OPERATION ANACONDA: LESSONS LEARNED, OR LESSONS
OPERATION ANACONDA: LESSONS LEARNED,OR LESSONS OBSERVED?A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE(Strategy)byDAVID J. LYLE, MAJOR, USAFB.S., USAF Academy, Colorado 1995M.B.A., Louisiana Tech, Louisiana, 2004Fort Leavenworth, Kansas2009Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing datasources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or anyother aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate forInformation Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware thatnotwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently validOMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)2. REPORT TYPE3. DATES COVERED (From - To)12-06-2009Master‘s ThesisAUG 2008 – JUN 20094. TITLE AND SUBTITLE5a. CONTRACT NUMBEROperation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed?5b. GRANT NUMBER5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER6. AUTHOR(S)5d. PROJECT NUMBERLYLE, DAVID J., MAJOR5e. TASK NUMBER5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)8. PERFORMING ORG REPORTNUMBERUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeATTN: ATZL-SWD-GDFort Leavenworth, KS 66027-23019. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’SACRONYM(S)11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORTNUMBER(S)12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES14. ABSTRACTOperation Anaconda, a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, was notable for difficultiesin integrating US air and ground forces in order to bring combat power to bear on a stronger than originallyanticipated foe. In the seven years of study and debate since 2002, key players from both sides have for the mostpart agreed that with better preliminary coordination, the operation could have been executed less risk to US andcoalition personnel. While many commentators have noted that suboptimal command and control relationships,lack of communication, and confusion all contributed to the initial problems in air/ground coordination, few haveexamined the joint and service doctrine from 2002 to determine to what degree it might have negatively influencedthe smooth planning and execution of the operation. This study seeks to determine if any inconsistencies oromissions in joint and service doctrine may have contributed to the problems with air and ground integrationobserved in Operation Anaconda, and also to determine if doctrinal updates since 2002 have adequately addressedany systemic disconnects the study discovers. In any cases where modern doctrine still does not address the keyproblems noted in Anaconda, the study will suggest modifications to doctrine which will increase the likelihoodthat the key ―lessons observed‖ from the operation truly become ―lessons learned‖ in the institutionalconsciousnesses of the ground and air components.15. SUBJECT TERMSDoctrine, Command and Control, Joint Integration, Operation Anaconda, Operation Enduring Freedom16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:a. REPORTb. ABSTRACTc. THIS PAGE(U)(U)(U)17. LIMITATIONOF ABSTRACT18. NUMBEROF PAGES(U)8219a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18ii
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGEName of Candidate: Major Dave Lyle, USAFThesis Title: Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed?Approved by:, Thesis Committee ChairLTC Brian Allen, M.A., MemberBruce Stanley, M.M.A.S., MemberTimothy Hentschel, Ph.D.Accepted this 12th day of June 2009 by:, Director, Graduate Degree ProgramsRobert F. Baumann, Ph.D.The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoingstatement.)iii
ABSTRACTOPERATION ANACONDA: LESSONS LEARNED, OR LESSONS OBSERVED? byMajor David J. Lyle, USAF, 82 pages.Operation Anaconda, a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002,was notable for difficulties in integrating US air and ground forces in order to bringcombat power to bear on a stronger than originally anticipated foe. In the seven years ofstudy and debate since 2002, key players from both sides have for the most part agreedthat with better preliminary coordination, the operation could have been executed lessrisk to US and coalition personnel. While many commentators have noted thatsuboptimal command and control relationships, lack of communication, and confusion allcontributed to the initial problems in air/ground coordination, few have examined thejoint and service doctrine from 2002 to determine to what degree it might have negativelyinfluenced the smooth planning and execution of the operation. This study seeks todetermine if any inconsistencies or omissions in joint and service doctrine may havecontributed to the problems with air and ground integration observed in OperationAnaconda, and also to determine if doctrinal updates since 2002 have adequatelyaddressed any systemic disconnects the study discovers. In any cases where moderndoctrine still does not address the key problems noted in Anaconda, the study willsuggest modifications to doctrine which will increase the likelihood that the key ―lessonsobserved‖ from the operation truly become ―lessons learned‖ in the institutionalconsciousnesses of the ground and air components.iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI wish to express my true appreciation to the members of my thesis committee fortheir patience as I struggled to learn the difference between ―seat of the pants‖composition and academic writing (perhaps prematurely assuming that I have indeedlearned that lesson), and I also wish to thank the distinguished members of the ―HighNoon Platoon‖ for helping me ensure that I did not learn those lessons to quickly.v
