New Agra Reports Offer Little Evidence To Justify Continued Donor Support
NEW AGRA REPORTS OFFERLITTLE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFYCONTINUED DONOR SUPPORTTIMOTHY A . WISESenior Advisor, IATPTimothy A. Wise is a senior advisor atthe Institute for Agriculture and TradePolicy (IATP) and leads IATP’s workon The Future of Food. He wrote thisanalysis of two recent reports fromthe Alliance for a Green Revolutionin Africa (AGRA), continuing hisdocumentation of AGRA’s failureto offer evidence that it has madesubstantial progress toward its goalsof doubling yields and incomesand halving food security by 2020for 30 million small-scale farminghouseholds. His research for lastyear’s report, “False Promises,”found that AGRA was failing to meetthose goals.The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa(AGRA) has been under fire over the last yearafter our research revealed that the billiondollar agency had made little progress towardits stated goals of doubling yields and incomesfor 30 million small-scale farming householdswhile halving food insecurity. Since the publication of that research in July 2020, as anacademic working paper and a related report,False Promises, AGRA has failed to provideevidence to refute our findings, withholdingoutcome monitoring reports after requests byAfrican organizations.Many hoped AGRA’s 2020 AnnualReport, published July 12 with acompanion report on “EmergingResults 2017-21,” would finally offersome evidence of its impacts. Afterreviewing the 66-page annual reportand the 37-page companion document,I can report that AGRA provides somedata but no convincing evidence ofprogress toward these three toplinegoals. The document confines itselflargely to reporting not on its 15 yearsof work but its most recent 2017-2021strategic plan. The evidence base for the reporting is unclear but it is undoubtedly thin; AGRA has published only one set of Outcome Monitoring reports,based on 2019 surveys.The lack of accountability to its goals is particularly troubling for two reasons.First, the original endpoint for achieving them was 2020, which was thenextended to 2021. This leaves African governments and farmers as well asAGRA’s donors — most notably the Gates Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), UK Agency forInternational Development (UKAID) and the German development agencyBMZ — with no compelling evidence of AGRA’s impacts.iatp.org
Second, AGRA is now formulating its new strategic plan;it has been drafted and approved by the Board of Directors and is awaiting an implementation plan. That planwill require new funding commitments, and anonymoussources indicate that AGRA will seek another 1 billion infunding through 2030. AGRA’s failure to provide evidenceof progress means donors will be asked to continue theirsupport without any assurance that such aid has beeneffective. As I wrote earlier this month, they will be askedto “throw good money after bad.”I was asked by the U.S. Right to Know (USRTK), atransparency organization that has been tracking thiscontroversy, to review AGRA’s 2020 Annual Report andcompanion document to assess whether it provides thekinds of evidence that have been lacking to date. Beloware my findings, which can be summarized as follows: AGRA provides no evidence of its effectiveness inraising yields, incomes and food security since itsfounding in 2006; in fact, it fails to offer any information about its first 10 years of work, reporting asif the initiative just started in 2017. AGRA does report on yields, incomes and foodsecurity, but the data comes from a mix of sources,including “rapid assessments” in an indeterminatenumber of countries with an indeterminate numberof farmers. As such, the data lacks validity. The data presentation is misleading, clearly intendedto cherry-pick success stories in selected countriesand crops without even pretending to put suchoutcomes in a larger context. Claimed improvements in food security suffer fromthese same deficiencies. The progress flies in theface of hunger estimates from a recent FAO report,released on the same day AGRA published its annualreport. The FAO reported a jump of 44 millionundernourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa to analarming 264 million. The new AGRA documents aredisturbingly tone-deaf about the dire and worseningconditions for poor Africans.reconsider their continued support for such a poorlyrun, unaccountable and ineffective organization.VAGUE DATA FROMUNDOCUMENTED SOURCESThe Annual Report is the fourteenth since AGRA wasinitiated