Does Deregulation Change Economic Behavior Of Firms? A .

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Does Deregulation Change Economic Behavior of Firms?A Latent Class ApproachSubal C. KumbhakarDepartment of EconomicsState University of New YorkBinghamton, NY 13902, USA.Phone: (607) 777 4762, Fax: (607) 777 2681E-mail: kkar@binghamton.eduandEfthymios G. TsionasDepartment of EconomicsAthens University of Economics and Business76 Patission Street, 104 34 Athens, Greece.Phone: (301) 0820 3388, Fax: (301) 0820 3310E-mail: tsionas@aueb.grAbstractCost minimization and profit maximization behavioral assumptions are most widely used inmicroeconomic theory to analyze firm behavior. However, in practice researchers do not knowwhether every firm in the sample maximizes profit or minimizes cost. In this paper we addressthis problem via a latent class modeling approach in which we first consider the costminimization problem (first class) and then the profit maximization problem (second class). Thetwo problems are then mixed and the probabilities of class membership are made functions ofcovariates. This approach does not require researchers to know which firms maximize profit andwhich ones minimize cost. On the contrary, it helps us to determine not only which firms behavelike profit maximizers but also why and what differentiates them from firms that failed tomaximize profit. The new technique is illustrated using a panel data for the US airlines. Theempirical findings suggest that very few airlines maximize profit consistently (if at all) and thatderegulation had a positive impact on the chances of behaving like profit maximizers, althoughvery few airlines continue to maximize profit even after the deregulation.JEL Classification No.: C51, L93, L2

1. IntroductionEstimation of the production technology using dual cost and profit functions (McFadden,1978; Chambers, 1988) is not new. The dual cost and profit function formulations explicitlyassume that producers either minimize cost or maximize profit. In doing so these dual modelsclearly state which variables (that is, whether only inputs or both inputs and outputs) areendogenous (choice) and which are exogenous to the producers. This is in contrast to the primalapproach (production/distance function) in which the model doesn’t take the input (output)choice decisions explicitly into account.In practice, researchers using a dual approach have to decide whether the cost or the profitfunction should be used. Most often the decision is in favor of a cost function without muchjustification from either theoretical or empirical viewpoints.1 The main difference between thecost and profit function is that output is treated as exogenous in the cost function while in theprofit function an additional condition for optimal output choice is included. Thus, instead ofusing a profit function explicitly one can use a cost function along with the optimal outputdecision rule as an additional equation. The advantage of doing this is that one can testeconometrically whether the data support cost minimization or profit maximization behavior(Schankerman and Nadiri, 1986; Kulatilaka, 1985). In spite of this, applied researchers arbitrarilydecide using either a cost or a profit function to estimate the underlying production technology.Following the methodology developed by Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) in the contextof testing whether firms are in long-run equilibrium, one may formally test whether theproducers in the given sample are cost minimizers or profit maximizers. Based on the test results,for example, one will be using either a cost or a profit function formulation. This implictlyassumes that all producers in the sample behave in the same way. In reality, firms in a particularindustry, although using the same technology, may differ in terms of their behavior. Forexample, some producers might minimize cost because of high adjustment cost (i.e., it may notbe optimal for such producers to adjust their outputs to the profit maximizing level), while forothers it might be optimal to maximize profit. Again a producer might be minimizing cost for1 For example, in banking applications, Mester (1993) and Grifell and Lovell (1997) grouped banks into private and savings banks; Kolari andZardkoohi (1995) estimated separate costs functions for banks grouped in terms of their output mix.1

some time periods and then switch to profit maximizing behavior and vice versa, depending onadjustment cost associated with outputs. In such a case estimating a single cost (profit) functionassuming that all the producers behave in the same manner will not be appropriate. That is, byimposing cost minimization behavior on producers who are profit maxizers and vice versa, theestimate of the underlying technology may be biased. Consequently, features of the technologysuch as returns to scale, elasticities, technical change, etc., estimated using the wrong technologywill be wrong.If one knows which producers are cost minimizers and which are maximizing profit, thenone can split the sample into two classes. A cost function is estimated using the sampleobservations in the first class, and a profit function approach is used for the producers in thesecond class. This procedure is not efficient because the above approach doesn’t take intoaccount the fact that the underlying technology is exactly the same for all producers. The otherpractical problem is that no one knows before hand which producers are cost minimizers andwhich are profit maximizers. Consequently, this approach cannot be used in practice.To exploit the information in the data more efficiently and avoid biases resulting frommisspecifying behavioral objectives of firms in the absence of any a priori classification rule, wepropose using a Latent Class Model2 (hereafter LCM). In this model both the technology and theprobability of a particular class membership (cost minimization, profit maximization, etc.) areestimated simultaneously. By doing so we assume that every producer has a probability of beingin either group. Thus all the observations in the sample are used to estimate the underlyingtechnology (that is the same for all) and the probability of their class membership. The advantageof the LCM is that it is not necessary to impose a priori criterion to identify which producers arein what class. Furthermore, the LCM approach is flexible enough to accommodate switchingbehavior on the part of a producer when panel data is available. Moreover, we can formallyexamine whether some exogenous factors are responsible for the presence or absence of profitmaximizing (cost minimizing) behavior by making the probabilities functions of exogenousvariables. When panel data is available, we do not need to assume that producers behave like2 See Greene (2002) for a survey of latent class models.2

