and challenges ofpolitics from the perspective of political actors known as founders.19 Pocock’sunderstanding of The Prince largely misses the populist dimension – and the citizenmilitia, which is the most important expression of that dimension – until he turnshis attention to The Discourses.20 Similarly, Quentin Skinner writes of The Prince that“the chief merit of the people is taken by contrast to lie in their characteristictendency to benign passivity” and that the prince must make the people asdependent on him as possible.21 Skinner fails to see that Machiavelli recommendsinterdependence between the prince and the people – and that the most importantmoment of that interdependence is in the citizen militia. Even Harvey Mansfieldsidesteps the citizen-militia in favor of a knowledge of the “art of war” whendiscussing Machiavelli’s meaning of a prince having his “own arms.”22 He similarlysidesteps the citizen-militia in favor of the Roman institution of the dictatorshipwhen discussing Machiavelli’s views of the practice of war.23 Philip Bobbitt’s recentcontribution to Machiavelli scholarship sees The Prince and The Discourses as workingin tandem to outline a modern theory of constitutionalism, which is consistent withthe idea that The Prince advocates an elite-people partnership in addressing theproblem of political violence, but mistakes the ends of the state for the ends of the18 Pocock, J. G. A. 1975. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlanticrepublican tradition. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. Page 156.19 “Il Principe is a study of the “new prince”- ‐‑we know this from Machiavelli’s internalcorrespondence as well as from internal evidence- ‐‑or rather that class of political innovatorsto which he belongs.” Ibid., Page 160.20 Ibid., Page 183.21 Skinner, Quentin. 1978. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. Page 125.22 Machiavelli, Niccolò, and Harvey Claflin Mansfield. 1985. The Prince. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. xxi23 Mansfield, Harvey Claflin. 1989. Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executivepower. New York: Free Press. Page. 1356
people.24 The former is meant to serve the latter. Bobbitt’s interpretation loses sightof that fact. It is with these omissions in mind that we ought to turn to theimportant role played by the citizen-militia in The Prince.The people as a basis for powerWe commonly assume that the subjects of an autocracy do not activelyparticipate in their own oppression. They might acquiesce to it, and it is certainlythe case that some classes of autocracies have become adept at coercing the averagecitizen into spying on his or her neighbor.25 But we generally think of the autocratand the members of his or her government as standing alone in both interest andaction.26 The words ‘prince’ and ‘principality’ carry none of these connotations asMachiavelli uses them. The prince must wield power just as much for the people asfor himself.27,28 The commonplace understanding according to which The Princeteaches its readers to acquire and maintain power per se mistakes the instrumentBobbitt, Philip. 2013. The Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the world that he made.New York, NY: Grove Press.25 For more, see Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political institutions under dictatorship. New York:Cambridge University Press., and Arendt, Hannah. 1951. The origins of totalitarianism. NewYork: Harcourt, Brace and Co.26 This assumption is consistent with the etymology of the word ‘autocracy’. It is acombination of the Greek words auto (single, self, same, alone) and kratien (power), which inturn combine to form the word autokrates (one who governs alone). As with the concept ofautocracy, Machiavelli’s concept of the principality differs from tyranny. The earliest knownuse of the word tyrannos is the 7th century B.C.E. poet Archilochus’s description of Gyges ofLydia. (Finley, M. I. 1963. The ancient Greeks, an introduction to their life and thought. NewYork: Viking Press. Page 25.) The 7th century use of the word tyrannos is distinctive for itslack of judgment with respect to the quality of the tyrant’s rule. From the perspective of thetyrant’s subjects, a tyrant could rule worse, better, or as well as a legitimate head of state.Indeed, the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus was praised for the quality of his rule. See:Herodotos, and Aubrey De Sélincourt. 1954. Herodotus: the Histories. Harmondsworth,Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1.59. It was only fourth century thinkers like Plato and Aristotlewho transformed the term into a negative one by describing tyrants as parasitic rulers.27 Maurice Merleau- ‐‑Ponty characterizes the responsibility of the prince in the following way:“Through his mastery of his relationship with others, the man in power clears awayobstacles between man and man and puts a little daylight in our relationships.” Merleau- ‐‑Ponty, Maurice. Signs. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 217. Merleau- ‐‑Ponty’s characterization of putting ‘a little daylight in our relationships’ also captures thenegative characteristic of the freedom the prince must pursue. The Prince cultivates freedomfrom external interference, whether that means freeing the people from the oppression of theelite or freeing the principality from potential conquest.28 Harvey Mansfield agrees: “Machiavellian virtue has a two- ‐‑fold character that seems toaccount for the peculiar ambivalence of the modern executive, who is strong, but alwaysclaims to be acting on behalf of a will or force that is stronger.” Mansfield, Harvey Claflin.1989. Taming the prince: the ambivalence of modern executive power. New York: Free Press. Page130.247