by the Gates Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation in 2006 and all share this same problem of vaguedata and undocumented sources. This year’s report, titled“Nourishing Change Across African Agriculture,” focuseson the organization’s current 2017-21 strategic plan,which AGRA Board Chair H.E. Hailemariam Dessalegn(former Prime Minister of Ethiopia) characterizes as “anintegrated delivery model to catalyze agricultural transformation.” AGRA’s goal is to catalyze private sector andgovernment capacities through public-private partnerships to improve the delivery of commercial seeds, fertilizers and other inputs and achieve the kind of productivityrevolution AGRA promises.As such, AGRA reports more on “transformationprocesses” than it does on outcomes. For AGRA, manyof those processes are the outcomes: the increasingavailability of certified seeds, the rising number ofVillage-Based Assistants as private extension agents, therapid approval of policy reforms to speed the delivery ofcommercial seeds and fertilizers, the capital catalyzed byAGRA for small and medium scale agribusinesses. Thereis little attention to the outcomes for farmers beyond thenumbers of farmers “reached” by AGRA, with no clarityon the extent of those farmers’ engagement nor theimpacts on their farming. The companion document on“Emerging Trends” offers little more data or clarity.One brief presentation on page 10 of the Annual Report,shown on the next page, summarizes the 2017-21 impacton smallholder farmers. It illustrates many of the limitations of AGRA’s presentation of outcomes. The sources ofthe data are unclear, the number of farmers reached bywhat interventions is not disclosed, and the percentagesare chosen to overstate AGRA’s impacts. AGRA’s stated monitoring methodology is deeplyflawed, ensuring that future claims of progress will bebased on unreliable data collected on selected cropsover too short a time period to offer valid results.AGRA’s inability to account for its first 10 years ofwork renders the organization’s claims of impact anecdotal and impossible to verify. As such, donors should2IATP AND TIMOTHY A. WISE
2NUMBER OFFARMERS REACHEDNO POINT OF3 COMPARISON“REGIONALIMPACT?”1Source: AGRA 2020 Annual Report54PAINTING AROSY PICTURENUMBER OF FARMERS UNCLEARWhat is wrong with this picture from AGRA?1. “REGIONAL IMPACT?” The map shows AGRA’scurrent 11 priority countries and then the claimed“regional impact,” though rarely is any evidencepresented of such impact. In general AGRA assumesthat if commercial seeds and fertilizers are morewidely available this will spill over into regionaleconomies. A more accurate map of AGRA’s trueareas of influence would likely be small blotcheswithin the borders of its 11 focus countries.2. NUMBER OF FARMERS REACHED: The claimof 10.1 million farmers reached directly by AGRAis not documented and fails to identify how theyengaged with AGRA. Some may have attended atraining, others perhaps sold to an AGRA-supportedbuyer, others simply had easier access to commercial seeds and fertilizers, and they are considered“beneficiaries” even if they did not buy any. AGRAshould disclose how many farmers were reached bywhat AGRA intervention.3. NO POINT OF COMPARISON: The nextfour categories — technology adoption, seed use(“replacing open-pollinated varieties” with commercial hybrids), access to credit and producing morethan a subsistence — offer percentages with nothingto compare them to. Is this an improvement overtime? How much of an improvement? Over how longa period? We do not know.4. NUMBER OF FARMERS UNCLEAR: Nor dowe know how many farmers are represented by thesepercentages. The presentation implies that those arepercentages of the 10.1 million farmers reached, butthat is unlikely to be true and we do not know what is.5. PAINTING A ROSY PICTURE: The last figurein the graphic is particularly misleading, suggestingthat two-thirds of farmers (the 10.1 million?) earnedhigher incomes in 2020 than they did in 2017 fromselling surplus crops, presumably the product ofhigher yields from AGRA inputs. From their owndata, it would be more accurate to say that nearlytwo-thirds of farmers saw little or no income growth.Consider:a. Later in the report AGRA states that “60% offarmers reached by AGRA have adopted newfarming practices.” (page 15) This contradicts the 76% figure in the graphic above. Itmeans that 40% have not adopted, perhaps atestament to the technology being expensiveand unproductive;NEW AGRA REPORTS OFFER LITTLE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED DONOR SUPPORT3
