07 Thomas Hobbes - Sacramento State

friends, their nation, their profession, or theirname.Hereby it is manifest that during the time menlive without a common power to keep them all inawe, they are in that condition which is calledwar; and such a war as is of every man againstevery man. For WAR consisteth not in battleonly, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time,wherein the will to contend by battle issufficiently known: and therefore the notion oftime is to be considered in the nature of war, as itis in the nature of weather. For as the nature offoul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain,but in an inclination thereto of many daystogether: so the nature of war consisteth not inactual fighting, but in the known dispositionthereto during all the time there is no assurance tothe contrary. All other time is PEACE.Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a timeof war, where every man is enemy to every man;the same is consequent to the time wherein menlive without other security than what their ownstrength and their own invention shall furnishthem withal. In such condition there is no placefor industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain:and consequently no culture of the earth; nonavigation, nor use of the commodities that maybe imported by sea; no commodious building; noinstruments of moving and removing such thingsas require much force; no knowledge of the faceof the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters;no society; and which is worst of all, continualfear, and danger of violent death; and the life ofman, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.It may seem strange to some man, that has notwell weighed these things; that Nature should thusdissociate and render men apt to invade anddestroy one another: and he may therefore, nottrusting to this inference, made from the passions,desire perhaps to have the same confirmed byexperience. Let him therefore consider withhimself: when taking a journey, he arms himselfand seeks to go well accompanied; when going tosleep, he locks his doors; when even in his househe locks his chests; and this when he knows therebe laws and public officers, armed, to revenge allinjuries shall be done him; what opinion he has ofhis fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of hisfellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and ofhis children, and servants, when he locks hischests. Does he not there as much accusemankind by his actions as I do by my words? Butneither of us accuse man’s nature in it. Thedesires, and other passions of man, are inthemselves no sin. No more are the actions thatproceed from those passions till they know a lawthat forbids them; which till laws be made theycannot know, nor can any law be made till theyhave agreed upon the person that shall make it.It may peradventure be thought, there wasnever such a time nor condition of war as this; andI believe it was never generally so, over all theworld: but there are many places where they liveso now. For the savage people in many places ofAmerica, except the government of small families,the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust,have no government at all, and live at this day inthat brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever,it may be perceived what manner of life therewould be, where there were no common power tofear, by the manner of life which men that haveformerly lived under a peaceful government use todegenerate into a civil war.But though there had never been any timewherein particular men were in a condition of warone against another, yet in all times kings andpersons of sovereign authority, because of theirindependency, are in continual jealousies, and inthe state and posture of gladiators, having theirweapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on oneanother; that is, their forts, garrisons, and gunsupon the frontiers of their kingdoms, andcontinual spies upon their neighbours, which is aposture of war. But because they uphold therebythe industry of their subjects, there does notfollow from it that misery which accompanies theliberty of particular men.To this war of every man, this also isconsequent; that nothing can be unjust. Thenotions of right and wrong, justice and injustice,have there no place. Where there is no commonpower, there is no law: where no law, no injustice.Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinalvirtues. Justice, and injustice are none of thefaculties neither of the body, or mind. If theywere, they might be in a man that were alone inthe world, as well as his senses, and passions.They are qualities, that relate to men in society,not in solitude. It is consequent also to the samecondition, that there be no propriety, no dominion,no mine and thine distinct; but only that to beevery man’s that he can get; and for so long, as hecan keep it. And thus much for the ill condition,which man by mere nature is actually placed in;though with a possibility to come out of it,consisting partly in the passions, partly in hisreason.The passions that incline men to peace, arefear of death; desire of such things as arenecessary to commodious living; and a hope bytheir industry to obtain them. And reasonsuggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon12