Machiavelli describes in detail (power) for the end for which it is designed (popularliberation). The person in power does not own that power the way one owns ahouse, land, or even the labor of others as defined by a contract. To put the matteranother way, when Machiavelli speaks of a prince “always maintain[ing] himself inhis state,” he speaks of the prince maintaining a relation (his state) between himselfand the people, rather than maintaining ownership of the state.29 For Machiavelli,the possession of power is conditional upon the prince’s ability to cater to popular“humors” and to suppress elite ones. The language of ownership is useful in thecontext of claims over objects, which are fundamentally will-less. Politicalinstitutions, on the other hand, are made up of people who do have wills and arecapable of independent action. Their existence, and thus the existence of a certainkind of power, always depends to a degree on a number of wills working in concert.When faced with the choice between catering to the many and catering to thefew, Machiavelli chooses the former as the most praiseworthy way to handlepolitical power.30 Thus, Machiavelli defines proper execution of state power interms of the needs of the people.31 The people are the starting point for addressingthe central problem of political violence because their ends are more ‘decent’ thanthose of the elites and because they make up the citizen-militia. The peoplethemselves are the means by which political violence can be exercised withoutoverwhelming the order it is meant to defend.In chapter IX (“Of the Civil Principality”) Machiavelli claims that the peopleare, in fact, the best foundation for princely power both in moral and strategicterms.32 Machiavelli writes: “one cannot satisfy the great with decency and withoutinjury to others, but one can satisfy the people; for the end of the people is moredecent than that of the great, since the great want to oppress and the people wantnot to be oppressed.”33 The elite have an impulse to oppress and they make theirdecisions in terms of their capacity to oppress, rather than power, profit, or longterm security.34 One cannot help but think of a schoolyard bully or a domestic29 Machiavelli, Niccolò, and Harvey Claflin Mansfield. 1985. The Prince. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. Page 6- ‐‑730 Machiavelli, Niccolò, and Harvey Claflin Mansfield. 1985. The Prince. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. Page 39.31 For the opposite argument, see Butterfield, Herbert. 1956. The Statecraft of Machiavelli. NewYork: Macmillan. Page 110.32 Machiavelli, Niccolò, and Harvey Claflin Mansfield. 1985. The Prince. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. Page 41.33 Ibid. Page 39.34 When Herbert Butterfield says that ““Machiavelli had a remarkably low view of humannature,” he must have Machiavelli’s view of the elite, rather than the people in mind.Butterfield, Herbert. 1956. The Statecraft of Machiavelli. New York: Macmillan. Page 111.8
abuser. These types act out of a sense of smallness and insecurity and find illusorysatisfaction in the abuse of those who cannot physically or emotionally resist them.There is no moral value in what they do. And when Machiavelli metaphoricallydivides the political world into beasts and men, those who have the drive to oppressthe people play the part of the wolves.35 Wolves, though social and intelligent, haveno place in a stable political association. Their drives are too strong to respect anygiven order other than the one that caters to those drives. We can agree withMachiavelli that an order based upon the systematic oppression of the many by thefew is morally repugnant.The importance of this characteristic of the nature of the people cannot beunderstated because it leads to a standard by which we can judge uses of politicalviolence and the institutions that structure it. In all uses of political violence, wemust determine which desire it satisfies, the one for oppression or the one for thefreedom from oppression. This feat, of course, is no easy one because the pursuit offreedom from oppression and oppression per se can easily resemble each other wherethe exercise of violence is concerned. Even when these pursuits do not resembleeach other, institutions of violence such as militaries and penal systems can easilybe reappropriated from projects of liberation to projects of oppression. Thedifficulty of judging between projects of oppression and projects of liberation shouldnot overshadow the importance of having the right basis for judgment. Accordingto the diverse humors thesis, the use of violence must cohere with the ends of thepeople, because their ends are more decent, which is to say morally superior thanthose of the elites. The presence of hard cases does not overturn this relationship.The moral superiority of the people’s desire is obvious, but Machiavelli wouldalso have his reader take note of the strategic advantage of the limited nature of thepeople’s desire. The people ask ‘only’ not to be oppressed.36 The people can besatisfied in its freedom from oppression, whereas we know that those who wish tooppress others cannot ever be satiated.37 As a result, it is possible to find a stableequilibrium in the political game when the people play a major role. The insatiablenature of elite appetites places political institutions and outcomes into flux. Popular35 Machiavelli, Niccolò, and Harvey Claflin Mansfield. 