Conflict Trends, Issue 1 (2006)
CONTENTSEDITORIAL2by Vasu GoundenFEATURES3Nation-building, State-building and Power Configurationin Zimbabweby Eldred V. Masunungure9Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Africa:Challenges for Post-Conflict Reconstructionby Khabele Matlosa16The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy:An Analysisby Tim MurithiSITUATIONREPORTS22242628SudanSomaliaCôte d’IvoireEthiopia and Eritreaby Karanja Mbugua and Richard KamidzaFEATURES30Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africaby Harriette E. Williams35Reintegration of Ex-combatants: The Liberia Caseby Joseph N. Sany40Veterans of Peace in Post-conflict South Africaby Susan E. Cook45African Nation-building and Reconciliation:Lessons from Rwandaby Paul Nantulya51Violence Against Women: Implications forPost-Conflict Reconstructionby Ingrid PalmaryBOOKREVIEW55“Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation InDivided Societies” – John Paul Lederachby Venashri PillayFront cover Supporters of Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf AFP/TOUCHLINEconflict trends I 1
EDITORIALBY VASU GOUNDEN1 March 2006 was a significant day in my life.I cast my vote in the third local government elections inmy country, South Africa. It was a good feeling. It is agood feeling to live in a country that is free and there isan extra special feeling of joy when you have spent thebetter part of your life struggling for this very freedom.By all accounts the elections have been free andfair and without incidents of violence. Our democracyhas once again been tested and it has been found to bedurable and sustainable. The people of South Africa haveagain been given the opportunity to choose those whomwe entrust with the governance of our country. All thatwe ask is that those we elect govern us fairly, equitably,transparently, and with good and noble intents.South Africa, once thought to be a totally intractableconflict, is today a model for the negotiated settlement ofcomplex conflicts. It is a model of effective compromisefor the greater good of all people of South Africa. Buthas that compromise really led to tangible benefits forall people of South Africa? Has there been fair, equitable,and transparent distribution of the country’s resources?In short, the question we have to ask is whether the postconflict reconstruction of South Africa has created anenvironment for national development that will lead to abetter life for all South Africans.The South African post-conflict reconstruction(PCR) agenda is still being implemented presently.There is no doubt that huge strides have been made inaddressing the developmental challenges that we inherited from the apartheid era. However, twelve years is avery short time-span to reverse decades of inequalityand structural deficiencies of the apartheid system. Apartfrom time, huge financial and skilled human resourcesare needed to implement a post-conflict reconstructionagenda. The dilemma and challenge for any post-conflictsociety is balancing the rising expectations of the population with limited resources that cannot deliver intime. South Africa, despite its relative prosperity, is still2 I conflict trendsvery much challenged by this dilemma. In the last yearalone several hundred local-level community protestshave taken place, some resulting in violence, overdemands for accelerated delivery of social services. SouthAfrica’s past of racial discrimination has resulted in twonations: one rich and white and the other largely poorand black. In addition, with some positive developmentsin post-apartheid South Africa there is also a growingdivide between rich blacks and poor blacks. These dividesbetween and within groups continue to strain the nationbuilding aspects of PCR in South Africa.I highlight the example of South Africa to illustrate the difficulties that a country with relatively goodresources, good infrastructure, good institutionalcapacity, and a functioning economy with a firm taxbase, has in successfully implementing its PCR agenda.How much more difficult is it going to be for Burundi,Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)to successfully implement a PCR agenda with all theirattendant weaknesses in infrastructure, institutionalcapacity, economic stability, and most importantly theirlack of financial and human resources?This issue of Conflict Trends surveys the current PCRdevelopments in Africa, highlights the challenges that areencountered during PCR and presents case studies ofbest practices and lessons learned. A significant lessonfrom South Africa very clearly illustrates that the processof PCR implementation requires lengthy time investment;the weaker the governing system and economy inherited,the lengthier the PCR process. Burundi, the DRC, Sudan,and Liberia will all have very protracted PCR phasesbecause they lack the necessary resources to supportand sustain the process. It is therefore incumbent on allstakeholders who desire a durable, sustainable peace inthese countries, to make concerted efforts to provide thenecessary resources for the successful implementationof PCR processes and not merely shift their attention andresources to the next media spotlight country in Africa!