which men may be drawn to agreement. Thesearticles, are they, which otherwise are called theLaws of Nature, whereof I shall speak moreparticularly in the two following chapters.Chapter XIVOf the First and Second Natural Laws,and of ContractsThe RIGHT OF NATURE, which writerscommonly call jus naturale, is the liberty eachman hath, to use his own power, as he willhimself, for the preservation of his own nature;that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, ofdoing any thing, which in his own judgement andreason, he shall conceive to be the aptest meansthereunto.By LIBERTY is understood, according to theproper signification of the word, the absence ofexternal impediments; which impediments mayoft take away part of a man’s power to do what hewould, but cannot hinder him from using thepower left him according as his judgement andreason shall dictate to him.A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is aprecept or general rule, found out by reason, bywhich a man is forbidden to do that, which isdestructive of his life, or taketh away the means ofpreserving the same; and to omit that, by which hethinketh it may be best preserved. For thoughthey that speak of this subject, use to confoundjus, and lex, right and law: yet they ought to bedistinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth inliberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW,determinith, and bindeth to one of them: so thatlaw, and right, differ as much, as obligation andliberty; which in one and the same matter areincosistent.And because the condition of man, as hathbeen declared in the precedent chapter, is acondition of war of every one against every one:in which case every one is governed by his ownreason; and there is nothing he can make use of,that may not be a help unto him, in preserving hislife against his enemies; it followeth, that in such acondition, every man has a right to every thing;even to another’s body. And therefore, as long asthis natural right of every man to every thingendureth, there can be no security to any man,how strong or wise soever he be, of living out thetime, which nature ordinarily alloweth men tolive. And consequently it is a precept, or general13rule of reason, that every man, ought to endeavourpeace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; andwhen he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, anduse, all helps, and advantages of war. The firstbranch of which rule, containeth the first andfundamental law of nature; which is, to seekpeace, and follow it. The second, the sum of theright of nature; which is, by all means we can , todefend ourselves.From this fundamental law of nature, bywhich men are commanded to endeavour peace, isderived this second law; that a man be willing,when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace,and defence of himself he shall think it necessary,to lay down this right to all things; and becontented with so much liberty against other menas he would allow other men against himself. Foras long as every man holdeth this right, of doingany thing he liketh; so long are all men in thecondition of war. But if other men will not laydown their right, as well as he; then there is noreason for any one, to divest himself of his: forthat were to expose himself to prey, which no manis bound to, rather than to dispose hiemself topeace. This is that law of the Gospel; whatsoeveryou require that othesr should do to you, that doye to them. And that law of all men, quod tibi fierinon vis, alteri ne feceris.To lay down a man’s right to any thing, is todivest himself of the liberty, of hindering anotherof the benefit of his own right to the same. For hethat renounceth, or passeth away his right, givethnot to any other man a right which he had notbefore; because there is nothing to which everyman had not right by nature: but only standeth outof his way, that he may enjoy his own originalright, without hindrance from him; not withouthindrance from another. So that the effect whichredoundeth to one man, by another man’s defectof right, is but so much diminution ofimpediments to the use of his own right original.Right is laid aside, either by simplyrenouncing it, or by transferring it to another. Bysimply RENOUNCING, when he cares not towhom the benefit thereof redoundeth. ByTRANSFERRING, when he intendeth to benefitthereof to some certain person or persons. Andwhen a man hath in either manner abandoned orgranted away his right, then is he said to beOBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those towhom such right is granted, or abandoned, fromthe benefit of it: and that he ought, and it isDUTY, not to make void that voluntary act of hisown: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, andINJURY, as being sine jure; the right being beforerenounced or transferred. So that injury or