b. AGRA reports that “60% of farmers withsurplus had higher incomes; over 70% hadsignificant income growth, by 20% to over80% vs. 2017.” (page 15) Again, the pictureis far less rosy. We do not know how manyfarmers they are counting, perhaps the 87%cited in the earlier graphic. If so, 13% did noteven produce a surplus;1. AGRA does not identify the number of farmersrepresented.2. AGRA does not offer any characterization of broaderyield trends beyond the selected crops, an important point. My research showed better results forsupported crops like maize and terrible results forcrops not favored by AGRA or government inputsubsidy schemes. (For example, across all AGRAcountries millet yields declined 21%.)c. and only 60% of those with surpluses hadhigher incomes, so just 52% (60% of 87) offarmers — barely half — saw higher incomes;3. AGRA does not identify the time period of the yieldgrowth, presumably since 2017.4. The figures certainly do not represent nationaltrends. Consider the figures for these same cropsand countries in our well-documented nationallevel data from FAO from a baseline of 2004-6 to anendpoint of 2016-18. I also include my more comprehensive Staple Yield Index which captures a range ofstaple crops in each country.d. Only 70% of those saw significant increases,so only 36% of all farmers (70% of 52) sawsignificantly higher incomes;e. Put another way, 64% of farmers saw zero oronly small income gains.The fact that many farmers do not see any benefits isimportant. One of the findings in the case study researchfor the False Promises report was that some farmers arebuying inputs at least partially on credit, and some arefinding themselves in debt when yields fail to rise enough tocover input costs. This is a problemthat is endemic to Green Revolutionprograms, from India to Africa.In other words, these are not just cherry-picked figures.Those cherries were picked after an indeterminategrowth period and from orchards that may have been veryRISING CROP YIELDS?PICKING CHERRIESOne common fallacy in datapresentation is to offer selectedsuccess stories (“cherry-picking”)without revealing the larger trendsor documenting the sources of thedata or the time periods they cover.AGRA’s presentation on productivity increases exhibits all of thesefailures, with the clear intent topresent progress toward the goalof doubling yields for 30 millionfarmers. The graphic below is frompage 16, prefaced by the statement:“We can see evidence of higheryields across different countriesand crops.” Indeed, they showdifferent countries and crops andthey show yield increases. But:Source: AGRA 2020 Annual ReportMaizeNigeriaAGRAMali 57% 108%FAO 7%Wise stapleyield niaGhana 111% 180% 69% 170% 63% 15% 41%* 40% 56% 13% 22% 22% 39%*FAO pulses4IATP AND TIMOTHY A. WISE
Source: AGRA 2020 Annual Reportsmall, i.e., from a small number of farmers unrepresentative of national trends.Again, in yield growth AGRA presents unconvincing datathat it is approaching its goal of doubling productivity forthe majority of smallholder farmers in AGRA countries.For AGRA as a whole, our data stands unrefuted thatover a 12-year period staple yields grew only 18%, not thepromised 100%.UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIMSON FOOD SECURITYThe final goal against which AGRA fails to convincinglydocument progress is halving hunger. As we show in ourown research, across AGRA’s 13 countries there was a31% increase in the number of people considered severelyundernourished by the FAO over 12 years through 2018.That is a far cry from the promised 50% decrease. Now,after a year that saw dramatic hunger caused by COVID-19and its related economic impacts, we would not expect tosee much progress, though AGRA devoted considerableresources to COVID-19 relief, much to its credit.though it does not easily correlate with their goal of halvinghunger. Again, we do not know where this data comes from,nor how many countries or farmers it covers.What we do know is that such figures are wildly out of linewith national trends, documented most recently by FAOin its annual State of Food Insecurity report. At a globallevel, those figures are alarming, showing an increase ofas much as 25% in the number of undernourished to 811million people, an increase of up to 165 million in one year.It is the fifth straight year in which the numbers rose.Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole saw 264 million chronicallyundernourished people, a jump of 44 million just since 2019.FAO reports undernourishment by country as a three-yearaverage, so the published data on AGRA countries do notreveal separate 2020 impacts. The 2018-20 average for allAGRA countries remained largely unchanged from the2016-18 levels we calculated in last year’s report, with 128million residents in AGRA’s 13 focus countries (includingNiger and Zambia) suffering chronic and severe hunger.That remains a major failing for AGRA, which held out thegoal of halving food insecurity not just for the farmers itworked with but for a larger group of 20 countries.Using selective and poorly sourced data, AGRA reportsdramatic success since 2017. They report only on theunsourced 87% of farmers with a surplus in 2020, so wedo not know how many farmers they include. Using onecommon metric — the number of months a family’s foodproduction lasts — they report that 66% of those with asurplus saw an increase of at least four months in 2020compared to 2017. That would indeed be a positive outcome,NEW AGRA REPORTS OFFER LITTLE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED DONOR SUPPORT5
OTHER OBSERVATIONSmitigate the destructive effects of COVID-19, supportthat was surely needed in such a rapid-onset crisis.purchase the inputs AGRA is promoting. It is safeto say there would be very little technology adoption without subsidies. In this report, AGRA seemsto support “efficient subsidy systems” and claims ithas worked with governments to improve them, nolonger pretending to bite the hand that feeds theirGreen Revolution. AGRA frequently stresses its focus on “farming At one point in the report AGRA President AgnesBeyond the limited and misleading presentation related toAGRA’s topline goals, I can offer additional observations: To AGRA’s credit, it devoted 11 million to efforts tosystems,” acknowledging at one point that itinitially had too much of a “technology-focusedapproach.” (page 13) There is attention to language.For example: “Like any ecosystem, the parts of theagricultural sector must work in concert.” They areclearly referring to functioning markets, not functioning ecosystems. AGRA is very proud of its 32,000 Village-basedAssistants (VBAs), privately funded extension agentstrained to complement governments’ meager extension services. AGRA’s own mid-term evaluationwarned that this system was unsustainable since theVBAs would not continue to work when funding iswithdrawn and the government is not able to pickup the tab. There is a constant focus on hybrid maize seed, andeven the explicit intent to replace open-pollinatedvarieties. This combines with a focus on domesticproduction of hybrid seeds by local agribusinessfirms. In one illustrative story, Rwanda proclaims“self-sufficiency” — not in food, but in hybridmaize seed production. AGRA’s obsessive focus onreplacing farm-saved seed with commercial varieties, which must be purchased every year, is one ofits most objectionable activities. Much of AGRA’s work on “farming systems” involveslobbying national governments to change laws andregulations to allow easier entry and distribution ofcommercial seeds, fertilizers and other inputs. Oneof their advertised successes in the annual reportis to have “reduced the time required for the policyreform process by 50%.” (page 31) Many Africans seethis not as a measure of administrative efficiency butof lobbying muscle. AGRA has traditionally taken the position that itopposes government input-subsidy programs asmarket-distorting, even though such programsprovide direct financial support to farmers to6Kalibata claims AGRA has “touched in some way” 44million smallholder farmers in its lifetime. She offersno evidence for this, of course. But one of AGRA’scriticisms of our research is that it is unreasonableto use national-level data as an indicator of progress when AGRA is working with only a subset offarmers. Its target of 30 million farmers was alreadya substantial majority of smallholders in AGRA’s13 countries, according to the most comprehensiveacademic survey available. That is why we thoughtour methodology was justified. 