AFP / TOUCHLINE PHOTONATION-BUILDING, STATE-BUILDING ANDPOWER CONFIGURATION IN ZIMBABWEWRITTEN BY ELDRED V. MASUNUNGUREIntroductionZimbabwe is a sovereign state presently understress. But Zimbabwe, like many African countries, is notyet a nation-state. This is often a source of intra-state (andsometimes inter-state) conflicts and tensions. Many countries inherited states without nations. Nation-building,like state-building, is a work of art and many Africanleaders have proved to be good state-building artists butpoor nation-builders. In countries with a kaleidoscope ofcultural, ethnic, racial, religious and other salient socialidentities, nation-building is a big challenge. This paperasserts that in such cases, a bipolar power structureis inherently unstable and breeds perpetual conflict.Furthermore, it proposes that a multi-polar powerAbove: A Zimbabwean walks past election postersfor Zanu-PF and the opposition party MDC,in Harare, 2005conflict trends I 3
configuration offers a more stable and viable arrangementif only because it is a more inclusive political formula.This paper examines the nature of nation-buildingand state-building as political projects that have stoodin competition with each other since Zimbabwe’sattainment of national independence from Britain inApril 1980. The focus is on two historical episodes inZimbabwe’s post-independence history: the period fromformal independence to the Unity Accord of 1987; andthe second period is the post-1999 era. Both have beendeeply troubling and though separated by nearly oneand a half decades, some of the underlying tensions andcausative factors are the same. In addition, a commoncharacteristic of both episodes is the bipolar nature ofthe power distribution.The Post-Guerrilla Bipolar ConflictTowards the end of the guerrilla campaign forindependence, the two exiled and major liberation movements, led by the Zimbabwe African National Union(ZANU) whose fighting army was called the ZimbabweAfrican National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and theZimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) whose fightinganimosities dated back to the 19th century and the oldwounds had not healed by Zimbabwe’s independence,notwithstanding that more than a century had lapsedand many political generations had passed by. Thissubterranean tension burst into the open soon after thecountry attained its independence.With the achievement of formal independence, thenew black government faced two challenges. The first ofbuilding a new, united nation from the ashes of colonialand racial subjugation and oppression. From the timeof the country’s colonial occupation in September 1890,it functioned as a bifurcated society. It was two nationswithin one territorial unit of rule. The two nations, onewhite and the other black, rarely saw eye to eye. Asalready alluded to, the blacks did not constitute a homogenous community. They were divided ethnically betweenNdebeles and Shonas and further sub-ethnic groupswithin the latter. The challenge was never to liquidatethese racial and ethnic differences but to manage them.It was to create a nation united in its rich diversity. As wewill see, the nation-building project was aborted in deference to the second challenge, that of state-building.State-building entails creating and strengthening theNATION-BUILDING, LIKE STATE-BUILDING, IS A WORK OF ART AND MANYAFRICAN LEADERS HAVE PROVED TO BE GOOD STATE-BUILDING ARTISTSBUT POOR NATION-BUILDERSwing was called the Zimbabwe Peoples RevolutionaryArmy (ZIPRA), forged a political alliance known as thePatriotic Front (PF). The PF came about for the purposesof synchronising political strategies to negotiate politicalindependence from a common position. Indeed, the twoparties seemed to share a common vision of an independent, non-racial, united Zimbabwe. Alas, this was notto be. After the multi-stakeholder ceasefire agreementand a political settlement in the form of the LancasterHouse Agreement crafted in London in December 1979,the two political parties went their separate ways. Thisplanted the seeds for tensions that later germinated intoa low-level conflict now commonly referred to as theGukurahundi or the anti-dissidence war in the westernpart of the country.The roots of the misunderstanding go back to thesplit of ZANU from ZAPU in 1963 when factionalism tooktribal and ethnic configurations and Joshua Nkomo’sZAPU became progressively Ndebele-dominated whileNdabaningi Sithole’s ZANU became progressivelyShona-led. The Shonas’ and the Ndebeles’ historical4 