CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND DELAYS IN THE U.S. EMBASSY

3KING-6430 with DISTILLERfor a strategic facilities plan is especially critical for facilities likeKabul, where there is a high turnover in personnel.One the things highlighted in the GAO report is that there areconstantly turnovers in personnel. And if you don’t have a plan, anew person coming in has a large and long learning curve.The State Department recently rescinded the requirements forthe development of a strategic plan for any facility, which was arequirement that had been in place since 1990. So because theState Department’s poor planning and the use of temporary facilities where Americans must live and work, they will continue indefinitely in Kabul. In fact, amazingly, the State Department recently requested an additional 124 million for temporary facilities.It is unclear why State didn’t do a better job planning for permanent and secure buildings, which resulted in the wasting of taxpayer dollars on temporary facilities. It appears, at least to me,that the effort to move towards temporary facilities is a way to getaround some of the requirements that need to go into good and better planning.Not only does State not properly plan for permanent facilities, italso has no standards for temporary facilities. The State Department’s own actions in Kabul make it clear how critical such standards are. In its fiscal year 2008 budget request, State expressed toCongress concerns about the threat to the Kabul facility posed byincoming weapons fire. However, as the GAO pointed out, quote,‘‘The only secure protection measures specified in the 2009 contractfor temporary housing was shatter-resistant window film,’’ endquote. That’s it, a little film on the windows. I’m no expert, but Idon’t think shatter-resistant windows can stop a bullet, grenade,an RPG and whatnot, and yet we ask our Americans to live therein this high-threat environment.In contrast, State contracted for the temporary offices to have ahigher standard level of security and ballistic protection on thetemporary housing that it built. This means that employees weresafer working 24 hours a day rather than returning to their housing, where they should be able to rest, relax, and be safe.The lesson here is clear. When there are no standards or guidance, the results are inconsistent and Americans are unsafe. Wehave to do a better job of getting our folks into safer, new facilitiesas soon as possible without incurring additional costs: 2 billion,and you’re still requesting temporary facilities with no standards,no protection. We did not learn the lessons in Iraq, and that is acrying shame.We look forward to having this hearing and hearing the answersand responses to that, but now I’d like to recognize the rankingmember, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes.Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.As I listened to your statement, I just sat here and said to myself: We’re better than that. We’re better than this.And listening to your answers to the questions that you presented, I think there’s a lot to be discussed here this morning, soI’m glad that you’re holding this very important hearing on theU.S. Embassy in Afghanistan.I’d like to make three main points that I think we all can agreeon. First and foremost, the safety of United States personnel serv-VerDate Nov 24 200811:23 Jul 13, 2017Jkt 000000PO 00000Frm 00007Fmt 6633Sfmt 6633H:\25880.TXTAPRIL

4KING-6430 with DISTILLERing overseas is a top national security priority, and it’s critical toour country’s interests throughout the entire world.Second, we recognize that the urgency of rapidly securing U.S.facilities abroad may cost more for faster results. However, cuttingcorners may have the opposite effect, and careful, very carefulstewardship of taxpayer funds is critical to maximizing the protection of U.S. personnel because any dollar wasted is a dollar thatcannot be used to protect our personnel abroad.Kabul is one of the most dangerous places on the face of theEarth. The State Department ranks it as one of the most highthreat, high-risk locations for United States personnel. The menand women who serve our country in Afghanistan recognize theserisks, and it is our job to honor their service by taking all appropriate steps to provide secure facilities for their work.In 2008 and 2009, the United States rapidly increased the number of personnel in Afghanistan to meet our Nation’s military andforeign policy goals, first under the Bush administration and thenunder the Obama administration. This, and I quote, ‘‘surge,’’ endof the quote, as it was called, required facilities for United Statestroops and civilian personnel, including those working side by sidein provincial reconstruction, the government—governance and stability efforts.Both Republicans and Democrats supported the surge. For example, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain argued that a surge was, and I quote, ‘‘vitally needed,’’ end of quote,in Afghanistan and that delays would put American lives at risk.This dramatic increase in personnel created a difficult challengefor State Department officials planning for facility and security requirements. On one hand, they had to increase the United Statesfootprint on the ground in a safe and secure way. On the otherhand, they did not want to repeat the same mistakes that weremade in Iraq, where the United States compound became a massive, expensive fortress, even as U.S. presence subsided.According to the Government Accountability Office, which has anofficial testifying here today, and I quote, ‘‘The dynamic and unpredictable operating environment of Afghanistan has produced changing facility needs that have continually outpaced existing capabilities at the post,’’ end of quote. GAO also cited a senior State Department management official who explained the effects of thisrush to accommodate the surge. State did not fully follow its costand risk policies in part of the urgency of the Embassy’s facilityneeds, the security environment, and challenges supporting thesurge and Embassy staffing that was occurring. Despite this urgency, however, GAO also found that the State Department couldhave and should have planned better. Could have and should have,but didn’t.According to GAO, the State Department contributed to construction delays and cost increases by failing to follow its own risk assessment and planning policies. There’s something awfully wrongwith that picture.The GAO also found that the Department’s original contracts didnot include adequate security measures for temporary facilities.This led to inconsistent security measures, more contract modifications, increased costs, and further delays, according to GAO.VerDate Nov 24 200811:23 Jul 13, 2017Jkt 000000PO 00000Frm 00008Fmt 6633Sfmt 6633H:\25880.TXTAPRIL