44 million wouldrepresent an overwhelming majority, further validating our claim that national-level data is indeedindicative of AGRA’s progress.AGRA’S FLAWED MONITORINGMETHODOLOGYAs I pointed out in my analysis of AGRA’s OutcomesMonitoring reports, AGRA is now stating that it will relyon three years of such data, from 2019, early 2021 and2022, to evaluate its progress. This will not generate reliable data. Here is how they explain it on their website:“The first wave of the outcome surveys carried out in 2019has provided the first data point in systems assessmentsand household surveys. Due to the COVID-19 pandemicin 2020, the second data point planned for April 2020could not proceed. The next round was commissionedin November 2020, implemented through the first halfof 2021. The third and final wave of the outcome panelsurveys may be carried out through the first half of2022 depending on AGRA’s next strategy re-investmentdecisions, providing three data points to initially assessAGRA’s contribution through its programmes.”It is common in agricultural research to measure progressover time by using three-year averages for starting andending points. This is what I did in my AGRA research,using a baseline of 2004-6 for the pre-AGRA baselineand 2016-18 for the end point, based on the latest dataavailable. Climatic, agronomic and other variations canIATP AND TIMOTHY A. WISE
significantly affect outcomes data in any given year. AGRAis failing to account for this in its monitoring plan, whichis partly the result of AGRA having done a very poor jobmonitoring and evaluating its first 10 years of work. Itnow scrambles to assemble a quick progress report.Ironically, glowing proclamations about the originalGreen Revolution in India in the 1960s and 1970s sufferedfrom precisely this error of relying on a skewed baseline.The two years before the introduction of Green Revolution inputs were drought years with severe impacts onproduction. The rains returned as the Green Revolutiontechnology arrived. Production returned to near-normallevels, but they appeared to be miraculous in comparisonto two unusually unproductive years. In fact, when onecompares yield growth for wheat in the 10-year periodbefore the introduction of the Green Revolution with the10-year period after, yields grew faster before than theydid after. (Read more on this here.)AGRA’s four-year time period, 2019-22, is both too shortto measure progress and fails to account for seasonalvariability year-to-year. As such, the outcomes data theyare promising for 2022 will not produce reliable measuresof impact.The other telling flaw in AGRA’s outcome monitoringis that for farmer impact they are relying on householdsurveys of 1,000 AGRA beneficiary farmers growinga given crop, using the 2019 surveys as a baseline andcomparing survey data from 2021 and 2022. That meansAGRA is not monitoring progress among other farmersgrowing other crops. Of the 14 surveys reported in their2020 Outcome Monitoring reports, nine were for thesupported crops of maize (six) and rice (three). Anothertwo were for soybeans, with two for beans and one forcowpeas. This means:1. Over four years their monitoring will heavily favorsupported crops such as maize. Our research showedthat support for maize, especially government seedand fertilizer subsidies, was undermining other cropssuch as millet, which saw a 24% decline in productionand a 21% decline in yields in AGRA countries.2. Surveying only favored and supported crops willbias the monitoring results upward. Rwanda, forexample, tripled maize production and increasedyields 66%, but overall its staple yields languished,rising just 24% as traditional crops lost land andinvestment to maize. Most important, the numberof undernourished people jumped 40%. A survey ofRwandan maize farmers would be very misleadingon its own.AGRA’s goal was to double food crop productivity, not justproductivity in one or two crops.Given AGRA’s poor record of monitoring and evaluationsince its inception in 2006, it is ironic that one of AGRA’sclaims of impact in the area of “state capabilities” reads:“We also supported the development and improvementof nine national agricultural monitoring and evaluationsystems .” (page 57)FINANCIAL REPORTThe financial documentation in the annual report shows 93,703 in 2020 contributions with 52,728 in grants.Another 16,000 goes to other program costs. Overheadis a relatively high 27,135, 28% of total expenditures of 96,025. As a percentage of direct expenses (a commonway of assessing nonprofit overhead burdens), overhead isa very high 39% of direct expenses.As usual for AGRA, there is no breakdown of contributions by donor or even category of donor. Such information is not made public in its tax filings either. Its donorsare listed, in a manner of speaking, on the final page ofthe report. A page of logos present “Resource Partners,”a mixture of bilateral aid donors, private foundations,corporate donors and international agencies. Again, thelack of transparency is troubling and beneath professional standards for nonprofit organizations. We