I conflict trendsinstitutions necessary to support and promote long-termeconomic, social and political development. It has beenargued that state-building and nation-building are twooverlapping but conceptually and historically differentprocesses. Furthermore, to the extent that the two projectsare not tightly overlapping and largely inseparable processes, the interaction of the two processes can andoften does produce problems in the country concerned.1At independence, and even during the fight forit, the territorial integrity of the Zimbabwean state wasrarely in dispute. What was in dispute, and for which thenationalists and the settler colonial regime were fightingeach other, was the question of who would control thestate. The 1979 Lancaster House Constitution answeredthat question only partially by allocating the control ofthe state to the black majority. However, it did not answerthe question of who, among the blacks, would controlthe state and its destiny. This question Robert Mugabeand his Zanu-PF sought to settle by deciding to contestthe February 1980 elections separately from PF-Zapu andthus presumably settling the question, once and for all,
of who had the majority support in the country and therefore who was entitled to rule it. As it turned out, Zanu-PFemerged the clear winner capturing 63% of the blackvote and PF-Zapu a distant second with 24% of the vote.One of the problems at independence was thecontested and not yet fully resolved question of whoconstitutes the Zimbabwe polity or political communityand which people should be members of that community.Zimbabwe’s politics is reflective of its multimodal ethnic and cultural character. Although the mostsignificant and ‘permanent’ line of social and politicalcleavage in present Zimbabwe is the ethnic polarisation between the majority Shona-oriented groups andthe minority Ndebele-oriented ones, it is a popular andpopularised myth that Zimbabwe is a bimodal country.This has led to a bimodal analysis of Zimbabwe politics.The result has been to create what the lateMasipula Sithole, one of Zimbabwe’s foremost political scientists, called “a bi-polar power structure”. Inhis view, such a power structure “tends to be tensionladen and therefore unstable, while a multi-polarpower structure has less tension and is more stable”.2Sithole was writing in 1979, a year before independence in Zimbabwe, and his observations were about the“struggles-within-the-struggle” in the two major nationalist movements. He further observed that tribalism andregionalism are as inevitable as social conflict but thatinstead of pretending that these tensions do not exist,“they must be faced fairly and squarely if they must beunderstood, managed and resolved properly”.3 Sitholerecommended “equilibrium theory” as “a framework fororganizational management and conflict resolution”.The bane of Zimbabwe’s politics is therefore rootedin its forced bipolarity in the context of a state that is yetto be a nation-state. The history of modern Zimbabweteaches us that the country is at its most unstable andconflict-ridden when two major enemies face eachother. The country has also not experienced a functional multi-polar power structure. It has either been aunipolar or a bipolar configuration. For instance, since themilitary conquest of the indigenous blacks in the ‘FirstChimurenga’ uprising in the late 1890s, Zimbabwe (thenRhodesia) was a unipolar country dominated entirelyand almost comprehensively by the whites. Thoughblacks were a visible majority, they were so completelysubjugated that they were not a political force to reckonwith. This continued until the early 1960s, which saw thestrengthening of the nationalist movement, particularlythe radicalisation and militarisation of the nationaliststruggle. This created a bipolar power structure withthe nationalists pitted against the white settler regime.The bipolarity was essentially racial in substance untilthe power struggle between the whites and blacks wassettled at the Lancaster House Conference.Instead of the Lancaster House settlement usheringin a multi-polar power configuration, what emerged wasanother bipolar situation, but this time an ethnic ratherthan a racial one. The essence of bipolarity remained,with its inherent tensions and instability. Moreover, thisbipolar power structure was expressed in explicit organisational terms in the forms of PF-Zapu and Zanu-PF.After assuming power, Mugabe and Zanu-PFformed a coalition government in which PF-Zapuwas a junior partner. Some analysts saw this offer