5KING-6430 with DISTILLERFinally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for agreeing to myrequest to invite Aegis here today. The people we hire and trainto protect our facilities are just as important to our security as thewalls we build. This company provides security at our facilities inAfghanistan under a contract that is scheduled to run through2017 at a projected cost of 723 million.In October 2014, the State Department’s Office of Inspector General issued a report with some very troubling findings. The IGfound that Aegis lacked required documentation showing that itspersonnel underwent mandated security investigations and training. That’s the same company getting 723 million. The IG alsofound that Aegis billed the government for more than 8 million inquestionable costs, including through the use of prohibited invoices.I am curious to learn what has Aegis learned about billing andwhat personnel they have in place, considering they’re getting 723million of hard-earned taxpayer dollars.The IG also found that Aegis held the passports—and this is particularly troubling—of third-country nationals longer than necessary, raising concerns about the company’s compliance with regulations about trafficking in persons. That is of great concern to me.In the past, our committee has investigated the actions of privatesecurity contractors in Iraq, where we witnessed shocking fraudand abuse. The current IG report does not include findings of nearly the same magnitude, but these are important areas that wewould like Aegis to explain and explain thoroughly. We understandthat some of these issues may have been addressed, and we thankMr. Gulino for being here today.Our goal is to make sure we carry forward our past oversight toensure that those lessons have in fact been learned and anythingthat needed to be corrected was corrected or is being corrected.And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for this hearing, and I yield back.Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman.I’ll hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any memberwho would like to submit a written statement.We’ll now recognize our panel of witnesses. We’re pleased to welcome Mr. Michael Courts, Director of International Affairs andTrade at the United States Government Accountability Office. Appreciate the work that you and your staff do and appreciate yourparticipation here.We’re also pleased to have Ms. Lydia Muniz, is the Director ofBureau of Overseas Building Operation at the United States Department of State. We appreciate you coming before our committeeagain.The Honorable Gregory Starr, Assistant Secretary of the Bureauof Diplomatic Security at the United States Department of State,a long-time servant at the State Department, and we appreciateyour participation here today.Mr. Jarrett Blanc, Principal Deputy Special Representative forAfghan and Pakistan at the United States Department of State.The Honorable Donald Hays, senior inspector at the Office of theInspector General at the United States Department of State.And Mr. Michael Gulino, president and chief executive officer ofAegis, LLC. Again, welcome all.VerDate Nov 24 200811:23 Jul 13, 2017Jkt 000000PO 00000Frm 00009Fmt 6633Sfmt 6633H:\25880.TXTAPRIL

6Pursuant to committee rules, witnesses are to be sworn beforethey testify, so if you will please rise and raise your right hands.Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you areabout to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing butthe truth?Thank you. Please be seated.And let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative.In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate it ifyou would limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire writtenrecord will be made part of the record.With that, we would like to begin with Mr. Courts.You’re now recognized for 5 minutes.WITNESS STATEMENTSSTATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. COURTSKING-6430 with DISTILLERMr. COURTS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking MemberCummings, and members of the committee. I’m pleased to be herethis morning to discuss a number of challenges related to the StateDepartment’s construction efforts at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul,Afghanistan. This testimony is based on a GAO report dealing withthe subject that we issued in May of this year. This work is partof a series of GAO engagements to review State’s efforts to manageconstruction and the efficiency and effectiveness of other aspects ofits operations overseas.GAO was asked to testify this morning on the extent to whichconstruction costs and schedules have changed, State’s use of temporary facilities on the Kabul Embassy compound, and State’splanning for projected embassy facility needs in the future.The primary message of my testimony this morning is that costshave risen and schedules have been extended significantly for twoconstruction contracts that State awarded in 2009 and 2010, andfurther cost increases are likely. State has also built numeroustemporary facilities in Kabul and will continue to use them for theforeseeable future, but it lacks specific security standards for them.Further, State’s lack of strategic facilities planning has led to coordination challenges and could lead to further problems as Statemakes additional investments to meet its future facility needs inKabul.My first point is that costs for the two construction contractshave increased by about 27 percent from about 625 million to almost 793 million. The projected completion of these projects hasbeen delayed by over 3 years and is now slated for the fall of 2017.State didn’t follow its own cost containment and risk assessmentpolicies for those contracts, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks. When these risks, such as delays in the sequencing ofthe two contracts, eventually materialized, they led to increasedcosts and extended schedules. As of March 2015, State and one ofits contractors were still negotiating the value of several potentialcontract changes that will likely result in further increased costs.My second point is that State has billed over 100 million intemporary buildings to meet space needs in the Kabul Embassycompound, but it has no security standards that are specifically tai-VerDate Nov 24 200811:23 Jul 13, 2017Jkt 000000PO 00000Frm 00010Fmt 6633Sfmt 6633H:\25880.TXTAPRIL