TABLE OF CONTENTSPageMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE . iiiABSTRACT . ivACKNOWLEDGMENTS .vTABLE OF CONTENTS . viACRONYMS . viiiILLUSTRATIONS . ixCHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .1Background.4Air/Ground Disconnects in Anaconda .7Primary and Secondary Research Questions .14Primary .14Secondary .14Definitions .15Limitations .16Scope .17Delimitations .17Assumptions .18Significance .19CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .20Doctrine Applicable to this Study .20Official After Action Reports .25Books .26Case Studies and Reports .26CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .31CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .32Cause and Effect Relationships of the Problems .32Analysis of Planning Doctrine in 2002 .34Joint Doctrine for Planning in 2002 .35Army Planning Doctrine in 2002 .38Air Force Planning Doctrine in 2002 .39Analysis of Planning Doctrine Shortcomings in 2002 .40vi
Analysis of Liaison Doctrine .40Joint Doctrine for Liaisons in 2002.40US Army Liaison doctrine in 2002 .42US Air Force Liaison Doctrine in 2002 .43Shortcomings in Liaison Doctrine in 2002 .43Analysis of Current Doctrine.43Today‘s Joint Planning Doctrine .44Current US Army Planning Doctrine .47Current US Air Force Planning Doctrine .48Current Joint Liaison Doctrine .50Current US Army Liaison Doctrine .51Current US Air Force Liaison Doctrine .51CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .53Overall Conclusions .53The Role of Doctrine .55The Role of Planning Doctrine .58The Role of Liaison Doctrine .59What Happened in Anaconda .59Current Shortfalls in Joint Planning and Liaison Doctrine .61Recommendations .64REFERENCE LIST .68INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .73vii
ACRONYMSACCEAir Component Coordination ElementALOAir Liaison OfficerAOCAir Operations Center (Air and Space Operations Center in USAFDoctrine)ASOCAir Support Operations CenterATOAir Tasking OrderBCDBattlefield Coordination DetachmentCAOCCombined Air Operations CenterCASClose Air SupportCFACCCombined Forces Air Component CommanderCFLCCCombined Forces Land Component CommanderCJTFCombined Joint Task Force (NATO) or Commander, Joint Task ForceJAEPJoint Air Estimate ProcessJOPPJoint Operations Planning ProcessJTFJoint Task ForceLNOLiaison OfficerMDMPMilitary Decision Making Process.viii
ILLUSTRATIONSPageFigure 1.Concept of the Operation . 5ix
CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTIONAt the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging warin order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith andknowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization ofmen, equipment, and tactics. It is the building material for strategy. It isfundamental to sound judgment.— General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, 1968“. . . we weren‘t idiots, but we weren‘t asking the questions we needed to . . .‖— Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, USA, 2004Determining the best way to integrate the capabilities of the different US militaryservices--increasing ―jointness‖--has been a continuous challenge in modern warfare.Despite the vast increases in communications and information sharing capabilities thathave accompanied digitalization, integrating the efforts of the various services continuesto present a challenge. These problems of integration have been especially acute betweenthe United States‘ oldest and youngest military services--namely, the US Army and USAir Force. Over their sixty plus year relationship, in both peacetime and war, the twoservices have often argued and debated over what the proper relationships should bebetween the ground and air components, and how they should be defined. Both havecodified these beliefs in their individual service doctrines, which respond to joint doctrinefrom their own service‘s perspective, and also provide the intellectual underpinnings oftheir permanent and abiding partnership between the ground and air focused services. Butoutside of actual combat, there are seldom sufficiently robust opportunities to see if the1