1985. The Prince. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. Chapter 18.3637 In this respect, Hannah Pitkin is wrong when she claims that the prince can “’command’and ‘manage’ his popular support at will.” Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1984. Fortune is a woman:gender and politics in the thought of Niccolò Machiavelli. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress. Page 20. She is right insofar as the prince does have a greater degree of freedom tooperate when he allies himself with the people, but he cannot command the people at will.The humor for non- ‐‑oppression defines the limit of his command.9
appetites do not. Their desired end (non-oppression) is a fixed goal; it is a solid andpredictable basis for political order.38A particularly crafty reader of The Prince will, of course, learn to exploit theinformational asymmetries endemic to the prince-people relationship. Many ofMachiavelli’s most memorable passages praise princes who are able to mislead thepeople when they must. The prince must, for example, maintain the appearance ofhonesty and mercy, even if he does not always exercise those virtues. The popularappetite for non-oppression establishes the limit of those deceptions. I ask thereader to bracket his or her valid objections to the claim that Machiavelli thinksthat the partnership between the prince and the people extends to all things.Princely secrecy and deception is tied to specific ends and limited to specificsituations, but exists nevertheless. For Machiavelli, it is an unavoidable necessity ofpolitics in principalities.Machiavelli’s “Greatest” ExamplesThese asymmetries aside, The Prince seeks to align the interests between theprince and the people by creating a normative register of political action thatelevates politicians who are defined by their popular service above those defined byanything else. The people’s freedom from oppression is the ur-value against whichprincely actions – particularly the use of violence - are measured. Chapter VIfeatures Machiavelli’s “greatest examples,” a group of political figures whodemonstrate peak political skill (and are thus the ‘greatest’ per se) and from whomMachiavelli’s reader can learn the most (and are thus ‘greatest examples’).39 TheirM
Machiavelli created a package of recommendations that, if followed, would result in a “trap” for the prince. According to her, The Prince was designed to leave Machiavelli’s Medici reader hated, undefended, and living with an armed citizenry.14 There is a
and Latin American populism, after which we present some ideas for future cross-regional research on populism. POPULISM DEFINED AND APPLIED Before we can actually compare populism in Europe and Latin America, we first have to establish 1) what populism means and 2) whether the four selected cases indeed meet the definition we adopt.
1. right-wing populism in austria: just populism or anti-party party normality? 25 Dr. manfred Kohler, PhD (European Parliament & university of Kent) 2. Populist parties in austria 30 Karima aziz, mmag.a (Forum Emancipatory islam) SlOVaKia 34 Populism in Slovakia Peter učeň, PhD (independent researcher) CZECH rEPuBliC 43 Populism in the Czech .
4 Niccolò Machiavelli to Francesco Guicciardini, May 17, 1521, in Niccolò Machiavelli, , vol. 2, p. 372; Eng. trans., Opere Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 336. Machiavelli stresses his love of the fatherland also in the opening of his A Dialogue on Language (Discorso o dialogo intorno
3 function as Machiavelli’s central military treatises, analyzing military strategy, tactics, and theory in Machiavelli’s time as well as for other important military traditions.9 Frederick found himself in a position far different from Machiavelli’s trials and
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI (1469-1527) Unit Structure: 1.1 Objective 1.2 Introduction 1.3 Theory of political power and Machiavelli 1.4 The prince and the central theme of prince 1.5 Why Machiavelli justified for a powerful state 1.6 Advise to the prince about statecraft 1.7 Evaluation of
Machiavelli (1469-1527) 1.0 Introduction Niccolo Machiavelli was born in Florence, (Italy) in 1469 in a family with modest means. His father was a jurist. Machiavelli as a child could not receive proper education and he studied the Latin classics, especially on Roman history under the guidance of his father.
Niccolo Machiavelli’s perspective of politics Polityka w perspektywie Niccolo Machiavellego Summary In this article, the focus is on classic author Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s work has constituted the object of research and analysis from two relatively opposite perspectives: the
Introduction: From Figure to Field There are, in fact, no cities anymore. It goes on like a forest. —Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, 1955 Landscape has recently emerged as model and medium for the contemporary city. This claim has been available since the turn of the twenty-first century in the discourse and practices the term “landscape urbanism” describes. This volume offers the first .