7lored to these types of facilities. Lacking specific standards or otherguidance to guide such construction, State inconsistently appliedalternative security measures that resulted in insufficient and differing levels of security for temporary offices and housing. Statesubsequently took corrective action that increased cost and extended schedules. State likely paid more than it would have hadthe security requirements been included in the original contract.My final point is that State plans additional capital constructioninvestments to address interim and future facility needs in Kabul,and it needs to improve its planning for these efforts. The post’scurrent facility needs stem primarily from changing circumstancesinherent to the operating environment in Kabul, including changesin the security situation and new capabilities that will be requiredas a result of the drawdown of the U.S. military there.While stakeholders within State are working to identify,prioritize, and address the post facility needs, their efforts lack astrategic facilities planning approach. This has inhibited coordination and undermined the continuity necessary to address the Embassy’s emergent needs.In summary, pursuing multiyear construction on an operationalembassy compound in a dynamic and dangerous environment suchas Afghanistan presents distinct challenges and considerable risk.With construction investments in Kabul currently projected to exceed 2 billion and likely to increase further, addressing the challenges GAO has identified should be a high priority.Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cummings, this concludesmy prepared remarks. I’d be happy to address any questions thatyou may have.[Prepared statement of Mr. Courts follows:]For complete submitted testimony, please see the -in-kabul/Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Courts.Ms. Muniz, you’re now recognized for—am I pronouncing yourname right?Ms. MUNIZ. Yes.Chairman CHAFFETZ. Close enough?Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. Close enough.Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re now recognized for 5 minutes. Tellme exactly how I should say it.Ms. MUNIZ. Muniz.Chairman CHAFFETZ. Muniz. I will improve. Thank you. You’renow recognized for 5 minutes.STATEMENT OF LYDIA MUNIZKING-6430 with DISTILLERMs. MUNIZ. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings,and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Department of State’sconstruction projects in Kabul, Afghanistan.From the beginning, the goal has been and continues to be to deliver permanent, safe, and secure facilities to support those servingin Afghanistan. The United States reopened its Embassy in Afghanistan in December of 2001 using the existing 1971 chancerybuilding.VerDate Nov 24 200811:23 Jul 13, 2017Jkt 000000PO 00000Frm 00011Fmt 6633Sfmt 6633H:\25880.TXTAPRIL

8KING-6430 with DISTILLERIn 2005, OBO completed a new office building, three new residential buildings, and support facilities to sustain the growingneeds of the Embassy.In fiscal year 2009 and 2010, OBO awarded two contracts to provide additional capacity. The projects included additional classifiedand unclassified office buildings; residential and support facilities;as well as security and infrastructure upgrades. They also providednonpermanent facilities to meet mission needs during constructionand to provide capacity for surge requirements. The total projectbudget was 881 million.In spite of fluid conditions and the logistical challenges of managing an ongoing construction project on an occupied compoundand in a war zone, I am pleased to report that the unclassifiedannex with a capacity of 917 desks will be completed this month.This November, the first residential facility will be delivered with226 residential units. In October 2016, the classified annex, witha capacity of 320 desks, will be completed, and the following October will see the delivery of the final two residential facilities, with432 units.When completed, the Embassy compound will have the capacityfor nearly 1,500 desks and over 800 residential units and additional capacity if compressed.These accomplishments have been and will continue to beachieved in the face of significant challenges and modifications.These include the termination of the fiscal year 2009 contract andmodifications to the scope of the fiscal year 2010 contract; an increase in scope from 545 permanent desks to 1,237; additional security requirements as the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated; a delay in vacating space needed by the contractor tobuild the unclassified annex; modifications to the old chancerybuilding to make it more functional for post in the short term; theelimination of scope planned for property adjacent to the Embassycompound occupied by the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health;and the closure of the Pakistani border from November 2011 toJuly 2012, temporarily eliminating the project’s most direct groundshipping route.The cumulative impact of these changes is the addition of over2 years to the project’s schedule and over 250 million.The GAO report on Afghanistan suggested that the costs andschedule to project increased due to incomplete cost and risk assessments. And while these are important tools, I reject the notionthat more thorough assessments would have had a material impacton the Kabul Embassy project. Instead, I would argue that theywould have risked further delaying delivery of permanent facilities.The material changes and challenges to the projects were notknown and could not have been anticipated at the time of development and award of the projects. Cost increases and delays were unavoidable.The GAO report also suggests that the Kabul project was not appropriately planned for the mission

Jul 09, 2015 · Cummings, Maloney, Lynch, Connolly, Duckworth, Kelly, Law-rence, Watson Coleman, Plaskett, Welch, and Lujan Grisham. Chairman CHAFFETZ. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. I appreciate you being here as we have a hearing today regarding the construction costs and delays at the United States Embassy in Kabul .