injustice, in the controversies of the world, issomewhat like to that which in the disputations ofscholars is called absurdity. For as it is therecalled an absurdity to contradict what onemaintained in the beginning; so in the world it iscalled injustice, and injury voluntarily to undo thatwhich from the beginning he had voluntarily done.The way by which a man either simply renouncethor transferreth his right is a declaration, orsignification, by some voluntary and sufficientsign, or signs, that he doth so reounce or transfer,or hath so renounced or transferred the same, tohim that accepteth it. And these signs are eitherwords only, or actions only; or, as it happenethmost often, both words and actions. And the sameare the BONDS, by which men are bound andobliged: bonds that have their strength, not fromtheir own nature (for nothing is more easilybroken than a man’s word), but from fear of someevil consequence upon the rupture.Whensoever a man transferreth his right, orrenounceth it, it is either in consideration of someright reciprocally transferred to himself, or forsome other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is avoluntary act: and of voluntary acts of every man,the object is some good to himself. And thereforethere be some rights which no man can beunderstood by any words, or other signs, to haveabandoned or transferred. As first a man cannotlay down the right of resisting them that assaulthim by force to take away his life, because hecannot be understood to aim thereby at any goodto himself. The same may be said of wounds, andchains, and imprisonment, both because there isno benefit consequent to such patience, as there isto the patience of suffering another to be woundedor imprisoned, as also because a man cannot tellwhen he seeth men proceed against him byviolence whether they intend his death or not.And lastly the motive and end for which thisrenouncing and transferring of right is introducedis nothing else but the security of a man’s person,in his life, and in the means of so preserving lifeas not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man bywords, or other signs, seem to despoil himself ofthe end for which those signs were intended, he isnot to be understood as if he meant it, or that itwas his will, but that he was ignorant of how suchwords and actions were to be interpreted.The mutual transferring of right is that whichmen call CONTRACT.There is difference between transferring ofright to the thing, and transferring or tradition, thatis, delivery of the thing itself. For the thing maybe delivered together with the translation of theright, as in buying and selling with ready money,or exchange of goods or lands, and it may bedelivered some time after. Again, one of thecontractors may deliver the thing contracted for onhis part, and leave the other to perform his part atsome determinate time after, and in the meantimebe trusted; and then the contract on his part iscalled PACT, or COVENANT: or both parts maycontract now to perform hereafter, in which casehe that is to perform in time to come, beingtrusted, his performance is called keeping ofpromise, or faith, and the failing of performance,if it be voluntary, violation of faith.When transferring of right is not mutual, butone of the parties transferreth in hope to gainthereby friendship or service from another, orfrom his friends; or in hope to gain the reputationof charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mindfrom the pain of compassion; or in hope of rewardin heaven; this is not contract, but GIFT, FREEGIFT, GRACE: which words signify one and thesame thing. . . .If a covenant be made, wherein neither of theparties perform presently, but trust one another; inthe condition of mere nature, which is a conditionof war of every man against every man, upon anyreasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be acommon power set over them both, with right andforce sufficient to compel performance, it is notvoid. For he that performeth first, has noassurance the other will perform after; because thebonds of words are too weak to bridle men’sambition, avarice, anger, and other passions,without the fear of some coercive power; which inthe condition of mere nature, where all men areequal, and judges of the justness of their ownfears, cannot possibly be supposed. And thereforehe which performeth first, does but betray himselfto his enemy; contrary to the right, he can neverabandon, of defending his life, and means ofliving.But in a civil estate, where there is a powerset up to constrain those that would otherwiseviolate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable;and for that cause, he which by the covenant is toperform first, is obliged so to do. . . .The force of words, being, as I have formerlynoted, too weak to hold men to the performance oftheir covenants; there are in man’s nature, but twoimaginable helps to strengthen it. And those areeither a fear of the consequence of breaking theirword; or a glory, or pride in appearing not to needto break it. This latter is a generosity too rarelyfound to be presumed on, especially in thepursuers of wealth, command, or sensualpleasures, which are the greatest part of mankind.The passion to be reckoned upon, is fear. . . .14