toPF-Zapu as an attempt to weaken the party by offeringit a secondary role in the coalition government “with aview to eventually swallowing it under a one-party statedominated by ZANU (PF)”.4 The reality though was thatZanu-PF governed as if the other partner did not exist. Itwas a recipe for future conflict. Allied with this coalitiongovernment formula was the declaration by Mugabe ofthe then much-praised policy of “reconciliation” whichwas understood and practiced in bipolar terms andrestrictively. Moyo thus points out that politics within theblack community was not seen in terms of reconciliationbut was viewed in terms of national unity. He argues:While the objectives of reconciliation were clear inso far as they related to reconciling races which hadbeen at loggerheads politically and economically,the objectives of national unity were not that clearbeyond ZANU (PF)’s desire to impose or otherwiseintroduce a one-party state.5As it turned out, the coalition government did notlast long as the relations between the two major blackparties deteriorated, culminating in the dismissal ofJoshua Nkomo and his colleagues from the governmentin February 1982. His core supporters in the newly creatednational army also deserted and some of them allegedly fought running battles with the government laterin a so-called dissident military campaign. The government responded massively and ruthlessly, deployingthe notorious Fifth Brigade in a campaign code-namedGukurahundi and which reportedly killed about 20 000civilians in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces.Gukurahundi is Shona for ‘the rain that washes awaythe chaff from the last harvest’. The Gukurahundiway of dealing with perceived and real enemies (the‘chaff’) of Zanu-PF was diametrically opposed to thepolicy of reconciliation. Where reconciliation sought toresolve differences and bring together diverse groups,Gukurahundi sought to eliminate differences and theirsources. It was a policy of annihilation and since thedissident episode, Zanu-PF and the government haveresorted to Gukurahundi as a strategy to deal with itsopponents. Gukurahundi was intended to be a militarysolution to a troublesome political problem. The failureconflict trends I 5
of Gukurahundi to liquidate PF-Zapu in its strongholds –as reflected in the 1985 elections when the party grabbedall 15 contested seats in Matabeleland region – convincedZanu-PF to try other means of achieving the same end.Zimbabwe has never implemented a genuine andfunctional multi-polar structural political arrangement aspart of its conflict resolution mechanisms. In an effort tocraft a presumably durable conflict resolution formulafor the low-level war in Matabeleland, Zanu-PF went fora unipolar power arrangement. This was in the form ofthe Unity Accord intended as a political solution to apolitical problem. However, the Unity Accord was alsoa unipolar solution to a multi-polar problem and to thatextent there was a mis-alignment between the nature ofthe problem and the nature of the solution. Zimbabweis by all definitions a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multireligious and multi-racial country but has never soughtand implemented a multi-partite solution. Granted, intheory Zimbabwe is a multi-party state, but in reality ithas never been a functional multi-party system.If it is accepted that Zimbabwe is a multi-culturalsociety, it then behoves those competent in politicaland constitutional engineering to craft a constitutionalPost-1999 Bimodal ConflictThe formation of the Movement for DemocraticChange (MDC) in September 1999 saw Zimbabwereverting to the bipolar situation which existed priorto the Unity Accord. Within six months of the MDC’sformation, chaos erupted. The fast-track land reformprogramme, popularly referred to as jambanja in reference to its violent and chaotic nature, became thedefining framework of Zimbabwe’s politics from 2000to date. The bipolar power configuration in whichZanu-PF faced an equally powerful, cohesive andwell-resourced party delivered Zimbabwe into oneof its most violent episodes in its post-independencehistory. In the run-up to the June 2000 parliamentaryelections, at least 30 people were killed in politicallymotivated violence and over 18 000 others were victimsof human rights violations. The conflict was betweentwo sharply divided political gladiators, the MDC andZanu-PF. This was a typical bipolar political dispensation.The argument being advanced is that a bipolarpower configuration in the context of an unfinishednation-building