knowfrom our research that over AGRA’s lifetime the largestfunder by far is the Gates Foundation (about 650 millionof a roughly 1 billion budget), followed by the RockefellerFoundation, USAID and UKAID (contributing maybe 75- 120 million each), followed by German aid organization BMZ (perhaps 11 million in recent years). TheNetherlands and Norway’s NORAD are listed as donors aswell, but NORAD told the Alliance for Food Sovereigntyin Africa that it no longer supports AGRA. So, AGRA’sreport on who their donors are also seems to be incorrect.The Gates Foundation’s dominant role is of courseobscured by this presentation. This seems intentional.All questions I have directed to the foundation have beenreferred to AGRA, and in one in-person interview theprogram officer refused to discuss AGRA, saying that theorganization is not the foundation’s responsibility. AGRAalso commonly distances itself from BMGF, insisting thatAGRA is an “African institution” and even disputing thefact that AGRA was started by the Gates and RockefellerNEW AGRA REPORTS OFFER LITTLE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED DONOR SUPPORT7
foundations. One fingerprint in the Annual Report istelling: it shows that AGRA is registered as a nonprofitin Olympia, Washington, a short drive from BMGF headquarters in Seattle.Source: AGRA 2020 Annual ReportCONCLUSION: DONORSSHOULD DEMAND BETTERAGRA’s 2020 Annual Report and its companion “EmergingTrends” report provide no convincing evidence thatAGRA is making significant progress in its original goalsof doubling yields and incomes for 30 million small-scalefarm families while halving food insecurity by 2020. Thenew documents make an effort to assess progress on thesetopline goals, but the data sources are not disclosed andAGRA’s presentation is selective and misleading. AGRA’splan for monitoring progress for its 2017-21 strategy isdeeply flawed and guaranteed to provide a favorablepicture of AGRA’s impacts.AGRA’s donors should reconsider their support for suchan unsuccessful and unaccountable initiative. As AGRAprepares a drive to raise an additional 1 billion through2030, donors should do their own rigorous assessmentsof aid effectiveness. They should shift their funding toagroecology and other low-cost, low-input systems. Thesesystems have shown far better results, raising yields acrossa range of food crops, increasing productivity over time assoil fertility improves, raising incomes and reducing riskfor farmers by cutting input costs, and improving foodsecurity and nutrition from a diverse array of crops.AGRA’s continued failure to report accurately on progresstoward its goals, and its apparent failure to achieve them,represent a challenge to the upcoming U.N. Food SystemsSummit, led by AGRA President Agnes Kalibata. By manyaccounts, the summit is preparing to endorse a set ofbusiness-as-usual “innovations” rather than breakingwith floundering programs such as AGRA to explorepromising new strategies to achieve zero hunger by 2030.The new reports certainly fail to refute our findings inthe comprehensive review of AGRA’s progress toward itsgoals using national-level data: Yields for a basket of staple crops grew just 18% over12 years through 2018, far below the goal of doublingproductivity, a 100% increase. There was no sign of significant increases in farmerincomes thanks to rising yields and marketablesurpluses. Overall, poverty remained endemic inmost AGRA countries. The attention to favored crops such as maize,supported by government subsidies for the purchaseof Green Revolution inputs, resulted in a decline inthe land and resources devoted to key staples suchas millet, sorghum and sweet potato. This had negative impacts on soil fertility, as well as nutritionaldiversity. Hunger rose dramatically, with the number ofundernourished people increasing 31% across AGRAcountries, not decreasing 50% as promised by AGRA.8IATP AND TIMOTHY A. WISE
farmers they are counting, perhaps the 87% cited in the earlier graphic. If so, 13% did not even produce a surplus; c. and only 60% of those with surpluses had higher incomes, so just 52% (60% of 87) of farmers — barely half — saw higher incomes; d. Only 70% of those saw significant increases, so only 36% of all farmers (70% of 52) saw
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August 2009 Assessing the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa. . extensive review of literature on the green revolution, Africa’s agricultural development, AGRA . Table 2.0: Summary of AGRA’s Budget and Funding In USD mill