Chapter XVIIChapter XVOf Other Laws of NatureFrom that law of nature, by which we are obligedto transfer to another, such rights, as beingretained, hinder the peace of mankind, therefolloweth a third; which is this, that men performtheir covenants made: without which, covenantsare in vain, and but empty words; and the right ofall men to all things remaining, we are still in thecondition of war.And in this law of nature, consisteth thefountain and original of JUSTICE. For where nocovenant hath preceded, there hath no right beentransferred, and every man has right to everything; and consequently, no action can be unjust.But when a covenant is made, then to break it isunjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is noother than the not performance of covenant. Andwhosoever is not unjust, is just.But because covenants of mutual trust, wherethere is a fear of not performance on either part, ashath been said in the former chapter, are invalid;though the original of justice be the making ofcovenants: yet injustice actually there can be none,till the cause of such fear be taken away; which,while men are in the natural condition of war,cannot be done. Therefore before the names ofjust, and unjust can have place, there must besome coercive power, to compel men equally tothe performance of their covenants, by the terrorof some punishment, greater than the benefit theyexpect by the breach of their covenant; and tomake good that propriety, which by mutualcontract men acquire, in recompense of theuniversal right they abandon: and such powerthere is none before the erection of acommonwealth. And this is also to be gatheredout of the ordinary definition of justice in theSchools: for they say, that justice is the constantwill of giving to every man his own. Andtherefore where there is no own, that is nopropriety, all men having right to all things:therefore where there is no commonwealth, therenothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice,consisteth in keeping of valid covenants: but thevalidity of covenants begins not but with theconstitution of a civil power, sufficient to compelmen to keep them: and then it is also that proprietybegins. . .15Of the Causes, Generation,And Definition of a CommonwealthThe final cause, end, or design of men, whonaturally love liberty, and dominion over others,in the introduction of that restraint uponthemselves, in which we see them live incommonwealths, is the foresight of their ownpreservation, and of a more contented life thereby;that is to say, of getting themselves out from thatmiserable condition of war, which is necessarilyconsequent, as hath been shown in Chapter XIII,to the natural passions of men, when there is novisible power to keep them in awe, and tie themby fear of punishment to the performance of theircovenants, and observation of those laws of natureset down in fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.For the laws of nature, as justice, equity,modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others, aswe would be done to, of themselves, without theterror of some power, to cause them to beobserved, are contrary to our natural passions, thatcarry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.And covenants, without the sword, are but words,and of no strength to secure a man at all.Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature,which every one hath then kept, when he has thewill to keep them, when he can do it safely, ifthere be no power erected, or not great enough forour security; every man will, and may lawfullyrely on his own strength and art, for cautionagainst all other men. And in all places, wheremen have lived by small families, to rob and spoilone another, has been a trade, and so far frombeing reputed against the law of nature, that thegreater spoils they gained, the greater was theirhonour; and men observed no other laws therein,but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain fromcruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instrumentsof husbandry. And as small families did then; sonow do cities and kingdoms which are but greaterfamilies, for their own security, enlarge theirdominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fearof invasion, or assistance that may be given toinvaders, and endeavour as much as they can, tosubdue, or weaken their neighbours, by openforce, and secret arts, for want of other caution,justly; and are remembered for it in after ages withhonour.Nor is it the joining together of a smallnumber of men, that gives them this security;because in small numbers, small actions on the

one side or the other, make the advantage ofstrength so great, as is sufficient to carry thevictory; and therefore gives encouragement to aninvasion. The multitude sufficient to confide infor our security, is not determined by any certainnumber, but by comparison with the enemy wefear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of theenemy is not of so visible and conspicuousmoment, to determine the event of war, as tomove him to attempt.And be there never so great a multitude; yet iftheir actions be directed according to theirparticular judgments, and particular appetites, theycan expect thereby no defence, nor protection,neither against a common enemy, nor against theinjuries of one another. For being distracted inopinions concerning the best use and applicationof their strength, they do not help but hinder oneanother; and reduce their strength by mutualopposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, notonly subdued by a very few that agree together;but also when there is no common enemy, theymake war upon each other, for their particularinterests. For if we could

centuries. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) has been chosen for inclusion in your reader for his contributions to our understanding of the nature of civil society, natural rights, and natural laws. Hobbes’ greatest work, Leviathan (1651) is a carefully argued defense of the theory of political absolutism. This theory should not be confused