project is a recipe for disaster. Thisis particularly so when one of the political gladiatorsZIMBABWE HAS NEVER IMPLEMENTED A GENUINE AND FUNCTIONALMULTI-POLAR STRUCTURAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT AS PART OF ITSCONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMSdispensation that recognises this reality and designa solution that suffices. Proportional representationimmediately suggests itself as such a viable formula inmulti-ethnic and multi-culutral Zimbabwe. Proportionalrepresentation recognises, via the electoral process, theplural society that Zimbabwe is. It is also a multi-polaranswer to a multi-polar question.From the Unity Accord to September 1999,Zimbabwe was for all practical purposes a one-partystate. Small episodical parties sprouted from time to timeas they continue to do today but none has been of anypolitical consequence with the possible exception of theZimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) that was formed justbefore the 1990 general elections and did win about 25%of the vote. However, soon after these elections, ZUMdisappeared into political oblivion and the country effectively functioned again as a one-party state, or rather, aparty-state. There appeared to be peace and calm but theunderlying problems and issues attendant on Zimbab
9 Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Challenges for Post-Conflict Reconstruction by Khabele Matlosa 16 The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis by Tim Murithi EDITORIAL 2 by Vasu Gounden FEATURES SITUATION REPORTS BOOK REVIEW 30 Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa by Harriette E. Williams 35 Reintegration of Ex-combatants: The Liberia Case by .
Functional vs Dysfunctional Conflict Functional Conflict- Conflict that supports the goals of the group and improves its performance Dysfunctional Conflict- Conflict that hinders group performance Task Conflict- Conflicts over content and goals of the work Relationship conflict- Conflict based on interpersonal relationships Process Conflict .
for conflict analysis. 2.1 Core analytical elements of conflict analysis . Violent conflict is about politics, power, contestation between actors and the . about conflict, see the GSDRC Topic Guide on Conflict . 13. Table 1: Guiding questions for conflict analysis . at conflict causes in Kenya in 2000. Actors fight over issues [, and .
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS October 27, 2006 Volume 30, Issue 43 PROPOSED RULES BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION A Master Plan for Postsecondary Education in Illinois . 28 July 3, 2006 July 14, 2006 29 July 10, 2006 July 21, 2006 30 July 17, 2006 July 28, 2006 31 July 24, 2006 August 4, 2006 .
2.3.1 Functional Conflict 2.3.2 Dysfunctional Conflict 2.3.3 Task versus Relationship Conflict 2.4 CAUSES OF CONFLICT 2.5 INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT 2.6 WORKPLACE DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT 2.6.1 Different Categories of Workplace Diversity 2.6.2 Cultural Diversity 2.6.3 Measuring Diversity
Understand the importance of conflict resolution in teams and the workplace. Explain strategies for resolving or managing interpersonal conflict. Describe the causes and effects of conflict. Describe different conflict management styles, identify the appropriate style for different situations, and identify a preferred method of conflict resolution.
January 13, 2006 St. John’s February 10, 2006 St. John’s March 10, 2006 St. Teresa April 14, 2006 (Note 3rd Friday) St. Michael’s May 12, 2006 Holy Comforter June 9, 2006 Advent July 14, 2006 TBD August 11, 2006 St. John’s September 8, 2006 St. James/St. Matthews October 13, 2006 Holy Spirit
Tradition vs. Modernity 21 V. Escalation and Access to Conflict Resources 22 The Clan System as a Conflict Multiplier (and Positive Social Capital) 22 The Precarious Situation of Youth 23 Information and Misinformation 24 VI. Available Conflict Management Resources 25 Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms and Social Capital 25 State Conflict Management Mechanisms 27 The Role of Religion .
BSc Accounting and Finance Department of Accounting Pie chart showing breakdown by country yet to place *Data for registered BSc Accounting and Finance students in years 1-3 in 2013-14 This guide is printed on recycled stock. The programme The BSc Accounting and Finance programme is widely regarded as being at the forefront of international teaching in its field. It is known for pioneering .