profit maximizers all the time, so we can accommodate switching behavior, and determine whenthey behaved like profit maximizers and when they acted as cost minimizers.The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the cost and profitsystems, the Hausman type (viz., the Shankerman-Nadiri) test for cost minimization and profitmaximization behavior, and the LCM/mixture model. Data and results are discussed in Section 3.The final section summarizes the major findings of the paper.2. The model2.1 The model with cost minimizing behaviorHere we consider the standard cost function approach3 that is based on the assumptionthat producers minimize cost, given output and input prices. In this approach one specifies a costfunction and derives the cost share equations (input demand functions) using Shephard’s lemma.Usually a translog cost function is chosen to represent the underlying production technology. Thecorresponding cost system (Christensen and Greene, 1976) is then written asln Ci ln C (ln pi , ln yi ) v1iS1i S1 (ln pi , ln yi ) v2i(1)MS M 1,i S M 1 (ln pi , ln yi ) vMiwhere ln Ci is the log of expenditure, S1i ,., S M 1,i denote the M 1 cost shares4, pi is the M 1vector of input prices, yi is the Q 1 vector of outputs, and vi [v1i ,., vMi ]′ represents the errorterms. The subscript i ( i 1,., N ) indicates producers/firms. The above cost system can beestimated using either the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique or the maximum3 Beard, Caudill and Gropper (1991, 1997) considered mixing cost functions to study differences in technology across regimes. They assumedcost minimizing behavior for all observations but allowed the technology to differ across regimes. See also, Caudill (2003), Orea and Kumbhakar(2002) for a stochastic cost frontier application.4 One cost share is dropped to avoid the singularity problem.3

likelihood (ML) method for which the error vector is assumed to be multivariate normal. That is,vi IN M (0 M , Ω) where Ω is the M M covariance matrix. The joint density of the cost systemin (1) can then be written as(f Z i ( Z i ) (2π ) M / 2 det Ω 1)1/ 2 exp( 12 vi′ (Zi ;θ )Ω 1vi (Zi ;θ ))(2)where Z i [ln Ci , S1i ,., S M 1,i ]′ , and′vi ( Z i ;θ ) [ln Ci ln C (ln pi , ln yi ), S1i S1 (ln pi , ln yi ), ., S M 1,i S M 1 (ln pi , ln yi )] .The maximization with respect to Ω 1 can be performed analytically, and substituting its valueinto (2) yields the following concentrated log-likelihood functionNln LC (θ ; Z ) N2 ln[det( N 1 vi ( Z i ;θ )vi ( Z i ;θ )′)](3)i 1which can be maximized to obtain ML estimates of the parameters in the cost system.2.2 The model with profit maximizing behaviorIn the previous section we assumed that producers face exogenously given output andinput prices in allocating their inputs to minimize cost. While such an objective is appropriate insome environments, it might be argued that for many producers the ultimate goal is to maximizeprofit. In such a situation the producers face exogenously given input and output prices(especially when input and output markets are competitive) in their pursuit of allocating inputsand outputs so as to maximize profit. Thus, there is an additional issue of choosing outputs aftercost minimizing inputs are chosen. The problem is to find the profit maximizing outputquantities. The optimization problem now adds Q additional choice variables – the optimumvalues of which are to be derived from the following Q additional conditions, viz., q j C / y j( j 1,., Q ) where qj is the price of output yj. These conditions (first-order conditions for profitmaximization) state that output allocation is optimal when output price equals marginal cost.These equations can be rewritten, in stochastic form, as4

ln y ji ln Ci ln q ji ln (ey ji (ln pi , ln yi ) ) vM j ,i , j 1,., Q , i 1,., Nwhere ey ji (ln pi , ln yi ) ln C (ln pi , ln yi ) ln y ji(4)is the output elasticity. Under the behavioralassumption of profit maximization, these additional conditions in (4) are to be appended to thecost system in (1) so that we have a complete system of M Q equations for M Qendogenous (choice) variables ( M inputs5 and Q outputs). Another difference with the costsystem in (1) is that the present system for a profit maximizing model consisting of (1) and (4)can no longer be estimated using the SUR technique. This is because the endogenous variables(especially outputs) appear on both sides of the equations in (1) and (4). The endogenousvariables of the profit system in vector form isΞ i [ln Ci , Si′, yi′]′where Si [ S1i ,., S M 1,i ]′ , and yi [ y1i ,., yQi ]′ so we have M Q endogenous variables. Letvi [v1i ,., vM Q ,i ]′ IN M Q (0 M Q , Σ ) where Σ is an ( M Q) ( M Q) covariance matrix.Under the assumption of profit maximization, we have a nonlinear simultaneous equation modelthat can be written in the formf (Ξ i , Ψi ;θ ) vi , i 1,., Nwhere Ψi represents the vector of predetermined variables (prices, and possibly other quasi-fixedfactors or shift variables) and θ Θ R k is the parameter vector. The above notation isappropria

Subal C. Kumbhakar Department of Economics State University of New York Binghamton, NY 13902, USA. Phone: (607) 777 4762, Fax: (607) 777 2681 E-mail: kkar@binghamton.edu and Efthymios G. Tsionas Department of Economics Athens University of Economics and Business 76 Patission Street, 104 34 Athens, Greece. Phone: (301) 0820 3388, Fax: (301) 0820 .

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