various doctrines are compatible in the actual practice of high intensity combat. Thispaper will examine a case study from recent combat history in which the ties between theArmy and Air Force were indeed tested, and were by many accounts found wanting.1From a results based viewpoint, March 2002‘s Operation Anaconda was a tacticalsuccess against Al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan, with the key eventsof the operation summarized as follows:Originally planned as a three-day battle with light combat, Operation Anacondaturned out to be a seven-day battle with intense combat and was officiallyterminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 2–18, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed andthe rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of US and allied forces.US casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Successwas achieved because the US military showed a capacity to adapt by employingjoint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising anddifficult challenge.2Despite the fact that this characterization is factually accurate, its brevity belies thecomplexity of the operation, the unanticipated risks that were undertaken, and theextreme difficulties that soldiers and airmen undertook in order to ensure success.While there is still disagreement on the causes, most of the extant literature onOperation Enduring Freedom acknowledges that there were significant problems1Elaine Grossman, ―Was Operation Anaconda Ill-Fated from Start?,‖ Inside thePentagon, 29 July 2004, http://www.d-n-i.net/grossman/army analyst blames.htm(accessed 22 March 2009).2Richard Kugler, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study ofAdaptation in Battle (Washington, DC: Sponsored by the Office of the Deputy AssistantSecretary of Defense Forces Transformation and Resources, Center for Technology andNational Security Policy, Case Studies in National Security Transformation Number 5,February 2007), 1.2
integrating air and ground operations during the opening phase of Operation Anaconda.3Since then, the action has been the subject of numerous professional journal articles, afteraction reports, and case studies since then, most of which focused primarily on thetactical level complications that resulted from suboptimal command and controlstructures and poor coordination between the components. Most have commentedspecifically on disconnects between the ground and air headquarters involved, notingshortfalls in the planning efforts in both sides.4What has not been evident in most accounts of this event is a detailed analysis ofhow service and joint doctrine might have shaped the entering arguments andassumptions that commanders used to decide on what level of coordination was requiredto effectively plan and conduct the operation. This study will examine if deficiencies indoctrine may have negatively influenced decisions on operational design and planning in2002, causing systemic disconnects in the way US air and ground forces planned andexecuted operations. Second, the study will see if updates in joint and service doctrinesince 2002 corrected any systemic deficiencies in air/ground integration that the studydiscovers. Lastly, this study will identify potential areas for improvement, and makerecommendations to correct deficiencies that were demonstrated by the evidence of3Rebecca Grant, ―The Echoes of Anaconda,‖ Air Force Magazine (April 2005);Richard L. Kugler, Michael Baranick, and Hans Binnendijk, Operation Anaconda:Lessons for Joint Operations (Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University, 2009).4Richard B. Andres and Jeffrey Hukill, ―Anaconda: A Flawed Joint PlanningProcess,‖ Joint Force Quarterly, no. 47 (4th Quarter 2007); Headquarters United StatesAir Force AF/XOL, Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective (Washington, DC:United States Air Force, 2005).3
Operation Anaconda, but still not been sufficiently addressed in joint and service doctrineto reasonably prevent their reoccurrence in future high intensity combat operations.BackgroundOperation Anaconda was arguably the first conventional style military operationin Operation Enduring Freedom, the US effort to destroy the Al Qaeda organization andtheir Taliban supporters in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks againstNew York City and Washington, D.C. Operation Enduring Freedom began inAfghanistan in October of 2001, and by November most of Al Qaeda and their Talibansupporters had been driven out of the major urban areas by US and Afghan NorthernAlliance forces. In January 2002, coalition forces received reports that a large number ofTaliban and Al Qaeda fighters were assembling in the Khowst--Gardez region in EasternAfghanistan, and were reportedly holding out in an extremely rugged mountainousredoubt in the Shahi-Kot Valley.5Initial planning for an
OPERATION ANACONDA: LESSONS LEARNED, OR LESSONS OBSERVED? by Major David J. Lyle, USAF, 82 pages. Operation Anaconda, a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, was notable for difficulties in integrating US air and ground forces in order to bring combat pow
iii MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: Major Dave Lyle, USAF Thesis Title: Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed?
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